[Skybird]

Another word from the press about the Puma, although probably from the chorus of those who are closer to the truth: the Neue Zürcher Zeitung writes:
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The breakdown tank: Eyes ahead into the Puma disaster

Germany affords the most expensive infantry fighting vehicle in the world. Time and again, the Puma breaks down because it is too complicated. This is also the fault of those who are now complaining to the defense industry: Politicians and Bundeswehr leadership.

Four days before the German Bundeswehr once again became a breakdown army on Dec. 16, General Björn Schulz was using slogans of perseverance. The commander of the tank troop school in Munster sat with soldiers and mused about the world's most expensive infantry fighting vehicle. The Puma, Schulz said, had its shortcomings. But they could be controlled. The tank is ready for action and war, he said, and everything will be fine. That's how the soldiers reported it.

The following day, three infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), three of the 18 that had begun final preparations for their deployment to the NATO Rapid Reaction Force (VJTF) in Lithuania from January, took part in an exercise at a firing range a few kilometers away. The company commander was sitting in one of the three Puma when suddenly a short circuit created an electric arc and fire broke out in the engine compartment. 24 hours later, the crews of the remaining two Puma also reported a defect. After a week of firing training, all 18 Puma were thus out of action.

The general's perseverance in Munster fits the pattern of the German army's handling of the Puma. Together with politicians and the armaments companies Rheinmetall and Kraus-Maffei Wegmann, it wanted to build the "Formula 1 car among infantry fighting vehicles" 20 years ago: light, fast, precise and well protected like no other. The result was a complicated, failure-prone, expensive vehicle. The version for the NATO task force cost 17 million euros.

The tank had to fit into the new Airbus

The story of the Puma symbolizes more than any other the errors of German arms procurement over the past three decades. It begins in December 1999, when the EU heads of state and government decided to build up a rapid reaction force by 2003. This was to include armored combat troops as "medium forces" that had to be deployable by air over a distance of at least one thousand kilometers.

At that time, the German government had to decide on two major armaments projects. The first was to buy a transport aircraft to replace the "Transall". This was the Airbus A400 M. Secondly, the Army needed a successor to the "Marder" infantry fighting vehicle, which was introduced in 1971. This was the Puma. The German government decided that there would only be a new infantry fighting vehicle if it could be transported on the A400 M. This meant that the maximum transport weight of the A400 M had to be exceeded. It thus made the maximum transport weight of the A400 M the decisive design feature for the new tank.

The Puma was not allowed to weigh more than the A400 M could transport: 31.4 tons. By comparison, the "Marder" 1A5 weighs 38 tons. There were even more specifications for the Puma, this time from the Bundeswehr: it had to be similarly enduring and agile to the "Leopard 2" main battle tank and be able to engage armored targets and targets behind cover. To do this, it needed a powerful engine and a large-caliber automatic cannon. It had to offer soldiers a high level of protection against mines, booby traps and bazooka shells. For this, it needed strong armor and a modern protection system. And finally, it had to be able to repel main battle tanks. For this, it needed a guided missile system.

On the edge of technical feasibility

The Puma was supposed to be an all-rounder. But the military specifications on the one hand and the weight limit on the other were tantamount to squaring the circle. Krauss-Maffei Wegmann and Rheinmetall wanted to build it anyway. They needed the order. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the German government had raked in the peace dividend and hardly ever awarded large orders to the armaments industry. Krauss-Maffei Wegmann and Rheinmetall announced their intention to deliver the first Puma within six years. This contradicted all experience in tank construction; the development of the "Marder," for example, had taken eleven years. It soon became apparent that they had promised too much. The Puma required numerous new and often highly complex solutions on the edge of what was technically feasible.

A new engine had to be developed that would be only half the size and half the weight of the "Leopard 2" but would be similarly powerful. It had to accelerate the vehicle, which weighed several tons, to 70 km/h within a short time. Further sophisticated assemblies were added. For example, a running gear with hydropneumatic suspension was developed that is decoupled from the hull. This ensures that the noise from the tracked undercarriage is no longer transmitted to the inside of the tank. This protects the soldiers' ears.

Weight also had to be saved on the turret. This is only possible thanks to thinner armor. However, this would have meant less protection for the commander and gunner who worked in the turret of the Puma's predecessor, the Marder. The Army considered this an unacceptable risk, which is why the commander and gunner were placed in the hull of the Puma. As a result, all the turret's functions, weapons and optics, had to be remotely controlled and monitored by numerous sensors.

A computer on chains

Therein lies one of the main problems. From the Puma's turret, 179 cables and wiring harnesses run into the interior via a slip ring. Electrical currents and signals from numerous sensors run along them, such as those of the targeting and observation devices in the turret and the directional drives for the turret and gun. Connected to a dozen computers, for whose software a million lines of program had to be written, these are thousands of potential sources of error. The Puma is a computer on chains, impossible for a classic tank mechanic to repair. Today, the Bundeswehr needs mechatronics engineers and IT experts to fix bugs and defects.

These people mostly do not work in the military. This is the next cause of the disastrous Bergen-Hohne firing exercise in mid-December. Most of the tanks failed because of problems with electronics and sensors. Specialists would have been needed to correct the defects. But they were not on site. This was not the first time this had happened. Time and again, soldiers complained that they couldn't fix many defects in the Puma without industry. Therefore, since the introduction of the tank in 2016, the question has been how it will survive in a tough and demanding battle. To date, the answer is: not at all.

The high level of automation makes the Puma vulnerable. Unlike in earlier tanks, there is no longer any manual emergency operation for important functions. In the event of failures in the onboard network, soldiers are left only with the hope of being able to leave the vehicle in time before it is hit. However, when the Puma functions faultlessly, soldiers report that it is unrivaled. No armored personnel carrier in the world is better protected and hits more accurately.

A disaster for the Bundeswehr

This is another reason why the total failure of Bergen-Hohne is a disaster for the German Army. But what good is the best tank on paper if it fails too often in practice? Army Inspector Alfons Mais had already declared weeks ago that he wanted to buy a wheeled tank instead of more Pumas, but this is not yet available. Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht (SPD) has put further modernization of the 350 Puma and the planned purchase of another 50 infantry fighting vehicles on hold. The industry, she said, must finally get to grips with the problems. Before that, there would be no more money, she said.

But the question is whether the causes of the Panzergrenadierkompanie's problems from Regen actually lay solely with the industry. Soldiers report, for example, that Panzergrenadier Battalion 33 from Luttmersen held a two-week exercise in Bergen-Hohne this year without significant failures of its 38 Puma. Members of the Bundestag told NZZ that "the Puma matter" was being hyped up by the Defense Ministry. The problems were not serious, they said, and only spare parts, tools and repair personnel were missing.

The total failure of the 18 tanks in Bergen-Hohne has now meant that the Puma will not be used in NATO's rapid reaction force for the time being. When German combat units leave for Lithuania in January, they will have the more than 50-year-old "Marder" infantry fighting vehicle with them. Meanwhile, the Puma is being repaired - and has not yet been transported once in an Airbus A400 M.
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To remind again: the tank does NOT fit into one Airbus A400M if configured for battle. The armour takes a second plane to transport it. Three tanks need three planes plus a fourth for their armour. Which also means: one single tank again needs two planes (one third of its maximum loading capacity).