[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, November 15, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. Sir Eyre Crowe states that the drafting of the resolution of November 11th concerning the status of Eastern Galicia does not seem to him to agree entirely with the decision which had been actually taken by the Council. He had understood that their decision was an absolutely final one and the Polish Delegates would be heard, not by the Council, but by the Commission.

M Clemenceau does not agree with Sir Eyre Crowe on that point; if his recollection is correct, the text of the resolution quite agreed with what they had decided. It was understood, however, that the hearing of the Polish Delegates would only be an act of courtesy on the part of the Council. Their declarations would have no influence on the Council’s decisions, and should not take more than one-half to three-quarters of an hour.

M de Saint Quentin stated that in accordance with the resolution of November 11th, the Secretary General had informed the Polish Delegation that Mr Patek would be heard by the Council as soon as he arrived in Paris, and had insisted on the extreme urgency presented by the question of Eastern Galicia.


2. The Council had before it the draft note to the Romanian Government, inserted in the minutes of November 13th.

M Berthelot reads the draft note.

Mr Polk asks whether it would not be advisable to refer, at the end of the third paragraph, to Sir George Clerk’s Mission at Bucharest.

M Berthelot says that, so as to take into account Mr Polk’s remark, which appears to him quite justified, one might insert at the end of the third paragraph the following phrase: “in order to show the importance which the Conference attached to obtaining the reply of Romania, it had even entrusted a special delegate, Sir George Clerk, to go to Bucharest.”

M Clemenceau states that in recognition of the good-will shown by General Coanda and Mr Antonescu in the interview he had with them two days previous, he proposed to omit in paragraph seven the words: “the time when Romania still had under arms an army of over four hundred thousand men.” He also suggested granting to Romania a period of eight days to make its answer known instead of six days which they had proposed to give them in their original draft.

Mr Polk suggests adding in Section 3 (on top of page 4) the following words: “under the conditions shown by the note from the Supreme Council, dated October 12th.”

Sir Eyre Crowe proposes a change of form in the second last paragraph of the draft which he thinks would read better as follows: “As far as the fixing of frontiers yet to be effected is concerned, Romania will thus, by its own conduct, forfeit all title to the support of the Powers, as well as the recognition of its rights by the Conference.”

S de Martino says that he finds himself in a rather embarrassing situation. He had received his instructions, but these were not quite clear. He was told on one hand, not to oppose the Allies in the question of sending the note to Romania, and on the other, not to subscribe to expressions which were too strong, and which would lend it a character of violence or of threat. As a matter of fact this draft threatened the Romanians with a diplomatic rupture. Under these circumstances he had asked Rome for new instructions which he hoped to receive that day. He would like to know if Mr. Polk had already received his instructions.

Mr Polk says he is ready to accept the draft which was then before them.

M Clemenceau says it is extremely important that they should vote that very day. The immediate dispatch of the note is necessary all the more because they are sure, according to the declarations made to him by the Romanian Delegates that their demands would be accepted.

S de Martino states he had also received the Romanian Delegates. The latter had come away with the very best impression of their interview with M Clemenceau and of the manner in which he had explained the situation to them. They had also told him that a misunderstanding had arisen between Sir George Clerk and Mr Diamandi on the question of the evacuation. The Romanians consider their retreat to the Theiss only as a first step towards the evacuation of Hungarian territory, and do not intend in any way to stop short on that river for a protracted period. They had also expressed themselves as ready to sign the Austrian Treaty. As for the rectifications of frontiers which were asked for by the Romanians, they were of very secondary importance, and concerned chiefly the Commissions of Delimitation on the spot. He wondered whether, taking into account the good-will which the Romanians seemed to show, they might not subdue some of the expressions which were used in the draft note under discussion.

M Clemenceau feels obliged to remark that he had read the draft note to General Coanda and Mr Antonescu. It therefore seems to him, under the circumstances, extremely unfortunate to change in the draft anything at all except the phrases concerning first, the Romanian forces still under arms at the time of the Armistice, and second, concerning the period within which they demanded an answer - a period which they had agreed to extend from six to eight days. He had himself let the Romanian Delegates hope for the granting of these two concessions. He does not think that they ought to make any further concessions, especially as General Coanda had already left for Bucharest to report on the situation with reference to the communication which he (M Clemenceau) had read to him.

S de Martino hopes his instructions would arrive in the course of that afternoon and that he could make known his final answer between 16:00 and 17:00. He feels certain, moreover, that he will receive authority to accept the note which was before them.

Mr Polk feels that a new delay in the dispatch of the note would be extremely unfortunate.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that the note should be sent as it had been read to the Romanian Delegates. S de Martino might let his Government know that there is, properly speaking, no threat towards Romania as they were virtually certain that the Romanians will accept their demands. Should the note not be sent immediately, the Council will be giving the Romanians the impression that the Allies are hesitating.

Mr Polk maintains that the Council has already used towards the Romanians language quite as severe.

S de Martino points out that the acceptance of the note by General Coanda and Mr Antonescu commit only themselves. The Council does not know for certain what will be the attitude at Bucharest.

M Berthelot remarks that the same thing had taken place concerning the Council’s note of November 7th. The Italian Minister at Bucharest, alleging that he had not received direct instructions from S Tittoni, had refused to join in the step taken in concert by his colleagues.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the British Delegation had received similar information from its representative at Bucharest.

S de Martino says that the Italian Delegation had, as a matter of fact, telegraphed to its representative at Bucharest to associate himself with his colleagues.

M Clemenceau proposes to dispatch the note to Romania immediately. If the Italian Delegate cannot accept that note, it would suffice to send a telegram to the Italian Representative at Bucharest advising him to abstain from joining his colleagues.

Sir Eyre Crowe asks what decision would be taken with regard to publishing the note.

M Clemenceau says he had promised in the course of his interview of November 13 with the Romanian Delegates to support in the Council the non-publication of the note. The Romanians had made a formal promise. He thought that they should take their good-will into account and not crush them under the blow of a publication, the effect of which in Romania would certainly be very serious.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks they are not sure that Mr Bratiano will appear as conciliatory as General Coanda.

M Clemenceau states that if Bucharest offers any difficulties the Council will then be free to publish the letter, and that, even without the toning down upon which they had decided that day. It should not be forgotten that General Coanda had answered for the King of Romania.

Sir Eyre Crowe says he is quite ready to associate himself with the views the President had just expressed. They ought, however, to take care that the Romanian Government should not take advantage of their silence to present the facts to Romanian public opinion in a false light.

S de Martino remarked that the telegram to which he had referred previously and which directed the Italian Minister at Bucharest to join in the step taken by his colleagues was dated November 10th, 00:47.

M. Berthelot says that as the note of the Allies was dated November 7th, the slight misunderstanding which had taken place was easily explained by the interval of three days which occurred between the note and the telegram.

(It is decided to adopt the draft note to the Roumanian Government.)

S de Martino makes the reservation that his final approval of the note will be made known in the course of the afternoon. If the instructions received by the Italian representative should not allow him to adopt the note, the Italian Minister at Bucharest will receive telegraphic instructions to abstain from associating himself with the step taken by his colleagues.

(It is further decided not to publish, for the present, the note addressed to the Romanian Government.)


3. Mr Polk reads the resolution adopted by the Supreme Council on July 5th on the subject of Colonel Haskell’s mission. He proposes to add after the word “Armenia” the words, “Georgia and Azerbaijan”. The Council had heard at the preceding meeting Colonel Colonel Haskell’s declarations. He simply wished to submit this proposal to the Council without insisting that it should be accepted.

Sir Eyre Crowe says he has submitted this question to his Government. He thinks he can already say that they would not object to the extension of Colonel Haskell’s mission for the organization of relief in Georgia and Azerbaijan. He would, however, call to the attention of the Council the fact that in the resolution which had just been read Colonel Haskell is entitled High Commissioner. He wishes to make his reservations on that title all the more so as he did not think that it corresponds with the functions with which Colonel Haskell has been entrusted.

Mr Polk says as the British are already represented in those regions, he proposes that Sir Eyre Crowe be good enough to submit a draft resolution at a later meeting.

S de Martino says that the Italians also have officers in the Caucasus. He will therefore consult his military experts, but he can already say that he is in favor of the American proposition.

(It was decided that Sir Eyre Crowe, after consultation with the competent experts, will put before the Council a draft resolution extending the powers already conferred upon Colonel Haskell for Armenia to include Georgia and Azerbaijan in matters concerning relief work.)


4. M Clemenceau says that it is advisable to take up as soon as possible the important questions which still remain to be decided by the Council. He wishes to ask whether they should not examine the list of questions on the agenda of the Council which had been drawn up by M Berthelot.


5. Sir Eyre Crowe wishes to call attention to the urgency of taking a decision concerning the provisioning of Vienna. Their information depicts the situation of the Austrian capital in a terrible light. To enable the Austrians to buy food, it seems necessary to grant them a loan. But he thinks the guarantee for this loan should be a charge upon the Reparations Fund. That is an important question which the Reparation Commission ought to deal with immediately.

M Clemenceau asks whether it does not rather concern a financial commission.

Mr Polk says the Reparation Commission is already acquainted with the question. Mr Rathbone had cabled Washington to explain the situation and to ask how far the American Government would consent to be committed.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that if immediate measures are not taken, it is to be feared that there will be from 300,000 to 400,000 dead that winter in the streets of Vienna. The Austrians realize the situation and are resorting to every possible means to get money. They are at the moment engaged in selling their art collections, pictures, jewels, etc, a procedure which is, as a matter of fact, contrary to the provisions of the Treaty.

M Berthelot says it is correct that the Austrians have tried to sell their “objets d’art”, but in fact they have not managed to sell anything with the exception perhaps of a few isolated objects. He had, moreover, seen Dr Benes, who had also depicted the situation at Vienna as tragic. He had stated that if the Powers were willing to help him, he would be in a position to send coal and food to Vienna.

M Clemenceau says that Dr Benes might be asked to discuss the question in agreement with the Reparation Commission.

(It is decided:

(1) To refer to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission for examination and report the problem of means to be adopted to ensure the provisioning of Vienna;

(2) That Dr Benes be asked to make known to the Committee his views on the subject.)


6. M Berthelot summarizes Sir George Clerk’s telegram, dated November 13th. He says that the information conveyed in this telegram is not very reassuring, and it seems that the formation of a coalition cabinet is making the situation more uncertain than ever.

M Clemenceau wishes, in that connection, to say a few words concerning the attitude of Admiral Troubridge. No one contests the fact that the Admiral is a distinguished and capable man, but he is a partisan of Archduke Joseph. He has a right to be, but he wonders whether the Admiral is not going a little far in following his preferences, which apparently are not those of his Government. The information he is giving on Admiral Troubridge’s attitude comes from an excellent source and he wonders if it is not advisable for the British Government to take this situation into account, all the more so because the Admiral’s influence throughout Hungary is considerable.

Sir Eyre Crowe says the Admiral has received instructions to comply with the policy of Sir George Clerk. He will not fail, however, to take up the question raised by M Clemenceau.


7. Mr Polk says he would have an important statement to add to the declarations he had made at the preceding meeting on the oil tank ships, but as the French and British experts are not present, he proposes to adjourn this question to the next meeting.


8. M Berthelot says that in the question of distribution of enemy ships, the naval experts have not yet succeeded in arriving at a complete agreement. He thinks that an understanding will be made easier if the Council hears the question, inasmuch as the differences of views which existed seemed to him of slight importance.

M Clemenceau says that they can put the question on Monday’s agenda.


9. M Berthelot says that they have informed the Serbs that they will not be authorized to sign the Bulgarian Treaty until they had signed the Austrian Treaty. The Serbs have answered they cannot sign the Austrian Treaty before the question of the distribution of Austro-Hungarian tonnage has been solved. That question can be discussed on Tuesday, for the British expert will then have received his instructions.

M Clemenceau thinks that if that question is settled on Tuesday, the signature of the Bulgarian Treaty can be set for Wednesday or Thursday.

(The meeting then adjourns.)