[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, November 12, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. The Council has before it a draft note to Mr Venizelos relative to the report of the Commission of Inquiry, prepared by the British Delegation, a telegram from the French High Commissioner at Constantinople, dated November 3, and a letter from the Greek Delegation, dated November 4.

M Berthelot reads the draft note prepared by the British Delegation.

M Clemenceau raises the following point of form: On page 2 he thinks the word “observed” should be changed to read “felt” in the sentence reading: “It hopes that the dangerous tension which at the present time does not seem to have ceased to make itself felt along the limits of the Greek occupation.”

Sir Eyre Crowe explains that in drawing up this note the British Delegation had wished to avoid mixing up two questions; he realizes, however, that other questions, referred to on the previous day by M Berthelot but not touched upon in this draft note, still remained to be settled. The question of the administration of Smyrna is a rather complex one and it might be well to turn it over to a Commission. A Commission on Greek Territorial Claims is already in existence. He understands that Mr Venizelos has a good deal to say on this question and it would perhaps be better for him to be heard by that Commission.

S de Martino agrees, particularly as he thinks it is time that a decision should be reached relative to the relations between the Greek army of occupation and the local authorities on the one hand, and the central Government of Constantinople on the other. It would be well to be guided by the principles of The Hague Convention. On the other hand, it would be well to show consideration to Mr Venizelos, who throughout the war had shown qualities of the highest value and whose difficulties were well known.

M Clemenceau suggests that the question be referred to the Commission on Greek Territorial Claims which, if necessary, can solicit the advice of the military experts.

M Berthelot points out that as General Bunoust, who is entirely familiar with the situation, is present he might give the Commission valuable advice.

Mr Polk calls the attention of the Council to a paragraph of the draft note authorizing the Greeks to advance from Aidin up to the river Kochak Chai. That clause is a very important one. It should be remembered that any further advance meant fighting between the Greeks and Turks. General Milne himself has recognized that fact. He therefore wishes to ask if the Council deemed it advisable to assume the responsibility for such further conflict.

M Clemenceau again points out that he can send no troops; he feels that possibly the best solution would be to have Mr Venizelos withdraw his troops from the region of Aidin where they had gone without the consent of the Council.

Sir Eyre Crowe observes that this means letting the Turks occupy this region.

M Clemenceau inquires if the Italians are far distant from the Greeks in this region.

S de Martino explains that they are not; that the Italian forces are within six hundred meters of the line of the River Meander and the parallel railroad. The Greek line was along the north bank of the river.

Sir Eyre Crowe explains that if the Greeks retire a triangle will be left between the river, the railroad and the Greek line, which includes Aidin. To the south the line had been fixed by agreement between Mr Venizelos and the Italian Government. He thinks that it would not be advisable to withdraw the Greeks from the triangle in question and turn it over to Italian occupation.

S de Martino points out that he has not made any such suggestion.

M Clemenceau then suggests that the Greeks could be left at Aidin, but that they should not be allowed to advance.

Mr Polk asked if General Milne himself had not said that a further advance by the Greeks would inevitably result in serious trouble.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that General Milne had rather said that he would be willing to authorize a further advance if the Council was prepared for the fact that such an advance would mean encountering armed opposition. General Milne had favored that advance on strategic grounds.

M Clemenceau observes that as Mr Venizelos feels capable of conquering Asia, the Greek troops certainly should be able to maintain their ground at Aidin. He agrees with Mr Polk that if the Council orders a further advance it will be in a position of creating further trouble.

Mr Polk says that he cannot agree to a letter authorizing the Greeks to advance in view of the fact that the authorities on the spot had said that trouble would certainly ensue. He thinks that this would be tantamount to authorizing the Greeks to advance and conquer additional territory.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the only alternative is to let in the Turks who will then unquestionably start to massacre the Greeks.

Mr Polk asks if Sir Eyre Crowe feels convinced of this?

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he does.

Mr Polk says that his personal view is that if this line of action is followed all Asia Minor will eventually have to be occupied.

M Clemenceau suggested that the Greeks be left at Aidin but that they not be authorized to advance further.

(This was agreed to.)

S de Martino wishes to ask Sir Eyre Crowe if he could give him some information on the intentions of the British Government relative to the occupation of Aidin. According to a telegram which he had received from Italian Authorities on the spot, English troops were reported to be ready to advance on Aidin. General Montague Bates, commanding the 83rd Infantry Brigade, was said to be in command of those forces. On November 4th more than 70 cars were reported to have left for Afium Karahissar in order to transport the British Troops.

Sir Eyre Crowe replies that the British arrangement had been made in contemplation of Inter-Allied occupation. As no French troops could be sent he thought that the British troops would likewise not approach Aidin.

(It is decided to approve the draft note to Mr Venizelos relative to the report of the Commission of Inquiry at Smyrna prepared by the British Delegation after making the following modifications therein:

(1) On the second page of this draft note the sentence: “It hopes that the dangerous tension which at the present time does not seem to have ceased to make itself observed along the limits of the Greek zone of occupation”, should be changed to read, “It hopes that the dangerous tension which at the present time does not seem to have ceased to make itself felt along the limits of the Greek zone of occupation”;

(2) The clause: “In the meanwhile allowing the Greek troops to advance from Aidin up to the river Kochak Chai, according to General Milne’s recommendation” should be eliminated.

It is further decided to refer to the Commission on Greek Territorial Claims the questions pertaining to the administration of Smyrna, and that the Commission should be at liberty to take the advice of Military Experts, in particular that of General Bunoust.)


2. The Council has before it a reply from the Romanian Government transmitted by the Chargé d’Affaires of France, dated November 2nd, to the note of the Allied and Associated Powers dated October 12th.

M Clemenceau observes that the answer is very unsatisfactory and is even of a nature to cause anxiety.

Sir Eyre Crowe agrees. He feels that the answer is practically a refusal of all the demands presented by the Supreme Council. The only point upon which the Romanians had even partially agreed was the evacuation of Hungary, and even on that point the Romanian Government had made a most formidable reservation with respect to the extent of the Hungarian territory to be evacuated. The Romanian answer gave no satisfaction to the Council’s demand relative to the evacuation in so far as concerned the withdrawal beyond the river Theiss. On all other points the answer is evasive and defiant. The Council should carefully examine the present situation in Romania. Its authority must be respected. Mr Bratiano is merely dilly-dallying and playing for time, and the measures adopted by him had resulted in deluding the majority of his countrymen into thinking him a great patriot. He (Sir Eyre Crowe) feels that if the King and the majority of the Romanians are made clearly to see that a persistence in their present attitude will necessarily mean a breach with the Allied and Associated Powers and Romania’s exclusion from the Alliance, then Romania would adopt a more compliant attitude. He thinks that in such an event the present Government would be forced to retire and that a Ministry would be constituted which would see the wisdom of meeting the Council’s just demands and would act accordingly. He thinks the above considerations should be put very plainly to Romania and that it should be told that if its reply to the communication proposed to be sent by the Council is not satisfactory it will mean the breaking off of relations between Romania and the Allied and Associated Powers. The Romanians cannot be driven out of Hungary by force as the Council has no force to dispose of, and it seems to him that the only alternative is the line of action he had proposed.

Mr Polk says he welcomes any strong action.

M Clemenceau thinks that the action proposed by Sir Eyre Crowe is strong enough to meet the requirements of the situation.

S de Martino inquires if it would be wise to adopt in its entirety Sir Eyre Crowe’s suggestion, which involves threatening Romania. The resulting situation if the Romanians should refuse to agree to the action proposed should be examined. If the Romanians refuse the situation would be worse than it was before.

M Clemenceau thinks that the terms of the communication to be sent to Romania were reasonably clear. They could be plainly told that they will be no longer in the Alliance.

M Berthelot reminds the Council that at the time of signing the Austrian Treaty it had considered telling Romania that Bukovina would not be attributed to it, but that in the Austrian Treaty it would be given to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. This had not been done as it had seemed too severe a measure to be judicious at that time. However, as it is now proposed to exert pressure on Romania, it is well to examine the means of bringing this pressure to bear and a similar plan might now be considered. Romania might be told that her claims to Transylvania will not be recognized and that the question of Bessarabia will not be discussed until it can be taken up with a reconstituted Russia. He points out that the Romanian reply is satisfactory in so far as it announces the imminent withdrawal of the Romanian forces to the Theiss; the result had been to facilitate negotiations with the Hungarians. What he was now suggesting was primarily theoretical. The question of the advisability of taking such measures must still be decided, for when considering the question of punishing a Government it would be well not to lose sight of the fact that the population should not be wholly antagonized.

Sir Eyre Crowe reminds the Council that Sir George Clerk had referred in a former telegram to Romanian atrocities in Transylvania and the Council had inquired what part of Transylvania was meant. This question had not yet been answered but he had that day received a mass of documents relative to outrages in Transylvania, an examination of which might lead to the conclusion that the inhabitants of Transylvania were not as favorable to Romania as might have been thought.

M Clemenceau observed that two distinct questions are raised. First, is there a basis of right for taking away from Romania the Hungarian territories in question? The second question relates to the outrages committed by the Romanians in Transylvania.

Mr Polk says that he has always felt that if Romania refused to accede to the very reasonable demands of the Council she should not have Transylvania given to her. He thinks that such action is entirely too generous.

Sir Eyre Crowe feels that the difficulty is that if Transylvania is withheld from Romania that would involve an occupation by Allied troops, which is obviously impossible.

Mr Polk observes that if these territories are withheld from Romania she would at least be in a position of never having been given them. Although occupation by the Allies is out of the question, he thinks that such action would at least have a great moral effect.

S de Martino thinks that the point of prime importance is to rehabilitate the prestige of the Council. The action proposed by M Berthelot was certainly rather severe. He would have to consult his Government on that point. In the meantime he thinks that the Ministers at Bucharest might be instructed to take further action.

M Clemenceau does not think this advisable in as much as the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers at Bucharest had already done all they could do.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that in his personal opinion a communication should be sent to Romania in the nature of a real ultimatum. He will, however, have to consult his government before agreeing to send such a communication.

Mr Polk inquires if it is necessary to send a communication of that nature. Could not an answer be sent to Romania pointing out that her latest communication to the Council is no answer at all, and demanding a satisfactory answer from her.

Sir Eyre Crowe feels that the time for such action has gone by and that the present is the time to act firmly and decisively.

M Clemenceau agrees.

Mr Polk also agrees.

M Clemenceau suggests that Romania should be informed that the Allied and Associated Powers will withdraw their representatives from Romania and that the Romanian representatives in the various capitals, as well as her representatives at the Peace Conference, must also be withdrawn. He further suggests that M Berthelot should draft a note, taking into account the views expressed at that meeting, this note to be submitted to the Council as soon as the Heads of Delegations have been able to consult their respective Governments.

M Berthelot points out that a diplomatic rupture is a serious matter and inquires if it is to be resorted to at once.

M Clemenceau says that his patience is utterly exhausted. He has been long suffering with the Romanian Government and has even been reproached for that attitude. The Romanians always try to prolong pourparlers indefinitely, and this must be put an end to.

Mr Matsui agrees to the action proposed. He, of course, will have to consult his Government, which he thinks will not raise any objections. He wishes to point out that his Government has no diplomatic representation in Romania. In the meantime, in as much as he might not be able to receive an answer from his Government until some time after the other members of the Council have heard from their respective Governments, he is willing to agree with the view which would be adopted.

M Berthelot summarized the contents of the communication to be prepared by him. He will recall to Romania all that has been done for her and in her behalf by the Allied and Associated Powers and will point out the refractory attitude consistently maintained by Romania with respect to the just demands of the Supreme Council.

S de Martino calls attention to one paragraph of the Romanian note which seemed to him to have some merit. That is the paragraph dealing with the granting of authority to the Sub-Committee of the Reparations Commission to receive complaints relative to unauthorized requisitions. Romania had pointed out that in this respect she had been treated worse than the Yugoslav State had been in the matter of its requisitions in the Banat.

M Berthelot explains that the situations are not at all analogous. The Serb-Croat-Slovene Government had never been in opposition to the Council on this question.

General Weygand states that he has lately received a visit from Colonel Dimitrescu. He did not know the Colonel and was unaware how much importance should be attached to his statements. By way of information, however, he wished to tell the Council that Colonel Dimitrescu had complained of the Council’s attitude towards Romania and had pointed out that the present Government in Romania, mainly composed of Generals, was only able to attend to internal affairs; he therefore hoped that the Council would have patience with Romania until elections had been held and a government constituted which was qualified to deal adequately with foreign affairs as well as internal matters.

M Clemenceau thinks that no importance should be attached to these remarks of Colonel Dimitrescu; Mr Bratiano was behind the whole matter.

Sir Eyre Crowe observes that the Ministry of Generals had been put in power so that precisely that argument could be advanced.

(It is decided that M Berthelot should draft a note to the Romanian Government, for submission to the Council, taking into account the views expressed by the Council at that meeting.)


3. The Council has before it a telegram from Sir George Clerk dated November 9th and a telegram from the Inter-Allied Military Mission dated November 10th.

Sir Eyre Crowe remarks that the situation in Hungary seems to have greatly improved. He calls attention to Sir George Clerk’s request that about 20 officers be sent to Hungary to be attached to various army and police units.

S de Martino says that he is in favor of sending these officers if the other members of the Council are also.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that the question of their payment would surely be raised. It seemed to him that they might well be paid by the Hungarian army.

M Clemenceau agrees and says that he also favors sending these officers.

Mr Polk says that at present Colonel Yates, he believes, is in charge of the reorganization of the Hungarian Gendarmerie. He thinks that his Government would have no objection to sending a few officers to Hungary temporarily but he will of course have to consult his Government.

M Clemenceau suggests that it might be well in replying to Sir George Clerk to warn him to be on his guard against a restoration of the Hapsburgs under any guise.

Sir Eyre Crowe remarks that this might be unnecessary in as much as Sir George Clerk had indicated that Friedrich’s departure is imminent.

M Clemenceau points out that his retirement in many ways resembles that of Mr Bratiano. Although nominally retiring he will still remain in power. He thinks it would be well to include a general phrase of the tenor above suggested by him.

Sir Eyre Crowe agrees.

(It is decided:

(1) That Sir Eyre Crowe should prepare, for submission to the Council at its next meeting, a telegram to Sir George Clerk in answer to the telegram, dated November 9th, received from him, and taking into account the telegram received from the Inter-Allied Military Mission dated November 10th;

(2) That the Heads of Delegation should examine the question of sending a total of about 20 Allied officers to Hungary.)


4. The Council has before it a note relative to the expenses of transportation of the Inter-Allied troops of occupation for Plebiscite Areas.

General Weygand reads and comments upon this note and points out that the German Government will certainly raise the question of the payment of expenses of transportation.

M Clemenceau observes that the work to be done by these troops would be for the account of various interested countries. He thinks that those countries might well bear the expenses.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that is the proper solution, but wishes to point out that in the case of Danzig and Memel the Council had decided that those expenses should be borne by the local authorities.

Mr Polk suggests that the matter be referred to the Drafting Committee.

(This was agreed to.)

S de Martino wishes to bring up a question closely related to the foregoing one. In the plebiscite areas the expenses of maintenance of the Inter-Allied troops and Commissions would entail expenses which had not yet been estimated with exactness. These expenses, however, will be considerable. According to the terms of the Treaty these expenses are to be met by the local revenues of each plebiscite area. In the case of Allenstein, Eastern Prussia might be called upon for partial payment in case the local revenues were not sufficient. In the remaining areas the local revenues should suffice. Under these conditions it seems necessary that a more or less accurate estimate of the expenses of maintenance of those troops and Commissions should at once be made by a Committee of Financial and Economic experts who would be charged with determining whether or not the whole of those expenses should be apportioned to the local revenues of the plebiscite zones.

General Weygand observes that he only raised the question of the expenses of transportation. The question of the expenses of maintenance was a far larger one. There has as yet been no means of arriving at a very accurate estimate of the transportation expenses but from some figures at hand it seemed that they would amount to two or three million francs. The amount of the expenses of maintenance he thought could easily be calculated.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that this latter amount cannot be estimated with great accuracy because it is impossible at this time to know how long the various areas will be occupied.

M Berthelot points out that the occupation will not be effected by a large number of troops and would not last for a long time, except possibly in the case of Upper Silesia where the local revenues would be amply sufficient.

S de Martino suggested that the Drafting Committee also examine this question at the same time as the question of the expenses of transportation.

General Weygand states that he will be able, with the aid of the Allied Military Representatives, to estimate the expenses of maintenance, and he will communicate that estimate to the Drafting Committee.

(It was decided:

(1) That the note relative to the expenses of transportation of the Inter-Allied troops of occupation for plebiscite areas should be referred to the Drafting Committee for examination and report;

(2) That at the same time the Drafting Committee, after receiving from Marshal Foch an estimate of the expenses of maintenance of the Inter-Allied troops and Commissions in the plebiscite areas, should determine by whom such expenses should be borne in case the local revenues were not in all cases sufficient.)


5. M Berthelot informs the Council that a telegram has been received from Sofia saying that the Bulgarians are prepared to sign the Treaty without any conditions whatever. Mr Stambouliski is anxious to be present at the signature of the Treaty, but as he is just leaving Sofia he will not reach Paris for several days. He (M Berthelot) thinks there would be no harm in awaiting M. Stambouliski’s arrival before proceeding to the signature of the Treaty, all the more so as there were several details still to be settled. For instance the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government which had to sign the Austrian treaty before signing the Bulgarian treaty, is prepared to sign the former when the question of the distribution of tonnage had been adjusted. The Council had also decided that certain clauses were to be inserted in the Bulgarian Treaty relative to the neutrality of Switzerland.

(It is agreed that there is no objection to awaiting the arrival of Mr Stambouliski before proceeding to the signature of the Bulgarian Treaty.)


6. M Berthelot informs the Council that according to a telegram from Prague the Czechoslovak troops have already been ordered to evacuate the mining district of Salgo Tarjan without awaiting a prior reimbursement of the Czechoslovak Government for expenses incurred by it on behalf of Hungary. Dr Benes had desired to remain in occupation of two points in the neutral zone by way of guarantee, but if the Council does not agree with him he is not prepared to insist.


7. General Weygand reminds the Council that at its meeting of November 4th it had approved the communication sent by Marshal Foch to the German Government relative to the interruption of railroad traffic in the occupied regions of Germany. The German Government had complied with the terms of this communication. Therefore, the day before Marshal Foch had consented to allow certain reductions in railroad traffic in the occupied territories. The matter was at that time settled satisfactorily to both sides.


8. M Berthelot informs the Council that a telegram from Belgrade has announced that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government is ready to sign the Austrian Treaty as soon as the distribution of Austrian commercial tonnage had been adjusted.

S de Martino states that he has been informed the previous day that his Government and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government had reached a complete agreement on this point.

(The meeting then adjourns.)