[Rockin Robbins]

Skybird, what are you trying to imply?

Ethiopian Airlines must have had a reason why they did not deliver the blackbox to the US and Boeing for analysis, but to France. depending on whom you ask, that is more or less an affront. Boeing was said to be not happy with that decision and wanted the state department to intervenbe and set up diplomatic pressure on France.

Ethiopian Airlines had nothing to do with where the black boxes were read. That was determined by the local air traffic safety authority. Boeing and the FAA were present when the boxes were read. They were given the full contents of the instruments. Implying that they wished to obtain the black boxes so they could redact unfavorable data is not only wrong, it's reprehensible. And as you can plainly see, the data as extracted in France exculpates Boeing. Shame on you.

The plane is now more vulnerable to the tail striking the runway during takeoff, becasue the gear has moved forward together with the wings, and so the tial got longer.

This characteristic is shared by dozens and dozens of commercial cargo and passenger planes from all manufacturers and nation. It's nothing remarkable and you're implying that it paints Boeing with some kind of rash irresponsibility. Bullocks.

If training and documentation beyond a certain amount would be required, FAA ticks by the logicof that then the plane is quite so different from earlier versions of the family that a new certification of the hardware is necessary - and that is what Boeing wanted to avoid

And that's entirely right and proper. After all, every 737 for the past 52 years could have an electric trim overrun, MCAS is just a new reason that might happen. If you have a trim overrun in a 50 year old version or a Max version, procedures are identical. Many trim overruns have happened over the years. Many pilots have reacted properly turning an annoyance into a harmless event rather than a tragic crash. MCAS trim overruns are not different in character or remedy than any trim overrun that has ever happened in thousands of aircraft over 52 years, and with three generations of pilots and crew. The plane is safe. And it can be made safer, just like any other plane.

Lacking knowledge on side of the pilots who did not - and could not!! - have fully understood the changes. Boom. Boom.

The pilots didn't need to know the changes. They already knew from memory the steps needed to fix a trim overrun. This was nothing new. It was a routine failure that should have been handled routinely. It wasn't.

Procedure says to shut down electric trim by turning the elevator trim override switches to "override." The co-pilot did this, showing that they knew the procedure. The pilot, with an out of trim plane, hand flew the plane to a save altitude and leveled off while his 94% throttle accelerated the plane like a dragster to twice its rated speed for that altitude.

They didn't have a trim problem then. They had an airplane that was about to be disassembled by aerodynamic forces! Still neither touched the throttles until impact. Note that planes at twice safe speed limits (250 knots for 10,000 feet or below) respond quickly and violently to trim inputs. Since the pilot had control of the altitude and indeed doubled the altitude while he was hand controlling the plane, the proper thing for him to do was FLY THE PLANE!

Instead, he turned a known malfunctioning system back on so it could kill everybody. Memory procedure, 52 years old, says clearly to leave the trim override switches off for the remainder of the flight. This pilot did not. Somehow this is Boeing's fault.


Boeing exhibit A, from the ONLY source of facts we have, the Preliminary Accident Report:

IssueDate: November 6, 2018
Airplane Effectivity: 737-8 /-9
Subject: Uncommanded Nose Down Stabilizer Trim Due to Erroneous Angle of
Attack (AOA) During Manual Flight Only
Reason: To Emphasize the Procedures Provided in the Runaway Stabilizer Non-
Normal Checklist (NNC).
Information in this bulletin is recommended by The Boeing Company, but may not be FAA approred
In the event of conflict with the FAA approved Airplane Flight Mammal
(AFM) the AFM shall supercede. The Boeing Company regards this information or procedures described herein as having a direct or indirect bearing on the safe operation of this model airplane.

THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE AND/OR INFORMATION 1S EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT
Background Information
The Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee has indicated that
Lion Air flight 610 experienced erroneous AOA data. Boeing would like to call
attention to an AOA failure condition that can occur during manual flight only.
This bulletin directs flight crews to existing procedures to address this condition.
In the event of erroneous AOA data, the pitch trim system can trim the stabilizer
nose down in increments lasting up to 10 seconds. The nose down stabilizer trim
movement can be stopped and reversed with the use of the electric stabilizer trim
switches but may restart 5 seconds after the electric stabilizer trim switches are
released. Repetitive cycles of uncommanded nose down stabilizer continue to
occur unless the stabilizer trim system is deactivated through use of both STAB
TRIM CUTOUT switches in accordance with the existing procedures in the
Runaway Stabilizer NNC. It is possible for the stabilizer to reach the nose down
limit unless the system inputs are counteracted completely by pilot trim inputsFlight Crew Operations Manual Bulletin No. ETH-13 , Dated November 6, 2018 (continued)
Additionally, pilots are reminded that an erroneous AOA can cause some or all of
the following indications and effects:
» Continuous or intermittent stick shaker on the affected side only.
* Minimum speed bar (red and black) on the affected side only.
» Increasing nose down control forces.
» Inability to engage autopilot.
° Automatic disengagement of autopilot.
» IAS DISAGREE alert.
°. ALT DISAGREE alert.
» AOA DISAGREE alert (if the AOA indicator option is installed)
. FEEL DIFF PRESS light.
Operating Instructions
In the event an uncommanded nose down stabilizer trim is experienced on the
737-8 /-9, in conjunction with one or more of the above indications or effects, do
the Runaway Stabilizer NNC ensuring that the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches
are set to CUTOUT and stay in the CUTOUT position for the remainder of the
flight.
Note: Initially, higher control forces may be needed to overcome any
stabilizer nose down trim already applied. Electric stabilizer trim can
be used to neutralize control column pitch forces before moving the
STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches to CUTOUT. Manual stabilizer trim
can be used after the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches are moved to
CUTOUT.Administrative Information
Insert this bulletin behind the Bulletin Record page in Volume 1 of your Flight
Crew Operations Manual (FCOM). Amend the FCOM Bulletin Record page to
show bulletin ETH-12 "In Effect" (IE).
This Bulletin remains in effect until Boeing provides additional information on
system updates that may allow this Bulletin to be canceled.
Please send all correspondence regarding Flight Crew Operations Manual
Bulletin status, to the 737 Manager, Flight Technical Data, through the Service
Requests Application (SR App) on the MyBoeingFleet.com

Folks, that's not a company attempting to hide potential harm from its customers. It is a company going the extra mile, even without FAA approval, to fully inform its customers, giving them a complete view of the possible malfunction and a 100% effective method to respond to it. This is a textbook example of a company putting the safety of its customers ahead of everything else, being transparent, helpful and open.

But Skybird paints them evil shirkers of responsibility, actively hiding known defects in their planes because dead people buy the most airplanes. That position is not possible given the facts revealed in the Preliminary Accident Report. But undeterred, Skybird says what he says, although completely contradicted by the truth.

A third passenger pilot/engineer in the blancolirio discussion said this after reading my analysis: "@RockinRobbins13 This guy gets it" On a subsequent post he clearly states "Rob Roilen
5 days ago
@RockinRobbins13 Agreed. I see a lot of people regurgitating the latest half-true mainstream media updates and calling for software fixes without addressing some really common sense flying practices that simply were not used in this accident. Sure, refine MCAS, but teach pilots to rely less on automation." All three commercial pilots and engineers agreed with my assessment that the Ethiopian Airlines crash was caused by pilot error. Doesn't make it any less tragic but facts are stubborn things.

I would be happy to conduct a line by line review of the Preliminary Accident Report for those who doubt I am telling the simple unbiased truth. But please read it for yourself, very carefully, before disagreeing with my conclusions. It will prevent a lot of embarrassment.