Quote:
Originally Posted by Kapitän
Started new career in August 2019 to commemorate the beginning of WWII, 80 years before ...
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Monday, 14 December 1942 - Gotenhafen-Oxhöft
Work-up's and Trials with the U.A.K. (Kpt.z.S.R. BRÄUTIGAM), the 2nd Training Division (U.L.D.; Freg.Kpt.d.R. Ernst HASSHAGEN) and 22nd U-Flotilla (Korvkpt. Wilhelm Ambrosius):
Dry-Run Exercises with Machinery/Mechanics; Weapons; Torpedoes.
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U 91 (Kptlt. Heinz Walkerling) is stationed in CF 2167 and owing to damage incurred earlier and the momentary bad weather conditions and is greatly endangered when submerging. She is making for CE 63 for repairs and refueling from U 155 (Kptlt. Adolf Cornelius Piening).
Of the first of 4 U-boats of type IXc intended for renewed activity in the Cape Town area, U 506 (Kptlt. Erich Würdemann) has put out, under Operational Order "Seehund".
The adaptation of the first 10 boats for the use of the "F.A.T." torpedo also equipped with combined Radar/Radar detector has been proceeding since the middle of November. For the most part there have been numerous unsupportable postponements in fitting the boats for action resulting from inadequate supply of constructional parts, so that the final completion of all 10 boats is not yet in sight.
With reference to this question B.d.U. Most Secret 5552 to OKM Head of K and OKM.
Head of MND reports:
1) The fitting out of 10 U-boats with Radar/Radar detector was requested in writing after a previous discussion with the Head of MND on 19.10.
2) Although the time limit for construction was fixed for 14 days during the verbal discussion and the shipyard limit at the time of the constructional agreement lay between the 11th and 20th of November, the shipyard limit was fixed for up to 14 days later owing to the installation of the Radar/Radar detector apparatus. At the time B.d.U. concurred with this delay.
3) Owing to the delay in the supply of structural parts, above all and the knock out blow, the electrical parts, the completion of the boats was delayed for a further 10 - 20 days. The delay lasted then for only a few days and B.d.U. was only informed at short notice through the shipyard and flotilla reports. These postponements are operationally insupportable and the disposition of the command impossible. Difficulties in the disposal of the crew and completion of other boats are other accompanying results.
4) Inquiries into this matter can only lead to partial and unsatisfactory revelations, as there is no actual department absolutely responsible for the execution of these measures. The results of the telephone and written inquires were for this reason worthless to the practical administration.
5) B.d.U. requests a single department and a single person to be responsible for the execution of this fitting out, concerned with all isolated details including ship construction, Radar and the supplying of individual ports and the name of the person concerned is to be made known to them.
6) As a result of these arrangements not being kept, U-boats ready for action have been frozen and our Naval Command thereby caused painful losses in the sinking of enemy tonnage. This is, from this stand point, irresponsible and insufferable.
C-in-C U-boats Most Secret 5552.
U 648 (Ltnt.z.S.d.R. Peter-Arthur Stahl) conducts Work-up's and Trials with the U.A.G. in Danzig.
RST
KorvKpt.& Cmdr. U 115 |
Started new career in August 2019 to commemorate the beginning of WWII, 80 years before ...
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Tuesday,
15 December 1942 - Gotenhafen-Oxhöft
Work-up's and Trials with the U.A.K. (Kpt.z.S.R. BRÄUTIGAM), the 2nd Training Division (U.L.D.; Freg.Kpt.d.R. Ernst HASSHAGEN) and 22nd U-Flotilla (Korvkpt. Wilhelm Ambrosius):
Dry-Run Exercises with Machinery/Mechanics; Weapons; Torpedoes.
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U D 3 (ex Dutch submarine O 25; Krvkpt. Hermann Rigele) hunted strongly zig-zagging tanker on a general course of 140° speed 12 knots, from EH 9984 to EH 3681. Contact lost after triple miss.
U 159 (Kptlt. Helmut Friedrich Witte) sank "Star of Suez" of 4,999 GRT course 120° in FC 3725. Carrying motorcars and aircraft parts from New York to Alexandria. This confirms the supposition that the traffic at the moment runs, greatly spread out over the area between St. Paul's Rocks and the Brazilian coast.
As there is no possibility of our own traffic being encountered in the northern section of "Route Anton" permission for attacks on isolated vessels N. of 30° N. is given, until 0000 on 19.12.
The supply situation is at the moment very tense, owing to the scarcity of tankers and the bad weather conditions. Boats are warned that supplies can only be expected on the express orders of the Command.
The outward bound steamer "Germania" escorted by 4 U-boats ran into a northward bound convoy towards 1400 in about BE 9166. As escape was not possible, the ship was scuttled by the crew of the escorting boats. U 706 was in contact last. Measures for the rescue of the crew are ordered. Success, however, is questionable, owing to the weather predominating at the moment. 5 boats are searching the place of sinking for survivors.
Of the boats detailed for the protection of the "Germania" one was near the ship. The sinking though, as anticipated, could not be prevented. How the other 3 ships were placed in relation to the ship is not known. In any case they were useless. A real support for a blockade runner could only be formed by an all round screen at a distance of 50 - 60 sea miles from the ship. With a range of visibility of 10 sea miles - a favorable supposition - 15 boats would be needed during the day, a number by no means available. But even this protection is theoretical, as, owing to the necessity of submerging in the event of aircraft, differences in fixes, deterioration of visibility, the possibility of not being able to report the sighted enemy before submerging, and other incidents, the position could be changed entirely.
U 648 (Ltnt.z.S.d.R. Peter-Arthur Stahl) conducts Work-up's and Trials with the U.A.G. in Danzig.
RST
KorvKpt.& Cmdr. U 115