[Sailor Steve]

Monday, January 19, 1920

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of Premiers.


M Clemenceau: The first question that arises is that of the telegram that ought to have been sent dealing with the arrangement with the Russian Co-operatives. That telegram has not been sent. Why?

M Kammerer: We were waiting for instructions on the point. Last night Mr Berthelot told me that the telegram could be sent. I stated that, for my own part, we had no objection to its despatch.

M Clemenceau: Were you in a position to raise objections to the despatch of that telegram?

M Kammerer: Not at all, but I had to say that I had not any instructions and that I was awaiting them. In any case the telegram is ready and is going to be sent.

S Nitti: To arrange the details of execution of the question in the best way possible, it would be well to send it to the Supreme Economic Council.

Mr Lloyd George: I am in entire agreement. All this ought to be done by the Economic Council and not by the Foreign Ministers.

M Clemenceau: We are then agreed upon that.

(It was decided that economic questions involving the commercial policy of the Allies in Russia should be dealt with by the Supreme Economic Council.)

Mr Wallace will refer the present resolution to Washington for the instructions of his Government.


2. M Clemenceau: We will go on to the Caucasian question. I think that Marshal Wilson or Marshal Foch ought first to be heard.

Marshal Foch: A question on this subject was put to the Interallied Military Committee at Versailles. The committee pronounced an opinion. It is to that opinion that I am now going to refer.

M Clemenceau: You mean, I take it, the pronouncement of the 12th January. That has been circulated; everybody here knows it; have you nothing to add to that?

Marshal Foch: No, Mr. President, I have nothing to add unless it be that since that time the situation cannot have appreciably changed, that in any case, if it has changed, that can only be to our disadvantage, and consequently that the restrictions we formulated are perhaps even more justified at the present moment.

Sir Henry Wilson: I also am in the position of having nothing to add.

Mr Lloyd George: What is necessary at the very outset is to collect all available information so as to be in a position to discuss the matter profitably later on.

M Clemenceau: We are agreed.

Mr Lloyd George: The military advice, if I have understood it correctly, is that no barrier, consisting of less than three divisions would be effective against the Bolsheviks; and Lord Beatty could not send his sailors unless there were already assurance of such effective military measures.

Lord Beatty: I have nothing to add to that statement of the situation.

Mr Lloyd George: The situation may be regarded from another point of view. With the object of holding up the Bolsheviks, would it be any good to supply the Caucasian Republics of Azerbaijan, Daghestan and Georgia with guns and war materiel? And if so, ought it to be done immediately?

Marshal Foch: That question is very difficult to answer from here. Only an officer on the spot would be in a position to say what effective force those countries can muster and whether therefore it is worth while supplying them with anything whatsoever.

Mr Clemenceau: Does the Marshal suggest entrusting such a mission to an Allied general?

Marshal Foch: There is an English general with Denikin and the French general Mangin is also there.

Mr Lloyd George: But what I want now is military advice. We have already been asked to send material to those tribesmen. I want to know if that is militarily expedient.

Marshal Foch: I am entirely without information as to whether those populations are ready to receive materiel and to employ it to advantage or whether all that we might send would not simply fall into the hands of the Bolsheviks.

Sir Henry Wilson: In the meeting that took place the day before yesterday and at which we examined the defense of the Batoum-Baku line, the conclusion is reached that unless the British Navy effectively holds the Caspian, that line could not be effectively defended: and, inversely, that unless there exists the means of defending that line, it is impossible to send Naval forces into the Caspian. For that matter, unless the Caspian is occupied and held, Baku will certainly fall.

Mr Lloyd George: I take it then to be Sir Henry Wilson’s advice that we ought not to send war materiel to those peoples to help them to defend themselves against the Bolsheviks.

Sir Henry Wilson: That, Sir, is undoubtedly my opinion if the Caspian is not effectively held by the British Navy - I should then send nothing.

Mr Winston Churchill: I entirely agree with Sir Henry’s opinion on that point. Indeed, if the Caspian were not held, all that we might send would almost immediately pass into the hands of the Bolsheviks.

Lord Curzon: I should like to add a word. If, as General Wilson says, an Allied military expedition cannot succeed, then obviously we ought not to send one, but the present question it seems to me, is not so comprehensive. I have been speaking with the representatives of the Caucasian republics who are at this moment in the adjoining room. They have told me already that the Bolsheviks will attack them; they are anxious to defend themselves, provided we supply them with food, arms and munitions. So supplied, they believe that the danger could be averted. Without supplies, their fall, they say, is inevitable. In any case I suggest that we take no decision upon the matter without first of all hearing them.

Marshal Foch: I repeat my question: can we inform ourselves sufficiently here? I am willing to accept the discussion which ought to be profitable, but I think that we cannot have really adequate information unless we send actually on to the spot a representative of the Allied Powers.

M Clemenceau: The reason for your remark is, I believe that you did not quite understand what has just been said, to wit, that the representatives of the republics of the Caucasus are at present within the building and that it would be possible to hear them now.


(The representatives of the Republic of Georgia, Messrs Tsheidze, Tseretelli and Avaloff and of Azerbaijan, Messrs Topchibacheff and Magaramoff, are then introduced.)

3. M Clemenceau: Gentlemen, the Conference has been discussing the urgency of sending to Georgia, Daghestan and Azerbaijan food, arms and ammunition. We are told that you can give us information about an intended Bolshevist attack upon your people and of the means at your disposal for defense. We wish to know if at this juncture you would be in a position to exploit the help that we might be able to send you. We are quite disposed to do something effective but we want to know the present state of your countries and whether such aid would be effectively used against the Bolsheviks, or whether it is more likely to happen, as it did with Denikin, that the Bolsheviks would be strong enough simply to capture from you the materiel sent and thus to make matters worse.

Mr Tseretelli: I speak in the name of the Georgian Delegation as well as in that of the Delegation of Azerbaijan. We are equally likely to be attacked by the Bolsheviks but we do not know whether we shall be or not. Were we helped by the Entente, the Bolsheviks might hesitate to attack us. In any case, we need the material assistance of the Great Powers if we are to defend ourselves.

M Clemenceau: Am I to understand that you are asking us to send troops also?

Mr Tseretelli: That would be better still; but the mere fact of being protected on the sea and receiving the arms, munitions and food we require, would be an invaluable help. The state of mind of our people is such that, should the Bolsheviks attack, and if at the same time we received the material support of the Entente, we hope to defeat every attack. But such material aid is necessary immediately. We would like in any case to point out that the present situation in the Caucasus is dangerous from the point of view of the morale of the populations. When Denikin was in our land, our despairing peoples fought his troops by every means in their power, and a current of sympathy with the Bolsheviks appeared. Today, our people see their independence recognized and we are convinced that all the forces of the Highlanders will be used to resist a Bolshevist invasion and to defend our independence. It is under those circumstances that we build so much hope upon receiving help from the Supreme Council. We do not wish war: we are even ready to come to an agreement if that is possible, with the Bolsheviks, but only upon the condition that they also recognize our independence.

M Clemenceau: You would really sign an agreement with the Bolsheviks?

Mr Tseretelli: Yes, on condition that they pledged themselves not to invade our country and that they did not try to introduce propaganda among our people. But I must repeat, if we were strong, and the Entente were to help us, the Bolsheviks would be obliged to recognize our independence and give up their attempts.

I should nevertheless like to point out that there are three Trans-Caucasian Republics - Georgia, Azerbaidjan and Armenia. We would like to know why Armenia has not received de facto recognition. That recognition would help us all and render easier resistance to any aggression whatsoever. But, in short, it is in immediate help that our hope of resistance lies.

Mr Lloyd George: How many men can Azerbaijan put into the field?

Mr Magaramoff: A military law has been passed by our Parliament; assuming that we have the necessary arms and munitions, we shall be able to put into the field some 100,000 men.

Mr Lloyd George: Have you the troops at the moment?

Mr Magaramoff: We have a little army, in the command of a native Azerbaidjan general, about 50,000 strong, perhaps more, disciplined, but there are only from 10,000 to 12,000 of these men with arms.

Mr Lloyd George: And in Georgia?

Mr Tseretelli: We have about 16 battalions of regular troops, each 600 strong and nearly 15,000 men of the National Guard. These are well-disciplined troops. In a fortnight we could mobilize 50,000 men if we had the necessary arms and munitions. But on the other hand in a war for independence we could count upon the support of our whole people, among whom national enthusiasm runs very high. I am myself not a military specialist; but, if the Supreme Council wishes quite accurate information we can ask our Government by telegraph to supply it.

Mr Lloyd George: Is compulsory military service the system obtaining in Georgia?

Mr Tseretelli: Yes, and, in the Russian Army, Georgian officers were considered the best. Our troops too, were among the flower of the Russian Army.

Mr Lloyd George: Have the young men of Azerbaijan received military instruction?

Mr Magaramoff: There was no compulsory military service with us; but at the beginning of the war there were organized detachments of volunteers who distinguished themselves in the Iron Division. We had remarkable officers and generals. It was only two years ago that our Republic was constituted: henceforth all our youth must serve with the colors.

Lord Curzon: Reports that I have received say that a certain number of officers of Azerbaidjan are Turkish officers. Does the presence of these Turkish officers in the army leave us the guarantees necessary in a fight against the Bolsheviks?

Mr Magaramoff: After the conquest of Azerbaijan by Russia a great part of the population emigrated 25 years ago to Turkey. Later on, when the Turkish Army invaded the Caucasus, a certain number of its officers were natives of our country and of Daghestan. Among these, some 50 preferred to remain in Azerbaijan but they are native Caucasians and we can be certain that they, like all our populations, will use their whole energy in fighting the Bolsheviks for the defense of our independence.

Mr Topchibacheff: We, the inhabitants of Azerbaijan, dread Bolshevism even more than do our Georgian neighbors. We have had an experience of it. The Bolsheviks occupied our country for four months. I myself, head of a Trans-Caucasian committee, was a prisoner with them for two months and a half.

The danger threatens us from two sides: from the north and from the Caspian. On the Caspian side we hope that the English, who have a naval base at Enzeli, will give us perhaps marines and, in any case, arms and munitions. As for the northern frontier, we believe that in order to protect the whole of Trans-Caucasia, and especially Azerbaijan, it is expedient to recognize the Republic of the Highlanders, which would then form a buffer state against Bolshevik attacks. These Highlanders are indeed a very brave people.

Mr Lloyd George: Did the fight against Denikin take place in Georgia or Daghestan?

Mr Tseretelli: Denikin invaded Daghestan and the fight developed between the Highlanders and him. As for Georgia, it has always been threatened by Denikin; we displayed our sympathy with the Highlanders, who were defending themselves against him.

Mr Lloyd George: Why did Denikin attack Daghestan?

Mr Tseretelli: Denikin looked upon Daghestan and all Trans-Caucasia as Russian provinces. He judged it easier to invade those territories than to fight the Bolsheviks; it was against the peoples of the Caucasus that he turned the arms which were supplied to him to maintain the fight against the army of the Soviets.

Mr Lloyd George: For that attack had he great forces at his disposal?

Mr Tseretelli: His forces were fairly large, how large I cannot say, exactly. Anyhow, he had to use a great many men in maintaining the strife of factions in which the Highlanders involved him. The fight lasted nearly a year: I do not know whether it is not still going on. We have no recent news. I believe that Denikin has issued an appeal to his troops. Whatever may be the number of his forces, they are disorganized and demoralized and are doubtless no longer worth very much.

Mr Lloyd George: What is the Cossack’s attitude towards Denikin?

Mr Tseretelli: According to reports we have received from Tiflis, confirmed by Mr Bitch, president of the Kouban delegation, who is in Paris, great discontent reigns among the Kouban population; it is possible that the discontent is already receiving some direction. In the existing situation the Red Army is able to invade Kouban. But resistance to the Bolsheviks is being organized under the direction of Mr. Magaramko, the president of the Rada of Kouban. But it is still necessary to have the guarantee that it is not Denikin who will profit by the defeat of the Bolsheviks.

Mr Lloyd George: How long has the Kouban Delegation been in Paris?

Mr Tseretelli: For a year.

Mr Lloyd George: Is there a separatist movement in Kouban?

Mr Tseretelli: That is the political tendency of the Kouban Delegation, which is keeping in touch with its own country. That Delegation presented to the Conference a memorandum asking for recognition of the independence of the Kouban Republic.

S Nitti: If I have properly understood Mr Tseretelli, the real objective of Denikin’s army is the reconstitution of the old centralized Russia, rather than the defeat of the Bolsheviks; is Mr Tseretelli quite sure about that?

Mr Tseretelli: I am certain. I do not know Denikin’s personal ideas, but the unanimous opinion was that, had he managed to defeat the Bolsheviks, he would immediately have turned all his efforts towards the reduction of those nations whose independence has been proclaimed. That is not merely my conviction, it is that of all those independent states of which I speak and which defended themselves against him. It is the conviction also of our Azerbaijan neighbors.

S Nitti: Do you believe that the recognition of the Caucasian Republics, which exist already, or which will be recognized later could arouse the spirit of resistance in the country?

Mr Tseretelli: I am convinced that that recognition will strengthen resistance to all aggression from whatever side the aggression comes. We entertain the high hope that after the first step which has just been taken, the Supreme Council will go to the full length of recognizing our Republics de jure. That is the hope that sustains the courage of our peoples and our Governments; our population will display all the more zeal as they know that this de jure recognition will come about.

As for Denikin’s policy, he has declared officially several times that he does not recognize the right of our nations to self-determination: in his eyes, we still constitute mere provinces of the old Tsarist Russia.

Mr Magaramoff: The Georgian Delegate, in explaining the dangers that might menace his country from the direction of the Black Sea, has shown that on that side the Entente could send ships of war. But for us, on the Caspian, the situation is entirely different. Sending ships of war there cannot be thought of. There is a Bolshevist fleet to the North of Petrovsk and a small fleet of Denikin’s between Petrovsk and Baku; finally, at Enzeli, there is an English ship with some small gun boats.

Recently, the Azerbaijan Government protested against the allocation of a fleet to Denikin; but, at the present moment the volunteer army is beaten and the crews of his fleet, who manifested sentiments of sympathy with the Bolsheviks, are going possibly to join them: hence will arise a danger for Baku and for the defense of all Trans-Caucasia. That is why we should be happy if the Conference would be good enough to take the necessary measures to prevent Denikin’s joining the Bolshevist fleet.

Mr Lloyd George: Could you garrison Baku if you were given the arms? How many men could you find to defend that town?

Mr Magaramoff: There is a strong garrison at Baku already.

M Clemenceau: Of how many men?

Mr Magaramoff: We do not know now, as for two months direct communications have been cut off. Within that time, the strength of the garrison may have varied. However, that may be, two months ago, there were 7,000 men in Baku, all natives of Azerbaidjan, of which state Baku is the capital.

Mr Lloyd George: Why did Denikin not receive the support of the peasants in Ukrainia? Why did they abandon him?

Mr Tseretelli: I think that Denikin was considered in Ukrainia the representative of the counter-revolutionary movement which was going to take the land from the peasants and restore it to the nobility. He was looked upon as a man who had placed the Ukraine under the yoke of a centralized government reminiscent of Tsarism. In fact, both from the social and from the national points of view, the peasants looked upon Denikin as the enemy.

To avoid all misunderstanding, allow me to supplement what I said a little while ago. I spoke of Kouban. I am not qualified to make known here the aspirations of its population and I cannot say whether the separatist movement is very strong in that region or whether it is merely destined to avert the possibility of a civil war. In any case, I should not like to give the impression that the cause of Azerbaidjan and of Georgia ought to be considered from the same standpoint as that of Kouban. As you know, our populations are, from the national point of view, quite different. For centuries they have lived as independent states. I want it to be clearly understood that all I have said has merely the value to be attached to the information that can be given by a man who has read the newspapers. There is a Kouban Delegation in Paris; only that Delegation is in a position to speak precisely upon the national aspirations.

Mr Winston Churchill: Was the Kouban Delegation regularly appointed by the Rada?

Mr Tseretelli: Yes, and its president is the president of the Rada. He is Mr Bitch, a man very well known in the Caucasian world. He has been here for nearly a year.

(At this point the representatives of Georgia and of Azerbaidjan leave the Conference.)


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