As was reported repeatedly by now, trainign on changede MCAS was not conducted by Boeing to save time and to not oput cetification in danger. If they would have trained it, it would have delayed certification.
The Blowback theory I mentioned is NOT just trim overriding pilot inpout. That is a possible issue in itself. It was deliberatekly desc ribed over here that the blowback theory, accpording to the meaning of the term as it is usually used, indeed means that the floight attitude of the plane is such that airspeed over the wings is so high that it defeats internal hydraulic system pressure - the system cannot move the ailerons and rudder anymore.
We talk abotu two different explanation theories ther,e RockingRobbins. Possible hthat they also mutually fed back on each other.
I just repeat what was written in two quite insightful German article two days ago. The one was authored by a former Boeing engineer, the other by a German Luftwaffe pilot. Both described the Blowback thing identically. They did not say it was like this - they just say it could have been like this, and that the flight behaviour of both planes seem to speak for it.
Boeiong has had a striong itnerest to bypass usuall secirotyplannings ans the time they need, the pressure, said the engineer, was immense, and the worst he had ever experienced in his career. I woul,d assume th econmic oressure to poush the 737Max still out, is still existent, even more so right now. So I would not enteriley trust in Boeing theories alone that thus are suspicious of trying to paint the picture such that a simple solution like ansoftweare update alone can brign the aircraft off the ground again. Even after the second crash they wanted to fly on and it was external fact finding that forced them to stop. Boeing, government Perntagon are way too close in this. Eisenhower, anyone?
