[Sailor Steve]

Monday, July 21, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers


1. (a) Mr Balfour says that before starting with the subjects on the Agenda, he would like to observe that there is not a single item on it touching Peace with Bulgaria, or indeed touching any Treaty of Peace at all. The subjects for discussion ire no doubt important subjects, but the Bulgarians are to come to Paris on the following Friday. He thinks it will be discreditable if the Conference is not ready to hand them a Treaty on their arrival, or shortly after it. He understands that the delay comes from the re-opening of the frontier question. The Reparation and Financial Clauses are delayed in consequence. Unless the ultimate size of Bulgaria were known, it is difficult to estimate what sums she will be able to pay. Another question that is delayed is that of responsibilities, and the method of procedure to be adopted against persons who had broken the laws of war. He has inquired why Clauses similar to those inserted in the Treaties with Germany and with Austria are not adopted for the Treaty of Bulgaria, and he has been given the following explanations. In the other Treaties it had been stipulated that if the crime had been committed to the detriment of a Frenchman, the trial should be in a French Court, and if against an Englishman, in an English Court. If against Nationals of several countries, in a mixed Court. It appeared, however, that a Greek, Serbian, or Romanian Court would not be regarded as offering a fair trial to a Bulgarian who had committed an offence against a Greek, Serbian or Romanian. This might or might not be, but whatever the merits of the case, he thinks the Council should insist that the work be terminated rapidly. He would suggest that M Clemenceau should request the Commissions to expedite their labors.

Mr White says that he would like to add a word to Mr Balfour’s remarks. He wishes to propose that the Council should give authority to the Commission on New States to take up the protection of minorities clauses for the Treaty with Bulgaria. He understands that the Economic Clauses and the clauses prepared by the Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission are ready.

Mr Balfour thinks that Mr White’s information is not quite accurate. The Port question for instance, was held up, pending a decision as to whether or not Bulgaria is to have Dedeagatch (modern Alexandroupoli).

Mr White says that in any case the Commission on New States might get to work on Clauses for the protection of minorities.

(It is agreed that the Commission on New States be asked to prepare for the Treaty with Bulgaria.)

(b) S Tittoni says that in accordance with the request of his colleagues, he has discussed the question of frontiers between Greece and Bulgaria with Mr Venizelos. The latter demands the whole of Eastern and Western Thrace, and declines to reduce his claims in any respect. It is therefore impossible to obtain any concession and the question must be decided by the Council. Consequently he considers his mission ended as he can obtain nothing further from Mr Venizelos.

(c) M Clemenceau says that he will ask M Tardieu to explain the situation regarding the frontiers of Bulgaria.

(M Tardieu entered the room.)

M Clemenceau says that the Bulgarians are expected to arrive in four days. He asks him, as President of the Commission dealing with Bulgaria, to explain to what extent the Treaty is ready for them.

M Tardieu says that he is only President of the Commission dealing with the frontier question. In that Commission, the result obtained is total disagreement between the American and Italian Delegations on the one hand, and the British, French and Japanese Delegations on the other. M Tardieu then reads and explains the report. He says that he would like to add a few words in support of the opinions he had himself backed in the Commission. In western Thrace there is no choice between Greece and Bulgaria on ethnological grounds. The vast majority of the population was Turkish. The country, however, is not to be given to the Turks. The next most numerous population is, according to French statistics, Greek; according to other statistics, Bulgarian. It is very likely that the war has brought about alterations in the relative proportions of the population. As to the possession of a Port, the Bulgarians have a good Port on the Black Sea. The internationalization of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles will give them free access to the open sea. As to discontent, there will undoubtedly be discontent in Bulgaria, but the Balkans are the natural home of discontent, and the only question is whether discontent should be chiefly on the side of those who had fought against us, or mainly, among the Balkan Nations who had fought for us. He would remind the Council that the impossible desire to produce union in the Balkans had wasted precious months during the war. It led to the Allied defeat at the Dardanelles, and to numerous troubles in Salonika. The mistakes made in the war should not be repeated in the Peace. As to the ultimate disposal of Eastern Thrace, he did not wish to prejudice the question. It might perhaps be most fitting to attribute it to the territory of Constantinople should the Council decide not to give it to Greece. The point was, not who got it, but who lost it.

M Clemenceau says that the question is evidently one which the Council must solve. He is prepared to discuss it at once, but he is afraid that Mr White will not be able, without consulting his Government, to reach a decision immediately.

Mr White says this is so.

M Clemenceau says that unfortunately he cannot be present in the Council on the following day, and that M Pichon also would be unavoidably detained in Brussels. He is not sure that a meeting can be held on Wednesday. He hopes that by Thursday Mr White can obtain the views of his Government.

Mr White says that he will send a second telegram that very evening to endeavor to obtain instructions by Thursday.

Mr Balfour says that he regrets the delay as he regards the matter as very urgent. He will, however, as it is necessary, assent to a postponement until Thursday.

(In view of the importance of terminating the Treaty of Bulgaria at the earliest possible moment, it is decided that the first item on the Agenda for Thursday, July 24th, should be the determination of the frontiers of Bulgaria.)


2. M Clemenceau says that he has just received a communication from Bela Kun announcing that he proposes to attack the Romanians, in order to enforce upon them respect for the Armistice arranged by the Powers. M Clemenceau adds that he does not know whether the Romanians will be able to resist the attack. They have two divisions with which to oppose it. French troops are not far off and General Franchet d’Esperey has ordered them to fire if attacked. This news perhaps renders the appointment of the Committee unnecessary.

Mr Balfour says that he considers himself authorized to nominate a General to go to Hungary. The General in question is Major-General Gorton.

M Clemenceau says that the Generals might proceed to the front and report on what was going on there.

Mr White says that he has, as yet, received no orders from Washington.

S Tittoni says that, according to news from a good source General Boehm, who had been Commander of the Hungarian Red Army, had paid a visit to Vienna. He had ceased to be Commander-in-Chief but appeared to be still in touch with Bela Kun. It would seem, from what he had said in Vienna, that an effort was being made to convert the Communist Government of Hungary into a Socialist Government. He suggests that the Allied Representatives at Vienna be asked to inquire into this report and inform the Council of the results of their inquiry.

(It is decided not to nominate the Committee of Inquiry until such time as Mr White should have obtained the views of his Government. It is further decided that the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers in Vienna should be asked for information regarding the visit of General Boehm to that city, and to investigate the report that he had declared that he was trying to bring about a movement in Hungary aiming at the transformation of the present Communist Government of Bela Kun into a Socialist Government. The truth and eventual importance of the alleged scheme should be verified.)

(At this point the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles and General Thwaites enter the room.)


3. The Council has before it a report of the Military Representatives on the Army of Occupation in Upper Silesia.

Report of the Military Representatives on Army of Occupation in Upper Silesia General Belin reads the conclusions of the report to the effect that 1 division of 13,000 men will be required.

Mr Balfour asks whence this division could be obtained.

General Belin says that, in the first draft of the report it has been suggested that the division should be drawn from the troops employed in the occupation of the Rhineland. He would suggest, therefore, that Marshal Foch be asked if he can spare the troops. These troops would not be lost to Marshal Foch’s command: they would be stationed on the confines of Poland and Prussia, and, should any trouble arise requiring armed intervention, these troops, which would remain under Marshal Foch’s orders, could be utilized to co-operate with any movements made in the west.

M Clemenceau says that Marshal Foch’s estimate for the troops of occupation is 150,000 men. He will certainly be able to spare 13,000 from this number. He entirely agrees with the judicious remarks of General Belin. The division, would, no doubt be composed of international elements.

(It is agreed that the report of the Military Representatives, together with the suggestion that the necessary troops should be furnished by the Army of Occupation on the Rhine, be approves in principle and be submitted to Marshall Foch for his views regarding the possibility of furnishing the divisions required and on its composition.)


4. The Council has before it a report of the Military Representatives.

General Belin reads the conclusions of the Report under the heading “Material Assistance.”

M Clemenceau says that the means of transport to Poland are unsatisfactory. An inter-allied train, laden with munitions on its way to Poland, has been blown up on German territory. The German Government does not appear to be involved. The train was guarded by Polish soldiers, who had apparently been neglectful. It would perhaps, therefore, be advantageous to organize transport by sea.

Mr Balfour points out that the only port available is Danzig and that Allied control over it was not very good.

M Clemenceau says that the situation at Danzig had improved. The turbulent elements are quieter and the German Government appears to be resigned to losing the port. He suggests that the best plan would be to ask Marshal Foch to telegraph to General Nudant in Berlin to open negotiations with the German Government regarding transport by sea.

(It is decided that Marshal Foch be asked to initiate negotiations with the German Government for the transport of material for Poland to Danzig.)

General Belin then reads the conclusions of the report under the heading “Preventive Measures.” He explains that there are Allied officers serving in the Polish Army. Some of these might be nominated in advance to posts on the Delimitation Commission, which, as such, are only to be appointed 15 days after the coming into force of the Treaty. These officers might, in anticipation of their future duties, undertake to supervise the handing over of the ceded districts.

(This proposal is agreed to. It is decided that Marshal Foch be requested to report on the possibility of appointing Allied Officers serving in the Polish Army, who would ultimately be nominated to the Delimitation Commission, to supervise the transfer of the ceded territory from Germany to Poland.)


5. M Clemenceau says that he received a letter from Mr Venizelos regarding the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry. Mr Venizelos desires that a Greek Commissioner be appointed. This proposal does not appear to be very acceptable.

Mr Balfour points out that the Council had sent French and Italian officers to investigate the incidents at Fiume.

M Clemenceau observes that the case is different. At Fiume the incidents had occurred between Nationals of the Great Powers. In Asia Minor the incidents concern Greeks and Turks. It appears to him unreasonable to appoint a Greek to investigate a case of that kind. If his colleagues disagree with him, however, he will not press this point of view.

S Tittoni says that he is of the same opinion as M Clemenceau. The investigating Commission would be the direct emanation of the Council. It should, therefore, conform to the composition of the Council. If a Greek officer were to be appointed to the Commission in Asia Minor, it might be argued on the same lines that Mr Venizelos should have remained in the room, at a previous meeting, when the Council deliberated on the subject of the Greek occupation in Anatolia.

Mr Balfour said that in the early days of the Conference, it had been laid down that Powers with limited interests should be represented when matters directly affecting them were discussed.

M Clemenceau said that they were heard on matters regarding their interests, but the deliberations were conducted by the Five Powers.

Mr White says that he thinks the argument on both sides is strong, and that he had no very definite preferences.

Mr Balfour asks the military experts present in the room whether they think the collaboration of a Greek officer would be conducive to a sound finding.

General Thwaites expresses the opinion that it is undesirable to appoint a Greek officer.

General Bliss says that the presence of officers of all Allied Nations would give an appearance of impartiality. He does not feel strongly on the subject, but he is inclined personally to think that there should be officers from each of the Allied Nations on the Commission.

M Clemenceau says that the presence of a Greek officer on the Commission would doubtless not matter much.

S Tittoni objects to it as creating a precedent, which challenges the whole mechanism of the Conference.

Mr Balfour observes that the Greek officer would go as a representative of the Powers.

(After some further discussion it is agreed that Mr Venizelos be informed that he might appoint a Greek officer to follow the labors of the Commission. This officer will not, however, have a vote on the Commission and will take no part in its finding.

The following nominations were then made:

For Italy: General Dallolio.
For France: General Franchet d’Esperey to nominate an officer.
For Great Britain: General Milne to nominate an officer.
For The United States of America: An officer to be appointed after a reply from Washington has been received.

It is decided that the Commission should begin its labors at once, and should gather as early as possible at Constantinople.)


6. (It is agreed that nominations to this Commission should be communicated to the Secretary-General on the following day.)

7. Mr Balfour says that the report is to the effect that the Commission is unable to say whether the money required by General Gough is really necessary, whether the Allied Governments could furnish the money and what security exists for repayment. For all the assistance given to the Council, the Commission might as well not have reported at all. He quotes from a telegram from General Gough to the effect that the Germans are paying 15 million marks a month to support the Baltic Landwehr and the troops of Prince Lieven, and suggesting that to deliver Latvia and Russia from financial obligation to Germany, the Germans be ordered to continue payment into a British bank to the account of the Ulmannis Government as a portion of the reparation due from Germany. Mr Balfour adds that it is surprising that the Germans should be able to pay such a sum while all the Entente Powers together could not afford half a million a month.

M Clemenceau says that he thinks the matter cannot be settled at that meeting.

(The question is therefore postponed.)


8. M Tardieu says that, as he had previously explained, there is a Commission to supervise the execution of the Territorial and Political Clauses of the Treaty, and another to supervise the execution of the Reparation and Financial Clauses. There are, however, two other important chapters in the Treaty requiring similar Commissions, namely, the Economic and Colonial. He pointed out that the existing Committees could not perform this work He, therefore, proposes that a Committee be appointed to supervise the execution of these Clauses of the Treaty.

Baron Makino says that, as regards the Colonial Clauses, the most important of these were covered by the work of the Reparation Commission, and the remainder by the Committee dealing with Mandates. The work of these two bodies appeared to cover the main part of the Articles dealing with German colonies. If anything is left over, there might be a reason for appointing a new Commission, and he would be glad to know what remains over.

M Tardieu says that he agrees. The Reparation Commission can, he thinks, in a few hours deal with all questions which the Committee on Mandates left untouched. All he wishes is that some body should be required to do the necessary work on behalf of the Council.

Baron Makino suggests that the Committee on Mandates should be asked to make a report.

(After some further discussion, the two following resolutions are then adopted:

1) That the supervision of the execution of the Economic Clauses of the Treaty with Germany should be entrusted to the Economic Commission. The Commission was asked to report to the Council at an early date.

2) That the supervision of the execution of the Colonial Clauses of the Treaty with Germany should be entrusted to the Mandates Committee. The Committee is asked to report to the Council at an early date.)


9. M Tardieu says that he has just seen a letter which had not been communicated to the Commission dealing with the question of Klagenfurt.

S Tittoni observes that the question relating to war material was totally different from that of the Armistice line.

M Tardieu says that the Council had required a line to be drawn behind which the two belligerent parties could withdraw. It had then been thought right that this line should, as nearly as possible, be the boundary between the plebiscite areas. This had been done. An argument was now raised by the Yugoslavs against withdrawing behind the line on the plea that there was a certain stock of arms and munitions captured by them from the Austrians which they were entitled to remove. He thinks this excuse for not withdrawing should not be tolerated.

Mr Balfour says that he had imagined that it had been arranged that the Serbs should retire leaving behind them a small guard under Allied officers to watch those stores, to which it appeared they had a legitimate title. There appears to be no serious objection to the execution of this plan. The stores belonged to the Serbs and should they have to abandon them they would have a real grievance.

S Tittoni says that the matter is not as clear to him as it seemed to be to Mr Balfour. Mr Balfour seems convinced that these stores belong to the Serbs. The Serbs had occupied the territory in which these stores were after the armistice. They had no right, therefore, to claim as war booty material taken after the armistice. These stores represent a security for the reparation due from Austria. In it the Serbs were entitled not to the whole, but to one-fifth. The whole question should therefore be handed over to the Reparation Commission. If all the armaments in Austria were bartered away, there would finally remain nothing in the country to pay reparation. Further, he thinks the presence of Serbian troops, even in small numbers, is incompatible with the due observance of the plebiscite. As it is, the inhabitants complained that the Serbians threatened them. The same plan therefore should be adopted in this territory as was adopted in the areas in dispute between Germans and Poles. A police force is required, but not one representing either claimant.

Mr Balfour says that S Tittoni’s argument was a strong one, but it could hardly apply to a very small section of Serbian troops posted to guard a building. This he thinks is all that the proposed force amounts to. He would like to ask at what date the plebiscite was to take place.

M Tardieu said that S Tittoni’s observation might have force at the time when the plebiscite was to occur, but this was to be from three to six months after the coming into force of the Treaty. The Treaty had not yet been signed.

Mr Balfour said that long before this the munitions would have been removed, and the Serbian guard would have gone with them.

M Tardieu says that he would suggest a slight modification of Mr Balfour’s proposal, namely, that instead of a Serbian guard, the Allied generals in the area be asked to take charge of the stores, and to give the Serbians a receipt.

(The following Resolution was then adopted:

“It was decided that the troops of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes be required to evacuate the whole of zone “B” in the Klagenfurt Basin, in conformity with the boundary already communicated to them. The arms and stores claimed by them will be handed over for custody to the Allied Generals, who will furnish a receipt for the same.”)

10. M Clemenceau says that there is a complaint communicated by Mr Paderewski that the Germans are removing from Danzig all that is necessary for the working of the factories. The complaint emanates from a Committee of the working population of Danzig.

M Clemenceau proposes that Marshal Foch be asked to deal with the question.

(It is decided to refer the document communicated by Mr Paderewski regarding German action in Danzig to Marshal Foch for suitable action.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)