[Sailor Steve]

Monday, September 1, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. The Council has before it a Draft copy of a Treaty of Peace between the Allied Powers and the The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that the Treaty before the Council was similar to that with Romania already approved by the Council. There are three such Treaties, one with Romania, one with Yugoslavia and one with Greece, all on the same lines. The Treaty with Greece will be ready in a few days. The Committee has had the advantage of consultation with Mr Venizelos in regard to the last of these Treaties. The suggestions he has made have been very helpful. His attitude had been very different from that adopted by the other States. As to the Treaty with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, the Delegation of that State had protested both against the principles of the Treaty as a whole, and also against its application to old Serbia. The first of these objections is no concern of the Committee. As to the second, the Committee is of opinion that the questions involved were questions of principle which should govern the whole policy of the State. The Committee thinks that it is not practically possible to distinguish between one part of the territory of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and another. Serbia in 1912 had had a population of three millions, but after the Balkan war, this population increased to five millions, and at the present time it amounted to twelve millions. The State, moreover, has changed its name and a Constituent Assembly is to be gathered in order to draw up the Constitution for the whole territory. The Committee therefore, thinks it is fair to consider the whole as a new State. It did not think that the stipulations in the Draft Treaty represented any real derogation from the authority of the sovereign State.

M Clemenceau asks whether the supervision of the Minority Clauses is to vest in the Allied and Associated Powers, or in the League of Nations.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that the State conferred these rights on the Allied and Associated Powers pending the creation of a League of Nations, and thereafter stipulated that they should be transferred to the latter.

M Clemenceau says that this provision satisfies him.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that there is agreement in the Committee on all points save one. Before proceeding to describe this point, he wishes to draw attention to the very first sentence of the preamble. The date 1913 had been deliberately chosen in order to show that the Treaty had under consideration, not only the acquisition of territory made subsequent to the Great War, but also those which resulted from the Balkan War. This was the more necessary as the territory acquired in the Balkan war contained most of the population for whom special minority legislation was necessary, for instance, Macedonia. All were agreed that a strong and a just Government is necessary in Serbia. It is even more necessary that the Government should be strong than that it should be just. Macedonia is now to be delivered to Serbia in perpetuity. The question arises whether any restriction, not contained in the general clauses, for the protection of Minorities, should be imposed on the Serbian Government in this area. The French Delegation is of the opinion that nothing should be done in this sense. The argument is that freedom of religion and language were to prevail in Macedonia and that the population would have appeal to the League of Nations. The French Delegation thinks this sufficient. The Italian Delegation on the other hand proposes a far-reaching scheme amounting to a special form of autonomous Government for Macedonia. He will not explain this scheme as the British Delegation has not supported it. He would prefer that it should be explained by a member of the Italian Delegation. The American, British and Japanese Delegations propose what is included in the first version of Article 12. The suggestion is that the League of Nations should have their representative living in the country, who should report to the League and give advice to the Serbian Government. It is thought the presence of such a representative would be beneficial to the population as well as to the Serbian Government and might help to avoid outbreaks of violence. It is proposed that this arrangement should last five years. He has taken the liberty of consulting the Secretary-General of the League of Nations unofficially. He, on his side, makes no objection.

S Tittoni says that he would not insist on the Italian proposal. He is ready to adhere to the proposal of the majority.

M Berthelot says that the view of the French Delegation was that the Article proposed by the American, British and Japanese Delegations constituted an obvious mark of distrust of the Serbian Government. It had a further objectionable feature in that it left Macedonia open to Greek and Bulgarian intrigue, instead of allowing it to merge into Serbia, as it more naturally should, since it became part of Serbian territory. He thought the proposal would make it very difficult for the Serbian Government to accept the Treaty, especially as no special reasons for this distrust could be alleged.

Mr Polk asks whether the proposal applies only to Macedonia.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that it is intended to apply not only to Macedonia, but also to areas in the neighborhood of Albania, where a considerable part of the population is Albanian.

M Berthelot says that those people, like other minorities, had certain guarantees, including appeal to the League of Nations. The view of the French Delegation is that the Serbian Government has not deserved any special mark of suspicion.

S Tittoni observes that the measure is a temporary one, and that the Commissioner could be withdrawn after five years.

M Clemenceau says that he would prefer to tell the Serbian Government that the League of Nations will establish a Commissioner in the country if disturbances arose. The Minority Treaties are already ill-received by the Poles and the Romanians. He thinks it very undesirable to incur the ill-will of the Yugoslavs as well.

Mr Balfour says that he also would like to avoid hurting the feelings of the Serbs. Apart from their feelings, however, he thinks there were strong arguments in favour of the British, American, Japanese proposal. It is said that the people of Macedonia can appeal to the League of Nations if they were oppressed. Is it not better for the League of Nations to have an Officer on the spot who could report on the state of the country, rather than to receive Delegations from Macedonia in Geneva, Brussels or wherever the seat of the League might be? In the latter alternative, the League of Nations would have a poor chance of estimating the comparative mendacity of the reports brought to them. The Council has had experience of the kind of evidence supplied from the Balkans. There is equally hard swearing on both sides, and it was hardly ever possible to disentangle rights and wrongs. The Commissioner on the spot, assuming he were an able man, would know what really happened and he could give the League better evidence than could ever be obtained from rival Delegations. He does, however, think it is a serious matter to give offence to small Nations who were perhaps unduly sensitive about their sovereign rights. He is therefore inclined somewhat favorably towards M Clemenceau’s proposal; but it involves delivering Macedonia to the mercy of the Serbs until such time as the arrangement breaks down.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that the Committee has been influenced by the evidence of people with a knowledge of Balkan affairs. They have led the Committee to apprehend not legal injustices as in Poland, but outbreaks of illegal violence, such as massacres and petty persecutions. He ventures to suggest that if the outbreak of such forms of disorder are to be awaited, the object of the Conference will not be attained. He thinks it can be fairly stated to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation that it was a matter of common knowledge that they would have trouble in governing certain areas, and it would be an advantage not only to the local populations, but also to their Government, to have a representative of the League of Nations on the spot.

M Clemenceau says that the adoption of the preventive system would cause the Conference to have great difficulties with the Serbs. On the merits, he thinks Mr Headlam-Morley is quite right, but the result of any stipulation such as he proposed would be to encourage a large section of the Macedonian population to have recourse to the Commissioner of the League of Nations in opposition to the Central Serbian Government. This would in the end probably come about, but he would prefer that it should come about as the result of the faults of the Serbian Government, rather than as the result of action by the Conference.

S Tittoni said that he thinks an extraordinary commissioner might possibly cause annoyance. The desired result might be obtained by extending the powers of Consuls in Macedonia.

M Clemenceau says that conflict will inevitably ensue with any such system. It might even amount to the re-introduction of the “capitulations”.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that the object of the Committee should be to do away with any reminiscences of the old control of the Powers. A very careful attempt had been made to avoid this difficulty.

Mr Polk says that he feels the same scruple as M Clemenceau. He does not wish to hurt the national pride of the Serbs. On the other hand if nothing is done the Macedonians will suffer.

M Clemenceau says it is for this reason that he suggests the threat of imposing a Commissioner. He suggests that a formula be introduced in the Treaty to the effect that the League of Nations would send a Commissioner to Macedonia, should trouble arise in the area. The Serbs would understand that they must behave.

Mr Polk asks whether M Clemenceau suggests the insertion of this in the Treaty of Peace itself.

M Tardieu says he thinks that if anything of the sort is said, it would be better to say it in a letter, but he does not think it desirable to say anything of the kind. Why should Macedonia be specially singled out?

Mr Polk asks whether the suggestion could not be made to the Serb, Croat Slovene Delegation. Their opinion might then be obtained.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that though the Delegation has not seen the draft Treaty, he is quite certain they would refuse to sign it. He did, however, think it urgent to submit the Treaty to them. They would certainly make comment on the Article as at present drafted. It was better to submit it to them in a strong form, in order to have a margin for concessions.

Mr Polk says he thinks in the end it will be necessary to amend the Article in the sense suggested by M Clemenceau. He agrees, however, that the Article in its present form might be shown to the Serbs.

Mr Headlam-Morley said that the Committee wished genuinely to obtain the views of the Delegation. The Committee has not had the advantage of discussing the question with them in consequence of their uncompromising attitude. The conversations with Mr Venizelos on the other hand had been very fruitful.

Mr Balfour asks what the Committee will do if the Serbs regard the Article as such an insult to them that they refuse to discuss it.

S Tittoni suggested that the Article be so worded as not to impose a Commissioner, but to suggest the appointment of one if necessary.

M Tardieu says that whatever the situation in Macedonia might be, he does not think it right to add a special provision to the clauses, which in themselves are extremely unpopular. There are other areas in which disturbances might be expected. He does not look forward to the administration of part of Serbia by the League of Nations. Such a provision could not in any case be made general.

Mr Balfour says that the Commissioner, he thought, would not have an agreeable post. He would have no executive authority and no protection. He could only offer advice which might be neglected with impunity. There seem to be areas in which mutual massacres are the only method of reaching conclusions.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that this is what the Committee expects will take place if no arrangements were made in anticipation. There will be at once considerable agitation fostered by the friends of the Bulgars, in America, Great Britain and perhaps in France. They would claim the attention of the League of Nations; and the trouble would be aggravated.

M Tardieu says that if information is all that is desired, consuls can make reports.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that this is the old system, which it was desirable to eschew.

M Tardieu says that the old system includes international gendarmerie. The appointment of a Commissioner appears to reintroduce that system, in contradiction of the principles of the Conference, and in particular of the League of Nations.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that he accepts M Tardieu’s general criticism, but that he thinks this special exception is justified.

Mr Balfour says that no doubt the Serbs, if they knows their own interests, will suggest the appointment of the Commissioner themselves, but it is clear they do not.

M. Pichon says that what chiefly shocked the world in the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia was the violation of Serbian sovereignty. If the Conference adopts the same course, Serbia will refuse to sign. Mr Pachitch has already declared quite clearly that he will not.

Mr Balfour inquires whether the League of Nations has a right under the Covenant to send representatives to make an inquiry, should massacres take place.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that the League has this power according to the terms of the Minority Treaties; in this instance, according to Article 11, the League of Nations can act if an infraction of the Treaty occurs.

M Clemenceau after reading Article 11, expresses the opinion that these stipulations are sufficient to protect Macedonian and Albanian minorities in the Serbian State.

Mr Balfour agrees that it will be easier in practice to give effect to Article 11, rather than to Article 12.

S Tittoni suggested that the words “prendre telles mesures” be substituted for the words “procéder de telle façon” in the French text of Article 11.

(It is then decided to accept the Treaty as a whole, to expunge Article 12 entirely, to amend Article 11 by the substitution of the words “prendre telles mesures” for “procéder de telle façon”, and, after the necessary drafting amendments, to communicate the Treaty to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation.)


2. M Tardieu explains the letter sent by Mr Venizelos to the President of the Council on the 24th August. He points out that since then a new element in the situation had been introduced by a telegram from President Wilson. This telegram sets aside both the alternatives considered.

M Clemenceau said that he thinks that it is a very dangerous proposal to ask the Commissioner at Constantinople to take charge of an area containing 700,000 Greeks and 700,000 Turks, who would be in a continual state of warfare. He cannot therefore accept the proposals made by President Wilson, but he is ready to listen to any new proposals that might be made.

S Tittoni suggests that the question be adjourned, as no decision could be reached that day.

Mr Balfour points out that the Bulgarians are awaiting the Treaty, which must be completed without further delay.

M Clemenceau said that if President Wilson adhered to his proposal it was not possible to reach a settlement.

Mr Balfour says that the future of Constantinople and Asia Minor need not be settled before the conclusion of the Treaty with Bulgaria. It was possible to say that Bulgaria should have nothing south or south-east of a given line. The fate of the territories outside that line might be reserved.

S Tittoni said that if this plan is followed, difficulties will arise in Western Thrace. Eastern Thrace could be reserved without any difficulty, as it is occupied by Turkish troops. But the Bulgarians will be called upon to evacuate that part of Western Thrace they at present occupied. If so, they must be told to whom they were to deliver the country.

M Tardieu said that there is also a difficulty for Greece if the decision is adjourned until the fate of Constantinople has been settled.

Mr Balfour says that it was possible to distinguish between the questions at issue. The most pressing of the problems is to decide what was the boundary of Bulgaria. The other questions as to exactly how the parts of the Turkish Empire South of the Bulgarian boundary should be disposed of, could be for the time being deferred. As to President Wilson’s telegram, he could not help feeling the President had not given sufficient consideration to the position of Mr Venizelos. Mr Venizelos is the only statesman in the Balkans who had sincerely tried to assist the Conference, and whose policy aimed at maintaining peace in the Balkans, yet if the American policy in Eastern Europe were carried out, Greece of all these States, would fare worst. Serbia would acquire three times as much territory as she previously possessed. Romania, in spite of her constant defiance of the Conference, would double her population. Poland and Czechoslovakia were created by the Conference itself. Greece, if a large Greek population in Thrace were not added to her, would hardly increase at all, except in national debt which was as great as Bulgaria’s, even when the Bulgarian indemnity of £90,000,000 was counted in. He thinks that it is not altogether fair to treat Mr Venizelos in this manner nor did he believe it to be in the interest of Peace, especially as all Greece asks for is the application of the Fourteen Points. The President’s message, however, must be seriously considered. He therefore suggests that a line be adopted for the purpose of the Treaty with Bulgaria and that the attribution of all territories south of it be reserved.

M Tardieu says that to the reasons adduced by Mr Balfour might be added the fact that Greece since the Armistice, at the instance of the Conference, had mobilized three more divisions than she had under arms during the war. She had increased her army from 9 to 12 divisions. Greece is the only Power which had increased her Army since the Armistice. Out of 7¼ million Greeks living in compact masses in Greece, Thrace and Asia Minor, 2,300,000 living at the very gates of their own country would be excluded from it by the President’s plan. He does not think this would conduce to peace. There is also another aspect to the question. The Council had seen fit to deny the Hapsburgs the recovery of the throne in Hungary. If Greece were to be treated as was now suggested, King Constantine would be back on the throne within six months. He agrees that Mr Balfour’s solution would meet the practical necessity of framing a treaty for Bulgaria, but he thinks the arguments raised against the President’s message should be put to him.

Mr Polk says he would gladly send the arguments to President Wilson. He heartily agreed with what Mr Balfour had said concerning the attitude of Mr Venizelos during the Conference. This attitude had always been most loyal and generous. It is therefore most distasteful to the American Delegation to adopt any decision not immediately acceptable to Mr Venizelos. He does not wish to enter into all the reasons which had determined President Wilson. He would only point out to M Tardieu that, if all the Greeks outside Greece were allowed to join Greece, it was rather the territory round Constantinople than the territory round Adrianople which would become Greek. He felt sure that the danger of the restoration of Constantine was recognised by President Wilson.

(It is decided that the Central Territorial Committee should determine a boundary line in accordance with President Wilson’s message, as the Southern frontier of Bulgaria. The portion of Western Thrace to be ceded by Bulgaria will be ceded to the Allied and Associated Powers. This territory will be occupied by British, French, Italian and Greek troops, the last being kept in the portion of this territory by general agreement attributed to Greece. The Treaty should, further, stipulate for Bulgarian access to a port on the Aegean.)


3. Mr Balfour says that he has sent M Clemenceau’s proposals to the British Government with a personal opinion in their favour, and is waiting to hear further as to representatives being sent out to confer regarding details.

(It is agreed the question should be adjourned.)


4. Mr Balfour says that he understands the policy of the Conference to be that repatriation of the German prisoners in British and American hands should be carried out without delay under the auspices of an Inter-Allied Commission. It is not intended that the Commission should delay repatriation, even for an hour. The Commission itself is mere camouflage. He is ready to discuss any report the Commission might make, provided repatriation went on in the meantime. He did not, however, think that it was necessary for the Commission to make any report. All it had to do was to give a free hand to the British and American Authorities to carry out the repatriation. On Saturday he had heard that the engine drivers on the French trains said that they will take no German prisoner trains into Germany without a direct order from M. Clemenceau. Repatriation of Prisoners of War

M Clemenceau says that no obstruction has been put by him on the process of repatriation.

M Alphand explains the report made to the Council and the interpretation of its orders made by the Commission. He further points out that the Treaty stipulated that repatriation of prisoners should be carried out with the help of German rolling stock.

M Clemenceau points out that it had not been intended that the Commission should make any arrangements with the Germans. All it was to do was to facilitate in every way the repatriation of the prisoners held by the British and the Americans.

Mr Matsui asks whether there is any objection to a discussion within the Commission regarding repatriation of prisoners held by the Japanese.

M Clemenceau says that he sees no objection.

M Alphand asks whether German civilian prisoners held by the French Government should also be repatriated.

M Clemenceau replies in the negative.


5. The Council has before it a draft note to the German Government regarding the violation of the Treaty constituted by Article 61 in the new German Constitution.

M Clemenceau says that he sees several solutions, none of which are entirely satisfactory. One is to tell the Germans that the Treaty will not be ratified unless they alter their Constitution. Another is to say that, as Article 178 of the German Constitution rendered Article 61 inoperative, the German Government is asked to acknowledge the nullity of the latter. The third idea that strikes him is that the Council should avail itself of the article in the Treaty providing for a prolongation of the occupation of the Rhine if guarantees against German aggression appeared insufficient.

M Tardieu points out that Article 428 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany stipulates for something to take place after the lapse of 15 years. The breach of the Treaty complained of had just occurred. It seemed a long time to wait before taking action.

Mr Balfour said he thinks the notion of not ratifying the Treaty must be rejected. He thinks, however, it would be quite legitimate to occupy more territory on the East of the Rhine should the Germans not amend their Constitution.

M Tardieu agrees with Mr Balfour that action should be taken at once of such a kind as to discourage Germany from a repetition of the offence.

Mr Balfour points out that the German Government alone can do nothing. It cannot alter the Constitution. It can interpret it but its interpretation could be called in question by another Government. Only the German Parliament could deal with the matter and the German Parliament was not sitting. He suggests that the German Government be told that it had committed a breach of the Treaty which cannot be accepted, and that this breach must be remedied within a certain time, failing which the Allied and Associated Powers would take such action as they might think fit.

M Clemenceau suggests that such action might be the occupation of Frankfurt.

(It is decided that M Berthelot should re-draft the message to the German Government regarding the breach of the Treaty constituted by Article 61 of the new German Constitution in the spirit of the discussion and that the new draft should be considered at the following meeting.)

(The meeting then adjourns.)