Quote:
Originally Posted by Kapitän
Started new career in August 2019 to commemorate the beginning of WWII, 80 years before ...
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U 115
- KTB -
First War Patrol
(17th war patrol overall)
Monday, 12 July 1943 - Indian Ocean -
Annex 2.3
Radio Messages transferred by Schliemann:
U-boat Situation.
C. Southern Operations Area:
The operation of all available type VIIC and IXC boats, which could be supplied by U-tanker, in remote operations area in the Caribbean, and off the Brazilian and W. African coast, has begun to take effect during the last few days. On the way to their operational areas, these boats did not sink a single ship, a clear proof of the fact, that there are actually no independently-routed ships in the N. and Central Atlantic.
After a short period in their operational areas, the boats have so far scored the following successes:
In the Caribbean:
2 steamers from convoys
1 cargo sailing vessel by U 759 in EC
Off the N. coast of Brazil:
1 steamer by U 590
3 steamers from a convoy and one independent ship by U 510 in EP
5 steamers from a convoy by U 185 in FC
Off the E. coast of Brazil:
1 steamer by U 172 in FD 70
Off Rio:
4 steamers by U 513
Off Freetown:
1 ship by U 618 in ET 50
Off Lagos:
2 steamers by U 508 in EV 60.
It can be seen that in general, traffic is by convoy even in these areas and according to present experience, the escort is very poorly trained. The constant air activity is unpleasant, although is it by no means as strong or as dangerously effective. It remains to be seen how long the U-boat crews will be able to stand being submerged all day with few opportunities to surface in these operations areas, in the Equatorial zone, where the weather is particularly hot and damp at this time of year. Although the risks are much fewer than in the N. Atlantic, operation in those waters requires extreme endurance on the part of the crews. The length of time spent in the operational area will ordinarily be governed by the state of health of the technical personnel, who usually have to work in temperatures of 40 - 50 degrees celcius. On the whole, however, all Commanding Officers and crews like to go to these areas, in spite of the trials involved, because chances of success are so much greater than in the convoy operations on the England - American routes.
The first wave of boats which have arrived in these operational areas, will be relieved by a second and a third wave. Unfortunately, much depends on the tanker situation, which is at present bad (U 462 has returned to port, as she was forced to turn back on her way out through Biscay, owing to bombing attacks). Only small supplies of fuel and provisions can be provided fairly far N. in the Central Atlantic.
RST
KorvKpt.& Cmdr. U 115 |
Started new career in August 2019 to commemorate the beginning of WWII, 80 years before ...
+++++++
U 115
- KTB -
First War Patrol
(17th war patrol overall)
Monday,
12 July 1943 - Indian Ocean -
Annex 2.4
Radio Messages transferred by Schliemann:
U-boat Situation.
D.
Situation in Biscay:
So far, 4 losses have occurred this month in Biscay, U 126 and U 535 on return passage and U 528 and U 514 on outward passage. It is fairly certain that the first two were the victims of an enemy air attack, but there is no clue as to the cause of loss of the other 2. It is strongly suspected that the enemy has laid a form of blockade around Biscay with part of the defence forces withdrawn from the N. Atlantic, convoys concentrating in BF 70, BE 90, BF 10 and BE 30. The following facts speak for this:
1) Increased sightings of A/S vessels of all kinds (destroyers, corvettes, trawlers) by U-boats.
2) Increased sightings of destroyers and cruisers by aircraft.
3) U 650's report of a long methodical D/C hunt heard in her hydrophones in BE 90. U 450 and U 119 were probably sunk at this time.
4) The unexplained disappearance of inward and outward-bound boats in Biscay.
5) A report from Naval Attache Madrid of the sighting of 3 destroyers and one other patrol vessel in the Cape Finisterre area and off El Ferrol.
6) Enemy press reports of the blockading of Biscay by naval forces.
This organized blockade may develop into a really serious danger for U-boats. The activity of English A/S a/c already makes great demands on the battery capacity of the boats which are submerged all the time, so that sometimes the boats are forced to proceed on the surface to charge their batteries in spite of danger from enemy a/c and keep off the planes with their Flak armament. The presence of English naval forces, which, according to experience, can be brought up to the U-boats in a very short time by the a/c will mean a considerable increase in losses which are already numerous due to English a/c alone. Every effort must therefore be made,
1) To obtain an exact idea of the disposition of these light naval forces and their method of operation, so that the boats can be given routes which will evade the blockade or enable them to break through it at the most favorable points. This will have to be done by organized air reconnaissance and systematic evaluation of all Radio Intelligence reports and reports from U-boats themselves.
2) To attack and destroy anti-submarine forces reported with our own few naval forces (destroyers).
3) To combat these light anti-submarine vessels, which usually operate in two's or three's with the FW 200s available, suitably armed.
If we cannot succeed in driving the English forces off from Biscay, further losses will be inevitable. The danger is particularly serious for damaged U-boats returning. The situation with regard to combating the enemy anti-submarine aircraft by G.O.C. Atlantic Air Forces' heavy bomber formations, has not in the main changed. It must however be noted, that enemy air activity has abated considerably W. of 8° W., so that at least in this sector of Biscay, the U-boats are safer against surprise attacks. It is to be hoped, that the
new ME 410s will reduce the superiority of the English Mosquitoes and Beaufighters to such an extent, that the Ju 88s operating further south will be able to carry out their sweeps with less than 8 aircraft at a time. If fewer aircraft can operate in one formation, more sorties can be flown and greater success achieved. It is probable however, that the enemy will counter the new aircraft by increasing the numbers of Mosquitoes and Beaufighters.
RST
KorvKpt.& Cmdr. U 115