[Sailor Steve]

Friday, July 18, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers


1. M Clemenceau says he has received a dispatch stating that the Greeks have committed atrocities in Smyrna and its neighborhood.

The Sheikh-ul-Islam formally accuses them. He wishes to propose to his Colleagues that they should send a Commission of Inquiry. The Council is not without responsibility, seeing that it had sent the Greeks to Smyrna.

Mr Balfour says he has been much concerned about the reports from Asia Minor. A question has been asked in the House of Commons. It has been found on investigation that the Greeks have in fact committed atrocities. Mr Venizelos has been greatly perturbed, and has himself been forced to admit the truth of the allegations.

S Tittoni says that fighting between the Turks and Greeks must be put to an end. It is very bitter, and no quarter is given on either side.

M Clemenceau asks whether his colleagues would be prepared to agree at once to the dispatch of the Commission.

Mr Balfour says that he would prefer, before deciding to do this, to discuss the whole question of Asia Minor. He does not object to the proposal in itself, though he would point out that if Commissions of Inquiry have to be sent to investigate all charges of atrocities throughout the world, he does not think he would be able to lay his hand on a sufficient number of officers.

M Clemenceau says he proposes to send French Commissioners, even if his Colleagues appoint none. He would, however, prefer that they should do so.

Mr Balfour says that he has no objection, but that it is more important to prevent recurrences of atrocities in the future than to investigate those which have already taken place. Control could only be exercised by the Conference through the local Commander-in-Chief.

M Clemenceau says that Mr Balfour’s plan would only result in the issuing of a proclamation, which would have no effect at all. The Allies would have to deal with the Turks hereafter, and it must be made clear to them they did not send the Greeks to Smyrna merely to commit atrocities.

S Tittoni said that he agrees with M Clemenceau. It is very important to make the Turks feel that the Allies did not propose to have them massacred.

Mr Balfour points out that the atrocities complained of had been committed by soldiers. They should be checked by the Commander-in-Chief in Anatolia. Orders of the Council could be sent and executed through him. He would have certain proposals to make on this subject, and he thinks that M Clemenceau’s plan would fit in with his own.

(It is decided that the question of appointing a Commission of Inquiry should be postponed till the Meeting in the afternoon.)


2. M Clemenceau says that he has received an account of proceedings at Dédéagatch which, seeing that Italy as well as the other Allies, is still at war with Bulgaria, deserves comment and perhaps action by the Italian Government.

S Tittoni said that he agrees with M Clemenceau that the behavior of the Italian officers in fraternizing with the Bulgarians is, if correctly reported, highly reprehensible. He undertakes to have an inquiry made into the matter, and asked that M Clemenceau’s information be handed to him.


3. Mr White informs the Council that he has received the following telegram from President Wilson, and asks his colleagues what answer he should give on their behalf:

“Respecting the decision announced in your telegram of June 30th, to postpone further discussion of the Treaty with the Ottoman Government until the Government of the United States is in a position to say whether it will be able to undertake a mandate for a part of Turkish territory, I am afraid that the delay which this will involve will be very considerable and should like to know what attitude towards Turkey the Powers propose to take in the meantime.”

M Clemenceau says that the only attitude the Powers could adopt as far as he knows is one of expectancy. He is for certain reasons not ready to talk about Asia Minor. He does not know what kind of declaration the President expects the Council to make.

Mr White says he thinks perhaps the President had the maintenance of order in his mind.

M Clemenceau says that on this subject the Council will take the necessary measures in concert. As to the future he can at present enter into no pledges. If the Greeks, Turks, and Italians are fighting it is not his fault.

Mr White asks if M Clemenceau’s intention is to wait until the Government of the United States was in a position to say whether it will undertake a mandate.

M Clemenceau says he will not undertake to wait indefinitely. For the time being he can make no statement. When other work has been done, the Council will do its best to settle the affairs of Turkey. All he can say in reply to the President’s message is that the Council has taken note of it. President Wilson knows full well what the difficulties are. He wishes to obtain a mandate in Armenia and an American Commissioner has been appointed. He asks for part of Cilicia, and is favorably disposed towards accepting a mandate for Constantinople. The question of Constantinople is one of the greatest importance for Europe. It had caused wars in the past, and required the closest study.

Mr Balfour agrees that no definite answer can at present be given to President Wilson. The President is unfortunately prevented by the American Constitution from undertaking anything for the time being. Meanwhile the Council will try and maintain order in Turkey.

(It is agreed that Mr White should reply in the above sense to the President’s telegram.)


4. S Tittoni reads the following agreement between himself and M. Venizelos:

“The line of division between the Greek and Italian occupations in Asia Minor begins from the mouth of the Küçük Menderes river: thence it will follow the course of the river up to the Ayassoluk-Scala-Nova road: thence it will follow the line of the Greek occupation of Ayassoluk and old Ephesus.

From old Ephesus it will follow a line at an average distance of 600 meters from the railway Smyrna-Aidin to the west, then to the south of the said railway, the line to be fixed on the spot by the Greek and Italian Governments in order to allow the Greek troops to protect the railway from sudden attacks from Comitagis.

The line will then reach the Muschluk-Deresi river which will be followed to its junction with the Menderez.

Thence it will follow the bed of the Menderez to the east as far as Keuehk.

The two Governments agree not to pass beyond the line above established. Moreover this occupation has only a provisional character corresponding to the actual state of affairs, the consideration of the definite regime for these regions being reserved to the Conference.

Each of the two Governments agrees to afford in the territory which it occupies full and complete protection to the co-nationals of the other.

Instructions will be given to the commands in order that the officers of the two armies may maintain towards each other most friendly relations.”

He explains that the expression “occupation” implies occupation at the present time.

Mr Balfour says that the question must be considered from a larger aspect than that of a friendly agreement between the Greeks and the Italians. The Entente had told the Greeks to go to Smyrna. Since their arrival there was a divergence of opinion as to whether they had or had not obeyed the instructions of the British Naval Authority on the spot. Commodore Fitz-Maurice considers that they had exceeded their orders, which were not to go beyond the Sandjak of Smyrna. This might not be the fault of Mr Venizelos, but nevertheless it would seem that the harm was done. As to the Italians (he knows this was not S Tittoni’s policy) they had gone to Asia Minor without informing their Allies, and they had made successive advances into the country, also without informing them. The Council of Three had informed S Orlando that there could be no possible conversations until the Italian troops had been entirely withdrawn. Then a change of Government had taken place in Italy, and there had been a friendly meeting with S Tittoni. S Tittoni had said that the Italian Government would be put into a very serious difficulty if the British and French Governments insisted on the total withdrawal of the Italian troops. No formal decision had been taken as a result of this declaration, but the French and British Governments had not insisted.

M Clemenceau observes that it had been decided to send S Tittoni an answer.

Mr Balfour, continuing, says that, in effect, nothing had been done. There were, therefore, in Anatolia, Greek troops who were disobeying orders, and Italian troops who were there without orders. From this resulted a difficult and confused situation. He is anxious that no national susceptibilities should be hurt, but he supposed that the Council also had susceptibilities. He thinks, therefore, that he might suggest that the whole method of procedure should be altered. The Greeks had been told to consult a naval officer before making any movement. It was not the business of a naval officer to know all the intricacies of land operations. This system had not worked well. The Italian troops, on the other hand, acted in an irresponsible manner, and are under no Allied control. Would it not be better for the orders of the Council to be conveyed to all the troops in Asia Minor through its local Commander-in-Chief? In Eastern Europe, General Franchet d’Esperey is the medium for the Council’s policy and Marshal Foch in the rest of Europe. Why should the same procedure not be adopted in Asia Minor, where the Commander-in-Chief is General Allenby? It is not because General Allenby is a British officer that he suggests this, but because he is Commander-in-Chief. There might even be some advantage in his being British, seeing that the British Government has no interests in the region affected. He suggests, therefore, that General Allenby be utilized as an agent of the Council just as Marshal Foch and General Franchet d’Esperey in other parts of the world. If this were done, the Turks would realize that the Conference does not approve of outrages, and that they are to be put a stop to. The face of both Greeks and Italians would be saved, and order would be established in Turkey. This solution would not only be logical, but would conducive to sound administration. This method could not injure Italian pride, as there are Italian troops at Konia already under General Allenby’s command. A very difficult situation could thus be regularized and some order could be made to reign over the trespasses of the Greeks and the unauthorized presence of the Italians.

M Pichon says that he thinks that General Milne is directly in command.

Mr Balfour says he thinks that is the case, but that General Milne is under the superior authority of General Allenby.

M Clemenceau says that to speak his mind freely, though he has great respect for General Allenby, he feels that, in Turkey, he acts as a British officer receiving orders from the British Government rather than as an Allied Commander-in-Chief. The effect of his activities is distinctly anti-French. This ambiguous situation is unsatisfactory. General Allenby commands British troops as a British General. As an Allied Commander-in-Chief he refuses to allow French troops to be relieved. He refuses to allow them to enter Syria. He places them in Cilicia, knowing that the mandate of Cilicia is likely to go to the Americans. All his agents were consistently against the French. On every occasion, he says that the unpopularity of the French troops renders their relief or their stationing in Syria undesirable. There is a pyramid of files on this subject, and he could prove what he said. General Hamelin had telegraphed that he did not dare celebrate the 14th of July, to which he (M Clemenceau) had replied, ordering that the day should be celebrated. It had been done and there had been no trouble. In Damascus, the French had been welcomed, in spite of all General Allenby had said. As a result of all this, a condition of confidence does not exist. He would have more to say on the subject later, but he is so anxious to make peace, that he does not absolutely refuse Mr Balfour’s proposals, provided some assurance would be given that General Allenby would consider himself not a British, but an Allied agent.

Mr Balfour says that he regrets M Clemenceau had raised the vexed question of Syria. He does not believe that his charges against General Allenby would be sustained. M Clemenceau says that he had provoked agitation against the French.

M Clemenceau says that General Allenby’s agents had done so even if he had not. He had also refused to allow the relief of French troops already in the country.

Mr Balfour says that he feels sure that no responsible British officer desired to impair French popularity in Syria. They know that, under no circumstances, would Great Britain accept a mandate in Syria. The British Government, therefore, had no motive for creating difficulties in the path of others. He did not wish to pursue this matter, but only to enter his caveat against these allegations. M Clemenceau might be thoroughly assured that any officer, British or other, to whom the work was entrusted, would be impartial. He thinks, in fact, the officer in charge would be General Milne, acting under the directions of General Allenby. This said, he does not think he need add anything to the arguments he had previously used.

M Clemenceau says that he has not disagreed with the proposal, but has felt it necessary to make a reservation.

Mr White says that he is inclined to approve of Mr Balfour’s proposal. An arrangement made only between the Italians and Greeks would not reassure the Turks. The proposal would regularize the position of the Italians, who had gone to the country without the authority of the Conference. The Commander-in-Chief would be able to issue orders to Turks, Greeks and Italians, and thus the Conference would be put in charge of the situation.

S Tittoni says that (as Mr White had observed), the proposal under discussion would amount to an official recognition of Italian presence in Asia Minor. He takes note of this, as he thinks that this ultimately must be done. Italian troops are there. They can not physically be there and officially not be there. He, personally, had not sent them there, but he is, nevertheless, in an equivocal position and he would like it regularized.

M Clemenceau says that though S Tittoni is not responsible for sending Italian troops to Asia Minor, he seems disposed to take advantage of their presence there. He trusts that whatever arrangements are made, S Tittoni will not base any claim on this situation again.

S Tittoni says that he undertakes not to plead accomplished facts, but to rely entirely on justification, based on title.

M Clemenceau says that provisionally the Council should accept the arrangements made between the Greeks and the Italians, and that it should also accept Mr Balfour’s proposal as giving the Council a means of being obeyed, provided only that the question of substance is entirely reserved. On this understanding only would he accept these arrangements. He suggests that Mr Venizelos be asked to come into the room to express his formal adhesion to the arrangement made with S Tittoni.

(Mr Venizelos then enters the room.)

M Clemenceau, addressing Mr Venizelos, says that the Council is about to take two decisions, to one of which he is a party.

Mr Venizelos says that he was in full agreement with S Tittoni.

M Clemenceau says that the agreement is accepted by the Council subject to the proviso that it does not affect the ultimate decision either on Greek or on Italian rights. Furthermore, the local Commander-in-Chief will be in control of all troops - Turkish, Greek and Italian. They will have to obey the orders of General Milne. It is probable also that Commissioners will be sent to inquire into the atrocities which it is reported have been committed by Greek troops. Mr Venizelos is doubtless aware of what had taken place.

Mr Venizelos says that he fully understands. He would, however, observe that the Government at Constantinople is not in full control of the situation. Action at the Capital therefore might not produce all the effect desired in Anatolia. The Committee of Union and Progress still has more power than appears on the surface.

M Clemenceau observes that Mr Venizelos himself does not always control the actions of his countrymen.

Mr Venizelos says that whenever excesses had been complained of, he had caused the culprits to be severely punished. There have been two executions. He does not wish to conceal anything and is quite ready to accept the Commission of Inquiry. He wishes, however, to leave a note with the Council, asking for the execution of two Clauses of the Armistice, namely the disarmament of Turkey and the control of railways either by Allied troops or failing them by Greek troops and Allied Officers. He further asks that he might be heard when the Council comes to determine the southern frontier of Bulgaria.

(This is agreed to.)

(Mr Venizelos then withdraws and it is decided that his note should be submitted to the Experts.)

(It is decided provisionally to accept the agreement reached between S Tittoni and Mr Venizelos as given above.)

It is further decided to adopt the following Resolution proposed by Mr Balfour:

1) Resolved that the Conference shall communicate to the Turkish Government their intention of immediately marking out the limiting lines beyond which neither Greek nor Italian troops will be permitted to move, all rights secured to the Allies under the armistice being of course reserved. The Turkish Government is required to withdraw its troops to a position which will be determined by the Commander-in-Chief. The Turkish Government shall be at the same time informed that the limiting lines above referred to, have no relation to the ultimate territorial arrangements which will be imposed by the Peace Conference.

2) The Commander-in-Chief of the forces belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers in the Asiatic possessions of Turkey shall be directed to send officers who, after communicating with the Senior Naval Officer at Smyrna, and the Italian and Greek Generals, shall fix the military lines above referred to.

3) Any future movement of the Allied forces shall be under the supreme direction of the Commander-in-Chief who is responsible to the Conference for military operations in the Asiatic portion of the Turkish Empire.

M Clemenceau questions whether it would be useful to discuss this matter before Mr Balfour and Mr White have obtained the views of their Governments.

Mr White says that he would like more precise information before he consults his Government.

Mr Balfour says that the policy he would like to see carried out is:

1) That the execution of the Armistice by Hungary is required by the Conference.

2) That if the Armistice is carried out, Romanian troops should withdraw to the original frontier.

3) That the Allies cannot negotiate Peace with those who are breaking their engagements.

4) That the Conference cannot tolerate the continuation of conditions which would make Peace, Commerce and disarmament in Central Europe impossible.

Unless satisfactory evidence of compliance is obtained the necessary steps should be taken to enforce the will of the Conference. His attention has been drawn that morning to certain figures given on the previous day by Marshal Foch regarding the forces at the disposal of Bela Kun. His own hypothesis has been that the Hungarians are trying to collect an aggressive force to attack their neighbors. If this is untrue, the policy built upon it naturally must be abandoned, but if the hypothesis is true, he will recommend his Government to agree to military action.

M Clemenceau suggests that four Officers representing each of the Powers concerned should be sent to Hungary to verify the military situation and that Bela Kun be asked to allow them to make their investigation. Should he refuse, he would be admitting his guilt. Should he accept, the Council will be in a position to form an accurate judgment. A short time ago the Council had addressed him and said that no further conversation could be held with him because he had broken the Armistice. He had replied that a breach of the Armistice had been committed not by him but by the Romanians. The Council before acting, wished to know the exact truth.

S Tittoni says that he has no objection but he would like to re-enforce this action. The Council is dealing with a man whose ill-faith is proverbial. He has already used such communication as he had had with the Powers for his own advantage. He represents a small minority ruling an immense majority which is deprived of the means of rebelling. If his permission is solicited, this would increase his prestige. The Commission should be sent to Hungary without asking for his consent.

M Clemenceau said that he entirely agrees.

Mr White draws attention to the resolution of the Council recorded in H. D. 7 Para. 1,7 taken on July 15th:

“It was decided to refer the communication received from Bela Kun to Marshal Foch for a full report on the observances and non-observances of the original Armistice conditions by all parties concerned.”

M Clemenceau says that information obtained direct from the country would be more valuable than any information accessible to Marshal Foch.

S Tittoni said that the Commission should be numerous in order that it should produce a great moral effect.

M Clemenceau thinks that four General Officers would be sufficient. Instructions could be given to them, before they started, by the Council.

Mr White says that he would prefer to reserve his opinion until the afternoon’s meeting.

(It is agreed that the decision should be postponed until the next meeting at 16:00 on the same day.)

(The meeting then adjourns.)