[Sailor Steve]

Thursday, July 17, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers


(The Members of the Commission on Tientsin enter the room.)

1. The following Report was before the Meeting:

The Commission entrusted with the examination of the Italian claim for the Austro-Hungarian concession at Tientsin, considering on the one hand that

1) The demand of the Italian Government that the Austro-Hungarian concession at Tientsin should be handed over to them is contrary to the principle laid down by the Allied and Associated Powers in Article 260 of the Treaty of Peace signed on the 28th of June 1919 by the Allied and Associated Powers and the German State,

2) The said principle has been embodied after deliberation by the Allied and Associated Powers in Article 22, Section IV, Part IV, of the conditions drafted for re-establishing peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria, and that this Article was submitted to the Austrian Delegation at St. Germain-en-Laye on the 2nd June last,

3) The principle of restoring to China her full rights of sovereignty over former enemy concessions was unanimously adopted by the Allied and Associated Powers in spite of the fact that certain of them might have derived advantages from acquiring possession of enemy concessions bordering their own, in order to give evidence of the confidence which the high contracting parties are disposed to place in efforts towards improvement made by China, who, through declaring war against the enemy Empires, showed her determination to side with the Nations which defend the cause of right,
considering on the other hand that the objects of the Italian claim are deemed justifiable in the following respects:

I) As regards the urgent work which should be carried out for clearing the marshy portions of the former Austrian-Hungarian concession bordering the Italian concession,

II) As regards the works which should be carried out in the Austro-Hungarian concession for regulating the course of the Hei-Ho river and preventing the recurrence of floods damaging to the Italian concession,
is of opinion,

i) That it is inadvisable to modify the principle embodied in Article 22 of Part IV (section IV) of the draft Treaty of Peace with Austria;

ii) That it would be expedient that the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers should request from our Chinese Allies a formal promise that within a period of one year from the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Austria the necessary works of sanitation in the late Austro-Hungarian concession and the necessary works of improvement in the course of the river shall be undertaken with all desirable promptness and shall be entrusted to the Hei-Ho Commission which has already given proof of its competence and activity.

S Tittoni says he wishes to make the following declaration:

The Italian Delegation expresses the wish that the minutes of today’s sitting of the Supreme Council should show that His Majesty’s Government, while giving its assent to what is set forth in Art. 22, Part IV, Section IV, of the draft text of the Conditions of Peace with Austria, insists, nevertheless, on the soundness of its claims submitted in 1917 by the Legation at Peking to the Chinese Government for a rectification of the boundary line separating the Italian concession of Tient-Tsin from the former Austro-Hungarian concession.

M Pichon says that the Report of the Commission will be adopted, and no alteration will be made in Article 22. S Tittoni’s declaration, however, will be inserted in the Minutes.

Mr Balfour questions whether the declaration referred to the same subject as the Report of the Commission.

Mr Gout explains that the Italian concession is separated from the river by a small strip of the Austrian concession. The Italian Government in 1917 had asked for an alteration of the boundaries in order to obtain easier access to the river. The Commission has asked for fuller information on this subject than is available. The Italian delegate had undertaken to obtain it, but it has not yet been received, and the Commission therefore has reserved judgment on the subject.

M Pichon says that the Council is therefore asked for no decision on this matter. It would, however, be necessary to fix a time limit within which the works of sanitation should be undertaken. He thinks it might be sufficient to state that the work should be undertaken within a “reasonable time”.

Mr Balfour thinks perhaps the matter might be left to the League of Nations.

M Pichon observed that there is a Health Section of the League of Nations which might take an interest in the matter.

Baron Makino observes that the sovereignty over the ground in question is Chinese; the Chinese Government will, therefore, have to be approached on the subject.

Mr Gout said that if the Chinese Government takes steps within a year to set the enterprise going, there need be no complaint. Once the Hei-Ho Commission had taken the work in hand, it will certainly complete it thoroughly well.

Baron Makino observes that if the Chinese Government is asked by the Powers to execute a sanitary measure it would surely agree. The determination of the time limit would appear to be a sort of imposition.

M Pichon says that it might be difficult to get the Chinese Government to undertake the work. Once it has undertaken it, it will no doubt execute it.

After some further discussion it is agreed to fix a time limit of one year for the undertaking of the work.

Baron Makino says that as his objection is a matter of form he would agree.

(The Report of the Commission as above quoted is therefore adopted, and it is decided that no alteration need be made to Article 22, and that the Chinese Government should be asked in the name of the Powers to undertake the sanitary work required by the Italian Delegation within a year.)

(The Members of the Commission withdraw.)


(Mr Hoover, M Seydoux, S Crespi and Mr Gorvin enter the room.)

2. M Pichon asks how much, in Mr Hoover’s estimation, has been spent on the revictualling of Austria?

Mr Hoover says he estimates that to complete the present program up to the 15th of August, Eighty Million Dollars will have been spent.

M Pichon asks whether Mr Hoover thinks there are securities in Austria enough to cover the cost of the scheme he proposed to undertake.

Mr Hoover says that he doubts whether the sums already spent could be recovered for three or four years. Everything that could be realized had already been realized. The Austrian Authorities latterly had gone so far as to offer the National Art Galleries in payment for food.

M Pichon says that under these circumstances it seems hardly possible to advance money.

S Tittoni says that the alternative is Bolshevism.

Mr Hoover says that his hope is if priority is given to payment for food, even over payment of reparations, the Austrian Government might take heart and set to work in order to meet its liabilities. This is the only means of giving the present Government enough encouragement for it to hold on. Should the harvest succeed in Hungary, there will be a surplus of food in that country. It was only Allied help that had hitherto kept Austria from Bolshevism. The Hungarians are employing most active propaganda. Should they take the place of the Allies in the supply of food, it can hardly be expected that the Austrians would not join them and become Bolshevik. It seems clear that the Austrian Delegation sincerely wishes to keep a moderate Government in Power in Austria. If they could be assured by the Powers that the help he suggested would be given them, he thinks they might resist Bolshevism.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks Mr Hoover had made out a most serious case. He is not quite sure that the Bolsheviks in Hungary would have much food to spare. He was told that Bela Kun had quarreled with the peasants, who would be inclined to resist requisition. The main point is that it is desirable to set up Austria economically. She cannot be left to starve. Food must be advanced to her either on such securities as existed, or she must be put in a way to earn money. She cannot produce the food she required, as the territory left her by the Treaty is insufficient. Mr Hoover’s proposal is first to encourage the Austrians by a promise, and secondly, to tell the Reparation Committee to think first of making Austria a paying concern before getting money out of her. This appears to him to be the most statesmanlike method. If a man were kept alive by charity, he could not be asked to pay his debts. He is not quite sure, however, what the functions of the Reparation Commission are, or whether the Council cab give it orders as suggested by Mr Hoover.

Mr Hoover says the wording of the German Treaty enables the Reparation Commission to furnish food and raw material to Germany, and to obtain payment for these in priority to payment of reparation. In any case, as the Reparation Commission had complete control of all resources, no other body can intervene.

S Crespi says that the Reparation Commission has the right to raise resources with the object of obtaining food. The Reparation Commission could certainly be given orders by the Governments as it was itself merely an Agent of the Government.

(At this point M Clemenceau entered the room.)

M Clemenceau asks how payment for food will be obtained?

S Crespi says that money can be raised by taxation. Hungarian food might turn Austria Bolshevik. It is for this reason that Italy has sent food into Austria.

Mr Balfour says that he is ready to accept Mr Hoover’s plan, but he will take the opportunity of telling the Austrians that they must give up the arms and ammunition in Austria to the Czechs.

Mr Hoover suggests that the Austrians might be told that the food supplies will cease unless they did so.

S Tittoni considers that the question of the delivery of the arms should be kept quite separate from the question of food. These arms represent one of the securities in Austria for the payment of Reparation. He does not say that the arms should not be delivered, but an equivalent in value should be available for the Reparation fund.

Mr Balfour says that it is most urgent to send the arms to Czechoslovakia at once.

Mr Hoover says that this difficulty has already arisen. Trade has been arranged between Austria and Serbia. Five steel bridges are to be given to Serbia in exchange for food. The same objection had been raised, that these bridges represent a security for the payment of reparation. The Czechs are prepared to exchange coal for arms, but once the Czechs have given coal and the Serbians food, there is no means of making them contribute anything towards the reparation fund.

Mr Balfour says that if S Tittoni’s thesis is carried to its logical extremity, all Austrian trade would be stopped. Austria could get neither food nor anything else. He has no wish to reduce the reparation fund to Italy’s detriment. He thinks it imperative that Austria should be fed, and Czechoslovakia armed.

S Tittoni said that he acquiesces regarding food, which is a matter of primary necessity. It is not so vital a matter to arm the Czechs. Italy and the other Allies should get some equivalent for the liquidation of a valuable Austrian security. If the Czechs are ready to give coal in exchange, Italy should obtain her share of this coal, for the coal situation in Italy is as bad as that in Austria.

Mr Balfour said that in his opinion it is to Allied interests that the Czechs should be armed. If so, it was nearly as important that commerce between Austria and Czechoslovakia should be carried on as between Austria and Serbia for food. He thinks nothing should be allowed to stand in the way of the passage of arms from Vienna to Prague.

S Tittoni says that Italy recognizes the need of Austria for food, but as to coal, Italy needed it just as badly. Italy must therefore have her share in the coal which pays for the arms.

Mr Hoover says that the amount of the surplus of Bohemian coal is infinitesimal, and barely enough to supply the needs of Vienna. Moreover, the Czechs have ceased to export coal because they received no arms from Austria. Austria is afraid of exporting these arms out of fear of the Hungarian Bolsheviks. By a threat to withhold food, the Austrians could be prevailed upon to deliver the arms. They could also be promised, if they did so, Bohemian coal. The Italians, short as they were of coal, had realized Austrian needs, and had themselves supplied coal to Vienna.

S Crespi observes that it is the duty of the Separation Commission to see that all Austrian securities are not one by one spent to the detriment of the common reparation fund.

Mr Balfour says that he will be content to allow the arms to go, and to find out afterwards in what way payment can be obtained. So long as they are delivered to the Czechs, he does not mind in what way the re-adjustment was made for the benefit of the reparation fund.

Mr Hoover suggests that if his formula is adopted, a few lines might be added regarding the sending of arms to Czechoslovakia.

(It is therefore agreed that the following reply should be made to the Austrian Delegation:

“In respect to the Request laid before the Supreme Economic Council from the Austrian Delegates that provision of further food supplies should be immediately undertaken by the Allied and Associated Governments, this request has been laid before the Council of Five and the Council wishes to state that as food and raw materials for Austria during the forthcoming year are fundamental to her recuperation and her ability to make reparation, the method of provision of such food and raw material will be one of the first considerations of the Reparations Commission.

The Council wishes, however, to make this assurance contingent on an undertaking by the Austrian Government. The delivery of arms to Czechoslovakia has been greatly delayed despite the offer of coal in exchange. It must be understood that the continuation of the present supplies of food to Austria, as well as the above assurances, depend on the execution by Austria of the delivery of the arms and ammunition required by Czechoslovakia.”

The question raised by M. Tittoni was remitted for further study to the Supreme Economic Council.)


(At this stage, Marshal Foch, General Weygand, the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, Dr Benes, Mr Kramarcz, Mr Pachitch, Mr Misu, and Mr Vaida Voevod enter the room.)

3. Marshal Foch reads a memorandum regarding possible military action in Hungary. He also quotes from a telegram sent on the 10th July to the British War Office by Colonel Cunningham from Vienna to the effect that the red army is composed of 9 divisions, one of which, the 4th infantry division, has been disbanded. Each division can only muster a small number of rifles. For instance, the 9th division had only 2 to 3,000 rifles. To liberate Hungary from Communism in one week a force of 8 infantry divisions, one cavalry division, 100 aeroplanes and as many armored cars as possible would suffice.

Mr Balfour says that one statement in the very remarkable report read by Marshal Foch gives him some apprehension. He refers to the passage in which Marshal Foch alludes to the necessity of establishing in Hungary a Government with which the Entente could negotiate peace. Such a Government would not appear to be a Hungarian Government, but one set up by the Entente Powers. The Peace would be represented for all time, not as one between the Powers and the Hungarian people, but as a Peace between the Powers and their own puppets. This would furnish a weapon to all the enemies of the Entente. He will not ask Marshal Foch to say how this difficulty can be avoided, as the Marshal would doubtless reply, with justice, that this is the business of the politicians.

S Tittoni says that the Hungarian situation is a very difficult one. As to the military proposals, he has nothing to say, but regarding the political side he had some observations to make. Hungary is ruled by a small minority. 80 per cent of the Hungarian troops are against Bela Kun, so are the peasants and the bourgeoisie. At Szeged, there is an opposition Government which was a nationalist center. If the Council determines to have Hungary attacked by Czech, Romanian and Serbian troops, Bela Kun will be able to drape himself in the national colors and pose as a patriotic Hungarian. In the end, it will not be Bela Kun who would be destroyed, but the Hungarian nation. If the Allies, on the other hand, can act in concert with the Szeged Government, they will appear as the deliverers of the country from tyranny. All the Governments have to contend with the criticism and opposition of the Labor parties in their own countries. It is, therefore, highly opportune to appear to act on behalf of the majority in Hungary. He makes no criticism of the military means proposed by Marshal Foch, but he thinks they should be accompanied by political action of the kind he has described.

Mr White asks in what manner S Tittoni would suggest that this political action should be begun?

S Tittoni says that he would send Allied Agents to get into touch with the Government at Szeged before any military action began.

Marshal Foch says that he had, in his report, asked for Governmental instructions. When the armies set out for Budapest, they would be preceded by proclamations conveying the intentions of their Governments. It is for the Governments to determine what these proclamations should be.

Dr Benes says that he thinks S Tittoni’s proposals are based on wrong premises. From information he has received, the Hungarian Officers, though not sharing Bela Kun’s opinions, were loyal to him, because they think the Communist Government would give them means of fighting their neighbors. All of them are passionately attached to the integrity of Hungary. They would like to win back for it Transylvania, Croatia, and Slovakia. There is no hope of seducing these Officers. As to the civilians, no doubt the bourgeoisie parties would like to be rid of Bela Kun, but they will not cooperate with the neighboring nations to that end. If the Powers begin to negotiate with the Magyars, they must count with the suspicions and mistrust of the Romanians, of the Yugoslavs and of the Czechoslovaks. The Magyars do not admit their defeat. They remain Imperialist in spirit and they will use any conversation they might have with the Great Powers to turn the tables on their neighbors. He thinks for these reasons that there are strong objections to the course of negotiating with any Hungarian Party.

M Clemenceau asks Dr Benes whether he agrees to Marshal Foch’s plan?

M Benes says that he does but not to S Tittoni’s.

Mr Kramarcz says that the armies must march under the banner of “Respect for the Armistice”. The existence of a Hungarian army forces the neighboring countries to remain armed. They are anxious to disarm and demobilize. Enforcement of the Armistice Conditions is a complete and sufficient justification for action, and it will serve as an answer to criticism. He has the same fears and interests as S Tittoni, but he is convinced that there should be no talk with any Hungarian parties, as this will only revive Hungarian nationalist ambition. Action should be taken on military grounds if only to uphold the decrees of the Conference.

Mr Vaida-Voevod says that he agrees with Mr Kramarcz and Dr Benes. He thinks it is necessary not to give Bela Kun a pretext for posing as a defender of his country. The majority of the Hungarian population wishes to remain quiet and to be ruled neither by a communist nor by a reactionary government. When the Allied armies have taken Budapest, they might proclaim to the people that it is open to them to choose their own Government. The Allied Commander-in-Chief, however, should consult non-Magyar elements as well. There are Romanians, Serbs and Slovaks of Hungary who know the devices of the parties and who could help the Commander-in-Chief.

General Bliss says that the general purpose aimed at was one he would gladly see carried out, but only the Head of his Government could decide on any action in this respect. In spite of all disguises it is manifest that what is proposed is a renewal of war on Hungary with the object of destroying its present Government. If action is to be based on the pretext of a breach of the Armistice by Hungary, the Allies must be quite clear that the fault is entirely on the side of the Hungarians. In the Armistice arranged by General Franchet d’Esperey on the 13th November at Belgrade, a certain line had been fixed by Article I. North and west of this line the Serbians and Romanians respectively are not to advance. The second Article requires the demobilization of the Hungarian Army down to six Infantry Divisions and two Cavalry Divisions. It is alleged that the Hungarians had broken Article II.

Mr Balfour asks whether there is anything in Clause I forbidding the Serbians and Romanians to cross the line.

General Bliss says that the Romanians should not have crossed west of the line. When they had been relieved of German domination, they had crossed the line in spite of General Franchet d’Esperey. He had then tried to stop them on another line further west, but without avail. The matter had been discussed in Paris and the discussions had lead to the establishment of a neutral zone approximately representing the line fixed in the Treaty of 1916. Even this, however, had not stopped the Romanian advance. At a Meeting held by the Military Representatives at Versailles on the 25th February, 1919, General Charpy, Chief of Staff to General Franchet d’Esperey, had given the following evidence:

"On November 7th, 1918, General Franchet d’Esperey and Count Karolyi had met at Belgrade to sign a supplementary armistice with Hungary on the same lines as General Diaz had signed with Austria. At that time Romania was still under German domination and therefore only French, Serbian and Hungarian representatives were present at Belgrade. They all knew the terms of the Hungarian armistice. A certain zone was to be definitely occupied and further zones could be occupied for strategic reasons. The Armistice was signed on November 13th, and the Hungarians had made no difficulties and had carried out all the conditions. The French and Serbians advanced as agreed. The only difficulties occurred with Romania.

Without informing General Franchet d’Esperey, the Romanians had advanced, especially in the region of Klausenburg. The Hungarians at once protested that this was a breach of the armistice conditions. The Romanians replied that they were in agreement with the Hungarians. This was not correct, but eventually an agreement was reached. The Romanians were allowed to advance up to a line well in advance of the armistice line. This was reported to the Allied Governments.

Unfortunately, the Romanians advanced still further with the result that certain incidents took place; the Romanians oppressed the local population and the Hungarians became incensed. Up to that time, however, the position had not become serious.

The Romanians stated that they feared an attack by Hungarian armies; this was absolutely impossible. Hungary had no organised troops, whereas the Romanian army was well organised. Naturally there was much unrest in Hungary and some Bolshevism, but nothing important, and Bolshevism in Transylvania was not apparent. The Romanians had for some time tried to advance to the Treaty line, but General Franchet d’Esperey had refused so far though he had sent a mission to make inquiries into alleged atrocities. The information received was that the local situation was quite quiet.

Taking these facts into consideration the Romanians should remain on their present line as all the trouble had been caused by their advance. It was not for him to give advice on a political question, but the Romanians should not be allowed to cross the line Arad–Grosswardein–Szatmar–Nemeti and it would be preferable to send Allied troops there; a neutral zone would be of no advantage as there were not sufficient Allied troops to guard it.

To maintain order it would be sufficient to garrison Grosswardein and Szatmair with Allied troops; there were already some at Arad.

In spite of this the neutral zone had been accepted. The Romanians had advanced to the Eastern limit of this zone and finding it empty had proceeded as far as the Theiss. An American observer had informed him that as soon as the Hungarians came to know of the decision taken on March 12th, the Karolyi Government would go. He had written a letter to this effect to the Council. The Hungarian Government had only received information on the 19th. On that very date the Karolyi Government resigned and handed over its powers to Bela Kun. Bela Kun had succeeded in raising an Army solely to repel the unwarranted invasion of the Romanians. The violation of the armistice was first made by the Romanians in spite of the Powers and at a time when the Hungarian Army had gone to pieces. If the Council meant to take action on the ground that the Armistice had been violated, it should examine carefully at what date the Hungarian Army had been reconstituted. He is confident that it would be found that this had taken place after the violation of the armistice by the Romanians."

Mr Balfour says that he has three observations to make on General Bliss’s very important statement. In the first place he agrees with him that the American delegates and he himself as British representative could not initiate a considerable military policy without consulting the Governments at home. He personally cannot authorize a new war, or the resumption of an old war, without reference to London. In the second place he begs to dissent entirely, as far as he was concerned, from the allegation made by General Bliss that the breach of the armistice was merely alleged as a pretext for attacking the Communist Government of Hungary. He wishes it to be understood that he is not animated by any consideration of Hungarian internal politics, little though he might approve of Bela Kun. He agrees with Mr Kramarcz that it is intolerable to allow the Hungarian State to become a military stronghold, from which economic and political disturbances radiates over Central Europe. When he insists on the disarmament of Hungary by reason of her breach of the armistice, he is not disguising his intention, but stating exactly what he wishes. Without the disarmament of Hungary, there can be no peace or settlement of frontiers in Central Europe. On the third point he speaks with more diffidence. General Bliss’ argument is based on the view that the Allied Powers are precluded from sending troops across the line beyond which the Hungarians are not to advance, according to Article I of the Armistice. He is surprised at this view. The Article forbids the Hungarians to go beyond the line, but does not explicitly forbid the Allies to cross it. Clause III moreover gives the Allies the “right of occupying all places and strategic points which may be permanently fixed by the general Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.” It is difficult to reconcile this with General Bliss’ interpretation of Article I. There is another small point on which he does not wish to rely, namely, that when the Convention was signed Romania was not a belligerent. He would like to be told by experts in military jurisprudence whether the Romanian advance, regrettable though it might be, amounts to a breach of the Armistice in the same sense as the obvious and important breach made by Hungarians.

General Bliss says that the interpretation of Article I of the Armistice does not require a lawyer. The very word Armistice means the laying down of arms by both sides on a given line in order that civil plenipotentiaries should negotiate. It cannot impose a purely unilateral obligation. As to Article III, giving the Commander-in Chief of the Allied Armies the right to occupy strategic points, no such provision has been made in the Armistice with Germany. But it had been feared that hostilities with Germany might begin again, and when the Armistice Convention with Austria had been negotiated, it had been stipulated that the Allied Armies should have passed through Austrian territory in order to threaten Germany from the South. A similar provision had also been made in the Convention with Hungary. The provision, however, does not mean that any Allied Commander could occupy any point he liked without reference to the Commander-in-Chief. Romanian action had been taken in defiance of the wishes of General Franchet d’Esperey.

Mr Kramarcz said he does not wish to enter into the legal question. Czechoslovakia is threatened by the Hungarians. The Army of the Hungarians kept Czechoslovakia and other countries armed and mobilized. This is the only question for consideration.

Mr Pachitch says he agreed with Mr Kramarcz, Dr Benes, and Mr Vaida. Action ought to be taken to force Bela Kun to fulfill Hungary’s engagements under the Armistice. The Yugoslavs have reason to expect that they would be the third victim of Hungary. The Hungarians undoubtedly desire to re-establish Hungary in her historic frontiers.

M Clemenceau says that all concerned have now expressed their views. Two Governments, however, have to be consulted before action could be taken.

Marshal Foch observes that on July 11th, when he had been asked to study a plan of operations, the principle of action itself had not been in question. If it is questioned now, it will seem that the Council is in contradiction with itself.

Mr Balfour says that he dissents entirely from what Marshal Foch had just said. He cannot consult his Government on the propriety of military operations unless he knows what their nature is and what chance of success they offer.

Mr White says that as he understands the case, Marshal Foch had been asked to make a report to send to the Governments. Marshal Foch had made a most able report. He cannot commit his Government and even the President would have to be assured that the proposal does not involve a new war before he can assent, without consulting the Senate.

M Clemenceau says that this is not a subject that can be discussed. Each of the members of the Council is free to consult his Government. Marshal Foch has presented a remarkable report showing that success could be hoped for without a great expenditure of effort. General Bliss has put forward certain questions which deserve close examination. He will remind the Council that Mr Balfour had lately drafted a telegram in which the Council had informed Bela Kun that it cannot hold any conversations with him as long as he does not respect the Armistice. No one had then raised any objection.

Mr White says that he wishes that he had followed his usual method, and asked for time to consider the matter.

M Clemenceau says that he would like to point out that a state of war with Hungary still exists and there can be no question of a new war.

S Tittoni asks that the greatest secrecy be observed regarding the discussion.

(It is agreed that the discussion should be resumed on the following day at 10:30 by the Members of the Council.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)