TMO. 2.5 w custom mods
100 difficult cams off contacts off.
USS Drum SS-228
Report of Third War Patrol
23 September-8 November 1942
Area(s) 4A and 5.
1.) NARRATIVE
23 September-
0900-Depart Midway Island for Area(s) 4A and 5 via Midway. 4A is primary assignment with orders to "sweep" Area 5 for forty eight hours between 1 October and 6 October. A boat is scheduled to take station in that area later in the month.
30 September-
1500-SD contact 10 NM closing. Submerged to avoid. 32 N 145 E
2100-Surface.
1 October-
0100-Entered Area 4A
2 October
2200-Entered Area 5 for "sweep" over 48 hours.
3 October-
0900-Submeged for patrol.
2100-Surface.
2252-SJ contact bearing 354 9 NM.
2300-General Quarters. Visual on large transport escorted by two DD course 140 speed 17 knots. Contact report sent to COMBSUBPAC.
2310-Received reply from COMBSUBPAC. X Large troopship likely carrying frontline troops bound for Solomons via Truk. Attack at once X Moved into position, readied stern tubes for night surface torpedo attack, Drum's first. This decision was made as Drum's speed advantage was only two knots and preventing gaining optimal submerged position for dawn submerged attack. There was no moon with a light fog, optimal conditions for surface attack.
2322-Attack No. 1: Fired four torpedoes at troopship 3200 yards AOB 70. The rear DD identified as Akizuki Class.
2323-Two torpedoes prematurely exploded. Two hit the target, causing large fire and target to list to starboard. Akizuki DD closed in on Drum's position immediately but did not seem to actually acquire Drum visually. DD may have radar. Target continued underway at 6 knots, listing and burning. Drum worked ahead for follow up attack.
2351-Fired three bow torpedoes from 2300 yards AOB 80. Two prematurely detonated, one hit. Target split in two at keel. HORAI MARU 9192 tons sunk 33 48 N 138 23 E. Akizuki DD again honed in on Drum's location but was able to escape into the night. After a few minutes, the DD slowed and dropped depth charges, convinced Drum had submerged. Drum continued to clear the scene on course for primary patrol area.
4 October-
0144-SJ contact 010 8 NM . 33 20 N 138 50 E
0150-Judging by rapidly changing bearings, targets moving at high speed. Drum went to General Quarters and began closing.
0207-Visual contact on large warship identified as a CA or CL with two DD in single column. Estimated course/speed : 052 18 knots. Contact report sent to COMSUBPAC.
0214-Received reply from COMSUBPAC. X ATTACK X
0217-Large warship identified as YUBARI Class CL. Two DD unidentified.
0218-Haze lifted moon is out illuminating Drum. Submerged for attack.
0221-Attack No. 2: Fired four torpedoes range 2600 yards AOB 60.
0222-Three torpedoes prematurely detonated. This alerted the enemy as ships alarms were audible and the CL clearly slowed. However, no star shells or searchlights were spotted. The CL sped back up on its original course.
0223-As Drum's last torpedo was estimated 200 yards from target, it was spotted. More alarms were heard and the CL slowed turning hard to port (towards torpedo and Drum), The torpedo just barely missed striking the bow of the CL. Drum prepared to try another shot as was at just 1600 yards. However, the CL then sped back up and turned hard to starboard moving away from Drum at high speed. Sound had both DD's closing from different directions at high speed. Ordered 300 ft depth, rig for silent running and depth charge.
0229-0415-Pinging heard as DD's closed in. Each DD laid 3-4 patterns, none close. Drum went to 350 feet to get under them. Then both left area at high speed. The attack was ineffective in terms of damage and cut short, but effective in it kept Drum down long enough for the Yubari CL to escape.
0500-All clear. Secured GQ and Surfaced on course back to Area 4A.
6 October-14 October-
Aside from daily aircraft patrols, no contacts.
15 October-
0510- SJ contacts 345, 353 degrees. 31 52 N 141 23 E. Worked ahead of two ship one escort convoy to track until dawn for submerged attack.
0841-Submerged for attack. Escort identified as Chidori Class Torpedo Boat with two mid sized AK.
0919-Attack No. 3:Utilizing the rising sun to provide light for periscope, fired two torpedoes at RYUNN MARU 6538 tons. One impacted. causing explosion and fire amidships. Sound reports engines ceased. Chidori closing in fast. Ordered 300 ft, rigged for silent running and depth charge.
0923-The initial two barrages of depth charges were well off the mark. However, the third pattern at 0941 landed two very close charges, which is believed exploded just forward and above , possibly one below the forward torpedo room. Serious, but manageable damage resulted. (See damage section of report) .
After several more patterns, the Chidori grew distant, dropping more charges before stopping to "listen" before finally making a high speed run to the north at 1400 hours.
1600-Periscope depth. Sighted damage freighter dead in water at 6000 yards. While escort was gone, with Hachijojima just 90 NM away, highly likely a patrol craft or two and aircraft were en route.
1630-Fired one torpedo from 1000 yards at crippled ship. Torpedo prematurely detonated just 100 yards from target. Fired second torpedo, which hit and caused large fire.
1650-Still afloat. Decided to finish off freighter with deck gun.
1655-1702-Battle Surface-Gun Action. Fired 14 3 inch 50 cal shells at waterline. RYUNN MARU 6538 tons sunk 32 27 N 141 04 E.
1705-Secured from GQ. Headed away from scene at high speed.
1720-Submerged to avoid aircraft.
2100-Surface.
16-21 October-
Patrol-No contacts.
22 October-
1650- SJ contact bearing 032 8 NM. 30 32 N 141 40 E
1657-Smoke plume bearing 285 degrees. General Quarters.
1710-Submerged for attack.
1727- Two large AK sailing together. Course 345 10 knots. While no escort present , large guns as well as MG and AC observed on both vessels Lead identified as HAKUSIKA MARU class 8150 tons. Trailing AK is HEIAN MARU 11800 tons. Will target HEIAN MARU for initial attack.
1730-Twin engine bomber G4M "BETTY" observed flying over the two ships. Aircraft looped the area before moving out of sight. Drum moved in to attack.
1739-Attack No. 4: Fired 4 MK 14 torpedoes from 1000 yard AOB 85. Torpedo #4 went into circular run to port. Ordered emergency descent to 100 feet at high speed careful to keep stern from rising lest it impact with the torpedo. As Drum passed 83 feet, the torpedo, now completed one and half circle pattern, detonated directly above the stern of Drum. Damage reported to aft torpedo room and engine room. (See damage). Luckily the torpedo was set shallow and Drum was not struck by the torpedo no did it take the full effect of the explosive shock wave.
The other three torpedoes hit HEIAN MARU as aimed. Causing the ship to catch fire and list to starboard. However, the large vessel remained afloat and underway. Even at one point increasing speed to 10 knots to turn away from Drum. After five minutes, the vessel's speed dropped to 4.5 knots, likely due to engine damage from the torpedo hits.
1807-Fired two more torpedoes from 800 yards, both prematurely exploded.
1808-Fired two more torpedoes...one impacted but failed to detonate-dud. Other prematurely exploded very close to the bow, initially thought it was a hit. However, believe its close proximity did cause damage.
1809-Target now turned away from Drum presenting stern. Decide for a stern shot. Range 600 AOB 180. Fired final torpedo. Torpedo failed to detonate when impacted the stern. All torpedoes expended, Drum could just watch the stricken vessel sail on. A battle surface was not considered due to the heavy armament of both vessels compared to Drum's lone 3 inch gun, clear conditions, and proximity of assisting vessels and aircraft.
1814-HEIAN MARU took a hard roll to starboard. Many lifeboats in the water. HEIAN MARU capsized to starboard.
1815-HEIAN MARU 11800 tons sunk 30 33 N 141 32 E.
1816-Aircraft spotted bearing 091 closing fast. Drum went to 200 feet. No bombs as anticipated.
1820-Secured from GQ.
2100-Surfaced. All torpedoes expended. Set course for Pearl Harbor.
23 October-7 November-
No contacts aside from aircraft on SD radar along the track to home. Likely patrol aircraft from Marcus and Wake Islands.
8 November-
0830- Arrived Pearl Harbor. Terminated war patrol.
2.) SINKINGS
AP-HORAI MARU 9192 TONS 10/4/1942 2351 33 48 N 138 23 E
AK-RYUNN MARU 6538 tons 10/15/1942 1655 32 27 N 141 04 E.
AK-HEIAN MARU 11800 tons 10/22/1942 1815 30 33 N 141 32 E
3.) DAMAGE/CASUALTIES
A
Drum suffered considerable damage to forward torpedo room and bow area from two close depth charges during the attack on 10/15/1942. Drum was at 350 feet when charges exploded. Most serious immediate damage was flooding in forward torpedo room. The Damage Control party immediately went into action and flooding with quelled within 5 minutes. However, enough water was taken on that speed had to be applied to control the angle, including some initial backing at 2/3 to stabilize. Drum descended to 391 feet before stabilized. Water was pumped out within the hour.
Forward batteries were also damaged and in spite of repair would only maintain full 97 percent charge for rest of the patrol.
Torpedo tubes 4 and 5 were damaged and torpedo tube six was left inoperable for two days.
Dive planes were damaged, as was WCA listening gear, and both sonar head hoists.
All repairs, minus the irreparable battery damage was completed by 18 October.
Drum also suffered damage to forward hull integrity from these close charges, which was repaired upon return to port.
B
The circular running torpedo's detonation on 22 October caused considerable damage to the after torpedo and engine rooms.
After torpedo room: Stern Dive planes and rudder transmission were damage, along with tubes 8 and 9 and the port prop shaft.
Aft Engine room: Numbers 1 and 2 diesels and numbers 1 and 3 electric engines damage
All damage repaired by 17 October. While a serious matter and believe torpedo running deeper than set as it proximity when detonated to Drum's stern indicate it was deeper than the 3 feet, Drum was fortunate as she did not absorb the full shock wave of the explosion, which most likely would have resulted in her loss.
Amazingly, none of the crew were injured in these incidents.
3.) ENEMY ASW
Enemy ASW was roughly the same as previous patrols although the attacks were not as persistent nor had same duration. Daily aircraft activity in the home islands and off shore areas. Occasional PC or DD types on patrol are encountered. Believe enemy does have patrol assets based at Hachijojima.
The counter attack on 15 October as noted caused considerable damage. Believe the ideal sonar conditions assisted in plac chingarges in proper spot.
In three patrols, Chidori Class Torpedo Boats have proven to be effective escort vessels with passive active sonar, depth charge racks and throwers.
However, Below 300 ft and especially closer to 400, the effectiveness of enemy sonar gear does seem to greatly diminish.
Air patrols remain the most consistent threat to our submarines on patrol. While SD radar is generally reliable, on occasion is does fail.
Believe the Akizuki Class DD encountered on 4 October was equipped with surface search radar as quickly honed in on Drum's location. If not for the ideal conditions(no moon, light fog) preventing visual contact, Drum likely have had to dive to avoid the DD.
3A.) EVASION
Drum employed the same evasion tactics as previous patrols. After attack, dive to 300 feet, silent running. 5-10 degrees of rudder is maintained at all times, alternating direction as required. This keeps Drum in a constant turn and prevents enemy from gaining an accurate estimate on Drum's course.
When able, Drum is turned into the attacking escort to present a zero AOB and thus narrow profile to the sonar beam. Once overhead, speed bursts are used to clear from under the vessel until after the depth charges have exploded, relying on the disturbances to shield the sound of Drum speeding away. 15-20 seconds after last burst Drum goes to all stop and allows the momentum to carry through a turn to port of starboard, as is required, typically with 25 degrees rudder. Once speed has fallen to 2 knots and turn underway, go to 1/3 and return rudder to or 10 degrees.
Depth is added as required. In three patrols Drum had to exceed test depth to get under enemy sonar and depth charges, typically 300-400 feet. First patrol in Suruga Bay, Drum was forced to 500 feet in order to escape but this is done in extreme circumstances only.
4.) SOUND CONDITIONS
Sounds conditions in patrol area(s) was moderate to poor at times. Thermal layers were encountered during the attack(s) 10/4(210 ft) 10/15 (156 ft)
5.) WEATHER
Weather conditions were surprisingly calm for majority of patrol with a few storms in mid October. A light fog and haze hampered visibility most nights, especially when off Honshu in Area 5.
6.) HEALTH AND HABITABILITY
Crew health is excellent as is morale.
7.) Miles steamed: 8,500 Nautical Miles.
8.) 75,000 gallons of fuel consumed.
9.) Ammunition Expended:
Torpedoes: MK 14 x 24
Guns:
14 3 inch 50 caliber rounds.
20 MM: 0
10.) COMMENTS
Patrol and attack tactics for were somewhat different this time out. Since Area 4A is a somewhat open ocean area, Drum remained surfaced most of the time, diving to avoid aircraft and to remained hidden as needed. Patrolling with the SJ on the surface enabled to make important contacts likely would have missed. While in Area 5 and closer to the coast, submerged in the day time day to air patrols. and diminished SD performance close to land.
Second, Drum conducted her first night surface torpedo attack. The attack was successful and could be repeated again in proper conditions.
Torpedo malfunctions remain a serious issue on patrol. Torpedoes were set to minimal depth permitted by sea state typically 3 feet) on all attacks given the results of the recent testing regarding running depth of the MK 14. This seemed to stop the misses due to deep running torpedoes experienced on the first two patrols.
Premature detonation remains the most common failure, followed by "duds" , the failure of torpedoes to detonate upon clearly impacted a target.
The circle run during the final attack on 10/22 was the second circular run Drum has experienced in three patrols and this time it indeed endangered the boat as it exploded within close proximity.