[Sailor Steve]

Thursday, September 25, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


Thursday, September 25, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


Thursday, September 25, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. M Tardieu says that M Pichon will be unable to be present on account of the session of the Chamber and had therefore asks him to make his excuses for him to the members of plenary Labor the Council and to act in his place.

The Secretariat of the American Delegation has transmitted to the Secretary-General of the Conference a note containing a telegram addressed by Mr Gompers to M Arthur Fontaine. He wishes to ask whether Mr Polk is in position to say for what reason this meeting had been called and whether the members of the Council had any objections to the meeting of the Commission.

Mr Polk says that he has no information as to the reasons of the meeting.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that it is unfortunate that the Council was without information as to the reasons for the meeting.

M Tardieu said that it will be possible to call the Commission together and to await further information as to the subjects to be discussed at the meeting.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he is ready to telegraph to Mr Barnes, but he has a further question to ask, and that is where the Commission is to meet. It will be difficult to take a decision on this point without knowing the reasons for the meeting.

Mr Polk says that he had received a telegram from Washington dated September 23rd, according to which Mr Gompers has stated that the Plenary Labor Commission would meet in Paris between September 25th and October 5th and that it was hoped that no decision to recommend postponing the Conference will be taken until further information in the premises was telegraphed. It will probably be possible to find a method to enable the United States to participate in the Conference, whether the Treaty was ratified in time by the Senate or not.

M Tardieu proposes that the Council summon a Representative of the Ministry of Labor and that the discussion of the question be postponed until his arrival.

(M Lazard then enters the room.)

M Lazard says that he is not fully acquainted with the object of the meeting and that M Fontaine, who will be in a position to inform the Council better than he, is at the moment in Rome. He is able to say, however, that the telegram from Mr Gompers did not come entirely as a surprise. In the unofficial meeting held by several of the members of the Commission on September 7th, a number of members of the Commission expressed a desire to hold a further meeting, but nothing was said which would indicate what the subject of discussion would be. The telegram came unexpectedly and as a surprise, because the situation was the same now as it was a fortnight ago.

Mr Polk says that he thinks the best plan will be for him to telegraph Mr Gompers in order to ascertain the nature of the subjects which will be discussed at the meeting.

M Tardieu agrees, but adds that he wishes to point out that the French Government is entirely disposed to call the Commission together.

M Lazard says that Mr Gompers asks that the meeting take place before the 29th. At present that appears impossible and it would seem better to meet early in October.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that that was his opinion, especially as the place of meeting had not been fixed.

M Tardieu says that the Council will wait for further information. He understands that Mr Polk will telegraph to Washington, and that Sir Eyre Crowe will communicate with Mr Barnes.


2. Mr Polk says that at the last meeting it had been decided that the Supreme Economic Council should be asked to take immediately the necessary steps to guarantee the delivery to the Allies of fourteen German oil tank ships.3 According to information which he had received no orders on the subject had been given in London.

M Tardieu says that he was informed that the Supreme Economic Council had been acquainted with the decision of the Council, but he is without information as to whether the order had been carried out or not.

Mr Polk says that it is necessary for the Supreme Economic Council to immediately carry out the measures which were asked of them, as in the meantime the ships would be delivered.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he telegraphed to London to arrange that an expert be sent to him to furnish information on the subject.

Mr Polk says that in any event Admiral Charlton should be directed to keep the ships where they were until further orders were received.

M Tardieu said that the situation appeared to be as follows: The Supreme Economic Council, which was in possession of the resolution of the Supreme Council, thought that there was something to be said in connection with the matter. The French Government held the same view. In 48 hours the Conference would be in possession of the Supreme Economic Council’s proposals.

Mr Polk says that in awaiting this decision it was most urgent that the ships should not be moved.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that he had telegraphed to London in regard to the matter.

M Laroche says that only the Armistice Commission is in position to stop the delivery.

Mr Polk says that he considers it essential that the Supreme Council should act, for up to the moment it appeared to him that the only steps taken in the matter had been through the kindness of Sir Eyre Crowe.

M Tardieu says that if a resolution is taken in a sense of what Mr Polk asked, the Council will be doing exactly what had been done on the preceding day.

(M Tardieu then reads the resolution taken on September 23rd, HD 59.)

Mr Polk says that in any case it will be necessary for the Supreme Council to take steps which had been asked of it. If they have not done this, it is necessary to know the reasons. The Armistice Commission should be asked to suspend all action.

M Tardieu says that that had been decided at the previous meeting. He would ascertain in the afternoon just what the Supreme Economic Council had done and whether they had executed the order of the Conference and in what manner.


3. M Tardieu says that the question before the Council is the report of the Spitzberg Commission and a draft Treaty which had been revised by the Drafting Committee. The members of the Commission are unanimous, and, in view of the resolution taken by the Council at the last meeting, he does not believe that it will be necessary to open a discussion of the question.

S Scialoja says that it would not be necessary to read or to discuss the report, but that it will be necessary to take a vote.

M Laroche says that the conclusions of the report are as follows:

(1) The Commission submitted to the Council the text of a draft Treaty, which had been modified in form by the Drafting Committee in such a manner as to make the French and English texts agree;

(2) The Commission proposes that, as regards the signature of the Treaty, the Treaty be communicated, first to the Norwegian Government, which will state whether it agrees. The other contracting parties would then be invited to state within a space of six weeks time whether they were prepared to sign.

(It is decided to accept:

(1) The report addressed to the Supreme Council by the Spitzberg Commission, and

(2) To approve the draft Treaty as prepared by this Commission and revised by the Drafting Committee.)


4. M Tardieu reads an extract of a letter from Lord Milner to M Dutasta dated August 14th, 1919. The Special Commission on Mandates at its meeting in London on August 5th had unanimously proposed that the Portuguese claims to the triangle of Kionga should be recognized.

(This proposal is adopted.)

(It is decided to accept the proposal made by the Special Commission on Mandates at its meeting of August 5th, and to recognize Portugal as the original and legitimate proprietor of this part of the former German Colony of East Africa, situated south of the Kovuma and known as the “Kionga Triangle.”


5. M Tardieu reads a letter of September 14th, 1919, addressed by S Tittoni to the President of the Conference asking that the Military Representatives at Versailles should be directed to study the question of organization of a military, naval and air control for Austria.

(The proposal is adopted.)

(It is decided that the permanent Military representatives at Versailles should be directed to prepare, together with the Naval and Air representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers, a detailed proposal, in view of the constitution of Inter-Allied Commissions of Military, Naval and Air Control, which should be charged to see to the execution by Austria of the Military, Naval and Air Clauses of the Treaty of Peace.


6. Sir Eyre Crowe says that he has received a telegram from Sir George Clerk who proposes returning to Paris unless the Supreme Council directs him to remain. He has telegraphed to Sir George Clerk that the Supreme Council will undoubtedly desire to discuss the matter. Upon receiving this telegram Sir George Clerk decided to remain. He finally telegraphed him to come to Budapest and from there to Paris. He thought that this telegram had not reached him.

M Tardieu says that he is grateful for this information, but he cannot see that anyone is to blame for the delay.

Mr Polk says that the Relief Administration has a telegraph line to Budapest and that he will be glad to place this wire at Sir Eyre Crowe’s disposal for any telegrams which he might desire to send to Sir George Clerk.


7. Sir Eyre Crowe says that Mr Lloyd George is more than ever convinced that firm action should be taken to force the Germans to evacuate the Baltic Provinces. Mr Lloyd George wishes, but he would not press the point, that Polish troops should be utilized. He is now charged by the British Government to make a new proposal. The Allies have pledged themselves in previous conversations with the Germans to facilitate the importation into Germany of foodstuffs of which Germany was in great need, and they had authorized the Germans to communicate to the Supreme Economic Council a list of articles which they particularly needed. He proposes that the Supreme Economic Council should be asked to stop the shipment of food-stuffs and other necessities to Germany and that the German Government be notified accordingly. Mr Lloyd George thinks that this will have a very good effect. He thinks also that the American Government is prepared to stop all financial transactions with Germany. If these measures are insufficient it will be necessary to take whatever further steps seemed advisable. Mr Lloyd George has always advocated the utilization of the Polish Army and he now proposes that the head of the British Naval Mission in France place himself at the disposal of Marshal Foch to study with him the question of what military and naval measures might be advantageous at a future date. He has prepared the draft of a note, the first three paragraphs repeating the words of the note prepared by General Weygand, which has already been discussed. It will be necessary to change the end of the third paragraph in such a way as to take into account the remarks which Mr Polk had made at the last meeting. The end of the note will be drafted in the manner which he had pointed out. If the American Delegation consents, it will be possible to insert a supplementary paragraph respecting the suppression of financial transactions.

M Tardieu says that if he understands the British proposal correctly, it calls for immediate action, first, the refusal of the German demands for the furnishing of food for Germany; second, the refusal of credits. If these measures are insufficient the British Government are willing to consider the question of military action. He agreed with this proposal, but wished to make two remarks, one as to form, and the other as to substance. In regard to form, the British Delegation proposes that the Allies reserve the right to take further steps. This is the fourth time that the question has been raised, and, in view of this fact it seems to him that the least which can be done, if the Allied and Associated Governments wished to make a real threat, is to take actual steps. He proposed, therefore, that the note should say that, if the Allied and Associated Governments do not receive satisfaction they will take other steps.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he would accept this modification.

M Tardieu remembers that Mr Polk had said that it might be advisable to stop the repatriation of German prisoners of war. He asked whether Sir Eyre Crowe has referred this matter to the British Government, and whether he had received any instructions.

Sir Eyre Crowe replies that he has received no instructions from his Government on this point.

Mr Polk says that he is convinced that something ought to be done. He prefers action to a threat. In a conversation which had recently taken place at Versailles between Colonel Logan and Baron von Lersner, Colonel Logan had not failed to call attention to the bad impression which the attitude of the German Government had made upon the American Government. Colonel Logan had pointed out that it was most important that Germany should take action, and had let him understand that if the action is delayed America will take definite steps. Baron von Lersner had replied that it is a political question and that the Army which was in the hands of the reactionaries would not obey the Government which was powerless. Colonel Logan then said that this explanation is not satisfactory and that if the German Government had no power it had better withdraw. It is necessary that that Government should take immediate measures to prove its good faith. He adds that Colonel Logan had not spoken in the name of the Council, but the Germans had learned unofficially the view of the United States.

M Tardieu asks whether the Council are in agreement as to the first three paragraphs.

Mr Polk says that there remained the question of the alteration of the last phrase and that he would propose a draft.

M Tardieu said that he thought that it would not serve a useful purpose to fix a delay and to say at the soonest possible moment for from the present moment the Allied and Associated Governments proposed to take action.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he would ask his Government whether it will be possible to make any statement in the note regarding the holding-up of the repatriation of the German prisoners of war, but he wishes to ask if the repatriation of the prisoners of war were stopped it would necessarily apply to all the Allied Powers and whether it would not be possible to speak of a total or partial holding-up of the repatriation. He does not think that the British Government are prepared, so far as they are concerned, to stop the repatriation completely for the work of repatriation was in operation and it is difficult to stop it.

M. Tardieu says that this will nevertheless be a most efficacious method of action.

S Scialoja said that he agrees that this method could be most usefully employed.

M Tardieu says that for the sake of their own peace it is most necessary for the German Government that the repatriation be continued. If the repatriation is stopped pressure will be brought upon the German Government by the German people themselves. It is, therefore, highly important that an expression of this threat be made in the note.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that if the proposal is accepted he thinks it would be advisable that the decision of the Council be made known to the public through the press. He wishes to ask, however, what Powers have consented to the proposed repatriation of the German prisoners of war in their custody.

Mr Matsui says that Japan is in a difficult situation. The repatriation had begun. He asks whether the prisoners’ transports should be held up en route, for instance at Singapore. That would be difficult. He thought that it would be preferable to adopt the formula: “total or partial suspension of repatriation.”

M Tardieu says that the American, British and Japanese Governments have consented to the repatriation, but that the German Government has received a communication in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers. He wishes to recall the terms of the note which had been addressed to the German Delegation and which had been prepared by Mr Balfour.

(M Tardieu then reads the text of the declaration of the Allied and Associated Powers relative to the repatriation of prisoners of war.)

He says that it will be possible to insert in the reply the following phrase: “at the same time the Allied and Associated Powers, with reference to Paragraph of their declaration of August 28th last, points out that the benevolent measures respecting the anticipated repatriation of German prisoners of war is to take place either for all the prisoners or for part of them.”

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he wishes to make it quite clear that if the British Government does not interrupt the repatriation of prisoners of war they are not acting counter to the resolution of the Council.

M Tardieu says that he wishes to point out that if the British Government continues to repatriate the prisoners, the threat of the Council would be in vain, and, in that event, he thinks it would be better to make no threat. It will be necessary to ascertain from Sir Crowe and Mr Polk whether Great Britain and America are prepared to interrupt the repatriation of prisoners.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he wishes to point out that the interruption of the repatriation would be far more prejudicial to Great Britain than to Germany.

M Tardieu asks whether Mr Polk is in a position to furnish a paragraph in regard to the refusal of credits.

Mr Polk says that he will take up the matter on that day.

M Tardieu says that in any event it will be possible to refer the draft reply to the Drafting Committee in order that the Committee could agree upon a reply which would include Mr Polk’s draft paragraph and the proposal of the British Delegation.

Mr Polk says that he wishes to point out that it will not be possible for him to receive a reply by the following day.

(It is decided:

(1) That the Drafting Committee should prepare a note to the German Delegation concerning the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces by Germany;

(2) That the Drafting Committee should take as a basis for its work the note prepared by General Weygand and modified by the British Delegation (Appendix F) with the changes in text approved by the Council;

(3) That the text prepared by Mr Polk should be noted; and,

(4) That in case the American and British Governments agree to an interruption of the repatriation of prisoners of war, an additional paragraph should be prepared to notify the total or partial interruption of the repatriation of German prisoners of war.)


8. M Tardieu says that the Council has received new proposals from the Blockade Commission.

Mr Polk reads and comments upon the annex to this Proposal.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that his experts do not consider the American proposal sufficient. They think that the following text should be adopted.

“On account of the military operations which are taking place in the Gulf of Finland, mariners are warned against the dangers to themselves of going there.

“With a view to avoid accidents, for which they cannot be responsible, the Commanders of the Allied and Associated Forces in the Baltic, will direct all merchant ships, which are found proceeding up the Gulf of Finland, to stop and turn back.”


The British experts thinks that this proposal would resolve a number of difficulties. There would be no blockade. There would be no capturing of ships. Vessels would be instructed to turn back. They would be informed that there was danger ahead. If they still persisted they would be made to turn back.

Mr Polk asks what would happen if the ships refused to obey the orders given them.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that they will not refuse.

Mr Matsui said that he thinks that it is quite probable that they will refuse.

Commandant Levavasseur says that the British proposal is a make-shift. If a ship wishes to pass there was no method of stopping it. He desires to point out that from the day when peace was signed with Germany no warship had any longer the right to stop a merchant ship. If a merchant ship wishes to pass in spite of the injunctions of the Allied warships there is nothing that can be done. The former proposals make it possible to avoid these dangers. He asks what will happen if a cruiser should meet a German convoy escorted by destroyers which insisted upon passing. He thinks that this is a question which ought to be carefully studied.

M Tardieu said that it is most important to avoid taking decisions which cannot be applied. The British proposal undoubtedly presents serious inconveniences. He thinks that so far as the American proposal is concerned it will be inconvenient to permit the Commander of each warship to judge as to the action which he chose to exercise. In both cases there was no impression of an operation well conceived and likely to be pressed to a successful conclusion.

Commandant Levavasseur said that in the proposals formerly presented the Commanders of ships of war were vested with the authority of all the Powers.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that that would also apply to the British proposal. It will be communicated by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to the neutral Governments.

M Tardieu agrees, but says that in the British proposal it is the means of execution which are inadequate.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he could not agree, for the British proposal gives vessels of war the right of turning back merchant ships.

S Scialoja said that the proposal will not foreshadow any possible action in the event that merchant ships refused to obey the order.

Commandant Levavasseur says that he thinks that in preparing the proposal for which he acted as spokesman, provision was made for the right of turning back ships.

M Tardieu says that in fact there was a blockade without the right of capturing cargoes.

Mr Polk says that he thinks that there is danger of creating a new kind of blockade which would not be recognized in International Law. In view of the fact that the Allied and Associated Governments are not at war with Soviet Russia, they will be creating a dangerous precedent. The United States will not give clearance to vessels desiring to leave American ports for Russia. The danger lay in the case of leaving Scandinavia or Germany.

M Tardieu asks Mrs Polk whether the reserve contained in the American proposal is sufficient to satisfy him.

Mr Polk replies that it is. He adds that if a neutral ship is stopped in its course, for example a Danish ship, the Allied and Associated Governments expose themselves to the payment of damages.

Commandant Levavasseur says that the note of the Allied and Associated Governments would be addressed to the neutral Governments. If these Governments accept the contents no difficulty will arise.

M Tardieu says that the agreement of these Governments will serve as the basis for this new form of blockade.

Mr Polk asked what the situation would be if the neutral Governments does not accept. The notification would not bind them or protect the Allies against claims for damages.

Commandant Levavasseur says that in one case as in the other the situation will be the same. It is a question of a blockade which is not a blockade.

Mr Polk says that he will be equally frank and that if they want a blockade, the best means would be to declare war against Russia.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that it should be remembered that the warships are carrying on hostile operations in the Baltic against the Bolsheviks according to the orders of the Allies. It is necessary to give them means of fulfilling their mission.

M Tardieu agrees.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that the difficulty should not be exaggerated. A few ships will be stopped, they would learn that they could not pass and soon no ships would appear.

Mr Polk says that the United States hesitates to create precedents. In the present war they had had difficulties with the precedents of the American Civil War.

M Tardieu says that he wishes to call Mr Polk’s attention to the observation of Sir Eyre Crowe with which he entirely agrees. The Allied fleets in the Baltic are in fact playing the role of war vessels on war service. That being the case, he cannot see how it is less serious to stop merchant ships than to bombard Cronstadt. A difficult question of form ought not to be sufficient to prevent a solution of the question. In view of these facts, he agrees with Sir Eyre Crowe, that even if the Allied and Associated Powers run the risk of having to pay damages, they should be willing to take the risk in view of the present situation. There are many examples in history of pacific blockades, for example the case of Greece and of China. The pacific blockade has a recognized place in International Law.

Mr Polk says that it is not a question of a pacific blockade.

M Tardieu says that he does not agree. The blockade in question was a means of coercion.

S Scialoja said that in order to conform to the regulations of International Law, it would be necessary to communicate the state of blockade to the Soviet Government, but in view of the fact that that Government is not recognized, he does not see that strictly speaking it is a question of blockade. He thinks that it is rather a question of International police and that the precedents in this sense should be examined.

M Tardieu says that the Council agrees as to the practical utility of the measures proposed. But Mr Polk objects to the precedents which would be created. He suggests that the legal advisors be asked to study the precedents and find a formula to which all can agree. So far as the execution of the blockade is concerned the proposals of the Naval representatives will be adopted. He does not wish to delay the solution of a question which had already been too much delayed, but what he proposes appears necessary.

M Cambon says that he wishes to recall precedents which exist. Great Britain and France had often used the pacific blockade as a means of coercion. The examples of Greece and of China had recently been mentioned. The difficulty in the present case is that there is no Government in Russia to which a notification of the blockade can be communicated.

M Laroche says that the very fact of there being no Government will justify a measure of International police.

M Tardieu says that he wishes to sum up the situation as he sees it. It will be possible to impose a pacific blockade if a Government exists to which a notification of the blockade could be made. No such Government exists. It is therefore necessary to trust to the ingenuity of the legal advisors to find a means of justifying a measure of International police.

Mr Polk agrees that the question should be referred to the Drafting Committee.

(It is decided:

(1) To request the Drafting Committee to immediately examine the arguments in International Law upon which the blockade of Soviet Russia could be based; and,

(2) To call to the attention of the Drafting Committee the fact that the absence of a Government in Soviet Russia recognised by the Powers prevented the Powers from notifying that Government in the regular way of a state of blockade.


9. M Cambon reads and comments upon the proposal of the Commission on Polish Affairs which it is hoped will be consistent with the opinion formerly expressed by the Supreme Council on the subject of agrarian legislation in Eastern Galicia.

Mr Polk says he has no objection to make to this text.

M Tardieu recalls the declarations which Mr Paderewski had made before the Supreme Council. Mr Paderewski had stated that he could not admit that the agrarian question was not one for the National Assembly at Warsaw to decide.

M Cambon says that he wishes to add that in a private conversation, M Paderewski had told him that he was in favor of the League of Nations scheme. M Paderewski had insisted that the attribution of Eastern Galicia be made in a definite way. If he (M Cambon) might express a personal view, he wishes to add that the Council are going beyond their rights in entrusting the fate of an entirely agricultural district to a population the majority of which is not Polish.

Mr Polk says that Mr Paderewski had opposed, above everything else, the provisional character of the statute. He (Mr Polk) thinks that it would be possible to satisfy Mr Paderewski in suppressing the provisional character and in altering certain points of the proposal. With this end in view he had prepared a memorandum. He feels that in establishing a provisional regime the Council are allowing the existence of a region in the Central Europe which will become a dangerous center of discord.

M Cambon says that he shares this view, but that he thinks there is still another reason for giving Galicia more complete autonomy. Poland will be much more disposed to accept a more complete autonomy for Galicia if she knows that there is a question of definite organization. The question cannot be solved on that day and it will be necessary to send the American memorandum to the Commission, but on this point it will be necessary for the Council to express an opinion by which the Commission could be guided. They should give their view as to whether East Galicia should be definitely attributed to Poland. He wishes to point out that the American memorandum deals with this subject.

S Scialoja says that in effect Eastern Galacia will be placed under a Polish mandate.

M Tardieu said that this would not be altogether the case for this mandate would not have a temporary character.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he cannot agree to the Council’s suppressing the temporary character of the statute. He recalls the fact that the British Government had originally opposed the union of Eastern Galicia with Poland. He had accepted a compromise because a plebiscite had been promised. Now the idea of the plebiscite had been given up. He cannot, without instructions, accept this solution in view of the fact that it completely alters the principles which had been previously raised.

Mr Polk proposed that the American memorandum be simply referred to the Commission.

M Tardieu says that he wishes to hold to what he had previously said, purely as his own opinion.

S Scialoja says that it conforms to the proposal previously made by Baron Sonnino.

(It is decided to refer to the Committee on Polish Affairs the memorandum presented by the American Delegation.)


10. General Le Bond reads and commented upon Report No. 6 of the Commission on Polish Affairs (on the eastern frontiers of Poland).

Mr Polk says he approves the proposals of the Commission.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he also approves of these proposals, but he wishes to ask in what form the Council intends to communicate the decisions which they had taken to the Polish Government. He thinks that the question of form is most important.

M Laroche says that it would be sufficient to inform the Polish Government that the territories lying west of the line traced by the Commission will be definitely attributed to Poland.

Sir Eyre Crowe asks whether it will not be necessary to include a Treaty.

M Laroche says that in any case it is not a question of a Treaty defining the eastern frontiers of Poland but a Treaty according certain territories to Poland.

Mr Polk says that it will be possible to give Poland her choice between two solutions:

(a) The acceptance of the minimum line proposed in the Committee’s reports, with the assurance that this line would not prejudice any future negotiations regarding this frontier after the reestablishment of Russia or the obtaining of satisfactory information regarding the desires of the people to the east of this frontier; or,

(b) Leaving the determination of this eastern frontier entirely open until such time as Russia and Poland consider it possible to make a definite settlement.
M Laroche proposes that the Drafting Committee be requested to find a formula, taking the Report of the Commission as a basis.

(It is decided:

(1) To accept the conclusions of Report No. 6 of the Committee on Polish Affairs; and,

(2) To request the Drafting Committee to study, in taking the report as a basis, the means by which these decisions should be communicated to the Polish Government.)

(The meeting then adjourns.)