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Originally Posted by Skybird
The latest report now, which is the preliminary official report, says that what could have been done, was done,
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No, it shows that the pilot acted against memory procedures in the case of a trim overrun/MCAS malfunction. After the co-pilot switched the motorized trim system off, the pilot, against all procedures in the 737 from the first flight 40 years ago, turned the electric trim system back on. It did not throw its own switch back to the on position. The captain threw the trim system cutout switch back to the on position. Having overpowered the terrorist threatening to crash the plane, the captain voluntarily put the terrorist back at the controls of the aircraft, according to the Preliminary Accident Report. We now resume our previously running falsehoods
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Originally Posted by Skybird
...but the MCAS system indeed showed to be unable to be switche doff - it seems to still have affected the plane while it already was formally switched of. And this speaks very severly for a very fundamental software error.
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Again, with the high airspeed the pilot and copilot together couldn't turn the manual trim wheels on either side of the console. The captain then killed everyone by switching the trim system override switch back on so it could crash the plane. It did not turn itself back on. That is not possible. It did not affect the plane, as shown by black box records which show what MCAS wanted to do to the trim but couldn't because the co-pilot saved the plane by turning trim motors off with the trim system cutout switch, as per 40 year old procedures in the entire 737 series of aircraft. The black box clearly says the MCAS commanded x units of down trim but was prevented from doing so by the trim system cutout switch. The actual data is that clear. As long as the trim system cutout switch was off, MCAS commands were never executed by the trim motors. Indeed, they COULD not have been.
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Originally Posted by Skybird
Meanwhile, the FAA have accused Boeing of another serious software problem with the 737 Max, it is unrelated to the crashes and the MCAS problem and they did not say over here in our media what exactly it is - but it is severe enough that the FAA ruled that even with this problem alone the planes would stay grounded due to unacceptable risks. Boeing of course again says that it is minor and not means much. Well, they also said the plane and MCAS was okay and functionally right immediately after the crashes. They do not state the MCAS to be fully intact anymore by now, do they.
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I'll believe it when I see it. As it is, this whole paragraph is unsubstantiated gossip, worthy of disdain. Facts are stubborn things and only they matter. What people with agendas have to say about the situation is worth nothing.
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Originally Posted by Skybird
A planned update of the MCAS software that by now already should have been released, had to be delayed again because they found the update to be faulty as well.
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The plane won't be fixed by software changes. Mechanically, more sensors need to be hooked up to the MCAS system. MCAS must be able to be overpowered by pilot input in all circumstances slower than Vmo. The computer must let pilots know when there is disagreement between the three sensors measuring attitude and wing angle of attack. Those are physical, not software changes. They still won't keep people from being stupid, ignoring every flying concept they've ever learned, as the Ethiopian pilot did, and killing everybody. Perhaps in third world countries a qualified pilot should be required to ride along in the jump seat too.
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Originally Posted by Skybird
It looks as if the 737Max was designed not with security as a priprity, but getting a quick reaction to the A320 AT ALL COST. Time was the priority, nothing else.
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That's a ridiculous fabrication. The reason you go with a tried and true design for the basis of the 737 Max program is that the 737 is an airframe with a long-standing record of reliability and safety. You don't invent new mistakes when you have a thoroughly debugged platform to build from.
They took a proven airframe, widened the body, put more modern engines on it, compensated for the changes (the exact same compensations pilots make every day when cargo or people are distributed differently than the flight plan calls for and they have to compensate for a center of gravity different than anticipated.
The procedure for an MCAS failure is identical to the procedure for a trim overrun on any 737 produced since Fred and Barney Flintstone rode dinosaurs: switch off the trim system override switch. Regain control of the aircraft at a safe altitude in level flight. Then manually use the manual trim adjustment wheels on both sides of the console to set the trim you need. Then resume the flight without incident. This is a memory procedure, known to all 737 series pilots, required to be recited from memory as part of their qualification for a type certificate allowing them to fly 737 series aircraft.
Every 737 pilot for the past three generations has had the information memorized to save the airplane in the situation that killed both of these 737 Max aircraft. Switch the trim system override switch off. That was true for the very first 737 flight in April 1967. It is still true today. Had the Ethiopian pilot followed the procedure that he's absolutely required to know in order to get behind the controls, that aircraft would not have crashed. End of story.
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Originally Posted by Skybird
They overplayed their cards. Thats what it looks like to me. Over 300 people paid with their lives for this gamble. I do not buy this pilot error's theory. Thats just pawns they want to sacrifice to distract from the company's failure at boss level. Boeing pushed to hrd, too fast, too far, and broke it. Again that egineer: they cut short and ignored their own internal Boeing security and safety routines and testing procedures, that was his conclusion. And I will continue to think so as long as no new, massive changes to the information status become known.
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Yup, big evil corporation sought to kill poor Ethiopian victims by greed and hubris. THAT's the story that's unbelievable here. The official Preliminary Accident Report makes it crystal clear that pilot, against the good sense of his low time co-pilot who saved the plane, promptly snatched defeat from the jaws of victory to crash the plane. He violated 40 year old memory procedures to do so and others paid and are paying the price.
Can the plane be made safer? All planes can be made safer. Just keep them on the ground. But no matter what, no safety system can prevent a pilot from taking leave of his senses, ignoring everything he's learned in his entire life about flying, and crashing a perfectly good airplane.
Proper procedure in this situation was followed up to the point where the co-pilot recommended, the pilot agreed and one of them switched off the trim system cutout switch. At that point the pilot was in command of his aircraft.
Proper procedure would be to gain control of the airframe. Throttle had to be reduced to level attitude cruise position, instead of leaving it in full climb 94% throttle position. Then using yoke only, the pilot should gain control of the aircraft in level flight. Having done that, he should gently increase throttle to best rate of climb setting while he raises the nose with the yoke. No attempts to debug the trim system should be done until the airplane is safe.
Once the plane is at a safe cruise altitude, the pilot should have reduced throttle to level cruise setting and assumed a level cruise attitude. Then the manual trims would easily have been used by either pilot or co-pilot to unload the control yoke. The flight could then either resume to its destination without incident or return to takeoff airfield as management, tower or pilot deemed advisable.
First, FLY THE PLANE. Then look to solve other problems. It's the first thing you learn in ground school before the first time you fly. This pilot tossed that life-saving proverb out the window, killing all aboard.