[Sailor Steve]

Monday, November 10, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. S de Martino asks if he might deliver a message from S Tittoni, who wishes to express his great regret at not being able to be present at that meeting; he is obliged to leave on the following day and is still ill in bed. He had particularly hoped to be able to come to that meeting to bid farewell to his colleagues. At the same time he had asked S De Martino to submit to the Council a consideration which had occurred to him with respect to its work. The Supreme Council had organized a Committee for the execution of the Treaty and that Committee, called the Committee of Ambassadors, although other than Ambassadors might sit upon it, is to be entrusted with everything concerning the execution of the treaties; the Supreme Council, on the other hand, is entrusted with all work preparatory to the same treaties. In order to facilitate this division of labor and inasmuch as the large questions were at the moment not ready for settlement - such as the Treaty with Hungary, the question of the former Ottoman Empire and the Adriatic question - S Tittoni wishes to ask the Council to consider the possibility of adjourning, after the signature of the Bulgarian Treaty, until one of those questions should be ready for settlement. In the meanwhile all remaining unfinished work relative to the execution of the treaties can be entrusted to the Committee of Ambassadors.

M Clemenceau replies that this question cannot be raised without the consent of the Governments concerned. Of course three questions are raised by this suggestion: he thinks that the Hungarian question will be satisfactorily settled. The question of Turkey is a difficult one, but he is willing, and thinks it necessary to take it up, and he feels that the British and American Governments will agree with his views. The question of the Adriatic is a most delicate one but it must be admitted that the Council is not at fault. The responsibility lies entirely with Italy. The Italian Government has been incapable of executing the orders given by the Council. The Council had formally decided that only one Italian battalion should remain at Fiume, but this order had been flagrantly violated in such a manner that it seemed clear that the Italian Government had no control over its army and navy. The Command at Fiume had passed to D’Annunzio. He is not hostile to Italy but he is obliged to point out that the Italian Government has not been able to make its orders respected. He had supported the Italian point of view in a long telegram that he had sent to President Wilson, but he was very much embarrassed as to what he should further say, since he had received a courteous but emphatic reply from President Wilson to the effect that it was useless to make agreements with a Government which assumed obligations that it could not fulfill. French soldiers had been killed at Fiume and the French Government had taken no action; but such a situation could not be prolonged indefinitely.

S de Martino wishes to be allowed to remark that a Government exists in Italy as well as in any other country. As to the point of being obeyed or not by the army at Fiume, it is in agreement with the Allied Governments that Italy abstain from attacking Fiume. If Italy is confronted with difficulties, of which the Council is well aware, that does not mean that the Italian Government has not taken up the question of Fiume with the very best intentions of settling it properly. The Italian Government has shown a spirit of conciliation which he thought M Clemenceau would appreciate.

M Clemenceau points out that nevertheless the fact remained that the Italian Government was not obeyed by its Navy. The greatest spirit of good will had been shown. For this reason no action had been taken as a result of the incidents at Fiume, but that situation must be put an end to. The postponement of the work of the Council cannot be agreed to as long as that will result in the consolidation of the existing situation at Fiume.

Sir Eyre Crowe agrees with M Clemenceau, but feels that the points at issue with Germany and the Bulgarian question must first be settled before there can be any thought of postponement. He thinks that these questions might be settled before the end of the month, by which time he hopes that all other questions, except the Turkish one, will also be out of the way. He therefore feels that there is no great difficulty in practice; the object aimed at by S De Martino can be met without necessarily adopting his plea for an adjournment of the Conference now.

Mr Polk also agrees with M Clemenceau and observes that there are two or three questions which have to be settled before an adjournment can be thought of. He is of the opinion that those questions can be settled before December 1st. He also feels that it would not be fair to turn such questions over to the Committee of Ambassadors, which is only supposed to coordinate questions relating to the interpretation and execution of the Treaties.

M Clemenceau appreciates the troubles the Italian Government has had to encounter. However, that Government must settle the question of Fiume and get its army and navy under control.

S de Martino repeats that the Italian Government has the army and navy under control and is obeyed by them. If it had not wished to take military action against Fiume, it was because the Allied and Associated Powers had likewise not wished it. They had not wished to attack Fiume and a fortiori Italy had not wished to either. The situation there did not prevent his declaring that there is a Government in Italy and that the army and navy are under control of the Italian Government.

M Clemenceau declares that he must formally state that S Tittoni had said, not once but many times, that the Italian Government could not take Fiume because the army and navy would not obey the Government. He thought S Tittoni could not contest this, and he wished this to be formally put on record. The fact that the Italian Government had to contend with a very delicate question was no reason for attempting to place the responsibility on the other Allied and Associated Powers, who clearly could not be burdened therewith.

S de Martino says that such is not his intention, and that the sole question raised was one of expediting the work of the Council. S Tittoni, who had to leave for Italy on account of the political situation, had hoped to return to take up the discussion of the important questions alluded to.

M Clemenceau observes that such a solution would greatly embarrass him in any reply to President Wilson.

S de Martino says that he has transmitted the suggestion, but that if it is going to occasion great inconveniences he does not wish to insist upon it.

(It is decided to take no action on the Italian suggestion relative to the prolongation or postponement of the work of the Supreme Council.)


2. The Council has before it a note from the President of the German Delegation dated November 7th, 1919 relative to municipal elections in Upper Silesia.

M Clemenceau points out that the proposed action of the German Government is in utter defiance of the decisions of the Supreme Council.

Sir Eyre Crowe feels that strictly speaking the Council cannot prevent such action on the part of the German Government before the Treaty comes into force, but it can say that it has already warned that Government that such elections will not be recognized.

M Clemenceau agrees.

Mr Polk also agrees. He presumes that the Council is sure of its legal ground when sending such an answer.

(It is decided that the Allied and Associated Powers should again inform the German Government that the municipal elections proposed to be held by it in Upper Silesia, prior to the coming into force of the Treaty, will not be recognized as valid.)


3. M Berthelot comments upon the note from the Swiss Legation.

M Clemenceau observes that as such clauses are already contained in the Treaties with Germany and Austria there seems no good reason for not inserting them in all the Treaties.

(It was decided to act favorably upon the request of the Swiss Legation relative to insertion in Treaties still to be drafted and signed of clauses relative to Swiss neutrality, analogous to Article 435 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany and Article 375 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria.)


4. Mr Polk informs the Council that he has just received a telegram from Admiral Bristol to the effect that fighting between Greeks and Turks had taken place near Soma because the Greeks had not obeyed the orders of General Milne not to advance the line of occupation until the 15th of November and to wait until the Turkish army obeyed the orders given it to retire on November 12th, and that the Greeks had acted on the orders of their own Government.

Sir Eyre Crowe inquires if this point has not already been raised by Mr Venizelos at the preceding meeting of the Council.

M Clemenceau thinks it had not.

General Bunoust is sure that it had not. The point Sir Eyre Crowe had in mind was the incident at Nazilli.

Sir Eyre Crowe feels that Mr Venizelos should be asked to explain the incident referred to in the telegram read by Mr Polk.

M Clemenceau suggests that the information contained in the telegram be sent to Mr Venizelos and that he be asked for explanations.

(This is agreed to.)

Sir Eyre Crowe points out that the report of the Inter-Allied Commission of Investigation at Smyrna dealt with two questions. The Commission had been appointed to investigate the complaints made by the Sheik-ul-Islam. The Council might unwittingly have given the Commission too large a mandate but it had never contemplated that the Commission should go so far as to advise it whether or not there should have been a Greek occupation. He proposes to separate the report into its two component parts. The question raised by the second part of the report has already been presented in an acute form as a result of Mr Venizelos ordering Greek troops beyond the zone of occupation laid down by the Council without consulting it. He thinks that there is a good deal to be said for Mr Venizelos in this connection inasmuch as he has sent many pressing communications to the Council which, owing to the great pressure of work, had not been promptly answered. The Council had ordered General Milne to determine the Greek zone of occupation; he had done so and on the other hand the Greek and Italian Governments, after satisfactory negotiations, had agreed to a line of demarcation between their zones. He feels that the other conclusions of the report might be accepted; but he is struck by the fact that a great deal of pertinent testimony had not been heard by the Commission, therefore it was difficult for the conclusions of the report to be accepted unreservedly, although he might have been inclined to do so if he had not heard Mr Venizelos’ explanations at the preceding meeting. For instance, with respect to the affair at Menemem, Mr Venizelos had pointed out that the Greek authorities had made an accurate count of the victims and found that only 20 had been killed, identifying them by name, whereas the number fixed by the Commission as a result of an investigation made by a French officer had placed the number at several hundred. He does not feel qualified to state that a different procedure could have been adopted, but he feels that if the Greek side of the case could have been heard the conclusions of the report might have been different. In his opinion this was the one reservation to be made when accepting the report.

General Bunoust observes that some question has been raised as to the Commission going beyond the mandate given it. He wishes to point out that the report submitted consists of three parts: a summary of the facts, the fixing of the responsibilities, and the conclusions. This conforms not only to the spirit but to the letter of the Council’s mandate contained in its telegram to the Commission of July 26, 1919. It had been suggested that the Commission was not justified in taking up the question of the expediency of the Greek occupation. He wishes to reply that the complaint of the Sheik-ul-Islam to the Supreme Council had formed the basis of the investigation, and this complaint had pretended that the Greek occupation was unjustified. The Commission had therefore necessarily examined that question. To take up a question of detail, in an affair such as that at Menemem it is impossible for anyone to make an accurate estimate. The Commission did not insist upon the exactness of its figures but it was convinced that figures submitted by the Greeks could not be any more accurate. With respect to contradictory testimony he wishes again to cite the affair at Menemem, where all the Turks had testified in one way and all the Greeks in another. The Commission had therefore tried to take the testimony of the witnesses who seemed to be the most reliable and it had taken a great deal of testimony from French, English and Italian witnesses. The testimony of M. Laplanche, a French employee of the railroad, had established that the day before the massacre in question the Turks had claimed that they feared a massacre and the Greeks had been informed of this but had taken no precautionary measures. The Greek battalion retreating from Pergamum had indeed been subjected to outrages, but when it once reached Menemem not a single shot had been fired at it. Many Greek witnesses claimed to have heard and seen shots but not one of them had been able to substantiate his evidently false statements. The Commission does not insist that the Greeks had prepared this massacre, but it is convinced that they had done absolutely nothing to prevent it and that the Greek authorities were obviously incompetent.

Sir Eyre Crowe has never doubted that the Commission had proceeded in the most sincere and honorable way, but, as Mr Venizelos had pointed out, the principal accused parties had not been heard. He had felt that although it had possibly been well not to acquaint the Greek representative with the names of the witnesses, it might have been possible to give him the depositions without giving him the names of the witnesses. But even this had not been done. He could not say that the conclusions of the report would have been different had such procedure been adopted, but it is evident that they might have been; therefore these conclusions were not entirely satisfactory. When the procedure adopted by the Commission had been brought to the attention of the Council it had not approved thereof; but it had then been too late to make an effective change. However, he does not wish to insist unduly upon this point for on the whole Mr Venizelos had accepted the substance of the report, inasmuch as he recognized that abuses had been committed and had meted out punishment therefor. Furthermore, calm now reigned in and around Smyrna, and in fact everywhere except those points where Greeks were in armed contact with Turks. He felt that the Greeks had done their best and that on the whole they had succeeded rather well.

M Clemenceau wishes to ask General Bunoust if he feels that calm did in fact reign in the occupied territories.

General Bunoust says that it does in the town of Smyrna, but that elsewhere the calm was only apparent and might well cease to exist at any moment. Furthermore, the town of Smyrna is nothing in comparison with the entirety of the occupied territories. There certainly is no calm at Aidin.

M Clemenceau inquires if the Greeks have withdrawn again within the Sandjak of Smyrna.

Sir Eyre Crowe points out that General Milne has established a line beyond which the Greeks are to retire, and they have done so. There is, however, a small triangle in the region of Aidin where General Milne had proposed the following alternative: either the Greeks should be permitted to advance beyond the line of occupation previously laid down, or they should withdraw to a line behind the one at present held by them. In the latter event, General Milne had recommended an Inter-Allied occupation - i. e. Greek, French and English - of the triangle comprised between the present line of Greek occupation and that to which they would be forced to withdraw. This solution, including the exclusion of Italian troops from the proposed Inter-Allied force of occupation, had been discussed and approved by the Supreme Council, although he himself has found it difficult to agree with that conclusion. He feels that an Inter-Allied occupation would be the best solution possible, but it has not proven feasible. He is convinced of the impossibility of telling the Greeks to evacuate and of letting the Turks in.

Mr Polk inquires if the town of Soma is in the vicinity of Aidin.

S de Martino explains that it was to the north of Smyrna. He wishes to point out the following facts with respect to the region of Aidin. When the question was submitted to the Council as a result of General Milne’s report three solutions became possible: to leave the Greeks where they were, to let the Turks occupy this territory, or else to effect an Inter-Allied occupation, necessarily including the Greeks in such a force since they were already there. Turkish occupation had not been considered. But when the point of Inter-Allied occupation was raised there was no longer a question of a line of demarcation between Greek and Italian zones of occupation; it was a question, on the one hand, of Italian occupation, and on the other hand, of Inter-Allied occupation. He felt that when the word “Inter-Allied” was used Italy could not be excluded. What had been decided upon is, he thinks, contrary to the view of the French Government, because M Pichon had told him before the meeting that M Clemenceau’s point of view favored Inter-Allied occupation with Italian troops. He does not intend to resuscitate that question, which has already been decided, but he does wish to say that according to information he has received from Constantinople the solution which had been adopted had produced a very bad impression, inasmuch as it had been interpreted as a proof of discord between the Great Powers. He feels that if the Allies, all of whom had interests in Moslem countries, do not give evidence of solidarity towards the Moslem world they will expose themselves to the greatest danger in the future. He has spent eleven years in Moslem countries and could affirm that within ten or fifteen years the Allies would have the greatest difficulty in maintaining their Moslem colonies. The exclusion of Italian troops had made the Turks think that something queer was happening. When he had read the minutes of the meeting, at which he had not been present, he had seen that the reason given for exclusion of Italian troops from Aidin was the fear of disagreement and conflict with the Greeks. He wishes to insist that these fears had no foundation. The Italian Government had come to two agreements with Greece. One of lesser importance, relative to the provisional line of demarcation between Greek and Italian troops, the other a more general agreement. He knows that the Allies are pleased that this latter agreement has been reached. In view of the terms of this latter agreement, which laid down a common line of action with a view to avoiding any cause of disagreement or conflict, he feels sure that if the Italian troops had encountered the Greek troops at Aidin no conflict would have taken place between them. He would like to have Mr Venizelos himself questioned on this point. He wishes to bring all this to the attention of the Council as a matter of record, although he does not intend at that time to reopen the question of Aidin.

Mr Polk inquires if the agreements referred to have been put on record.

S de Martino replies that the agreement respecting the line of demarcation has been put on record and that the other had not.

Mr Polk presumes that there is no objection to it being put on record.

S de Martino thinks not, and says that he would speak to S Tittoni on the matter.

M Clemenceau remarks that General Milne had proposed three solutions: as two of them are impossible, he suggests the other be adopted.

Sir Eyre Crowe states that he has asked Mr Venizelos if the Greeks are certainly able to hold the territory in question and had been told that they could.

M Clemenceau thinks that the Greeks should then be allowed to remain at Aidin.

Sir Eyre Crowe agrees.

M Clemenceau points out that it should not be forgotten that all those questions of occupation are purely provisional.

Sir Eyre Crowe agrees.

S de Martino agrees.

Sir Eyre Crowe points out that General Milne had asked that the Greeks, if they alone are to supply the occupying forces, be allowed to advance beyond the present line of occupation, as that is a necessary condition of their being able to hold the Aidin region.

Mr Polk asks if General Milne has not made it clear that this proposed advance would necessarily mean further fighting between the Greeks and Turks.

Sir Eyre Crowe replies in the affirmative.

Mr Polk states that he will have to make a reservation on this point. His Government has no troops to send, therefore although he cannot unconditionally object to this solution, his Government does not wish to assent thereto, and feels that it must decline all responsibility.

Sir Eyre Crowe says it has been found impossible to find French or British troops to occupy this territory, but he hoped the point might again be raised and that M Clemenceau might once more examine the possibility of sending French troops.

M Clemenceau says that he will again raise the question and will let Sir Eyre Crowe know on the following day, but he feels that he will not be successful inasmuch as France has no troops to spare. He thinks it is no use for the Council to shut its eyes to the fact that the Turks will continue to harass the Greeks. If troops were sent to this region it will result in protecting the Greeks from attacks which they had brought upon themselves.

Mr Polk says that he hesitates to express an opinion inasmuch as his Government can do nothing to help the situation by sending troops. But he wishes to put himself on record as insisting that any further difficulties or fighting in Asia Minor would certainly make the ultimate settlement of the Turkish question more difficult. The Turks and Greeks will always fight each other; therefore, he feels that any decision which will necessarily bring them into closer and further armed contact was bad in principle.

M Clemenceau observes that even if it is found possible to send an Inter-Allied force, that would not solve the question of conflicts between the Greeks and Turks. The fact of having the troops at Aidin would not have prevented fighting in Soma. Mr Venizelos had rather taken the Council to task and it cannot leave unanswered some of the points raised by him. It is perhaps true that the procedure adopted had not always been the best. He suggests that an answer be sent to Mr Venizelos stating in substance that, although Mr Venizelos’ complaints as to the procedure adopted might have been justified in certain particulars, nevertheless he himself (Mr Venizelos) had recognized that abuses have been committed, and further recommending to Mr Venizelos the use of extreme caution in the future. In the same letter Mr Venizelos should be informed of the decision taken with respect to maintaining Greek troops in Aidin and he should be forcibly reminded that all occupation is purely provisional.

General Bunoust wishes to point out that the Council proposes to tell Mr Venizelos in effect that the Commission has not proceeded in the way it should have. He wishes to warn the Council that any such action would be an impeachment of its own decisions. The Council in its instructions of July 26th had marked out the exact lines of action which had since been followed by the Commission, and subsequently had decided that Colonel Mazarakis should not be present at the meetings of the Commission. He wishes to add that the Commission, in recommending an Inter-Allied occupation, had desired to test the sincerity of the Turks who had repeatedly proclaimed that they only objected to an occupation by the Greeks.

M Clemenceau replies that the Council has no wish to blame the Commission in any way. The question is whether the instructions had been well worded. He suggests that M Berthelot prepare an answer to Mr Venizelos, to be submitted to the Council, taking into account the views expressed at that meeting.

(It is decided:

(1) To ask Mr Venizelos for explanations relative to the conflict between Greeks and Turks near Soma, reported in a despatch from Constantinople dated November 8, 1919;

(2) That M Berthelot should prepare, for submission to the Council, a reply to Mr Venizelos, taking into account the views expressed by the Council at that meeting.)


5. The Council has before it a note from the British Delegation regarding the exportation to Russia of German munitions and war material.

Sir Eyre Crowe summarizes the note from the British Delegation. He thinks there is a good deal to be said in favor of helping General Denikin but he wishes to point out that his Government is already heavily committed in supplying the northern Russian forces.

M Clemenceau thinks that the manufacture and exportation in question could be stopped as soon as the Treaty has been put into force.

Mr Polk asks if it is proposed to do anything at that moment.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that the manufacture and exportation could be stopped at once.

Mr Polk wonders if this is wise. He inquires if any right exists to stop this manufacture and exportation at the present time.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that this right existed even under the Armistice. This was clear from the fact that the Germans themselves, in asking permission for this manufacture and exportation, recognized that the right to prohibit it existed under the Armistice.

Mr Polk wishes to know what the reason is for prohibiting this manufacture and exportation; is the idea that ammunition factories should not be put into operation or was it in order not to help General Denikin?

M Clemenceau suggests that the Germans be told that they cannot manufacture and export the munitions and material in question.

Mr Polk says that he objects to these supplies being furnished by Germans but he does approve sending such supplies to General Denikin. If anyone else could supply him with the material in question he would be in favor of it. He wishes to know who is going to pay for this material and how the payment would be made?

Sir Eyre Crowe replies that he is not sure. He thinks that perhaps Bolshevist money will be used in payment.

M Berthelot observes that the trouble is that there is no way of controlling the destination of this material.

Sir Eyre Crowe pointed out that the same group of manufacturers and exporters also supplied Colonel Bermondt.

M Clemenceau suggests that a reply be sent that inasmuch as the Council has no control over the use and destination of the munitions and war material in question, and cannot even be sure that part thereof would not find its way into the hands of elements hostile to the Allied and Associated Powers, the Council cannot sanction the manufacture and dispatch of the munitions and war material in question. He asks who would convey this information and to whom the communication would be sent.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he will send this answer to the British Military Representative in Berlin, in the name of the Council, for transmission by him to the proper parties.

(It is decided that Sir Eyre Crowe, in the name of the Council, should inform the British Military Representative at Berlin, for transmission by him to the proper parties, that inasmuch as the Council has no control over the use and destination of the munitions and war material in question, and cannot even be sure that part thereof would not find its way into the hands of elements hostile to the Allied and Associated Powers, the Council cannot sanction the manufacture and dispatch of the munitions and war material in question.


6. The Council has before it a note from the Drafting Committee relative to the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations.

M Fromageot reads and comments upon the note of the Drafting Committee and explains that what is proposed therein is not a formal convocation of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations prior to the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty with Germany but only informal warning information.

Mr Polk asks whether, assuming that the only thing the Council will do at its first meeting will be to nominate the Commission of Delimitation for the Sarre District, it will not be sufficient to call the meeting for the day after the deposit of ratifications.

M Fromageot replies that if it is sure that nothing further has to be done it will be sufficient. It is possible, however, that many and serious questions will have to be taken up especially in the event of the United States ratifying the Treaty prior to the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. It is therefore better to take all preliminary precautions even if they should eventually prove useless.

Mr Polk thinks that he will have to ask for an adjournment. He does not see the necessity for all these various notices. The question had once been very simple but it is now becoming very complicated. The only question he wishes to raise is: Does the President of the United States have the power to call the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations before the deposit of ratifications. If not, he thinks the President could issue such a call on the day of the deposit of ratifications and that the meeting could be held the following day.

M Fromageot says that the solution proposed by the Drafting Committee involved no convocation which might be deemed premature.

Sir Eyre Crowe adds that a further point had been raised: The United States might or might not ratify the Treaty prior to the date of the deposit of ratifications. Mr Polk’s point is only based on the United States not having ratified. The proposal of the Drafting Committee covers both contingencies.

Mr Polk says that he would refer the matter to his Government although he feels confident that there will be no objection.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he would have to make a small reservation with respect to the place of the first meeting. There have been some previous discussion on this point of whether the meeting should be in Paris, or in London where the machinery of the League of Nations already exists. When the point had come up before the Council the British Delegation had not agreed that the meeting should be held in Paris. Since that time he has obtained his Government’s consent to holding the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations in Paris if no other business was to come before the Council than the nomination of the members of the Commission of Delimitation for the Sarre District. That is all that he can agree to at the present time but he will try to obtain further consent for the first meeting of the Council to be held in Paris irrespective of the business to be transacted at that meeting.

M Clemenceau observed that he of course cannot make any statement as to what will be on the agenda at the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations.

Mr Polk thinks that there is a great deal of unnecessary trouble in connection with this question. It is proposed to be entirely prepared for an important meeting of the Council on the day of the deposit of ratifications. Apparently that day will be somewhere in the neighborhood of November 25th. If that is so his Government’s Delegate could not reach Paris in time, even if the United States had already ratified the Treaty.

M Berthelot thinks that the deposit of ratifications can be effected on or about November 27th, as far as the Allied and Associated Powers are concerned. It has become evident from various sources that the Germans will not sign the protocol without raising various difficulties. If the deposit of ratifications is delayed it will be on account of the German attitude.

(It was decided to approve the recommendations of the Drafting Committee relative to the convocation of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations with the following reservations:

(1) That Mr. Polk will refer the matter to his Government.

(2) That Sir Eyre Crowe will refer to his Government the question of holding the first meeting of the Council in Paris irrespective of the business to be transacted at said first meeting.


7. The Council had before it a draft answer, prepared by the Commission on Belgian Affairs, to the note of the German Delegation of October 3rd, relative to the organization of the plebiscites at Eupen and Malmedy.

(It was decided to approve the draft answer, prepared by the Commission on Belgian Affairs, to the note of the German Delegation of October 3rd, relative to the organization of the Plebiscites at Eupen and Malmedy.

(The meeting then adjourns.)