[Aktungbby]

Originally Posted by Catfish

Shouldn't there be always two systems, for redundancy?
Especially when it comes to flying and failure of components, what i learned is "Two is one, one is none".

Originally Posted by Aktungbby

MEETS BOTTOM LINE: A SUCCESSION OF SMALL ERRORS (ALA TITANIC) CAUSED TWO AIR DISASTERS; THE ERRORS STARTED AT THE VERY TOP (PROFIT AND DESIGN) AND WORKED DOWN TO FOUR PEOPLE; THE TWO PILOTS IN TWO AIRPLANES INSUFFICIENTLY BRIEFED TO DEAL WITH THEIR AIRCRAFT STALL SENSOR ISSUES...EVERYONE ELSE WAS...'JUST ALONG FOR THE (SHORT) RIDE'! https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/2/18518176/boeing-737-max-crash-problems-human-error-mcas-faa

Originally Posted by Catfish

So.. deregulation played a part?
" ... the conservative republicans fighting for a "small government" have already diluted, delayed or abolished dozens of protections in almost all sectors. [me thinking of EPA and this !"§$%&!!! Pruitt] The reason for this is called cost, redundancy and annoying bureaucracy. In truth, this happens at the request and pressure of the industry."

Google translation of the german »Spiegel«:
"Control out of control"
https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=de&sl=de&tl=en&u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.sp iegel.de%2Fwirtschaft%2Funternehmen%2Fdonald-trump-boeing-max-737-und-die-us-flugaufsicht-faa-ausser-kontrolle-a-1258713.html

And a british article
"The Boeing scandal is an indictment of Trump’s corporate America":
https://www.theguardian.com/commenti...porate-america

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/01/business/boeing-737-max-crash.html

Originally Posted by TODAY'S NYTIMES

The fatal flaws with Boeing’s 737 Max can be traced to a breakdown late in the plane’s development, when test pilots, engineers and regulators were left in the dark about a fundamental overhaul to an automated system that would ultimately play a role in two crashes. A year before the plane was finished, Boeing made the system more aggressive and riskier. While the original version relied on data from at least two types of sensors, the ultimate used just one, leaving the system without a critical safeguard. In both doomed flights, pilots struggled as a single damaged sensor sent the planes into irrecoverable nose-dives within minutes, killing 346 people and prompting regulators around the world to ground the Max.
But many people involved in building, testing and approving the system, known as MCAS, said they hadn’t fully understood the changes. Current and former employees at Boeing and the Federal Aviation Administration who spoke with The New York Times said they had assumed the system relied on more sensors and would rarely, if ever, activate. Based on those misguided assumptions, many made critical decisions, affecting design, certification and training.....As Boeing rushed to get the plane done, many of the employees say, they didn’t recognize the importance of the decision ....
The current and former employees, many of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the continuing investigations, said that after the first crash, they were stunned to discover MCAS relied on a single sensor.
“That’s nuts,” said an engineer who helped design MCAS.
“I’m shocked,” said a safety analyst who scrutinized it.
“To me, it seems like somebody didn’t understand what they were doing,” said an engineer who assessed the system’s sensors.

BOTTOM LINE: EVEN AFTER THEY SAY THEY GOT IT ALL FIXED I'LL NEVER FLY ON ONE!