View Single Post
Old 12-11-22, 02:56 AM   #260
Kapitän
The Old Man
 
Join Date: Mar 2010
Location: Frankfurt, Germany
Posts: 1,580
Downloads: 29
Uploads: 0
Default U.A.K., 2nd Training Division (U.L.D.) and 22nd U-Flotilla, Gotenhafen-Oxhöft

Quote:
Originally Posted by Kapitän View Post
Started new career in August 2019 to commemorate the beginning of WWII, 80 years before ...

+++++++

Thursday, 10 December 1942 - Gotenhafen-Oxhöft

Work-up's and Trials with the U.A.K. (Kpt.z.S.R. BRÄUTIGAM), the 2nd Training Division (U.L.D.; Freg.Kpt.d.R. Ernst HASSHAGEN) and 22nd U-Flotilla (Korvkpt. Wilhelm Ambrosius):

Dry-Run Exercises with Machinery/Mechanics; Weapons; Torpedoes.

+++++++

Italian Submarine Ambra launched three manned torpedoes and ten frogmen against Algiers, French Algeria in Operation NA 1, sinking one cargo ship and damaging two other cargo ships; all Italian torpedo crew members and frogmen are captured at the end of the operation.

U 618
(Oblt. Kurt Baberg) situation report: Very heavy air activity in DH 30. Auxiliary cruisers (Bewacher) and patrol groups off Casablanca - no traffic. Mehdia Roads empty. Continual air activity during the day by Catalina, ineffective vertical Radar at night. In view of its presence being known and the defence situation operations did not promise much success. U 432 (Kptlt. Heinz-Otto Schultze) was asked for report on situation. This boat has the same assignments as U 618.

U 301
(Kptlt. Willy-Roderich Körner) has passed through the Straits of Gibraltar and is therefore under F.O. U-boats, Mediterranean.

New position for "Milkcow" U 463 (KrvKpt. Leo Wolfbauer) is CD 90.

B.d.U. stated the following in his report at the Naval High Command on 8.12. in Berlin
:
From 1.1 to 30.11.1942, the boats in action in the North Sea have sunk altogether 262,614 GRT. These boats could certainly have sunk about 910,000 GRT in the Atlantic in the same period. The grounds for the assumption are: The number of boats assigned to the North Sea the degree of effectiveness in the individual months for the boats in the Atlantic, a proportion of 50:50 time in port to time at sea which is in fact more favorable to time at sea. Use of the North Sea boats in the Atlantic then could have brought an increase in tonnage sunk to 650,000 GRT, an amount that would have weighed heavily against the enemy.

B.d.U. again expressed the view that the tonnage war must be considered the main task of the U-boats, but that this tonnage war suffers heavy losses with the deployment of boats in the Mediterranean, the North Sea and attacks on the Gibraltar supply route (Group "Westwall") as the North Sea example shows. The Naval High Command has already ordered the examination of the question of the North Sea boats and states that he will order a detachment of the North Sea boats for the prosecution of the war in the Atlantic.

In an order issued by the Naval War Staff Iu 2636/42 of 9.12.:
1) Concerning: U-boats for the North Sea. As the time of year makes expectations of successes slight, further, ice conditions caused the increased narrowing of the navigatable area Spitzbergen - North Cape and reports indicate the possible curtailment of enemy supplies to Russia as a result of the Africa operations, easing up of the deployment of U-boats in the North Sea is permissible. Conditions for convoy warfare in the North Atlantic are at the moment particularly favorable, as convoy protection is weaker following withdrawal of forces for the African undertaking. There are not enough U-boats available, however, to exploit this position. On the other hand, dislocation of enemy supplies to Russia can be achieved directly by attacking convoys in the North Atlantic.
2) The following orders are therefore given:
As previously, Group "Nord" will be designated 23 boats. Of these boats, until further notice, 11 will be released for use by B.d.U. in the North Atlantic with these measures, that
2.A) Of the remaining 12 boats, 6 are to be ready for action and available (in the operational area) at any given time for Group "Nord".
2.B) That the control in the North Atlantic is carried out in such a way as to assure deployment in the Norway Area if necessary, as the task of U-boats in this area also consists of coastal protection against enemy operations. Interchange of boats, in some cases substitution by boats from home is left to B.d.U.
3) The Naval War Staff (message also to Group "Nord") are to be continually notified in detail according to 2.) b) of the permanent numbers and alterations of the 11 U-boats held in readiness.

Naval War Staff Operations. Iu 2636/42 Most Secret. S.O. Only.

Suggested by Group "Nord" for operations in the North Atlantic:
U 209, 334, 355, 376, 377, 403, 405, 456, 586, 601 which will be ready for deployment on 25.12. B.d.U. is in agreement but proposes 592 instead of 355, as this boat has been deployed in the North Sea considerably longer than U 355.

Naval War Staff Communications concurs.

U 648 (Oblt.z.S.d.R. Peter-Arthur Stahl) conducts Silent Running Tests off Rönne, Bornholm; Departs at 1400h for Danzig.

RST
KorvKpt.& Cmdr. U 115
Started new career in August 2019 to commemorate the beginning of WWII, 80 years before ...

+++++++

Friday, 11 December 1942 - Gotenhafen-Oxhöft

Work-up's and Trials with the U.A.K. (Kpt.z.S.R. BRÄUTIGAM), the 2nd Training Division (U.L.D.; Freg.Kpt.d.R. Ernst HASSHAGEN) and 22nd U-Flotilla (Korvkpt. Wilhelm Ambrosius):

Dry-Run Exercises with Machinery/Mechanics; Weapons; Torpedoes.

+++++++

The Cockleshell Heroes Raid: Ten British Commandos in five two-man canoes are launched from a submarine to attack our shipping in the port of Bordeaux. Three canoes are lost but two paddle 70 miles up-river to plant limpet mines on ships in the harbour. Six vessels are disabled. Two Commandos are drowned en route, six are captured and executed and two will make it back to England.

The Allies launch a new offensive toward Marsa Brega and El Agheila in Libya.

As, apart from the three ships previously sunk in the patrol channel of Group "Westwall", no further contact with enemy has taken place, and the boats are so low on fuel that they must begin the return voyage in the next few days, the Group has received orders to proceed in lines of reconnaissance on an easterly course, days reckoning 140 miles at 2400 from 11.12. A later deployment of the boats still fit for action in the north half of CF and for operations on the England - Gibraltar traffic is intended. Further refueling is not possible owing to the shortage of tankers.

"Milkcow" U 460 (Kptlt. Ebe Schnoor) has delivered the last of her fuel to U 67 and U 183 and begins her return voyage.
Supplied from "Milkcow" U 461 (Kptlt. Wolf-Harro Stiebler): U 126 - 174 - 128 - 134 and U 176. Tanker homeward bound.

The following waiting positions are to be occupied with a depth of 4 sea miles for protection and area reconnaissance for the tanker "Germania" putting out on 12.12.: U 514 - BE 9326; U 125 - BE 9629; U 563 - BF 7116; U 706 - BF 7442.

U 553 (KrvKpt. Karl Thurmann) reports strong spray formation and difficulty in depth maintenance as a result of the construction of the new 2 cm Flak Crew Protection "Wanne". The boat was seen continually during an attack on a convoy and thereby deprived of success. U 553 has been ordered to return at maximum speed and the adaptation of further boats discontinued in all shipyards.

The deployment of the Group "Westwall" has not led to satisfactory results, as the sinking of 4 ships cannot be regarded as such. As warfare directly west of Gibraltar was no longer promising, there were no possibilities of intercepting English - American supplies to Gibraltar and morocco.
a) Deployment W. of Portugal: Successful convoy warfare could not be expected here, as the entire area in question lies within range of enemy air activity. Isolated successes remained possible but depend a great deal on luck and opportunity.
b) Operations moved to area free of air activity against American supplies, which is presumed to be on the Great Circle America - Gibraltar. B.d.U. is in favor of the second possibility. This deployment could be quite successful even if only one convoy was intercepted. That did not in fact happen. Radio Intelligence reports show rather that the enemy has used a route far more to the S., whereby it is difficult to see whether he uses it principally or exploits it in order to spread out as much as possible. The former is possible. The available "Westwall" boats cannot, however be used anymore on the southerly route, owing to insufficient fuel supply, and they are numerically too weak to be used for a search in other areas. It therefore only remains to test the possibilities given under a) and to use the "Westwall" boats for this. They are unequipped for cold areas which cuts out the possibility of sending these boats to the Newfoundland area and putting boats from Western France in the area W. of Portugal.

U 648 (Ltnt.z.S.d.R. Peter-Arthur Stahl) conducts Work-up's and Trials with the U.A.G. in Danzig.

RST
KorvKpt.& Cmdr. U 115
__________________
KSDII-Ace/GWX 3.0 Gold/CCoM 10.0 + h.sie-patch; Windows 7 (64-bit); NVIDIA GeForce GTX650 (310.90)

Last edited by Kapitän; 12-11-22 at 03:37 AM.
Kapitän is offline   Reply With Quote