[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, November 1, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


Saturday, November 1, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. The Council has before it a note from the British Delegation dated October 28, 1919.

Sir Eyre Crowe states that the question is a very simple one, and is summarized in the note from the British Delegation which had been circulated among in the members of the Council. The Council had appointed, at some prior time, General Milne as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces in Asia Minor: It seems that neither the French nor the Italian authorities had been informed of the decision of the Council.

M Pichon thinks indeed that the question cannot raise any difficulty so long as the beginning of the note, as submitted to the Council, is altered slightly: The British Delegation had said that the General Officer commanding the British troops at Constantinople and in Asia Minor (Syria excepted) had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces in those regions. This assertion was correct, as far as Turkey in Asia was concerned, but the question of the command at Constantinople was the object of negotiations between the British and French Governments.

Sir Eyre Crowe agreed with this remark, but asked, above all, that the French and Italian military authorities be informed of the decisions of the Supreme Council, which had recognized the authority of General Milne.

M Berthelot thought that there could be no doubt whatsoever on this question, and added he could not understand the misunderstanding which had taken place, for the necessary information had been given at the same time to M de France and to General Franchet d’Esperey.

S Scialoja asked that the same instructions be repeated to the Italian military authorities.

M Pichon agreed that this information should be reiterated.

(It is decided that the French and Italian Delegations take the necessary steps to inform their representatives in Turkey that the Supreme Council had appointed General Milne as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces in Asia Minor, Syria excepted.


2. The Council has before it a draft note prepared by the Drafting Committee.

M Fromageot comments upon this draft note and remarked that the Drafting Committee has taken account of the observations made at the preceding meeting of the Supreme Council, and also that the new draft was presented by all the members of the Committee.

General Weygand says that the draft, as prepared by the Drafting Committee, invites the German Government to send representatives to Paris on November 6th. He would like to know whether on the 6th of November they could profitably discuss with the German delegates: would the Commissions be ready on that date?

M Berthelot said that he had proposed November 6th to take into account the wish expressed by General Weygand himself that the conference should take place as soon as possible, but could easily be put off for a few days.

General Weygand thinks that from a military standpoint they would certainly be ready on November 6th, but that perhaps that date might be a little early for the Commissions.

M Pichon proposes the 10th instead of the 6th.

(This proposal is adopted)

(It is decided that the draft note to the German Government, prepared by the Drafting Committee, relative to putting the Treaty into force, be approved, and that the German Government be asked to send representatives to be in Paris on the 10th, and not on the 6th, of November, 1919.


3. The Council ha before it a draft Protocol, prepared by the Drafting Committee.

M Fromageot reads and comments upon the draft prepared by the Drafting Committee, and remarked that there was occasion to modify the draft on the following points:

(1) Page 1, point 3: Eliminate in the second line the word “immediately” and add after the words, “in Russian Territory” the words, “as soon as the Allies judge opportune.”

(2) Page 1, point 4: Substitute the word, “coercive” for the word, “consecutive.”

(3) Page 1, point 5: Substitute the word “fiduciary” for the word, “judicial.”

(4) Page 2, point 6: Add to the end of the paragraph, “destruction in the North Sea of certain submarines on their way to England to be handed over.”

(5) Page 3, point 11: Add to the end of the paragraph, “and various other merchant vessels.”

(6) Page 4: Add to the end of the second paragraph, “and the destruction in the North Sea of certain submarines on their way to England to be handed over.”

(7) Page 4, point 2: Add to the end of the paragraph “also the three submarine engines of U–146, which still remained to be delivered in reparation for submarines destroyed in the North Sea.”

He explains that in point 1 of Page 1 they had mentioned an interval of thirty-one days expiring December 11th, 1918. Was this exact?

Marshal Foch says it is not quite right; the time limit had been exceeded by mutual consent and in consequence of various agreements. There is no need to mention it. On the other hand, he considered that as regarded handing over of rolling stock, the Germans had not, properly speaking, committed any real violation of the Armistice. There had been certain slowness of execution. It would be a mistake therefore to treat as equally serious the non-fulfillment of that clause and specific violations of the Armistice like the Scapa Flow incident and the non-evacuation of the Baltic Provinces. It would perhaps be better to mention in the beginning of the note the more important questions, and to consider secondary violations in a final paragraph.

M Fromageot says that they had followed the order of the clauses of the Armistice conventions; obviously that might be modified. From a legal point of view, on the other hand, he feels obliged to remark that the fact of an obligation being in course of fulfillment did not prevent their considering it unexecuted.

Marshal Foch thinks that it would be sufficient to say that, on that point, the Allied and Associated Powers had not received full satisfaction. He wishes to repeat, in that case, that there is no formal violation of the Armistice, and that it would be well not to confuse in the same category formal violations and incomplete execution.

M Berthelot says it had seemed advantageous to make a complete enumeration, but he wishes to remark that, in the last part, they had to take into account the arguments the Marshal had in mind, and that, doubtless, it would be sufficient to omit in that last part, paragraphs Nos. 4 and 5 of page 4.

M Pichon sums up that they are agreed to modify the first paragraph of page 1 in the following manner: “The obligations, etc., have not been carried out, or have not received full satisfaction.”

(This suggestion is adopted)

Marshal Foch wishes to remark that as for point 2, they cannot reproach the Germans with not having made the reimbursement of the upkeep expenses of the troops of occupation, for the simple reason that they had not yet told them the total amount of these expenses. It would therefore be better to omit the paragraph.

M Berthelot thinks it is all the easier, as the obligation is covered by the Treaty.

M Pichon concludes that the Council decided to omit this paragraph.

M Fromageot stated that with regard to Germany’s obligation to deliver documents, specie, valuables carried away by her troops, they had not felt in a position to mention the valuables removed from the prisoners’ camps, as the Minister of Finance had demanded, because the Armistice did not speak of it.

Mr Polk thinks that, although he does not suppose that his Naval Experts would raise objections on the point, he wishes to make a reservation on point 6 of the Committee’s draft. Similarly, he feels he must make a reservation on point 11 of the draft, concerning the handing over of the fourteen tank vessels which had been demanded. He believed, further, that on this point it might be possible to find a text which would satisfy at once the American Delegation on the one hand, and the British and the French on the other.

M Berthelot states they have already taken care to avoid a text which appeared to imply a decision by the American Government on property in these vessels.

Mr Polk adds that the American Government does not consider that the demand for the handing over of those tank vessels can be maintained.

M Berthelot wishes to remark that the Supreme Council had taken a decision on the subject,5 namely that a German obligation existed although, as between the Allies, the question might be examined anew.

Mr Polk does not wish to raise, at that time, the question in its entirety, but could not help remarking that if the decision which M Berthelot recalls, has not been taken, there would not have been a violation of the Armistice, in that case, on the part of the Germans. He is hoping that the Drafting Committee will prepare a text which would permit of an agreement.

M Henry Berenger states that they do not at that time have to examine the question of real property in the tank ships, nor what is the legal position of the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft. That is a question which belongs to the Reparations Commission; for the moment the question is: why have the ships which had been demanded in virtue of certain clauses of the Armistice, not been delivered, especially at a time when tonnage and fuel are everywhere the universal need. He thinks the British Delegation believes, as he does, that there is there a real obstruction on the part of Germany.

Mr Polk thinks that the question before this meeting was to revise the protocol and not to discuss in its entirety the question of the tank ships which, however, he was ready to discuss. He simply wishes to make a reservation, and he is convinced that the Drafting Committee would manage to agree on a text which would not bring up the whole question.

Mr Berthelot says that a distinction should be made between the two points: 1st, the attitude of the Allies towards the Germans: the Germans have been asked to deliver the ships, they ought to do it. 2nd, if the Supreme Council had several times decided that the tank ships are to be sent to the Firth of Forth it is no longer a matter of settling the question in substance; and discussion remains possible as between the Allies and America. But it is important to introduce in the protocol a clause! If they were not to do so they would unintentionally be deciding the question in substance and to the advantage of Germany.

Mr Polk thinks that the remarks of M Berthelot are probably true, but as time is short, he would for the moment confine himself to making a reservation.

M Clemenceau concluded that it is understood, then, that the protocol will contain a clause on that subject, but for the moment the Council decides to reserve the text.

Sir Eyre Crowe asks with regard to point No. 12 of the Committee’s draft whether it would not be advisable to examine it at the same time as the draft reply to the German note of October 12th on the sale of Aeronautical materiel which figured on the agenda of that morning.

M Fromageot thinks that the question will present itself more profitably a little later. He will have some observations to make which will satisfy the technical experts; and at that time could also be examined the draft reply which Sir Eyre Crowe mentioned. He adds that, following point No. 12, it would be right to alter the text of the paragraph beginning with the words, “A certain number of stipulations, etc”; it should read: “Unexecuted or incompletely executed stipulations” so as to take into account the observations offered some time before by Marshal Foch. M Clemenceau says that they then have to decide what reparations they are going to exact for the Scapa Flow incident.

Captain Fuller points out that the Naval Experts have not been able to come to an agreement. The Representative of the United States had made a reservation on the subject of floating docks that ought to be exacted.

Commandant Le Vavasseur states that he has submitted - and his British, Italian and Japanese colleagues are of the same opinion - that it is inadvisable to specify the percentage of large and small docks that ought to be demanded for the tonnage that is to be replaced. They think it sufficient to fix only the total, leaving it to the Commission of Naval Control to make the choice. The American Delegate alone is of a different opinion.

Commandant Le Vavasseur repeats that they all agree upon the principle that the handing over of Naval materiel ought to be demanded and agreed also upon the amount of tonnage that should be claimed as reparation. Their difference exists in the proportion as between large and small docks.

Captain Fuller agrees that is the situation.

Mr Polk wishes to ask for what reason they cannot specify at this time the proportion of great docks and small docks to be delivered.

Captain Fuller replies that it is because this raises the question of the docks at Danzig, for it is at Danzig that two of the biggest docks Germany possesses are situated.

Mr Polk says that, in the absence of his naval experts, it is difficult for him to take a decision. He feels, however, as he has already stated to the Council, that this question brings up the problem of the extent of Germany’s ability to make reparation, and for that reason comes within the province of the Reparations Commission; he confines himself to making a reservation and proposes that the discussion be resumed that afternoon.

(This proposal is adopted.)

M Fromageot wishes to draw the attention of the Council to the third obligation which the protocol imposes on Germany, to take into account the remarks which has been presented to the Committee by technical experts. They, therefore, proposed to alter the text which the Council had before it in the following manner:

"Third - to make over to the Allied and Associated Governments the value of the Aeronautical materiel which had been exported, according to the decision that would be given, and the estimate made or notified by the President of the Commission on Aeronautical Control, as provided in article 210 of the Treaty of Peace, before the 31st January, 1920."

It is the President of the Commission who will decide whether the exported materiel is civil or military, and who as a result of that decision, will determine the sum that Germany ought to pay.

S Scialoja remarked that the notification to Germany would be made by the President, but that the decision would have to be taken by the Commission itself.

M Fromageot explains that the technical experts have agreed that the President be trusted with the power of deciding whether the materiel in question is civil or military.

Captain Roper states that the Supreme Council has had to make a decision on this point on the 29th September on the point being raised by the British Delegation. In the text prepared by the British Delegation the President had been mentioned, but in their minds it was clear that the President was merely the interpreter of the Commission.

M Berthelot adds that this means the decision of the Commission as notified by the President.

M Clemenceau explains that of course the Commission could always delegate its powers to the President.

M Fromageot made the comment that the two following paragraphs, Nos. 4 and 5 on page 4, ought to be omitted in the light of the explanations just offered by Marshal Foch, but that the Drafting Committee thought that there was still ground for adding to the final paragraph the following phrase which was dictated by the analogous terms of paragraph 18 of the annex to part VIII of the Treaty; “Germany pledges itself not to consider these measures as acts of war.”

M Clemenceau does not think this a very happy addition. What are they going to do if Germany should refuse to sign that phrase.

Marshal Foch announces himself quite hostile to that phrase.

S Scialoja wishes to raise another question. In his opinion it will be well to ask the Germans to come armed with full powers to sign the Protocol, but expressly on the understanding that that Protocol would not be still subject to ratification by the National Assembly. We

Are they not to take this precaution they would expose themselves to the anomaly that the Treaty would have come into force while the protocol was in the air; for certain articles of the German Constitution left it an open question whether the document that they wished to have the German representative sign would be valid without ratification by the legislative authorities.

M Fromageot wishes to point out that in their draft note it is stated on Page 28 that the German representative who is to sign the protocol must be armed with full powers.

S Scialoja explains that this means full powers to sign, but it is necessary that this signature should hold Germany without ratification.

M Fromageot thinks it would be sufficient to modify the first paragraph on Page 2 of the draft note in the following manner:

“The German Government is therefore asked to give to the German representatives, authorized to sign the procès-verbal for the deposit of ratifications, full powers to sign at the same time the protocol of which a copy is hereto attached and which provides without further delay for this settlement.”

(It is decided to approve the draft Protocol prepared by the Drafting Committee to be signed by a representative of the German Government upon the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty of Peace, with the following modifications:

(1) Page 1, paragraph 1: “The obligations have not been executed or have not been entirely fulfilled.”

(2) Page 1, paragraph 2: Eliminate the words, “within a period of thirty-one days ending on December 11, 1919."

(3) Page 1, paragraph 3: This paragraph to be entirely eliminated.

(4) Page 1, paragraph 4: Eliminate in the second line the word, “immediately” and add to the fourth line the words, “as soon as the Allies judge opportune.”

(5) Page 1, paragraph 6: In the third line substitute the word, “coercive” for “consecutive”.

(6) Page 1, paragraph 7: In the third line substitute the word, “fiduciary” for the word, “judicial”.

(7) Page 2, paragraph 2: Add at the end of this paragraph the words, “and the destruction in the North Sea of certain submarines on their way to England to be handed over”.

(8) Page 2, paragraph 3: This clause is provisionally reserved.

(9) Page 2, paragraph 4: line 1, substitute for, “Clauses of the Armistice, “Armistice Convention”.

(10) Page 3, paragraph 3: The first part of this paragraph is reserved, and at the end thereof are to be added the words, “and various other merchant vessels”.

(11) Page 3, paragraph 5: Between the words, “unexecuted” and “stipulations” insert the words, “or incompletely executed”.

(12)
Page 4, paragraph 2: Add at the end of this paragraph, “and the destruction in the North Sea of certain submarines on their way to England to be handed over”.

(13) The next paragraph is reserved provisionally.

(14) Page 4, paragraph 4: This paragraph to be modified so as to read: “To deliver within a period of ten days, from the date of the signature of the present Protocol, the machinery and engines of submarines U–137, U–138, and U–150 by way of reparation for the destruction of submarine UC–48, as well as of the three engines of submarine U–46, which still remained to be delivered in reparation for the submarines destroyed in the North Sea.”

(15) Change paragraph 5 on Page 4, to read: “. … according to the decision that will be taken, the estimate made and modified [notified] by the Aeronautic Control Commission as provided for in Article 210 of the Treaty of Peace and before January 31, 1920.”

(16) To omit the two last paragraphs of the same page.

It is further decided that on account of the changes made in the Protocol, the first paragraph on page 2 of the draft note to the German Government should be modified in the following manner:

“The German Government is therefore asked to give to the German representatives authorized to sign the procès-verbal for the deposit of ratifications, full powers to sign at the same time the Protocol of which a copy is hereto attached and which provides without further delay for this settlement.”)


4. The Council has before it a draft reply prepared by the French Delegation Draft Reply to the German Note Upon the Sale of Aeronautical Matériel

Sir Eyre Crowe proposes to refer this draft back to the Drafting Committee for examination, and also to state whether the text thereof agrees with the resolutions which have just been taken.

(This proposition is adopted)

(It was decided:

(1) To refer back to the Drafting Committee the draft reply to the note from the German Government dated October 12th.9 (See Appendix “D”.)

(2) That the Drafting Committee will decide whether the note and the protocol which the Allied and Associated Powers have decided to send did not render superfluous the sending of that specific reply.)


5. The Council has before it the report from the Central Territorial Committee concerning the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier, and a draft reply from the same Committee to the Bulgarian note concerning Thrace.

M Laroche explains that the Committee has not been able to agree. Although it is unanimous, as far Thrace is concerned, in refusing the Bulgarian claims, on the contrary, a disagreement exists on two other points. Two delegations, the American and the Italian, are of the opinion that there should be a modification of the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier line as it is defined in the conditions of Peace, in two places, namely in the region of Tsaribrod and in the region of Bossiligrad. On the contrary, the three other Delegations are of the opinion that the original conditions should remain. With regard to the Dobrudja, the Committee is equally divided. On September 5, the Supreme Council had decided to examine the question of the Dobrudja when it would reply to the Bulgarian propositions. At the preceding meeting, Sir Eyre Crowe had proposed that they should confine themselves to answering the Bulgarians that the question should not come up in a Treaty between Bulgaria and the Allied and Associated Powers, but the American and Italian Delegations insisted that the question should be examined anew: As far as they were concerned, the question was bound up with that of the Serbian frontier. That was the opinion of the majority of the Commission. In justification of the changes which they proposed to make in the conditions of Peace, the American and Italian Delegations laid stress on arguments which were already known, and they also emphasized the feeling which was being shown in Bulgaria, they were afraid that the decision of the Conference would leave behind them lasting marks of resentment. These arguments were not of sufficient value for the majority. The Majority as a matter of fact, pointed out that the Serbian Delegation was familiar with the Peace conditions: Should the Council change them at the last minute, the Serbian Allies would be the ones to experience that feeling referred to by the minority Delegations. The majority was of the opinion that the reasons which had modified the line of the former Serbo-Bulgarian frontier were still good: they had wished to protect in the Vranje region the Belgrade–Salonika railroad from a Bulgarian aggression; indeed, it should not be forgotten that it was in that region, and by reason of the proximity of the railroad to the former frontier, the Bulgarian attack had begun in 1915.

Mr Polk wishes to remark that as far as the Dobrudja was concerned, he thinks it might be sufficient to insert a phrase on the subject in the covering letter; that the Allied and Associated Powers would declare, for instance, that the time had not come to discuss the question. Should the majority insist, he would not oppose himself to that decision, but he wished to state that he would have to make a formal reservation in the name of the American Government. The Dobrudja might become a cause of future war in the Balkans, and America would have some difficulty in interfering in a conflict which might be brought about by that question. He therefore wished to ask that this reservation be set forth upon the record: that the American Delegation would prefer the insertion in the covering letter of a line stating that the matter would be taken up with Romania. Was the Supreme Council hostile to this solution? He does not wish to hide the fact that it seems to him a great pity, at a time when they were guaranteeing the protection of Minorities, to go against the rights of these Minorities in the Dobrudja.

M Pichon remarks that the Treaty of 1913 which had decided the future of the Dobrudja was prior to the war; there is no reason why they should change it as far as Romania is concerned.

S Scialoja does not wish to insist that the question of the Dobrudja should be taken up, but he, however, thinks that it could very well be said that it does not concern the Treaty with Bulgaria.

Mr Polk reiterates the fact that he does not ask for the insertion of a disposition to that effect in the Treaty itself, nor even for the addition of a phrase in their reply to the Bulgarian counter-propositions; he is only asking that some words to that effect might be put in the covering letter.

M Clemenceau thinks this amounts to the same thing; such a phrase would be offering a pretext for war.

M Laroche continues his comment, and says that in the region of Tsaribrod, the Serbians had asked for a rectification of frontiers as far as the Dragoman Pass which protects Sofia. The Conference does not wish to go so far, but they have to point out that there is a series of mountain railways which in that region converge on Pirot and which consequently are the roads leading to Nisch; that was the traditional road of the Bulgarian invasions. It had appeared to them that there was reason for giving to the Serbians the strategic key of that road: indeed Serbia does not have any more claims to set up against Bulgaria, and therefore it was right to believe that there would be no further ambition to satisfy in that direction. On the contrary, Bulgaria will not cease to claim Serbian territories and on that side, the reasons for aggression subsisted. As a matter of fact the rectification of frontiers in question would only have the effect of passing approximately 20,000 inhabitants under Serbian authority.

M Laroche states that the report of the Minority had been distributed and that he was ready to read it.

Mr Polk wishes to bring out certain points: first, should they consider the text of their first Peace conditions as intangible? Secondly, when the question had come up for the first time, M Tardieu had told them that it was only a matter of 7,000 Bulgarians being turned over to Serbian authority. On verifying these figures, it was found that as a matter of fact, it was a total of nearly 42,000 Bulgarians being turned over as against 93 Serbian inhabitants. The only possible justification for this proposed change was to give the Serbians the means to attack Sofia without being stopped by any intermediary obstacles. He, therefore urges the Supreme Council to think over the consequences entailed in a decision which meant the handing over of 40,000 Bulgarians to the Serbians, so as to facilitate a Serbian attack upon Sofia. Even in Serbia the wisest people had seen that this would be a mistake which would make more difficult their mission of conciliation. He did not wish, however, to retard in any way the hour of Peace, but he felt it was his duty to express a very definite protest on this question.

M Laroche wishes to answer Mr Polk’s arguments by stating briefly that 40,000 Bulgarians in a total population of 4,000,000 inhabitants does not represent a very large figure. They had not left Sofia without protection since they had let the Bulgarians keep the Dragoman Pass which formed a defensive strategic position of the greatest value; and should it be found correct that they had ensured advantages to the Serbians, the reason was that they were convinced it was the Bulgarians who would attack. A concession at Tsaribrod would not make the Bulgarians forget either Stroumitza or Monastir.

S Scialoja agrees with the American thesis. The arguments of the majority, as a matter of fact, do not seem convincing in the least. The ethnographic question is a clear one: This is a question of a population purely Bulgarian, of a territory which was Bulgarian by its nature and history. The only argument which had been invoked was that of the railway; on this point, he wished to bring their attention to the fact that there were other points on which the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier came nearer thereto than in the Bossiligrad region. Why then base upon the existence of a railroad the determination of a frontier? From the military standpoint, they could no more give Serbia the means of invading Bulgaria than give Bulgaria the means of invading Serbia. If Serbia had legitimate fears, one might, to allay these impose on Bulgaria the disarmament of the entrenched camp of Slivnitza. The truth is that Serbia wishes to have an open door on Sofia. They ought to be working to insure equilibrium; they should not admit the violation of those very principles of peace which they are striving to establish. There will always be causes for war, it was not for them to try and bring them about. It is clear that Bulgaria will never admit that the Serbs get an open road to Sofia. Lastly, he wished to remark that the text which they had communicated to the Serbs was only a draft, and that they had a perfect right to change it.

M Laroche states that at the present time, from a strategic point of view, the Serbs were in a position of clear inferiority. It the line of the present frontier which had allowed in 1915 the Bulgarian invasion. The Peace conditions which they had handed to Bulgaria, at the same time as to all their Allies, were more than a simple draft. They would be taking a very serious responsibility should they modify these conditions. As for the disarmament of Slivnitza, which S Scialoja proposes, this will appear to the Bulgarians as much more serious than the loss of Tsaribrod.

Mr Bowman resumes the arguments of the minority as follows: First, he thinks it is useless to reinforce the feelings of reciprocal hostility between the Bulgarians and the Serbs; secondly, the minority does not consider that reasons existed to foresee an invasion of Serbia by the Bulgarians. Bulgaria was vanquished, and the Treaty disarms her as well on land as on sea. Precautions had been taken to prevent her reorganizing an army; under these conditions she could not think of starting a new war for a long time. It is correct that in the Bossiligrad region, the railroad was at a distance of about ten miles from the frontier. It is proposed to withdraw this frontier to twice this distance, although the population was entirely Bulgarian; the minority would consent to accept this modification, but the case of Tsaribrod was entirely different. The frontier on that point formed a salient which protected the railroad, and on the other hand, in the southwest, on a point where they had been asked to rectify the line, the frontier came much nearer to the railroad. The American and Italian Delegations were aware of the fact that if one wished to modify the frontier line, the new line as proposed was a good one, but the question was whether such modification was necessary. They still thought that no sufficient reasons were adduced to justify such a change; and when, on the other hand, they pointed out that this was the question of greatest interest to Bulgarian opinion, that it would likewise in itself be sufficient to prevent a rapprochement between Serbia and Bulgaria; that further the draft proposed to them was even opposed by influential men in Serbia, they deem it their duty to maintain their conclusions.

Sir Eyre Crowe stated that Mr. Polk was perfectly right in saying that the Peace conditions which they had handed to the Bulgarians were not unalterable. Any modification was difficult when it bore upon a question which had been discussed for many months and which had been the result of compromise. As a matter of fact the only new point brought up at this meeting was more complete statistical information. All the other arguments had already been discussed, and he admitted that in the first Commission, all the military experts had agreed that the proposed frontier did not give the Serbians offensive military advantages, but only defensive. They were now told that the idea of protecting a railroad had no sense, and that a strategical argument could never be adduced as against an ethnical one; he would point out that the Yugo-Slavs had said the same thing about the line proposed for the new Italo-Slav frontier. In preparing the treaties, they had had to make compromises on all points. Why maintain that in this question particularly principles were sacred? Would it not be wiser to stand by the clauses on which they had agreed? They were as a matter of fact assured that the Bulgarian Delegation would sign the Treaty in any event: on the contrary the conversations he had had with the Serbs had convinced him that if they were to make concessions to Bulgaria so as to facilitate in Sofia a signature which appeared certain, they were running the risk of having the whole treaty jeopardised at Belgrade. The Serbian Delegation which had arrived in Paris was in a difficult situation: it was ready to sign the Treaty with Austria. If this new sacrifice were imposed on Serbia, would the delegation still be able to sign? Their common desire was to sign Peace as soon as possible. They were sure to have the Bulgarian signature; ought they to jeopardise the Serbian signature?

M Pichon wishes only to add one word to Sir Eyre Crowe’s statement. The Serbian Delegates had told him that a concession would mean for certain political men a decisive argument in favor of the refusal of Serbia’s signature. On the other hand, the intentions of Mr. Trumbic were conciliatory. Had the Bulgarians deserved that the Allies should bully the Serbs? He does not think so.

Mr Polk wishes to rectify on one point the statements of Sir Eyre Crowe: the American and Italian experts had never accepted the new line of frontier, they had always pointed out its dangers. The new line was not the work of the Commission, the Supreme Council alone had decided in its favor.13 He does not wish to complicate a difficult situation and he accepted that the Council should maintain its former decision, but in that case he felt it his duty to protest, to point out once more the dangers of such a decision, and to repeat that this decision was made against the advice of the American Delegation. The American Delegation did not wish to assume any responsibility whatsoever in the event of future conflicts which this decision might bring about.

S Scialoja wishes to associate himself with Mr Polk’s declaration.

(The meeting then adjourns.)