[Skybird]

Rocking Robbins, there were reports form very early on that Boeing did not provide trainign for the new system, at least not sufficiently, and that the written m,anuals distrubuted with many planes still do not contain cimplete documentation of the changes in cockpit and the MCAS' operation, and it still seems to that Boeing did so to avoid time-consuming certification processes by the FAA, which would have been a legal consequence form that, becasue new training means: "technology too new as if old certificaiton still covers it". While some very quick to try minimise the dmaage to Boeing by claiming its all a pilot error, pilots can only practice what they have been taught and have aquired in knoweldge. The latest report now, which is the preliminary official report, says that what could have been done, was done, but the MCAS system indeed showed to be unable to be switche doff - it seems to still have affected the plane while it already was formally switched of. And this speaks very severly for a very fundamental software error.


Meanwhile, the FAA have accused Boeing of another serious software problem with the 737 Max, it is unrelated to the crashes and the MCAS problem and they did not say over here in our media what exactly it is - but it is severe enough that the FAA ruled that even with this problem alone the planes would stay grounded due to unacceptable risks. Boeing of course again says that it is minor and not means much. Well, they also said the plane and MCAS was okay and functionally right immediately after the crashes. They do not state the MCAS to be fully intact anymore by now, do they.


Boeing gets it hard currently. The yhave been found guilty of illegal state subventions (like Airbus before), and today I read that they had to announce a cut by over 20% in their planned monthly production rate of the 737. A planned update of the MCAS software that by now already should have been released, had to be delayed again because they found the update to be faulty as well.


The whole design of the plane is dubious a bit, I must say. When the new generation of A320s took the lead in the order statistics, Boeing kind of panicked and tried to squeeze another latest update out of an airframe and plane series that by now already is squeezed quite hard. Lets face it, the 737 is an old man in the business. To be more economical in fuel consummation, the engines became bigger. For this the whole airframe geometry and balance changed, and for compensating this, a workaround had to be found, which was the MCAS trim software. The MCAS as present today is a workaround in itslf already, to balance the messed up airframe geometry which was originally not planned for having such big, heavy engines this far to the front of the airframe. All this are drastic, fundamental changes, and were done in not even half the time that Boeing usually plans for work projects of this volume and size. Boeing did ignore its own internal safety regulationsn and testing procedures, to save time on the galloping orders coming in for the Airbus 320.



This paragraph above I quote by the witnessing of a former Boeing engineer who was throughly quoted in a long essay in a German newspaper a week ago or so. He reports by his own experience, he was engaged in the 737 Max development. He said the pressure set up by the management was immense and such as he had never experienced it ever before. Already during the work, he indicated, he felt concerned for the safety of the project. The time pressure was so immense that they did not even fit into the cockpit the new generation of certain cockpit gauges that are available already and would have been commanded to be used by the chnages in the Max model. Doing so would have costed time and so even some old-fashioned analogue displays were used once again, while better alterntaives are avalable since long. - Says this engineer.



It looks as if the 737Max was designed not with security as a priprity, but getting a quick reaction to the A320 AT ALL COST. Time was the priority, nothing else.



They overplayed their cards. Thats what it looks like to me. Over 300 people paid with their lives for this gamble. I do not buy this pilot error's theory. Thats just pawns they want to sacrifice to distract from the company's failure at boss level. Boeing pushed to hrd, too fast, too far, and broke it. Again that egineer: they cut short and ignored their own internal Boeing security and safety routines and testing procedures, that was his conclusion. And I will continue to think so as long as no new, massive changes to the information status become known.