View Single Post
Old 11-18-19, 07:17 PM   #4249
Sailor Steve
Eternal Patrol
 
Sailor Steve's Avatar
 
Join Date: Nov 2002
Location: High in the mountains of Utah
Posts: 50,369
Downloads: 745
Uploads: 249


Default

Tuesday, November 18, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. The Council has before it a note from the Reparation Commission dated November 17th on the observations presented by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation November 5th on the subject of the distribution of Austro-Hungarian mercantile tonnage.

M Loucheur fee;s that a certain confusion has arisen on this question. The note which the Council has before it comes from the old Reparation Commission which had prepared the Peace Treaties. The Committee on Organization of the new Reparation Commission, over which he presided, had also had the question put before it, but had not yet considered it. As it is a question concerning the application of the Treaty, he thinks that the Committee over which he presides is alone competent, and he asks that the discussion be adjourned. He believes he will be in a position to present a report to the Council on the following day at noon.

(The discussion of this subject is adjourned until the following meeting.)


2. M Pichon observes that this question depends on the decision to be taken on the previous question, which had been adjourned. He proposes likewise to adjourn the discussion of this point to the following meeting.

(This is agreed to.)


3. M Clemenceau states that it is necessary to fix a date for signing the Treaty with Bulgaria.

M Berthelot points out that certain questions of detail have still to be settled before the signature can take place. The signature of Serbia is dependent on a prior settlement of the question of distribution of Austro-Hungarian mercantile tonnage. Within eight days the Council will know whether or not it can count on obtaining the signature of Romania. Moreover, the Council has decided, upon the request of Switzerland, to insert in the Bulgarian Treaty articles guaranteeing Swiss neutrality. As far as the Bulgarians are concerned, no difficulties will be raised in this connection, but it will still be necessary to inform them of this matter upon the arrival of their delegates in Paris, which will take place the following day. These various considerations make it evident that the signature of the Bulgarian Treaty cannot take place before the following Wednesday or Thursday.

(After a short discussion, Thursday, November 27th, is settled upon as the date for the signature of the Bulgarian Treaty.)


4. M Clemenceau feels inclined simply to reply to Mr Venizelos that the Council adhered integrally to the text of the letter it had sent him on November 12th. M Berthelot can undertake the preparation of this letter.

S de Martino agrees entirely with M Clemenceau’s suggestion. He wishes to correct a misleading phrase in Mr Venizelos’ letter of November 15th. It is there said that the Commission on Greek Territorial Claims had categorically approved the Greek claims on Smyrna and the neighboring region. He feels obliged then to point out that the Italian representative on that Commission has always contested the Greek claims.

(It is decided:

(1) That M Berthelot prepare a letter to be sent to Mr Venizelos informing him that the Supreme Council adheres integrally to the point of view set forth in its letter of November 12th;

(2) That the above letter be signed by the President in the name of the Supreme Council and dispatched immediately.


5. The Council has before it a telegram from Sir George Clerk dated November 16th, concerning the situation in Hungary.

Sir Eyre Crowe reads and comments upon this telegram. He points out that the information contained therein is less satisfactory, that arrests of certain political leaders are taking place at Budapest, and that if the situation does not improve, Sir George Clerk might be obliged to carry out the threat which he had already several times made of leaving Hungary.

(Discussion of this question is adjourned pending the receipt of more precise information.)


6. M Clemenceau states that as a result of the conversation he had that morning with the French Naval Expert it has become apparent that the point of view set forth in the latest British proposition was an entirely new one. He finds it difficult to reach immediately a decision on such an important point in the absence of the Minister of Marine who was at that moment not in Paris. He feels that the Minister of Marine will not be disinclined to agree with the British proposals. Up to that time his own point of view has been somewhat different, but the new arguments presented to him have rather shaken his convictions and he is quite ready to change his previous point of view in order to arrive at an agreement. Nevertheless he wishes time for reflection. He cannot indeed pretend that the idea of destroying the vessels would not be very unfavorably received by French public opinion. If a solution of that nature were adopted, at the very least it would be necessary to draw up a statement clearly setting forth the reasons which militated in favor of that solution. Unfortunately the present state of the French navy is so regrettable that French public opinion would not understand why the navy should not use the share of German ships which were allotted to it. At any rate it would be necessary to act with due consideration for French public opinion which is acutely interested in this question.

(The discussion of this question is adjourned).


7. Mr Polk wishes to call attention to the fourth paragraph of the decision relative to German Oil Tank Ships in the Minutes of the preceding meeting, which does not entirely conform to what he had said. What he had actually said was that he would undertake to transmit to his Government Sir Eyre Crowe’s proposal, recommending its adoption, and that in the ships meantime the 9 oil tank ships of the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft should be retained without being used.

M de Percin asks if the remaining tankers can at once be used, as is set forth in the preceding paragraphs of the decision in question.

Mr Polk replies in the affirmative.

(It is decided that paragraph 4 of the decision relative to German Oil Tank ships should be modified to read as follows:

“(4) that Mr. Polk would transmit to his Government the foregoing proposals of Sir Eyre Crowe and recommend the adoption thereof, and that in the meantime the 9 oil tank ships claimed by American interests should be retained without being used.”)


8. M Fromageot explains that the question of German ships transferred to Dutch Navigation Companies had been brought up by a note of the Council demanding that the Germans retain the 5 vessels in course of construction which they claimed to have legally transferred to Holland in 1915 and 1916. The Dutch Government had protested against this note and maintained that the Dutch Navigation Companies were legal owners of the vessels in question. The Dutch note had been replied to and Germany had replied to the note which had been sent it. The question raised was the validity of a change of flag during the course of a war of a vessel belonging to a belligerent country. That question had not been juridically decided in an identical manner by all the Allied and Associated Powers. In France a very ancient rule was followed which had been laid down at the time of the war of American Independence by an Ordinance of 1778. That ordinance settled that no ship could avail itself of a neutral flag if that neutral flag had been acquired in the course of the war. The French had never ceased to apply that rule. In America and England the system followed was apparently different, and a transfer made in good faith was considered valid in principle; but if account were taken of the jurisprudence of prize courts it would be seen that in practice decisions were in general similar to those arrived at in France. In any case, as it might well be embarrassing to ask their Allies to adopt a course that would not be fully consistent with the juridical principles which they accepted theoretically, he thought, in agreement with his colleagues, that it would be preferable not to reply to the German note until the Treaty had come into force. The Treaty specified (See Part VIII, Annex III, paragraph 7) that Germany must secure for herself the full title to the property in all those ships that were transferred during the war. Basing their position upon that very definite text, the Allied and Associated Powers would be legally justified in demanding from the Germans delivery, pure and simple, of those vessels, without needing to engage in theoretical and obscure discussions upon the validity of the transfers.

(After a short discussion

It is decided not to reply before the Treaty came into force to the German note upon the German vessels transferred during the war to Dutch navigation companies.)

(The meeting then adjourns).
__________________
“Never do anything you can't take back.”
—Rocky Russo
Sailor Steve is offline   Reply With Quote