[Skybird]

Originally Posted by JoeCorrado

In Afghanistan we had the perfect scenario for an otherwise useless concept- that of NATION BUILDING. We won the war- if war you can call it against the "government" of Afghanistan in short order- but that should have been viewed as the necessary BEGINNING of the mission, and not the mission itself.

Disagree. despite the fact that - what often is forgotten - america pumps more civilian effort in Afghanoistan than any other nation inclduing Germany, germany in the first time was the Afghan-on-the-street's darling - because the Germans focussed on nation building in Afghnaistan earlier than any other. until two or three days ago, the German strategy wa suspeiror to what the more militarily oriented American approach acchieved. But the Taleban came back and started to bring NATO into the defensive. the reuslting ensharpening of the conflict since a long time has ruined the results created by the Germans as well. Which even was not cried about by america an Canada when they demanded the Germans should not focus on thata lone, but instead focus on fighting a war. however, the best preventive thing agfai8mnst the restrengthening of the Taleban would have been to have been successful to form m national mstructures strong enough to convbince afghans that it is worth it to defend them. Becaue nation building failed - today a war needs to be fought again, with no military solution in sight, against an enemy masisvely supported by Pakistan.

germ,any was naive to think that nation building alone is enough. Ameirca was naive to first forget Afghanistan, and next to think that nation-building is not as important as is the military fight. You nee dnation building to cionvince the people to fight for their land, and you need the military to defend the new nation's material structures against the enemy. Once the motivational spark jumps onto the Afghans, you wouild have been able to call back the troops. But this chance has been lost, the window of opportunity is closed now, and since long. pakistan is forbidden target, troops never will be sufficient in levels, the enemy enjoys suppoort by locals as well as he enjoys ideological and motivational superiority. Ba dcards to win a war. I rate it as a lost war since years. The politcal illusions-chasing in Europe and the US does not help to improve the situation.

Militarily? No. But the PEOPLE could be given a choice. A real choice by seeding an economy nurturing it through till it can sustain itself. There are possibilities for success, a success that creates alternatives- creates and shares wealth. Even if that wealth, is just the means to survive without turning to "benefactors" like the barons, the taliban or al-quada. - The "ttribes" you mention were in actuality really people just banding together for mutual defense and support- these "tribes" could be the first step in healing the country if the effort were spent in a wise manner. Think in terms of "The Awakening" in Iraq.

The problem with Afghanistan is that no real economy exists- no real choice is available.

Haven't you just complained about theis museless nation-building above? Now you defend it.

People will do what they must to survive. We need to provide them with that choice.

we neitzher have the moral obligation to do that, nor is it given to us to acchieve that. lats but not least it is a socio-evolutionary thing you talk aboiut: developement of a society that liek you desciobre it so far has not existed in afghnaisatn, in your description. I stoirngly beliefve evolution is more than an intentionally planned procedure. It is more basic, and beyond intention and knowledge. It needs to be experienced, lived and suffered through. so far, Afghanistan is not willing to start for that. They take the Wetsern attention as an opportunity to take from it what is in there for them - and stay like they are. your ambitions are well-meant, but will fail for that reason. you not only fight agai9nst Al Quaeda groups, and the Taleban - you also fight against growing parts of the Afghan population, and slwoly growing hnumbers of their clans and warlords who have different intentions than taklijng over the political plan you want them to submit too. Imn other word - that country and it's people still is not ready for the modern present.

al-quada depends on hoplessness. When people have no real hope and groups like the taliban through force, or al-quada becuase of hoplessness are able to become an answer for the people then there are deeper issues than war lords and corruption.

you ignore the simple fact that the Taleban has been embraced again by parts of the people. they are perceived as enemies by those in the corrupt establishement who are threatend in their corruptness and self-interest by their fioght, namely the government of Karzai that instead prfers to be left alone so that it continue to mil western aid moneys that then disappear for the better part into orivate pockets. that seems queer and absurd, consiedering how much the Taleban were disliked in 2001. But laready late 2002 they were welcome dback in some cities, becasue the few wetsenr tropps were disliked even more, and nthe Taleban ha dlearned to behave more friendly. Bush was talking abiut hearst and minds ö- the Taleban löeanred their lesson and not talked baout it, but won them in many places. that the West failed in improving Afghan's situation, and that many Afghans even suffered and died becasue of the incompetent dilltanticsm of wetsenr policies, did it's own share top drive more Afghans froma ll ethnicities into the arms of the Taleban.

In case you have read my essay, you remember that I stressed that alliances in Afghnaistan are short-living only. This cannot be underlined enough. Never trust in your "aliies" in Afghanistan, it is only a temporary affair, always. And we Westerners will never be truly accepted anyway, we will always be foreigners.

I know that the simplified version is just that- simplified- but the "root cause" and the "solution" are both defined.

We could have spent just a portion of the resources, a portion of the military presence and a like amount of true focus in recreating an Afghanistan that could sustain itself free of groups like the taliban, or al-quada. We should have been well down the road to success by now- but no.

Not even half of the money that was promised in 2002 had reached Afghnaistan on 2006, or 2005, I'm not sure. and the majhorfity ofnthe money that reached thgere, ended up in highly dubious and questionable channels. the little that went to the intended purposes, often was misused for wrong planned, mislead purposes (the grain imprts for example that helped not to strengthen but to ruin the farmers so that they turned to poppy again). If you would have saved even more money being spend, what good would have thta been? and if now you spend more money for this corrupt system, more money owuld disappear in private pockets. you are doomed, no matter what you do, it will be wrong.

the manipulation of the firts Loya Jirga should not have been conducted by then americans. The afghans should have undertstood that this was their nfirst and only chnace to launch into a modenr time. but who should they have known that if there evoltion was lagging behind many centuries? assuming they knew nevertheless, and Afghans had put their heart into it, and ameerica and western financial powers wpould have played it fair and straight - then a very massive, lasting financial investement honstely focussing on what is best for Afghnaistan and not what is best for wetsern powers combined with a boost of troop levels and not a decline but an increase in troop presence could have done the trick. but exactly hte opposite of all these Ifs has been done, and the result is what you have today - a mess.

And pakistan always would jhave been a hostile power, if not for direct selfish interest to influence Afghnaistan then for reason of rpeventing the Indians getting influence there.

Welcome to Absurdistan.