[JoeCorrado]

This report is not one that "opposes a candidates view on Afghanistan" - that "interpretation is one of opinion and spin" ~ likely inserted only as an editorial comment in an attempt to satisfy the seeming bias of the thread starter. There is no basis for that editorial and not once through the entire report is such a position stated or insinuated.

It is also a less than helpful introduction to an otherwise enlightening read. Having made that point clear at at the outset, lets take a closer look:

The decision to invade Afghanistan was one that carried overwhelming support in the U.S. and around the world. The time for that debate has long since passed.

The question for today is one of focus and providing the needed assets for the military to get the job done. And in that regard we really have no choice- we must take whatever steps are necessary for our miltary's success.

Terrorist groups from upper-income countries are much more likely to be left-wing or nationalist and much less likely to be motivated by religion.

Obviously al Qaeda defies the neat set of Rand Rules from the very start.

Most terrorist groups that end because of politics seek narrow policy goals. The narrower the goals of a terrorist organization, the more likely it can achieve them without violent action—and the more likely the government and terrorist group may be able to reach a negotiated settlement.

al Qaeda does not seek a louder voice in politics. Had this been an attempt to form or influence a government that would agree to their every demand and operate as they wished, they would have been happy with the Taliban Government in Afghanistan and that would have been that.

Against terrorist groups that cannot or will not make a transition to nonviolence, policing is likely to be the most effective strategy (40 percent). Police and intelligence services have better training and information to penetrate and disrupt terrorist organizations than do such institutions as the military. They are the primary arm of the government focused on internal security matters.

The idea of a police force that could end the groups existence also is less than applicable in this case since we are talking "international" terrorism, not that of a local or national variety.

Since the "preferred" methods, or the traditionally more effective methods will not be affective in this case- we are left asking the question; What is the most effective means of putting an end to al Qaeda? The answer is provided early on in the report:

Militaries tended to be most effective when used against terrorist groups engaged in an insurgency in which the groups were large, well armed, and well organized. Insurgent groups have been among the most capable and lethal terrorist groups, and military force has usually been a necessary component in such cases.

We are not talking Red Brigade, or even PLO here- we are talking al-quada. And for a realistic solution to that threat- I suggest that the option selected is the correct one. However, any military action requires a true commitment and a sustained focus to carry it through to it's desired conclusion.

The report then rambles on about how it believes the war on terror should be brought to a successful end... hypothetically and in a perfect world with unlimited resources that could be scattered one would assume, "cohesively and effectively" throughout the world:

Since al Qa’ida’s goal remains the establishment of a pan-Islamic caliphate, there is little reason to expect that a negotiated settlement with governments in the Middle East is possible. A more effective approach would be adopting a two front strategy.

First, policing and intelligence should be the backbone of U.S. efforts. In Europe, North America, North Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, al Qa’ida consists of a network of individuals who need to be tracked and arrested. This would require careful work abroad from such organizations as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as well as their cooperation with
foreign police and intelligence agencies.

Or, we could track down the leaders, kill them and in effect cut off the head of the snake. The remnants would then be left as so many separate groups that would lend themselves much better to the mop up operations that would better be handled in more traditional ways- ie; the local police wherever these disorganized and leaderless groups may, or may not choose to continue their efforts.

The fact that we are in Afghanistan now is evident and cannot be changed. The only question is whether we give it the focus and commit the resources to achieve the mission. Sounds like the report agrees 100 percent:

Our analysis concludes that al Qa’ida’s probability of success in actually overthrowing any government is close to zero.

And the reason for the above analysis is because of the U.S. Military presence in Afghanistan. That is a fact and we all should understand that.

Al Qa’ida’s resurgence should trigger a fundamental rethinking of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. Based on our analysis of how terrorist groups and, a political solution is not possible.

I don't mind a suggestion that we "re-think our strategies", but having read through all of this only to come full circle was a bit disappointing.