I do not believe that adding to the list of Germany's enemies to get Gibralter was a good idea. Franco's Spain made a neutral conduit to the world not at war with the Reich and reduced the amount of coastline that needed to be defended. A neutral Spain preserved access to the Atlantic from the captured French Biscay ports but if hostile then the Bay became another choke point, easier channeling of the U-Boats into a Royal Navy killing ground. Franco provided markets for export (commerce did continue after all) and some few soldiers for Hitler's passion, the Eastern Front (Infantry Division 250, the Spanish Blue Division). Invading an Facsist Spain promised much cost with little strategic gain.
Germany could never win WW2 in the Med nor could anything that happened there be decisive in itself and so the forces committed there were drawn from where they were really needed. The Med wasn't even a deal-breaker for the Brits other than for morale and in Churchill's Imperium Britannica mindset. Better for the Nazi's had they allowed the Italians to sink or swim on their own, better for the Allies that they didn't.
As for Gibralter, driving an armoured column through the Iberian penninsula, even with Spanish permission would have been a formidable logistical exercise that would have taxed the Wehrmacht to the fullest without fighting. The attrition and wear and tear just motoring to the Rock would have been significant. Given the already overworked German supply system and marginal Spanish infrastructure still trying to recover from their Civil War the entire effort would have been much pain for little gain. Hitler warped history to suit his ends but he would have known how Napoleon's decline started with the Spanish Ulcer and it's unlikely he wanted to follow suit.
Good Hunting
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