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Von Manteuffel · 01-20-08, 06:42 AM

Not much to add to the wealth of knowledge and research already posted here, except to hope that the GWX 2 team haven't managed to duplicate the post May 1943 situation too realistically - I'm too young to die. So far I'm still in 1940.

Airborne Radar gave the allies a huge advantage over the U Boats and in very short order forced them only to operate surfaced in the "air-gap" South of Greenland. The gap was soon closed. Add to this the fact that escorts and other sub-hunters obtained not only sea-borne Radar, but also very efficient Radio Direction Finding equipment, which meant that they could steam down the exact bearing to the source of the radio transmission. Apparently there was a large, almost continuous amount of radio "chatter" between U Boats - especially the large wolf-packs, whch made the job of the escorts much easier.

There were also new tactics for escorts and hunter-killer groups such as "Johnny" Walker's "creeping" attack and the Ultra intercepts of the "Shark" Enigma traffic from Bletchley Park. It's no wonder that the hunters very quickly became the hunted.

The turning point came in May 1943 and culminated in the wolf-pack attack on Convoy ONS 5. Six escorts sank 7 U-boats and damaged 3 others - 25% of the wolf-pack. In all 41 U-Boats were lost in May 1943 and Donitz was forced to the conclusion that "Wolf-pack operations against convoys in the North Atlantic were no longer possible." The success of the escorts was almost entirely attributable to Radar and new RDF technology.

One thing I'm not sure if GWX2, or any other version of SH3 reflects in the game is the shattering effect on morale the allied successes had. Boats crewed by young replacements would leave harbour, never to be seen again. Those left became increasingly reluctant to go out on war-patrols (sabotage to delay sailing became increasingly common) and, when at sea, crews became increasingly reluctant to engage allied shipping except at extreme range and submerged. This "defeatism" was also fuelled by Germany's reverse of fortune in the land-war.

One U-Boat commander summed it up when he said that "We no longer believed we could succeed."

01-20-08, 06:42 AM	#9
Von Manteuffel Commander Join Date: Feb 2007 Location: UK Posts: 473 Downloads: 411 Uploads: 0	Not much to add to the wealth of knowledge and research already posted here, except to hope that the GWX 2 team haven't managed to duplicate the post May 1943 situation too realistically - I'm too young to die. So far I'm still in 1940. Airborne Radar gave the allies a huge advantage over the U Boats and in very short order forced them only to operate surfaced in the "air-gap" South of Greenland. The gap was soon closed. Add to this the fact that escorts and other sub-hunters obtained not only sea-borne Radar, but also very efficient Radio Direction Finding equipment, which meant that they could steam down the exact bearing to the source of the radio transmission. Apparently there was a large, almost continuous amount of radio "chatter" between U Boats - especially the large wolf-packs, whch made the job of the escorts much easier. There were also new tactics for escorts and hunter-killer groups such as "Johnny" Walker's "creeping" attack and the Ultra intercepts of the "Shark" Enigma traffic from Bletchley Park. It's no wonder that the hunters very quickly became the hunted. The turning point came in May 1943 and culminated in the wolf-pack attack on Convoy ONS 5. Six escorts sank 7 U-boats and damaged 3 others - 25% of the wolf-pack. In all 41 U-Boats were lost in May 1943 and Donitz was forced to the conclusion that "Wolf-pack operations against convoys in the North Atlantic were no longer possible." The success of the escorts was almost entirely attributable to Radar and new RDF technology. One thing I'm not sure if GWX2, or any other version of SH3 reflects in the game is the shattering effect on morale the allied successes had. Boats crewed by young replacements would leave harbour, never to be seen again. Those left became increasingly reluctant to go out on war-patrols (sabotage to delay sailing became increasingly common) and, when at sea, crews became increasingly reluctant to engage allied shipping except at extreme range and submerged. This "defeatism" was also fuelled by Germany's reverse of fortune in the land-war. One U-Boat commander summed it up when he said that "We no longer believed we could succeed."