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Originally Posted by CaptainHaplo
Where the German blunders were either broadly tactical on a large scale (such as base location for the Luftwaffe) or strategic (such as the Western Invasion) - the Japanese made the mistake that the CSA in the Civil War made. They didn't really have any strategic vision - no long term goal other than to expand in whatever direction presented itself. Other than the attack on the Phillipines and the attempt to take Midway (which was folly - whether we had Ultra or not!), they really never focused on attacking the US after Pearl Harbor. Instead they looked for whatever target of opportunity could be exploited. This is what led to the creation of ABDA, which the Japanese promptly ran all over. ABDA was a polyglot collection of various naval vessels that was to defend certain areas. The only reason ABDA was smashed was it was in the way.
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Actually the Japanese did have a strategic vision. They just didn't stick with it.
Japanese planners never envisaged a total defeat of the Western powers. Their intention was to strike a series of coordinated blows securing the resources of south Asia and establishing a defensive perimeter around them. This perimeter, extending well into the western Pacific Ocean, would be developed into a barrier of bases and fortified islands impregnable to amphibious assault. Behind that shield, the Imperial Navy would wait to launch javelin thrusts at counterattacks from any direction, making up for inferior numbers by use of interior lines and superior ships.
Japan, in short, proposed to fight the Pacific war as it had fought China and Russia. Limiting the conflict by escalating it's material and moral costs beyond what the Western powers, America in particular were willing to pay. The strategy was, oddly enough, based on American rationality. Americans were businessmen, not samurai. It was believed that they would calculate costs and benefits, and then come to terms with the harsh realities created by Japanese arms.
The problem came when the initial victories came much quicker and more cheaply then expected. The perimeter idea was expanded beyond the southern resource areas and the western Pacific to include the New Hebrides, the Aleutians, Midway, and then came the inevitable strategic overreach and disaster which ensued.
