[Skybird]

Originally Posted by JALU3

Well isn't that one of the problems I have already stated. We, as in NATO, lack the forces, in order to provide economic and physical security in Afghanistan. Therefore, those forces which are able to provide those two securities in Afghanistan are able to gain influence over the populace. And in the present eyes of the populace, anti-government and Taleban forces appear to be providing a better job then government or NATO forces.
Therefore, in order to provide those two securities would we not need more boots on the ground, and more focus economic aid and revitilization to the populace?
And would you not agree that if we were able to provide the two securities which I have stated that the populace would be more apt to be positively influenced by government and coalition forces?

Not really. We are no Afghans, we would continue to be foreigners. Forever. an old saying over there says: "you can't buy an Afghan - you can only lease him for a limited time." Treaties do not really mean anything in Afghan history, and almost always ended in treachery. Aliances have changed so very often during the Soviet war that it is hard to count them anymore. And even during the occupation, sometimes tribes were fighting against each other, and ageinst the Soviets at the same time.

All this academic taling only. There is nobody willing to go into Afghanistan with a six digit number of forces and much more than a 1 at the beginning. also, there is nobody with the will to confront Pakistan. that is all we need to know.

Previous successful COIN operations has included several things:
1) Providing a continuous security dominance in any population center of consequence
2) Controlling the routes of movement to inhibit insurgency forces from having impact on those population centers
3) Creating a network of government and infastructure services which the populace uses. This allows the government to gain the trust of the people.
4) Provide economic growth programs which betters the life of the populace, thus allowing the government to grow the trust of the populace.

All nice and well, but you oversee one thing, as I repeatedly have expressed now in this thread, and in others as well. Afghanistan is Afghanistan, not a Western experimental lab expected to prove Western theories of reason and logic - your concept works for some places in the world, but not for all. It depends on the culture. If you sow living seed on a poisened field, what do you get...? Rich harvest, or hunger? Afghanistan is not only Islamic, it alos is a very xenophobic, closed, tribal society. Two stories shall illustrate both statments. First, I think from the time of the soviet invasion, there was the event of a landslide at the border to Pakistan. Pakistani, as a matter of fact, were and are regarded as hoistiles and outsiders by most Afghans, like all foreigners. You know what the closest village community did? The men came together with wooden sticks and tried to push rocks that have moved from evil Pakistan to the Afghan side of the border back into the land of Satan where they had come from. they did not dare to touch them with their hands, so that they would not be doomed by having touched Satan.

second story, from the time during the great Tsunami, it was not Afghanistan, but I think Pakistan - correct me if I am wrong - definitely it was a Muhammedan country in that region. A column of trucks with aid reached a village, whose inhbaitants had been told by their Mullah that they shall move up a hill and stay there, for Satan was near, and Allah already had shown his wrath by having send the Tsunami. noiw there were the trucks dowhn that hill, and uphill where the poeple, hungry, ill, since days without supply. And they did not come down that hill to unload the trucks. No further comment. The trucks stayed for days, wasting precious time to dleiver the goods where they would have been wanted, and they wasted time, for they were not usable for the duration of this halt. So in the end, somwehre else people died from disease and lack of water and hunger, and cold, becasue the trucks were not called back and redirected.

Nice theory with netwroks and infrastructure and contorlling this and that, but you underestimate the nature of resitance you are up against, and you also do not see that no nation has the will to get these things done (and most really could not do it anyway), and that the Kabulistan givenment never has been in that strong position you would lkike to see it in. That's why they call it Kabulistan - to make clear that Kabul is an entitiy of limited self-adminsitration and power in itself which has no significant meaning and influence beyond it's city walls. And it has been like this since very very long. No government ever weas able to hold itself there without the tribe leaders allowing that. When Najibullah was left alone by the Soviet military, his days were already counted, and he ended dead.It will be the same with Karzai the moment foreign powers in Kabul do no longer massively protect and support him.

Gainign control, establish natworks and infrastructure? you could kill as many Talebans as youn want - this conflict will not be determined by taleban losses, not a bit. It is close to meaningless and causes delays in their actions, at best. Manwhile, they win the war by denying there defeat to America, and outmanouvering America by othe rmeans. And every single collateral damage being done by American forces means more vows for blood feud, and more hostility against Western troops.

You are simply unrealistic by being too rational and too idealistic, Jalu. even more so since the situation was allowed for 5 years to substantially and constantly detoriate. I said somewhere that after 2002 all military focus should have been left with Afghanistan instead of being shifted to Iraq, and that massive and quick civilian support should have been given. But even if it would have been that ideal, I wouldn't have read the chances for success higher than 49:51 - at best. and today: for example Germany budget structure has shifted massively: we know spend 4/5 of the Afghnaisdtan budget on maintaining a military presence there, and only 1/5 is left to be used for aid and reconstruction projects. Not to the exact numbers, but with the general tendency it has been with all nations who got themselves engaged in Afghanistan - na dann mal Prost.

You also have another enemy to your model: the geography and uncontrollable terrain in many parts of the country. the British failed in controlling traffic, in fact the saw a whole modern and competently trained collonial army getting massacred. The Soviets failed, and faced high losses, and defeat whenever they dared to move outside their bastions. The Americans failed as well. Pakistan failed, too, but that is another story anyway.

I could also argue that at least one can debate that your reasonable model, which is very much the UN model, is working in a place that is much closer too us: the Balkans, namely Bosnia, and Kosovo. We do not really solve the problems there, it seems, all we acchieve is to keep growing tensions and pressure under control for the time being. But since the basic ethnic, historic and religous problems do not get solved, the pressure is rising. So in the future... go figure. It is already being carried over to the next generation.