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Originally Posted by Incubus
<snipity> it makes me wonder what a spanking the US sub fleet would get against a more ASW-oriented nations like England.
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Hmmm. No bias here....
But to address your points...
I think you more or less covered it yourself, right up front...
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Originally Posted by Incubus
<snipity snip snip> Obviously the major differences between nations is that each had a different overall mission, which likely reflected their boats' design.
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Dingdingdingdingdingding!
But then you went on to ignore the point for the most part.
It is indeed all about
horses for courses. The designs of the boats were firmly rooted in the doctrine espoused by that particular navy... typically developed during the period between the wars.
The Germans, despite an early prediliction toward and investment in the philosophies of A T Mahan, embraced Guerre de Course as a viable strategy, and built a Navy (including a submarine force) geared toward that type of activity. Entirely understandable given their 'tween wars circumstance and the constraints they were forced to operate under.
The USN viewed the submarine as a direct extension of the fleet... hence "fleet boat". The 21 knot top speed and 10000 nm range was not a coincidence. They had to be big... capable of extended operations (think "war plan orange") in a tropical environment. Meeting these requirements obviously had a profound effect on the basic design of the boat.
The IJN view was similar to the USN, but while the USN adapted to the SLOC denial (strategic supply line interdiction) role, the IJN more or less maintained the fleet boat concept through-out (with some nuisance type stuff thrown in here and there).
The Brits I'm not altogether familiar with... but from what I do know of them, they seem to have employed their boats mainly in a tactical or ops support role.
These differences required different points of emphasis in boat design. The only notable thing that stands out in my mind is that fact that the USN alone was able to successfully adapt to a completely different role than the one it was designed for - on the fly (as it were) - using the same hardware.
As to comparisons between the boats?... I hope the above makes it clear that intellectual exercises like role swapping (plugging USN boats into the German situation, or vice versa), much less head to head comparisons (For the honor of the services! Type VII vs Gato - torpedoes and deck guns at dawn) are pretty much a waste of time.
The only real method of comparison, IMHO, is to make an evaluation of how well the boats performed in their intended and actual roles, while dealing with the conditions they found themselves operating in and the forces they found themselves operating against. Realistically though, this may be as much a measure of pre-war naval planning and leadership as it is a measure of technical design. As such, adaptibility (see my comments RE USN designs above) is a critical factor in gauging relative success.
So with that, the question becomes, which of the submarine services fared best in carrying out their assigned mission during the war?
Very simply:
The KM attempted to strangle the Brits via blockade and knock them out of the war. They came close, but ultimately failed.
The IJN tried to pare down the US battlefleet prior to "The Decisive Engagement" (ala Hipper's BC squadrons vs the RN in 1914 and 1915). This strategy they carried through to the end of the war in the form of Kaiten.
The USN, on the other hand, from Dec 41 onward, set out to interdict Japan's strategic supply lines and destroy their seaborne logistics infrastructure, and they did just that. Overwhelming success.
The Brits? Again, I apologize for not knowing more about them... but it seems that their direct combat contributions were not what one might call "of profound impact".
So which side had the best subs?
JD