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Skybird · 04-17-07, 11:30 AM

And finally:

"....In this case, we must decide whether this amendment grants constitutional protection to an individual whose possession or use of machineguns and pipe bombs is not reasonably related to an organized state militia. We hold that it does not.... As a member of Georgia's unorganized militia,[fn12] Wright claims that he has a constitutional right to possess machineguns and pipe bombs because these weapons are used by contemporary militia fighting forces....A careful reading of Miller, however, strongly suggests that only militias actively maintained and trained by the states can satisfy the 'well regulated militia' requirement of the Second Amendment. As the Miller Court emphasized, the 'obvious purpose' of the Second Amendment was to 'render possible the effectiveness of' the governmental militia described in the Militia Clauses of the Constitution.[fn16] Miller, 307 U.S. at 178, 59 S.Ct. at 818. Thus, the Second Amendment 'must be interpreted and applied with that end in view....'" U.S. v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 1997)
"Appellant was convicted in the district court for the District of Kansas of knowingly possessing an unregistered machine gun in violation of 26 U.S.C. ?5861(d)....The second constitutional argument that appellant advances is that the prosecution here violated his right to bear arms guaranteed by the second amendment.[fn1] Defendant presents a long historical analysis of the amendment's background and purpose from which he concludes that every citizen has the absolute right to keep arms. This broad conclusion has long been rejected. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206....The purpose of the second amendment as stated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Miller, supra at 178, 59 S.Ct. 816, was to preserve the effectiveness and assure the continuation of the state militia. The Court stated that the amendment must be interpreted and applied with that purpose in view. Id. To apply the amendment so as to guarantee appellant's right to keep an unregistered firearm which has not been shown to have any connection to the militia, merely because he is technically a member of the Kansas militia, would be unjustifiable in terms of either logic or policy. This lack of justification is even more apparent when applied to appellant's membership in 'Posse Comitatus,' an apparently nongovernmental organization. We conclude, therefore, that this prosecution did not violate the second amendment...." U.S. v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1977)
"Appellant, Peter B. Thomas, argues that the City of Portland, Maine, and various city officials infringed his constitutional rights by denying him a permit to carry a concealed handgun. Established case law makes clear that the federal Constitution grants appellant no right to carry a concealed handgun. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178, 59 S.Ct. 816, 818, 83 L.Ed. 1206 (1939) (second amendment applies only to weapons that have a 'reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.')...." Thomas v. City Council of Portland, 730 F.2d 41
"Douglas Ray Hickman appeals from an order granting summary judgment in favor of the appellees, who denied Hickman a concealed weapons permit. He complains, among other things, that the appellees' permit issuance policy violated his Second Amendment right to bear arms. We have jurisdiction over his timely appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1291, and affirm on the basis that Hickman lacks standing to sue for a violation of the Second Amendment...We follow our sister circuits in holding that the Second Amendment is a right held by the states, and does not protect the possession of a weapon by a private citizen. We conclude that Hickman can show no legal injury, and therefore lacks standing to bring this action...." Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996)
"Wilbur Hale appeals his conviction of thirteen counts of possession of a machine gun pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. ?922(o) (West Supp. 1992) and three counts of possession of unregistered firearms pursuant to 26 U.S.C. ?5861(d) (1988). He argues....that the indictment violates his Second Amendment right to bear arms....we cannot conclude that the Second Amendment protects the individual possession of military weapons....The rule emerging from Miller is that, absent a showing that the possession of a certain weapon has 'some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia,' the Second Amendment does not guarantee the right to possess the weapon. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178, 59 S.Ct. at 818....After carefully examining the principles and implications of the then recent Miller decision, the First Circuit concluded that the existence of any 'reasonable relationship to the preservation of a well regulated militia' was best determined from the facts of each individual case. Id. Thus, it is not sufficient to prove that the weapon in question was susceptible to military use. Indeed, as recognized in Cases, most any lethal weapon has a potential military use.[fn4] Id. Rather, the claimant of Second Amendment protection must prove that his or her possession of the weapon was reasonably related to a well regulated militia. See id. at 923. Where such a claimant presented no evidence either that he was a member of a military organization or that his use of the weapon was 'in preparation for a military career', the Second Amendment did not protect the possession of the weapon. Id. Since the Miller decision, no federal court has found any individual's possession of a military weapon to be 'reasonably related to a well regulated militia.' 'Technical' membership in a state militia (e.g., membership in an 'unorganized' state militia) or membership in a non-governmental military organization is not sufficient to satisfy the 'reasonable relationship' test. Oakes, 564 F.2d at 387. Membership in a hypothetical or 'sedentary' militia is likewise insufficient. See Warin, 530 F.2d 103...." U.S. v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1992) U.S. v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1992)
"This appeal concerns the constitutionality of the Village of Morton Grove's Ordinance No. 81-11,[fn1] which prohibits the possession of handguns within the Village's borders. The district court held that the Ordinance was constitutional. We affirm....The second amendment provides that 'A well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.' U.S. Const. amend. II. Construing this language according to its plain meaning, it seems clear that the right to bear arms is inextricably connected to the preservation of a militia. This is precisely the manner in which the Supreme Court interpreted the second amendment in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206 (1939), the only Supreme Court case specifically addressing that amendment's scope. There the Court held that the right to keep and bear arms extends only to those arms which are necessary to maintain a well regulated militia....Under the controlling authority of Miller we conclude that the right to keep and bear handguns is not guaranteed by the second amendment.[fn9]" Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982)
"A jury convicted[fn1] James Cody of making false statements to a licensed firearms dealer in connection with the purchase of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. ?922(a) (6)....We find no merit in the contention that ?922(a) (6) violates appellant's Second Amendment right to bear arms. Since United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206 (1939), it has been settled that the Second Amendment is not an absolute bar to congressional regulation of the use or possession of firearms. The Second Amendment's guarantee extends only to use or possession which 'has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.' ....We find no evidence that the prohibition of ?922(a) (6) obstructs the maintenance of a well regulated militia...." Cody v. U.S., 460 F.2d 34 (8th Cir.)
"Defendant was convicted in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, William H. Becker, Chief Judge, for, inter alia, failure to make appropriate entries and to properly maintain records as required of a federally-licensed firearms dealer, and he appealed....With respect to a possible infringement of Second Amendment rights, we need only look to the rationale of the Supreme Court in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206 (1939): 'In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of (the weapon) at this time 167 has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument'....Thus, in light of the defendant's failure to present any evidence indicating a conflict between the requirements of "922(m) and 923(g) and the maintenance of a well regulated militia, we decline to hold that the statute violates the Second Amendment...." U.S. v. Decker, 446 F.2d 164 (8th Cir. 1971)

"Defendant was convicted before the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, Miles W. Lord, J., of violating the omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968...The next contention raised is that ' 1202(a)(1) violates the Second Amendment right to bear arms. We do not agree.... ....Although ' 1202(a) is the broadest federal gun legislation to date, we see no conflict between it and the Second Amendment since there is no showing that prohibiting possession of firearms by felons obstructs the maintenance of a 'well regulated militia.'" U.S. v. Synnes, 438 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1971)
"By virtue of 1996 amendments to the Gun Control Act of 1968 which prohibit persons convicted of domestic violence offenses from possessing firearms in or affecting commerce, Jerald Gillespie can no longer carry a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. ?922(g)(9). As a result, he has lost his job as a police officer. Gillespie filed suit against the City of Indianapolis[fn1] seeking to have the statute declared unconstitutional and his employment with the Indianapolis Police Department preserved. The United States intervened to defend the constitutionality of the statute....The Second Amendment provides that '[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.' U.S. Const. amend. II. The link that the amendment draws between the ability 'to keep and bear Arms' and '[a] well regulated Militia' suggests that the right protected is limited, one that inures not to the individual but to the people collectively, its reach extending so far as is necessary to protect their common interest in protection by a militia...." Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 1999) "This case requires a determination of whether certain provisions of the National Firearms Act as amended by the Gun Control Act of 1968, 26 U.S.C. ?5801 et seq., are an invalid infringement on the right to keep and bear arms guaranteed by the Second Amendment to the Constitution...It is clear that the Second Amendment guarantees a collective rather than an individual right....It would unduly extend this opinion to attempt to deal with every argument made by defendant and amicus curiae, Second Amendment Foundation, all of which are based on the erroneous supposition that the Second Amendment is concerned with the rights of individuals rather than those of the States or that defendant's automatic membership in the 'sedentary militia' of Ohio brings him within the reach of its guarantees...." U.S. v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir.)
"According to her complaint, in September, 1990, April Love tried to purchase a handgun at a shop in Prince George's County, Maryland.... On September 21, Corporal Ernest Pletcher reviewed the application and a computer printout from Maryland police and Federal Bureau of Investigation files. He discovered that Ms. Love had been arrested on four occasions....Citing law review articles, Love argues that she has an individual federal constitutional right to 'keep and bear' a handgun, and Maryland may not infringe upon this right....She is wrong on both counts. The Second Amendment does not apply to the states. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 6 S.Ct. 580, 29 L.Ed. 615 (1886); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 23 L.Ed. 588 (1876).[fn5] Moreover, even as against federal regulation, the amendment does not confer an absolute individual right to bear any type of firearm. In 1939, the Supreme Court held that the federal statute prohibiting possession of a sawed-off shotgun was constitutional, because the defendant had not shown that his possession of such a gun bore a 'reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.' United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178, 59 S.Ct. 816, 818, 83 L.Ed. 1206 (1939). Since then, the lower federal courts have uniformly held that the Second Amendment preserves a collective, rather than individual, right...." Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 813 (1995)
"Major Henry Johnson was convicted by a jury of transporting a firearm in interstate commerce after having been convicted of a felony, 18 U.S.C. ?922(g). He appeals, challenging the district court's instructions and contesting the constitutionality of section 922(g). For the reasons set forth below, we disagree with Johnson's arguments and affirm the conviction....The courts have consistently held that the Second Amendment only confers a collective right of keeping and bearing arms which must bear a 'reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.' 307 U.S. at 178, 59 S.Ct. at 818. Johnson presents no evidence that section 922(g) in any way affects the maintenance of a well regulated militia...." U.S. v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1974)
“Appellant Raymond Rybar, Jr. was convicted following a conditional guilty plea to two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. Section(s) 922(o), which makes it 'unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machine gun.' On appeal, he argues that the district court erred in rejecting his challenge to that provision as beyond Congress' commerce power and as violating the Second Amendment. Neither challenge is persuasive....In support, Rybar cites, paradoxically, the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), where the Court upheld the constitutionality of a firearms-registration requirement against a Second Amendment challenge. Rybar draws on that holding, relying on the Miller Court's observation that the sawed-off shotgun in question had not been shown to bear 'some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.' Brief of Appellant at 24-25; Miller, 307 U.S. at 178. Drawing from that language the contra positive implication, Rybar suggests that because the military utility of the machine guns proscribed by Section(s) 922(o) is clear, a result contrary to that reached in Miller is required, and the statute is therefore invalid under the Second Amendment....We note first that however clear the Court's suggestion that the firearm before it lacked the necessary military character, it did not state that such character alone would be sufficient to secure Second Amendment protection. In fact, the Miller Court assigned no special importance to the character of the weapon itself, but instead demanded a reasonable relationship between its 'possession or use' and militia related activity....Rybar's invocation of this statute does nothing to establish that his firearm possession bears a reasonable relationship to 'the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia,' as required in Miller, 307 U.S. at 178. " U.S. v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273 (3rd Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 807 (1997)
"At stake in the present appeal is the vitality of several key provisions of the Gun Control Act of 1968,[fn1] a statutory program which restricts the right to bear arms of convicted felons and other persons of dangerous propensities.[fn2]....U.S.Const. amend. II states: 'A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed' Arguably, any regulation of firearms may be violative of this constitutional provision. Nevertheless, the courts consistently have found no conflict between federal gun laws and the Second Amendment, narrowly construing the latter to guarantee the right to bear arms as a member of a militia...." U.S. v. Graves, 554 F.2d 65 (3rd Cir. 1977)
"Appellant, here petitioned the district court to enjoin the City of Philadelphia from enforcing its ordinance which regulates the purchase of firearms and transfer of same. Appellant's theory in the district court which he now repeats is that by the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution he is entitled to bear arms. Appellant is completely wrong about that. As long ago at least as 1939 the United States Supreme Court held that there must be "* * * some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia". There is nothing whatsoever of that kind in this appeal. It must be remembered that the right to keep and bear arms is not a right given by the United States Constitution. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206 (1939)...." Eckert v. City of Philadelphia, 477 F.2d 610 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 839 (1973)
"Appellant Dennis E. Friel was indicted by a federal grand jury with two counts of possession of firearms by a person convicted of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. "922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). [FN1] Appellant was convicted, after a jury trial, on both counts. He raises six issues on appeal, all of which we reject....Appellant argues generally that ' 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional. Specifically, he asserts that the limits imposed by ' 922(g)(1) violate the constitutional right to bear arms. The Supreme Court plainly has held that the Second Amendment-'A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed'-applies only to firearms having a 'reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia....'" U.S. v. Friel, 1 F.3d 1231 (1st Cir. 1993)
....These holdings, when considered within the broad intent of the Act, highlight the established principle that there is no absolute constitutional right of an individual to possess a firearm. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206 (1939)...." U.S. v. Swinton, 521 F.2d 1255 (10th Cir. 1975)
"In 1999, the State of California enacted amendments to its gun-control laws that significantly strengthened the state's restrictions on the possession, use, and transfer of semi-automatic weapons popularly known as 'assault weapons.' Plaintiffs, California residents who either own assault weapons, seek to acquire such weapons, or both, brought this challenge to the gun-control statute, asserting that the law, as amended, violates the Second Amendment....The district court dismissed all of the plaintiff's claims. Because the second amendment does not confer an individual right to own or possess arms, we affirm the dismissal of all claims brought pursuant to that consitutional provision....'Militia' appears repeatedly in the first and second articles of the Constitution. From its use in those sections, it is apparent that the drafters were referring in the Constitution to the second of two government-established and -controlled military forces. Those forces were, first, the national army and navy which were subject to civilian control shared by the president and Congress, and, second, the state militias, which were 'essentially organized and under control of the states, but subject to regulation by Congress and to "federalization" at the command of the president.'...."Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2002)(PDF file)
"....After a jury trial, appellant was convicted of carrying a pistol without a license, D.C.Code ' 22-3204 (1981), possession of an unregistered firearm, id. ' 6-2311, and unlawful possession of ammunition, id. ' 6-2361....We now hold that D.C.Code '' 6-2311, 6-2361, and 22-3204 (1981) do not violate the second amendment. We affirm appellant's convictions....We agree with numerous other courts that 'the Second Amendment guarantees a collective rather than an individual right.'....The purpose of the second amendment is 'to preserve the effectiveness and assure the continuation of the state militia.'.... Appellant cannot show that possession of a handgun by an individual bears any relationship to the District of Columbia's desire and ability to preserve a well regulated militia...."(Sandidge v. United States)

04-17-07, 11:30 AM	#216
Skybird Soaring Join Date: Sep 2001 Location: the mental asylum named Germany Posts: 42,648 Downloads: 10 Uploads: 0	And finally: "....In this case, we must decide whether this amendment grants constitutional protection to an individual whose possession or use of machineguns and pipe bombs is not reasonably related to an organized state militia. We hold that it does not.... As a member of Georgia's unorganized militia,[fn12] Wright claims that he has a constitutional right to possess machineguns and pipe bombs because these weapons are used by contemporary militia fighting forces....A careful reading of Miller, however, strongly suggests that only militias actively maintained and trained by the states can satisfy the 'well regulated militia' requirement of the Second Amendment. As the Miller Court emphasized, the 'obvious purpose' of the Second Amendment was to 'render possible the effectiveness of' the governmental militia described in the Militia Clauses of the Constitution.[fn16] Miller, 307 U.S. at 178, 59 S.Ct. at 818. Thus, the Second Amendment 'must be interpreted and applied with that end in view....'" U.S. v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 1997) "Appellant was convicted in the district court for the District of Kansas of knowingly possessing an unregistered machine gun in violation of 26 U.S.C. ?5861(d)....The second constitutional argument that appellant advances is that the prosecution here violated his right to bear arms guaranteed by the second amendment.[fn1] Defendant presents a long historical analysis of the amendment's background and purpose from which he concludes that every citizen has the absolute right to keep arms. This broad conclusion has long been rejected. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206....The purpose of the second amendment as stated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Miller, supra at 178, 59 S.Ct. 816, was to preserve the effectiveness and assure the continuation of the state militia. The Court stated that the amendment must be interpreted and applied with that purpose in view. Id. To apply the amendment so as to guarantee appellant's right to keep an unregistered firearm which has not been shown to have any connection to the militia, merely because he is technically a member of the Kansas militia, would be unjustifiable in terms of either logic or policy. This lack of justification is even more apparent when applied to appellant's membership in 'Posse Comitatus,' an apparently nongovernmental organization. We conclude, therefore, that this prosecution did not violate the second amendment...." U.S. v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1977) "Appellant, Peter B. Thomas, argues that the City of Portland, Maine, and various city officials infringed his constitutional rights by denying him a permit to carry a concealed handgun. Established case law makes clear that the federal Constitution grants appellant no right to carry a concealed handgun. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178, 59 S.Ct. 816, 818, 83 L.Ed. 1206 (1939) (second amendment applies only to weapons that have a 'reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.')...." Thomas v. City Council of Portland, 730 F.2d 41 "Douglas Ray Hickman appeals from an order granting summary judgment in favor of the appellees, who denied Hickman a concealed weapons permit. He complains, among other things, that the appellees' permit issuance policy violated his Second Amendment right to bear arms. We have jurisdiction over his timely appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1291, and affirm on the basis that Hickman lacks standing to sue for a violation of the Second Amendment...We follow our sister circuits in holding that the Second Amendment is a right held by the states, and does not protect the possession of a weapon by a private citizen. We conclude that Hickman can show no legal injury, and therefore lacks standing to bring this action...." Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996) "Wilbur Hale appeals his conviction of thirteen counts of possession of a machine gun pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. ?922(o) (West Supp. 1992) and three counts of possession of unregistered firearms pursuant to 26 U.S.C. ?5861(d) (1988). He argues....that the indictment violates his Second Amendment right to bear arms....we cannot conclude that the Second Amendment protects the individual possession of military weapons....The rule emerging from Miller is that, absent a showing that the possession of a certain weapon has 'some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia,' the Second Amendment does not guarantee the right to possess the weapon. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178, 59 S.Ct. at 818....After carefully examining the principles and implications of the then recent Miller decision, the First Circuit concluded that the existence of any 'reasonable relationship to the preservation of a well regulated militia' was best determined from the facts of each individual case. Id. Thus, it is not sufficient to prove that the weapon in question was susceptible to military use. Indeed, as recognized in Cases, most any lethal weapon has a potential military use.[fn4] Id. Rather, the claimant of Second Amendment protection must prove that his or her possession of the weapon was reasonably related to a well regulated militia. See id. at 923. Where such a claimant presented no evidence either that he was a member of a military organization or that his use of the weapon was 'in preparation for a military career', the Second Amendment did not protect the possession of the weapon. Id. Since the Miller decision, no federal court has found any individual's possession of a military weapon to be 'reasonably related to a well regulated militia.' 'Technical' membership in a state militia (e.g., membership in an 'unorganized' state militia) or membership in a non-governmental military organization is not sufficient to satisfy the 'reasonable relationship' test. Oakes, 564 F.2d at 387. Membership in a hypothetical or 'sedentary' militia is likewise insufficient. See Warin, 530 F.2d 103...." U.S. v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1992) U.S. v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1992) "This appeal concerns the constitutionality of the Village of Morton Grove's Ordinance No. 81-11,[fn1] which prohibits the possession of handguns within the Village's borders. The district court held that the Ordinance was constitutional. We affirm....The second amendment provides that 'A well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.' U.S. Const. amend. II. Construing this language according to its plain meaning, it seems clear that the right to bear arms is inextricably connected to the preservation of a militia. This is precisely the manner in which the Supreme Court interpreted the second amendment in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206 (1939), the only Supreme Court case specifically addressing that amendment's scope. There the Court held that the right to keep and bear arms extends only to those arms which are necessary to maintain a well regulated militia....Under the controlling authority of Miller we conclude that the right to keep and bear handguns is not guaranteed by the second amendment.[fn9]" Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982) "A jury convicted[fn1] James Cody of making false statements to a licensed firearms dealer in connection with the purchase of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. ?922(a) (6)....We find no merit in the contention that ?922(a) (6) violates appellant's Second Amendment right to bear arms. Since United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206 (1939), it has been settled that the Second Amendment is not an absolute bar to congressional regulation of the use or possession of firearms. The Second Amendment's guarantee extends only to use or possession which 'has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.' ....We find no evidence that the prohibition of ?922(a) (6) obstructs the maintenance of a well regulated militia...." Cody v. U.S., 460 F.2d 34 (8th Cir.) "Defendant was convicted in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, William H. Becker, Chief Judge, for, inter alia, failure to make appropriate entries and to properly maintain records as required of a federally-licensed firearms dealer, and he appealed....With respect to a possible infringement of Second Amendment rights, we need only look to the rationale of the Supreme Court in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206 (1939): 'In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of (the weapon) at this time 167 has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument'....Thus, in light of the defendant's failure to present any evidence indicating a conflict between the requirements of "922(m) and 923(g) and the maintenance of a well regulated militia, we decline to hold that the statute violates the Second Amendment...." U.S. v. Decker, 446 F.2d 164 (8th Cir. 1971) "Defendant was convicted before the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, Miles W. Lord, J., of violating the omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968...The next contention raised is that ' 1202(a)(1) violates the Second Amendment right to bear arms. We do not agree.... ....Although ' 1202(a) is the broadest federal gun legislation to date, we see no conflict between it and the Second Amendment since there is no showing that prohibiting possession of firearms by felons obstructs the maintenance of a 'well regulated militia.'" U.S. v. Synnes, 438 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1971) "By virtue of 1996 amendments to the Gun Control Act of 1968 which prohibit persons convicted of domestic violence offenses from possessing firearms in or affecting commerce, Jerald Gillespie can no longer carry a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. ?922(g)(9). As a result, he has lost his job as a police officer. Gillespie filed suit against the City of Indianapolis[fn1] seeking to have the statute declared unconstitutional and his employment with the Indianapolis Police Department preserved. The United States intervened to defend the constitutionality of the statute....The Second Amendment provides that '[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.' U.S. Const. amend. II. The link that the amendment draws between the ability 'to keep and bear Arms' and '[a] well regulated Militia' suggests that the right protected is limited, one that inures not to the individual but to the people collectively, its reach extending so far as is necessary to protect their common interest in protection by a militia...." Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 1999) "This case requires a determination of whether certain provisions of the National Firearms Act as amended by the Gun Control Act of 1968, 26 U.S.C. ?5801 et seq., are an invalid infringement on the right to keep and bear arms guaranteed by the Second Amendment to the Constitution...It is clear that the Second Amendment guarantees a collective rather than an individual right....It would unduly extend this opinion to attempt to deal with every argument made by defendant and amicus curiae, Second Amendment Foundation, all of which are based on the erroneous supposition that the Second Amendment is concerned with the rights of individuals rather than those of the States or that defendant's automatic membership in the 'sedentary militia' of Ohio brings him within the reach of its guarantees...." U.S. v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir.) "According to her complaint, in September, 1990, April Love tried to purchase a handgun at a shop in Prince George's County, Maryland.... On September 21, Corporal Ernest Pletcher reviewed the application and a computer printout from Maryland police and Federal Bureau of Investigation files. He discovered that Ms. Love had been arrested on four occasions....Citing law review articles, Love argues that she has an individual federal constitutional right to 'keep and bear' a handgun, and Maryland may not infringe upon this right....She is wrong on both counts. The Second Amendment does not apply to the states. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 6 S.Ct. 580, 29 L.Ed. 615 (1886); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 23 L.Ed. 588 (1876).[fn5] Moreover, even as against federal regulation, the amendment does not confer an absolute individual right to bear any type of firearm. In 1939, the Supreme Court held that the federal statute prohibiting possession of a sawed-off shotgun was constitutional, because the defendant had not shown that his possession of such a gun bore a 'reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.' United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178, 59 S.Ct. 816, 818, 83 L.Ed. 1206 (1939). Since then, the lower federal courts have uniformly held that the Second Amendment preserves a collective, rather than individual, right...." Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 813 (1995) "Major Henry Johnson was convicted by a jury of transporting a firearm in interstate commerce after having been convicted of a felony, 18 U.S.C. ?922(g). He appeals, challenging the district court's instructions and contesting the constitutionality of section 922(g). For the reasons set forth below, we disagree with Johnson's arguments and affirm the conviction....The courts have consistently held that the Second Amendment only confers a collective right of keeping and bearing arms which must bear a 'reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.' 307 U.S. at 178, 59 S.Ct. at 818. Johnson presents no evidence that section 922(g) in any way affects the maintenance of a well regulated militia...." U.S. v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1974) “Appellant Raymond Rybar, Jr. was convicted following a conditional guilty plea to two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. Section(s) 922(o), which makes it 'unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machine gun.' On appeal, he argues that the district court erred in rejecting his challenge to that provision as beyond Congress' commerce power and as violating the Second Amendment. Neither challenge is persuasive....In support, Rybar cites, paradoxically, the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), where the Court upheld the constitutionality of a firearms-registration requirement against a Second Amendment challenge. Rybar draws on that holding, relying on the Miller Court's observation that the sawed-off shotgun in question had not been shown to bear 'some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.' Brief of Appellant at 24-25; Miller, 307 U.S. at 178. Drawing from that language the contra positive implication, Rybar suggests that because the military utility of the machine guns proscribed by Section(s) 922(o) is clear, a result contrary to that reached in Miller is required, and the statute is therefore invalid under the Second Amendment....We note first that however clear the Court's suggestion that the firearm before it lacked the necessary military character, it did not state that such character alone would be sufficient to secure Second Amendment protection. In fact, the Miller Court assigned no special importance to the character of the weapon itself, but instead demanded a reasonable relationship between its 'possession or use' and militia related activity....Rybar's invocation of this statute does nothing to establish that his firearm possession bears a reasonable relationship to 'the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia,' as required in Miller, 307 U.S. at 178. " U.S. v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273 (3rd Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 807 (1997) "At stake in the present appeal is the vitality of several key provisions of the Gun Control Act of 1968,[fn1] a statutory program which restricts the right to bear arms of convicted felons and other persons of dangerous propensities.[fn2]....U.S.Const. amend. II states: 'A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed' Arguably, any regulation of firearms may be violative of this constitutional provision. Nevertheless, the courts consistently have found no conflict between federal gun laws and the Second Amendment, narrowly construing the latter to guarantee the right to bear arms as a member of a militia...." U.S. v. Graves, 554 F.2d 65 (3rd Cir. 1977) "Appellant, here petitioned the district court to enjoin the City of Philadelphia from enforcing its ordinance which regulates the purchase of firearms and transfer of same. Appellant's theory in the district court which he now repeats is that by the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution he is entitled to bear arms. Appellant is completely wrong about that. As long ago at least as 1939 the United States Supreme Court held that there must be "* * * some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia". There is nothing whatsoever of that kind in this appeal. It must be remembered that the right to keep and bear arms is not a right given by the United States Constitution. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206 (1939)...." Eckert v. City of Philadelphia, 477 F.2d 610 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 839 (1973) "Appellant Dennis E. Friel was indicted by a federal grand jury with two counts of possession of firearms by a person convicted of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. "922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). [FN1] Appellant was convicted, after a jury trial, on both counts. He raises six issues on appeal, all of which we reject....Appellant argues generally that ' 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional. Specifically, he asserts that the limits imposed by ' 922(g)(1) violate the constitutional right to bear arms. The Supreme Court plainly has held that the Second Amendment-'A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed'-applies only to firearms having a 'reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia....'" U.S. v. Friel, 1 F.3d 1231 (1st Cir. 1993) ....These holdings, when considered within the broad intent of the Act, highlight the established principle that there is no absolute constitutional right of an individual to possess a firearm. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206 (1939)...." U.S. v. Swinton, 521 F.2d 1255 (10th Cir. 1975) "In 1999, the State of California enacted amendments to its gun-control laws that significantly strengthened the state's restrictions on the possession, use, and transfer of semi-automatic weapons popularly known as 'assault weapons.' Plaintiffs, California residents who either own assault weapons, seek to acquire such weapons, or both, brought this challenge to the gun-control statute, asserting that the law, as amended, violates the Second Amendment....The district court dismissed all of the plaintiff's claims. Because the second amendment does not confer an individual right to own or possess arms, we affirm the dismissal of all claims brought pursuant to that consitutional provision....'Militia' appears repeatedly in the first and second articles of the Constitution. From its use in those sections, it is apparent that the drafters were referring in the Constitution to the second of two government-established and -controlled military forces. Those forces were, first, the national army and navy which were subject to civilian control shared by the president and Congress, and, second, the state militias, which were 'essentially organized and under control of the states, but subject to regulation by Congress and to "federalization" at the command of the president.'...."Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2002)(PDF file) "....After a jury trial, appellant was convicted of carrying a pistol without a license, D.C.Code ' 22-3204 (1981), possession of an unregistered firearm, id. ' 6-2311, and unlawful possession of ammunition, id. ' 6-2361....We now hold that D.C.Code '' 6-2311, 6-2361, and 22-3204 (1981) do not violate the second amendment. We affirm appellant's convictions....We agree with numerous other courts that 'the Second Amendment guarantees a collective rather than an individual right.'....The purpose of the second amendment is 'to preserve the effectiveness and assure the continuation of the state militia.'.... Appellant cannot show that possession of a handgun by an individual bears any relationship to the District of Columbia's desire and ability to preserve a well regulated militia...."(Sandidge v. United States) __________________ If you feel nuts, consult an expert.