[azreark1]

hmm, well i got some good info from this HUGE ranting on about the ware and china and taiwan and all that in the General section...gives a pretty good basis for the book.

Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASATs)
China is working on, and plans to field, ASAT systems. Beijing has and will continue to enhance its satellite tracking and identification network - the first step in establishing a credible ASAT capability. China can currently destroy or disable satellites only by launching a ballistic missile or space-launch vehicle armed with a nuclear weapon. However, there are many risks associated with this method, and consequences from use of nuclear weapons. China is also conducting research to develop ground-based laser ASAT weapons. Based on the level of Chinese interest in this field, the Defense Intelligence Agency believes Beijing eventually could develop a laser weapon capable of damaging or destroying satellites. At lower power thresholds, Chinese researchers may believe that low-energy lasers can "blind" sensors on low-Earth-orbiting satellites; whether Beijing has tested such a capability is unclear.

Anti-Secession Law

On March 14, 2005, China's legislature, the National People's Congress, passed the "antisecession law." The law's passage followed months of speculation by outside observers over its contents and a simultaneous lobbying effort on the part of Chinese officials to cast the law in benign terms, while closely guarding the draft of the text. The law itself is broken into ten articles that codify, or render as legal instruments, policies and statements applied by the Chinese government to the Taiwan question. Key elements are described below.

Article One establishes that the law was formulated for the purpose of "opposing and checking Taiwan's secession from China."Article Two restates Beijing's "One China" definition - Taiwan is part of China - and that China "shall never allow" Taiwan to secede from China "under any name or by any means."Article Three asserts that the Taiwan matter is part of China's internal affairs and is subject to "no interference by outside forces."Article Four states that China's reunification is the "sacred duty" of "all Chinese people," including "Taiwan compatriots."Article Five reiterates China's position that acceptance of "One China" is a necessary precondition for peaceful resolution. It does not refer to the "one country, two systems" model, but claims Taiwan would "practice systems different from those on the mainland."Article Six enumerates the steps Beijing is willing to take to realize peaceful unification, such as expanding cross-Strait exchanges, including cultural, economic, educational, science and technology, health, and sports exchanges. It also refers to "other activities" conducive to peace and stability, but does not offer details.Article Seven specifies the range of issues that would be subject to negotiation during cross-Strait consultations. The article states such negotiations would be on an "equal footing."Article Eight states the State Council and CMC "shall decide on and execute" non-peaceful means to "protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity" if "secessionist forces . . .cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from China," if "major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession" occur, or if "possibilities for peaceful reunification" are exhausted.Article Nine provides that during conflict, China will "exert its utmost" to protect lives, property, and rights of Taiwan civilians and foreign nationals on Taiwan, and the rights of Taiwan citizens in other parts of China.Article Ten specifies that the law comes into force on the day of its proclamation.

China continues to declare a policy of peaceful resolution under the "one country, two systems" framework that offers Taiwan limited autonomy in exchange for Taiwan's integration with the mainland. China sees the potential use of force as an integral part of its policy of dissuading Taiwan from pursuing independence and encouraging it to unite ultimately with the mainland. Beijing has not renounced the use of force against Taiwan.

The threat of force against Taiwan is now codified in the "anti-secession law," enacted by the National People's Congress in March 2005.

The circumstances in which Beijing has historically claimed it would use force against the island include: a formal declaration of independence by Taipei, foreign intervention in Taiwan's internal affairs, indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue, Taiwan's acquisition of nuclear weapons, and internal unrest on Taiwan.

These circumstances are not fixed and have evolved over the last decade in response to Taiwan actions and changes in China's own military capabilities. They are, moreover, deliberately general, allowing Beijing to determine the timing and form of its response.
Beijing's Courses of Action against Taiwan Although the costs of the use of force against Taiwan would be high, Beijing leaders might use force if they believed they had no other way to prevent Taiwan independence or, as implied in its "anti-secession law," to guarantee reunification over the long term.
The Chinese Communist Party came to power on its credentials as a defender of Chinese sovereignty; its leaders appear to see progress - or perhaps, the absence of failure - on the Taiwan issue as affecting the legitimacy of their rule.
Beijing is developing military capabilities that will enable it to pursue several courses of action against Taiwan, allowing Chinese leaders more flexibility to apply pressure against the island and minimize the risks of a military confrontation with the United States. The PLA is simultaneously developing the capability to deter and/or slow a potential U.S., or U.S.-led, response to defend Taiwan.
Persuasion and Coercion.
China's current approach to preventing Taiwan independence combines diplomatic, economic, legal, psychological, and military instruments to convince Taipei that the price of declaring independence is too high. This strategy combines the credible threat to use military force with the economic and cultural tools that China has at its disposal. China uses its growing economic links with Taiwan to influence political behavior on the island. Beijing seeks to attract more Taiwan investment in China, while emphasizing that peace in the Strait will bring prosperity.
Beijing is increasing its pressure on Taiwan businessmen operating in China to refrain from supporting "pro-independence" parties or individuals on Taiwan. Beijing emphasizes historic, ethnic, and cultural links between Taiwan and the mainland, and unofficial diplomacy with "Taiwan compatriots" to generate domestic propaganda in Taiwan in favor of reunification.
Beijing has also intensified its competition with Taiwan in the developing world for
diplomatic recognition. This effort has focused on eroding Taiwan's diplomatic support among the 26 remaining countries that recognize Taipei. Simultaneously, using diplomatic and commercial levers, China has increased pressure on other states to limit their relationships with and to restrain Taiwan.
Portraying a military threat to Taiwan backstops the overall campaign to isolate Taiwan diplomatically and pressure Taiwan leaders. Exercises, deployments, and press operations all contribute to Beijing's policy of pressure.
Limited Force Options. Beijing could use limited strikes, employing information
operations, special operations forces on Taiwan, and SRBM or air strikes at key military or political sites, to try to break the will of Taiwan's leadership and population. Although Beijing might view these as a complement to non-military coercion and as less than a full use of force, others may view such actions differently. Such a Chinese miscalculation could lead to a full-fledged conflict.
Third-Party Intervention
Beijing sees Washington and, increasingly, Tokyo as the principal hurdles to any attempt to use military force to coerce or capture Taiwan. Beijing might coerce or target other critical countries to deny or delay their willingness to provide support, basing, overflight rights, or transit authority to U.S. forces operating in the theater. Deterring, defeating, or delaying foreign intervention ahead of Taiwan's capitulation is integral to Beijing's strategy. To that end, Beijing will pursue political and diplomatic efforts to keep the United States and Japan from taking action to support Taiwan. The U.S. Intelligence Community also believes China will consider a sea-denial strategy to attempt to hold at risk U.S. naval forces, including aircraft carriers and logistic forces, approaching the Taiwan Strait.
Blockade
Beijing could threaten or deploy a naval blockade either as a "non-war"
pressure tactic in the pre-hostility phase or as a transition to active conflict. On one end of the spectrum, Beijing could declare that ships en route to Taiwan ports must stop in mainland ports for inspections prior to transiting on to Taiwan. Alternatively, China could attempt the equivalent of a blockade of Taiwan ports by declaring exercise or missile closure areas in approaches and roadsteads to ports to divert merchant traffic.
Chinese doctrine also includes activities such as an air blockade, missile attacks, and mining or otherwise obstructing harbors and approaches.
More traditional methods of blockade would increase the impact on Taiwan, but also would tax PLA Navy capabilities and raise the potential for direct military confrontation, particularly with U.S. naval assets. Although sea lanes closer to China (i.e., the South and East China Seas) could be interdicted, any attempt at a close-in blockade or operations on the east side of Taiwan would strain the PLA Navy, which lacks significant replenishment and open ocean surveillance capabilities. More restrictive blockades increase the likelihood of international intervention. Although any blockade would have an immediate economic impact, it would take time to realize decisive political results. It would also increase the opportunity for countervailing U.S. and international pressure and could lead to the protracted campaign Beijing seeks to avoid.
Amphibious Invasion
An invasion of Taiwan would be a complex and difficult operation relying upon timing and pre-conditions set by many subordinate campaigns.
Publicly available Chinese writings on amphibious campaigns offer different strategies for an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The most prominent of these is the Joint Island Landing Campaign. The objective of this campaign is to break through or circumvent the shore defense, establish and build a beachhead, and then launch an attack to split, seize and occupy the entire island or important targets on the island. To achieve the final objective of the Joint Island Landing Campaign, a series of sub-campaigns, such as electronic warfare, naval, and air campaigns, must be executed, including the underlying logistics support.
Amphibious operations are logistics-intensive and rely for success upon the rapid buildup of supplies and sustainment ashore and an uninterrupted flow of support thereafter.
This particular amphibious operation would tax the lift capacities of China's armed forces needed to provide sustainment for this campaign. Add to these strains the combat at
trition of China's forces, and an amphibious invasion of Taiwan would be a significant political and military risk for China's civilian and military leaders.
The PLA's prospects in an invasion of Taiwan would hinge on: availability of

amphibious and air lift, attrition rates, interoperability of PLA forces, the ability of

China's logistic system to support the necessarily high tempo of operations, Taiwan's will to resist, and the speed and scale of third-party intervention.

it basically shows how bad china wants taiwan and how far they are willing to go.