[QUOTE=Aktungbby;2938782][COLOR="ruby"]Having visited the U-505 IX at Chicago and the USS Pampanito at Fishermans Wharf: the main difference is the VII was a submerged
campground vs an actual submerged
dwelling of the superior Gato or Baleo vessel. One overlooked aspect of the capture of the U-505 was the huge bucket in the engine room that everyone defecated in as the 2nd toilet opposite the cooks galley was used for food storage. I've seen the picture of a US sailor who bravely removed the bucket
at the capture even as the scuttle charges were being neutralized, but cannot locate it. The engine room must have reeked!
Moreover, bathing aboard a U-boat was nil for a crew of 45+ due to poor desalinization equipment. The repair backlogs at German bases was miserable as opposed to US facilities at Peal, Midway, Australia thus negating the Nazi strategy of strangling Britain into submission while the Allied effort in the Pacific was what Doenitz could only dream of. The advent of Liberty and Victory cargo rapid production vessels further stymied the Kriegsmarine effort to a total of only
3-5% of Allied cargo vessels sunk overall; ie: a failure of the overall strategy concept largely borrowed from WWI's failure when Britain's Grand fleet did most of the starving of Germany into submission. Doenitz must have seen the light; he pulled all his subs from the Atlantic in 1943??!!
"Having visited the U-505 IX at Chicago and the USS Pampanito at Fishermans Wharf: the main difference is the VII was a submerged
campground vs an actual submerged
dwelling of the superior Gato or Baleo vessel."
Well said. Interesting, older thread I do not recall ever reading. Thanks for reviving.
I have visited both boats as well and agree. However, Pampanito is a Balao Class of course and 505 is a Type IX. Type IX as are aware is more comparable to the Gato or Baloa than a Type VII.
I believe we're perilously close to false comparison when comparing the Gato to the Type VII as were built for different theaters, different missions originally. Gato's were "fleet type submarines" designed to run with and scout for the US fleet when battleships were still the mainstay, before carrier airpower truly supplanted that role by the time the US was in the war. To my knowledge Us submarine doctrine was not faced on sinking enemy merchant vessels until after Pearl Harbor when the unrestricted warfare order was given, where as Germany had conducted such warfare in WW I and believe that was the plan all along for the next war, to blockade the enemy with warfare against commerce.
Not sure if anyone brought this up but one thing US submarines had going is they did not face the same type of mass effective, ASW effort from the Japanese that the Germans faced from the Allies. IJN was late to the game in ASW doctrine and while it was no cakewalk for the US submarine force, it was not what the UBoats faced. US submarines did not really hit their stride until 1944 (torpedo issues finally resolved in late 1943) and US doctrine evolved with night surface attacks being preferred method, "wolfpacks" becoming common against lage (by japanese standards) convoys of 12-15 ships.
The IJN never really had surface and air based radar that was effective against submarines that was widely deployed and it made AW less effective overall, unlike the Allies. I think about Tang in June 1944 off Nagasaki, attacking a convoy with 12 escorts, some with surface search radar, on the surface at night, from inside the convoy, in shallow waters. They slipped inside the screen and pretended to be part of it. Japanese apparently did not have PPI scopes, just "A Scope" type displays, so even if they detected the sub, it blended in well. They attacked successfully and escaped. This was not an abnormal feat against convoys in 1944 and 1945, even when they had plenty of escorts and radar. "Ramage's Rampage" of 31 July 1944 in Parche, of Jack's attack on the Take Ichi Convoy in April 1944, which had a direct strategic impact on the New Guinea campaign.