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Originally Posted by Ducimus
From my understanding, US submarines were infact designed around an entirely different philophy, and sinking merchant shipping wasn't it. They were designed to run with the fleet. Hence the term, "Fleet boat". If you look at some of the nonclamture (number of engines, surface speed and endurance) of the Gato, it almost spells out, "keeping up with the fleet".
Breaking them off from the fleet and using them against merchants was an afterthought.
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Yeah, pretty much. Thus the reference to Mahan above. The predominant theory was that naval supremacy was secured by a "fleet in being." When two of these were brought together for a fight, it was to be a decisive battle. This is what killed Japan - despite their brilliant air power victory at Pearl Harbor. They fought all of the war with the idea of luring the American navy to the "decisive battle."
Anyway, with subs, they really spent their early development being thought of as coastal defense boats - sort of like mobile shore batteries. The early attempts at "fleet boats" were boats intended to keep up with and support the fleet. I think the 'S' boats fall into that category. At any rate, the S-boats didn't work as far as keeping up with the fleet went, so subs acquired a little bit more operational independence. A little later (IIRC in the 30s), some strategists (I think Lockwood was one of them, maybe Ralph Christie also) favored using the sub as a long range scout. It would have to have long range and stay out for about 60 days, but not necessarily the top speed required to follow the fleet "in formation" - it would instead lie off enemy ports and watch and report enemy naval moves. In the event the "decisive battle" seemed to be brewing, it would attempt to intercept and sink the fleet elements coming out of the port it was watching.