I said I think there is a chance for a Russian operational breakthrough building up. And now, 6 hours ago, Colonel Reisner too starts to speak of the increasing chance of Russia acchieving a "major breakthrough".
What he also says is that the ATCAMS attacks done so far, four if I counted right, did not leave a lasting impression on the Russians. As was to be feared. A few scattered attacks here and there do not make much of a difference, I think you need enough ammo to fire them in volleys and several attacks
every day, day for day, over weeks. The Ukrainians obviously do not have enough ATACMS for that. So its headline-creating pinpoint attacks and on targets that are beyond reach of a Ukrainian push on the ground. Which makes them tactically useless so far.
I am thinking longterm here, the ukrainians obviously are in a strictly defesnive position now, and get eaten up, see their ressources in material and men being badly mauled every day, so they use what they are being given for defending themselves by trying to hit the veins and sinews of the Russian pressure wave on the ground: command centres, air force, missiles, and logistics. But by allowing to get locked in this effort, they get mauled up even more. If they do not gain the initiative again (with what...?) they must and will lose. Themerciless law of attritional warfare. The counters go back to zero. Who reaches zero first, looses.
This all slowly turns into a real hopeless fight, I think. No degrees of freedom seem to to be left for the Ukrainian command at the front. If you have both arms engaged to merely hold the roof over your head, you have no more hands free for fighting.
https://www-n--tv-de.translate.goog/...en&_x_tr_hl=de
Scheiße. This could turn into the first decisive turning point of the war since autumn 2022.
To close this gap will cost the Ukrainians many more precious reserves, and I dont bet money that they will be successful in this attempt.
Quote:
A few days ago, military economist Marcus Keupp told the Kölnische Rundschau newspaper that Russia had lost the war strategically. By the fall of 2023 at the latest, it was clear that the Russians' production rate would not be able to keep up with the attrition rate. How do you see that?
It's not my place to comment on others. However, I would like to warn against hoping for a turnaround in the war, which we haven't seen yet. We have to take the situation seriously and prepare for the worst-case scenario. German Defense Minister Pistorius recently pointed out that Russia is obviously producing more material than it needs for the war. What is the purpose of this overproduction? Are they already preparing for the next war? If you don't consider such possibilities, the surprise can be nasty. We can't say we didn't know.
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