“Russia is winning the war” – sure?
There are increasing voices everywhere that see Russia as having an advantage in the war against Ukraine: it is only a matter of time that Moscow wins. However, there are reasonable doubts about this claim. A reply Karl-Heinz Kamp. Vladimir Putin and his loyal followers are likely to take note of the current press coverage in Germany and other NATO states with goodwill. “Russia is winning the war of aggression,” one reads, because time is working for Moscow in the current trench warfare in eastern Ukraine.
Russia has larger reserves and can throw almost unlimited people and material to the front - the defeat of Ukraine is therefore inevitable sooner or later. Ukraine's phalanx of Western supporters will crumble as other crises, such as the fighting between Israelis and Palestinians, overshadow the war in Eastern Europe. The everyday worries of people in Germany, from rising prices to growing migration pressure, would also lead to growing fatigue with Ukraine. The USA, still the strongest supporter of Ukraine, would significantly reduce its aid under pressure from the Republicans, and if Donald Trump were elected president again next November, then everything would be over anyway. Apart from the fact that it is not even defined what exactly is meant by a Russian “victory” or a Ukrainian defeat, there are considerable doubts about such a scenario of decline.
Russia's position remains difficult
Firstly, it should be remembered that on February 24, 2022, it was considered almost certain that Ukraine would only be able to withstand the Russian attack for a few days or weeks. That wasn't even implausible, as the small Ukrainian defence force was opposed by the supposedly huge Russian armed forces, which saw themselves in the tradition of the glorious Red Army. The idea that a year later, a possible “victory” for Ukraine would even have been envisaged would have been dismissed as fantasy at the time.
Even today, Russia finds itself in a position that is anything but comfortable. In nine years of war against Ukraine, Russian armed forces have occupied just 19 percent of Ukrainian territory. The toll in blood paid is unimaginable. A few days ago, American intelligence published estimates of 315,000 casualties on the Russian side, almost 90 percent of the 360,000-man invasion force with which Russia launched the attack. Other estimates, which estimate the number of dead and injured based on the Russian government's (known) payments to victims' families, come to even higher figures.
Further waves of mobilization are likely to be extremely difficult, not to mention the consequences for the motivation of the armed forces. The loss of soldiers and material, the American report continued, would set Russia back 18 years militarily. Russia has also not been able to intercept any of the trains or convoys that bring Western aid to Ukraine via Poland. The Black Sea Fleet has had to withdraw a large number of its ships from Sevastopol and move them further east because just a few British Storm Shadow cruise missiles pose a significant threat. The ammunition supplied by North Korea is said to cause significant security problems and is unlikely to be usable. Further sanctions packages from the European Union and the USA close loopholes through which Russia had obtained modern technology.
Huge costs
The costs of the war are also enormous for Russia and will consume 40 percent of total government spending next year. Gazprom, whose profits once accounted for ten percent of the state budget, has lost 80 percent of its markets in Western Europe without being able to compensate for this with deliveries to India or China - there are simply no pipelines. Having to supply oil to India at $70 a barrel is not a bonanza either. With NATO, we are also faced with an alliance whose gross domestic product is around twenty times higher than that of Russia - not to mention Ukraine's other supporters within the G-7.
But, it is said, Russia is capable of suffering and can endure its own hardships until Western support for Ukraine dwindles. However, it doesn't look like that so far. The members of the European Union have just decided to start accession talks with Ukraine, offering the country anchoring in the West - something that Putin was determined to prevent. A new aid package for Ukraine will be decided sooner or later, despite the current resistance from Hungary, and even if the EU's overall commitment were to weaken at some point, countries like Poland, Finland, Sweden or the Baltic States will always support Ukraine.
Unbroken solidarity
It is also noteworthy that Germany has largely excluded the defence budget and aid to Ukraine from the budget cuts that have recently become necessary and is instead saving on social and climate protection spending - and that under a Social Democratic Chancellor and a Green Economics Minister. Surveys show that this prioritization even finds a clear majority among the public.
But what about the growing unwillingness of US Republicans to continue providing funds for Ukraine - didn't President Zelensky just leave Washington without having achieved anything? Here too it is worth having a closer look. The majority of Republicans in Congress are not against supporting Ukraine, but above all against President Joe Biden, who they do not want to begrudge success.
The real domestic debate revolves around means of securing America's southern border against migrants - a discussion that Republicans are keen to have but that Democrats want to avoid. Aid to Ukraine is the pawn in this heated dispute. If both parties manage to overcome their shadows despite the deep social divisions, aid can continue to flow to Ukraine. On December 13th and 14th, the Senate and House of Representatives passed a compromise resolution with a large majority of both parties that would allow aid for Ukraine for two more years, provided President Biden makes concessions on border security. Opposition to the decision came only from the ranks of Republican isolationists.
What if Trump wins and is sworn in as the new president on January 20, 2025? Then everything will be different anyway, not only when it comes to Ukraine, but also with regard to transatlantic relations or the future of NATO. But firstly, that is not guaranteed and secondly, there are still 13 months until then - a time that could be very long for Putin given the problems described.
Does all of this mean that, conversely, Ukraine's success is assured? Absolutely not, the losses there are also huge, and without the great international support the country would never have been able to withstand the pressure from Russia for so long. It is up to Ukraine to decide how long it can and will continue to make its own sacrifices, and whether it means “victory” as the reconquest of its entire national territory or some form of compromise. Until then, further Western help for Ukraine is absolutely necessary in terms of security policy, military and moral aspects. Any rhetoric like “Russia will win anyway” undermines the international solidarity that has allowed Ukraine to survive so far.
https://internationalepolitik.de/de/...n-krieg-sicher