Quote:
Originally Posted by Dargo
The goal was ambitious (to force a major breakthrough in the south to recapture the land link between Russia and Crimea). Those high expectations were not met, Ukraine liberated some 561 square kilometres of territory spread over three sites along the front since June. But it is too short of the mark to label the counteroffensive a failure; in a number of areas, Ukraine did achieve successes.
Ukraine did manage to inflict a lot of damage on the Russian army, which prevented Russia from launching its own offensives for a long time. While Ukraine did not regain control of the south, it did wipe out Russian control of it. Long-range weapons hit important and symbolic targets, such as the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea, that last resulted in a painful retreat of warships from Crimea. Expectations were simply too high, both on the Ukrainian and Western sides. Nevertheless, Ukraine wanted to try. In reality, Ukraine struggled with a lack of well-trained troops and air superiority. Western support also proved to be neither extensive nor rapid enough for the counteroffensive to succeed.
Ukraine has learned that they cannot afford a major operation because it is accompanied by great losses. Therefore, a different tactic will be chosen in the next offensive, they will try to engage the Russians in a war of attrition and attack Russian logistics.
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Thats in parts almost a beautifying of the events.
In fact it was Russia launching a successful distracting counteroffensive in the East when Ukraine was marching in the south, forcing Ukriane to move more and more of it southern attack forces to the defence in the East. The point goes to Russia here, the tactical goals weres obvious, and they were achieved: diversion and distraction to stop the ukrainian offensive in its tracks. Ukraine was too weak, obviously, to hold its ground in the east without giving up major ressources for its attack in the south, and so that attack in the south more or less collapsed, in slow motion. The gained territory is strategically irrelevant. Too little gained there. Not even Tokmak was taken, not to mention Melitopol.
Russia can sustain its losses in personnel. That simple.
I do not see that Rusian control of the territory it occupies has been "wiped out", as you called it. Their control is complete enopgh that the population is at their mercy and must accept Russian passports if they want access to ongoing medical case and supply. The control of theRussians is pretty much clear, its just not without meeting reistence to it by partisans.
Attacks of symbolic value rank very low in my book, they do not impress me at all. Symbols are not the things they point at.
Ukraine switches to a war of attrition, you said. Well, thats the sort of warfare that maximises Russian "virtues" and minimizes Russian weaknesses. The supply bas eof Russia is bigger than that of Ukraine - by factors, last but not least especially in human pool size. The economic cost Russia will pay in some years do not matter for the war now, and the war now benefits from Russian wartime-like production and additional huge buyings of ammo and weapons from other allied countries, nymels North Korea, probabyl Iran, also likely: China. Where there is a will, there is a way...
When Ukraine wants to retake the moentum, it must become able again to leave staitronary trench warfare wher eRussia slwoy suzfocates it, and retake the intiave for mobile warfare. Which is increidbly difficult with alcming mobility means and thes eimmenbse minefields, total (drone-based ) transparency of the battlefield, and loiteiurng ammuntiions and artillery suzpport ont he scale we see in Ukraine. I do nto see it happening any time soon. If ever again. The successes in Khercon and Charkiw in 2022, were acchieved by surprises from highly mobile, flexib le attacks. since then, Russia has learned, slwoly, but it has improved, definitely, and the result is clear: Ukraine was not able to repeat that success story this year. Instead it got locked own, bogged down. I see no reason why to assume it will be able next year.
Add clear Russian superiority in terms of ELINT and electronic jamming.
If the West doe snot fundamentally b eef up it support, it is quite clear how this war will go on and "end".
F-16s will not change that. More air defence for Ukrainian critical infrastructure also will not change that.
The West niow faces Israel-Hamas crisis, Taiwan, US eleciton, the looming threat of thigns gettign even worse after Biden when Trump launches his vendetta in case he becomes president again, European indifference and lacking material basis for ongoing military support, and dropping public and political support. Russia since summer last year has switched to play a long term strategy. And as things stand now it pays off for them. The West is already running out of breath. I cant say that of Russia.
Massiuve raiuses inb wetsern support are needed, urgently. But I do not see that happening any time soon. Or ever.