[Skybird]

I found this in FOCUS. It is a very relevant topic, that we understand that Putin started with a war of prostration, and when that failed, has shifted to a war of fatigue. And that is something Western nations are psychologically only ill-prepared for.
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Many still do not understand Putin's true war strategy


by Herfried Münkler

Many Western governments still believe that Russia is pursuing a strategy of defeat in the Ukraine war. Yet Putin is clearly waging a war of fatigue. This detail is crucial to understanding how the war in Ukraine will play out in the medium and long term.

In 1890, the Berlin historian Hans Delbrück distinguished between a prostration strategy and a fatigue strategy in a widely acclaimed essay. The former is the strategy of rapid warfare, as preferably planned by the general staffs of land powers; the latter is the strategy of naval powers, who opt for it when a decisive battle seems too risky. They then aim not at the enemy's armored fist but at his blood and nerves; their aim is to render the fist powerless by the means of trade blockade and economic warfare.

Small-scale warfare (guerrilla) also follows the dictates of the attrition strategy: partisans avoid engagement with the regular military, lay ambushes and commit raids to wear down the opposition and force them to surrender. And finally, the fatigue strategy plays a role when a war does not reach a quick decision, even though both sides had set out to do so, and at least one side relies on exhausting the enemy, as was the case in the First World War.

In a war of fatigue, the advantage goes to the side with the greater reserves

In the war in Ukraine, we can currently observe that the Russian side is counting on exhaustion, while the Ukrainians are counting on the fact that they will succeed in driving the Russian troops out of Ukrainian territory, i.e. perhaps not knocking them down, but throwing them out.

Fatigue strategies can be directed mainly against the military or mainly against the civilian population, and they rely on the combination of physical and psychological exhaustion. This is as true of the artillery duels in the Donbass as it is of Russian missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure. In a war of fatigue, the one who has the greater reserves and whose territory is less affected by acts of war than that of his adversary has the advantage.

In the case of the Ukraine war, the advantages clearly lie with the Russians. If the West does not want Ukraine to lose this war, as politicians have repeatedly stated, it must compensate for Russia's superiority with extensive deliveries of weapons and ammunition and a comprehensive willingness to stabilize the Ukrainian state budget. If he does not succeed in this, Russia will achieve its military goals in the long run. Then there will be no more Ukraine.

Many Western governments are overwhelmed with fatigue strategies

Waging a fatigue war is not only a question of will, but also of ability: Will the West's reserves of weapons and ammunition be sufficient to keep the Ukrainian army adequately supplied? In the long run, will the Ukrainian army have enough well-trained soldiers to offer effective resistance? And will the populations of Western countries be willing to shoulder the huge costs of supporting Ukraine for a long time to come?

The answer to these questions remains open, but it must be noted that many Western governments are not prepared for the challenge posed by the fatigue strategy, but have behaved as if they were dealing with a defeat strategy on the part of the Russians: in fact, the production of weapons and ammunition would have had to be ramped up in late spring 2022 to be able to deliver what was promised. And even now, it is apparent that many countries that were at the forefront of loudly declaring their willingness to supply Ukraine with modern battle tanks, but when it came to the immediate provision of these weapons systems, were hardly heard from.

Obviously, they were counting on the fact that the Germans would not deliver Leopard tanks and therefore made big talk behind their broad backs. Just as muzzlers (=Maulhelden) are not real heroes, muzzle suppliers are not real supporters.

A fast and comprehensive supply of the Ukrainian army is the solution

So now it is up to the German government to organize the tank coalition of the Europeans and thus do what it wanted to avoid at all costs - probably also anticipating how things would develop. The formula of "no German unilateral action" must now be refocused. It can no longer consist of observing in Berlin what others are doing in order to then join those who are in the majority, but must itself organize majorities and ensure that these majorities are also capable of action.

This is a challenge to which German politicians are not necessarily accustomed, for which they are not "trained." It remains to be seen whether they will be up to this challenge. This also applies to the way in which these arms deliveries are communicated to their own population: If Ukraine loses the war of fatigue, this will result in a flight of several million people to Germany. One must be clear about this. The formula familiar from the migration debate, namely that problems must be tackled where they arise, also applies here, and it means a rapid and comprehensive strengthening of the Ukrainian army.

Possible window of opportunity for negotiations?

But isn't there a negotiating window that can be used to end the war? Fatigue warfare always implies that at least one of the two sides will rely on a combination of warfare and negotiation. For them, in a reversal of Clausewitz's formula, diplomacy is a continuation of war by other means.

This does not argue against negotiations; one only has to know that here diplomacy also follows the principles of fatigue and that what happens on the front always plays a role. In other words, one can be defeated in negotiations because one suffers defeats in theaters of war and one's own negotiating position becomes weaker and weaker as a result - or collapses, which immediately turns compromise negotiations into surrender negotiations.

For German policy, this means that it must contribute to strengthening the Ukrainian military in such a way that the Russian side sees no chance of achieving its military goals even in a war of fatigue, or must suffer unbearable losses and accept disadvantages in the attempt to achieve them after all. The more insistent this prospect is for the Russian side, the sooner the fatigue war will end.
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About the author

Herfried Münkler, born in 1951, is professor emeritus of political science at Berlin's Humboldt University. Many of his books are considered standard works, such as "The Great War" (2013), "The New Germans" (2016), and "The Thirty Years' War" (2017). Herfried Münkler has received many awards, including the Aby Warburg Foundation Science Prize and the Carl Friedrich von Siemens Fellowship
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Its like I said since weeks: Russia must not necessarily "win" tactical engagements and battles on the ground, just must keep the pressure on and keep the Ukrainians bleeding. Therefore, as some German commentator wrote some time ago, Russia will try to create "many little Verduns": and even if Russia suffers big losses and makes no tactical gains, the losses caused to the ukrianains, even if relatively smaller than the Russian, nevertheless damage the Ukrainians more severely. Russia can afford high losses easier than the Ukraine. This might chnage in a year or so, but for the time being this is the simple grim truth: Russia can afford high losses, Ukraine much less so.

Time is working for Russia, not for Ukraine.

Weapon deliveries must be unleashed, all inhibitions and limitations and concerns must be put down. A decisive military decision must be enforced - the ukraine cannot win by playing the long game. Even if in one or two years the Russians were completely kicked out (and thats a big "if"): what use is in that if then the Ukraine and all its industry, critical infrastructure and agriculture would be in complete ruins? Playing the long game only works for Ukraine if it were fighting the war on the soil of the enemy - not on its own. Over 70% of the critical infrastructure in Ukraine is destroyed already, and that is the assessment of Colonel Reisner from already several weeks ago. The fairy queen will hardly have come over night and improved things since then. China seems to mull delivery or artillery and ammunition, it cannot allow Russia getting too weak if it should be of use as an ally in China's confrontation of the USD. .