[Skybird]

Severla weeks ago I posted an essay from I think the NZZ that gave an insight into what a tactical nuke indeed is, that its damage is intentionally so limited (for a nuclear weapon) and radiation is short termed, that the use of just one or two tactical nukes militarily makes no sense. A study by the Indian military on the expected losses in an armoured brigade or division also came to that conclusion: they said if correctly defended against, it would kill just 12-13 tanks. However, that may be optimistic, I dont know.

So using tactical nukes either comes by the dozens - or is meant indeed to psychologically stun Western civil societies that are quite vulnerable to such perceptions, and sentiments from such events. Whether that Russian assumption, which makes the whole concept a risky gamble, would work out, can be debated, but the past 12 months should tell Russia that it had underestimated Western resilience. Also, there is high political cost - also from "allies" like China, and former Sovjet republics. Many who now still tolerate Russia's monstrosity for economic reasons, would turn away in contempt: Brazil, South Africa, India, Pakistan, China... Nobody can afford to be associated with a villain who throws around nukies like balls at Wimbledon.

As Kaplan explains, the US would not even need to reply nuclear to a Russian nuclear attack, but probably can boil the Russians conventionally in their own, self-made aftermath from this, plus I strongly assume that all conventional Russian forces in Ukraine and Crimea would soon seize to exist, falling victim to massive conventional air and missile strikes. If those stealth aircraft really are worth their costs, they should be able to take out Russian air defence, which is - do not get fooled here - extremely strong and capable to carry out "area denial" to any conventional NATO airforce. Once air superiority and SAM suppression has been achieved, its free hunting season from altitude beyond the reach of manpads. Easier said than done, but the US would not risk to see its reputation as the current superpower (there are never two superpowers at the same time in my understanding, always just one, that is why it is called the superpower, like ther enever are two world champions in any competition, just one) being put in doubt by not rigorously wiping out any Russian ground presence: 1. to show the world that it can do it, and 2. to teach the Kremlin the lesson.

If the US would not do it, it could say good-by to its claim to be the dominant military power on the globe. I doubt any president allowing this without fighting for the top rank in the world first would not survive this with the American public and American self-perception. However, the Us would make sure to not overstep the triggerline to a nuclear retaliation by Russia against the US.



And that is where it is uncertain grounds, because nobody can say how sane the Russian leaderhsip still is and where their triggerlines runs along. Its possible that it is defined as low ranking already as loosing Crimea, although as explained this would trigger an american conventional retaliation across all Ukraine and a wipe-out of any Russian presence on the ground. This would not be acchieved due to air power, the war against Yugoslavia was surprisingly ineffective regarding the attacks on military units, tanks, and artillery, the campaign was more successful where it taregetted what is called critical infrastructure (bridges, powerplants, water supply and the likes) - but the targetted army units on the ground were anything but impressed and later pulle dout in an organised and well-sorted fashion, without the significant losses the heavy bombardement let the West expect, British intel later said that over 90% of air attacks on army vechilkes liek tnaks and artilelry fell for dummyies made of rubber and wood or failed due to clever use of cover provided by urban surrounding. But now - is twenty years later. I assume the air campaing against russian ground forces would be successful due to the incompetence and lacking skill shown by he Russians - this is the argument here. But one must expect that they do not send their untrained conscripts into high tech air defence assets, so - it remains impossible to exactly predict the outcome here.