[Skybird]

Markus Kaim, born in 1968, is a senior fellow in the "Security Policy" research group at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Berlin, as well as a lecturer at the Institute for Political Science at the University of Zurich and a visiting lecturer at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin. he writes in Der Spiegel:
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The Secret Fear of a Quick Peace

In hardly any other European country is an end to the Russian-Ukrainian war as longed for as in Germany. It is a very heterogeneous group that is urging the parties to the conflict to reach a quick negotiated settlement: Some argue the terrible consequences of the war for the Ukrainian population, which is suffering from the destruction of civilian infrastructure by Russian airstrikes.

Others point to the war's lasting destabilizing effect on Europe, migratory movements, high energy prices, and the conflict's risk of escalation. Finally, a third group hopes that a swift Ukrainian-Russian peace will allow them to return as quickly as possible to the state of economic and energy relations between Berlin and Moscow before February 24.

Only a cynic would turn a deaf ear to the cause of peace. But just as a war is bound to certain preconditions and has specific consequences, a peace is also subject to or produces comparable effects. Both states of aggregation have far-reaching consequences for the parties to the conflict, the parties indirectly involved and the global balance of power. From this perspective, it seems questionable whether Germany would be prepared at all for the desired quick peace between Moscow and Kiev.

The German strategic gap

A quick peace would strategically catch German policy on the wrong foot. It is indisputable that all the basic assumptions of Germany's Russia policy of the past 25 years have turned out to be wrong and that this field of German foreign policy became one of the first victims of the war: "Change through trade" or "European security can only be organized together with Russia" are just two of these diplomatic gems which, representative of many others, mark the complete defeat of German Russia policy.

At present, then, German policy can indicate what is no longer the basis of bilateral relations. A new Russia policy for the future, however, does not exist. That it will be guided by security policy priorities rather than energy policy priorities is so far only conjecture. Whether the National Security Strategy, which the German government will present in a few weeks, will be able to close this gap remains to be seen.

A quick peace in Ukraine, possibly only in the form of a fragile ceasefire, would be tempting in times of this strategic vacuum. The outcome of the war would then define the goals of Berlin's future Russia policy from a pragmatic point of view. Strategic foreign policy, however, works the other way around: its security policy goals should guide the German government in defining and implementing its future policy toward Ukraine and Russia even before the end of the war. Elsewhere, this is happening: the huge aid and reconstruction pledges to Kiev or Ukraine's EU candidate status are far-reaching geopolitical decisions for the future of Europe.

Germany as guarantor of European security

In early December, Chancellor Olaf Scholz outlined in a technical article that Germany aspires to become "a guarantor of European security, just as our allies expect us to be." He set the bar high by firing up the hopes of German allies and claiming political leadership of the West. After all, a "guarantor" is clearly more than a contributor; it provides guarantees for the performance of the European security architecture, it provides the necessary military and financial resources, and it bears the corresponding costs disproportionately.

A litmus test for this claim will be what contribution Germany is willing to make to securing Ukraine's territorial integrity and political sovereignty. The obvious option, namely NATO membership for Ukraine, was again put on the back burner by the German government at the last meeting of NATO foreign ministers. Nor does Berlin really like to commit itself to granting security guarantees to Kiev, even after ten months of war. Both Chancellor Scholz and Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock have repeatedly expressed Germany's willingness to do so in principle. However, there is still a droning silence on the details.

A quick peace would deprive the German government of the possibility of this "strategic ambivalence" and force a concretization of the hitherto vague commitments. For the alternative is even more dangerous: a Ukraine threatened from the east, inadequately connected to the West, would remain a haven of instability. In this respect, too, a quick peace in Ukraine would be rather inconvenient for German foreign policy.

Germany and U.S. Security Policy

In the wake of Russia's attack on Ukraine, the United States has unhesitatingly fulfilled its security obligations in and for Europe and forcefully underscored its role as a protective power. Since February 2022, the Biden administration has supported Ukraine with massive arms deliveries, sworn the West to severe economic sanctions against Russia, and increased the number of U.S. troops in Europe by some 20,000 to more than 100,000. The U.S. Congress had provided aid to Ukraine totaling $68 billion through mid-November 2022 alone.

However, the Biden administration's security policy commitment in favor of Ukraine and Europe is ultimately only a snapshot, which one may be pleased about in Europe's capitals, but which one should not interpret as a permanent regular state or even use as a basis for one's own strategic planning. Even if the Biden administration's support for Ukraine does not diminish in the short term, Washington is unlikely to be able or willing to maintain the current level of diplomatic engagement, troop deployments and financial resources for European security in the long term.

This is because the U.S. political turn toward the Indo-Pacific region continues unabated. The main focus is on China's rise in power politics. As early as May 2022, U.S. Secretary of State Blinken clearly communicated U.S. prioritization to the Europeans: "Even as President Putin's war continues, we will remain focused on the most serious long-term challenge to the international order - and that comes from the People's Republic of China." The outbreak of a military conflict in Asia, in which China could attack Taiwan, would change U.S. priorities even more rapidly. The same thing happened with a quick peace in Ukraine, which would allow a reduction in U.S. involvement.

The German government would therefore urgently need to start thinking now about how to permanently recalibrate the transatlantic security relationship. More political responsibility, a stronger military commitment, and greater financial burdens over decades will be necessary to "successfully weather the geopolitical storms of our time" (Scholz).

A quick peace between Kiev and Moscow would also increase the pressure to act in this regard. Ten months after the proclamation of the turning point, it seems doubtful whether all those responsible in Berlin are aware of this.
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I think the idea of Germany as a guarantor of Ukrainian or European security is simply ridiculous, it is far too impotent militarily for that. And Babble-Olaf doesn't want to show leadership, he's too cowardly and turncoatish for that. He just wants to pretend and get the applause.