[Skybird]

This analysis goes far beyond what the media usually say about the likelihood of nuclear war. Recommended read! Not just profane bluffing but psychological automatisms is the name of the game, and that is what makes it so dangerous. AdG writes:
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How likely is a nuclear war in Europe?

Putin has indirectly threatened to use nuclear weapons. How credible is this declaration of war? Let's play through the conceivable scenarios of a nuclear escalation.

Putin has indirectly threatened to use nuclear weapons and declared that he is not bluffing. But this is where things get complicated. Someone who is not bluffing cannot convince the other person who thinks he is bluffing that he is not bluffing by saying he is not bluffing, because that would probably be expected of someone who is bluffing. The only way Putin could safely prove to the West that his threat to use nuclear weapons is not a bluff would be to use nuclear weapons. The West's only way to find out whether it is a bluff or not is to call his bluff. If the military situation comes to a dramatic head, if there is a widespread collapse of the Russian Front, for example, the question of "bluff or no bluff" becomes a matter of fate.

The danger of nuclear escalation is not grasped by the broader public because of a misconception of how nuclear war might occur. The image of the red button possessed by the Russian and American presidents who, by pressing the same, would usher in the end of the world, is misleading. The scenario is different, namely that of gradual escalation, which is much more dangerous because it sets in motion a spiral in which each further turn is associated with greater risk, without either side feeling fully responsible for the escalation. The lines between bluff and actual intent become blurred, and what was meant to be a bluff can become reality.

What needs to be understood is this: The dynamic does not begin when the Kremlin deploys the first tactical nuclear weapons, but before that, when it deploys the delivery systems of those tactical nuclear weapons, because then the White House is under direct pressure to move. The U.S. knows, through satellites and spying, virtually in real time where these delivery systems are and where they are going. The Russians know that the Americans know, and the Americans know that the Russians know. That is, as soon as the delivery systems move, the Russians use that to send a signal to the United States. That message was: to influence the Ukrainians to call off their offensive because, on the other hand, Russia's tactical nuclear weapons are being used.

The question would be: Who will draw his colt first?

If this were a bluff and the U.S. put this pressure on the Ukrainians, this strategy would work and the U.S. would have to worry that the Kremlin would use this method again later. So instead, they could call their bluff and gamble that the Russians will not use the tactical nuclear weapons they have set in motion. If that's the case, Putin's bluff would be called and there would be no denying that he's left bare. This would have far-reaching consequences, because from now on every threat would come to naught and the Kremlin's nuclear armament would be exposed as a toothless tiger. As good as this may sound to Western ears, it comes with a serious problem. For this very reason, Putin would be under extreme pressure to actually use the weapons he has threatened to deploy.

The situation becomes even more complicated. We are dealing with escalation stages where assumptions about later stages influence earlier stages. Because the U.S. is also aware of this dilemma, it is reasonable to think that Putin may feel compelled to actually use the tactical nuclear weapons. This puts pressure on the U.S. to prevent Ukraine from such a strike and not wait for the first nuclear warhead to strike Ukrainian soil. Former U.K. and NATO biological, chemical and nuclear weapons defense force commander Hamish Bretton Gordon told CNN that he assumed Biden had made it clear to Putin: "If you move your tactical nukes, NATO will destroy them with precision-guided long-range missiles."

The United States would be able to use a conventional preemptive strike to knock out the delivery systems of tactical nuclear weapons and make the Kremlin's nuclear strike impossible. The question would be: Who will draw his Colt first? Even if we assume that the Biden administration would not choose to do so, the sheer possibility has repercussions for the Russians' course of action. Since they would have to reckon with such a conventional strike against their tactical nuclear weapons, they would have to strike as quickly and as massively as possible because they only have one opportunity to shoot down their tactical arsenal. In turn, the Americans know this as well, which also puts them under severe pressure to quickly eliminate tactical nuclear weapons.

How would Biden respond?

There is something to be said for the Ukrainians' assumption that the U.S. will protect them in this way against attacks with tactical nuclear weapons and can therefore act in such a cold-blooded manner. Putin, in turn, could now aim to call the U.S. guarantees as a bluff by targeting his tactical nuclear weapons. If he does that, but the U.S. makes no move to do anything about it, that may increase nervousness on the Ukrainian side and thus Moscow's threat potential against Ukraine. That will increase Ukrainian pressure on Biden to take the Russians' tactical nuclear weapons out of play with a preemptive strike. However, that may be a trap and exactly what the Kremlin wants to achieve. The U.S. would look like the aggressor in one fell swoop, the Russian people would rally behind its leadership, and large segments of the world community would condemn the United States.

In other words, once the Russian launchers start moving, the 79-year-old Biden will have a very short period of time to decide whether to take the risk that the Russians are not bluffing and carry out the nuclear decapitation strike against Ukraine or to strike conventionally against the launchers himself. The pressure on him will be enormous, and what the old man decides to do in this situation is an open question. If he chooses to take out the Russian delivery systems with conventional weapons, that would effectively be the U.S. declaring war on Russia. The problem with a preemptive strike is that you end up having difficulty proving that you actually preempted the attacker.

By attacking Russian territory, Putin would have a free hand politically, but would face the problem of not being able to hold a candle to NATO conventionally. The only arsenal of weapons the Russians would have left to counterattack after destroying tactical nuclear weapons would be strategic nuclear weapons, which are widely believed to be impossible to disable. The Kremlin would probably not attack the United States directly, but would go to the next higher level of escalation. That would be an attack with strategic nuclear weapons on military bases in NATO countries that do not have nuclear weapons themselves, i.e., countries like Germany, Poland, or Italy. In Germany, this would probably affect southern Germany and the Rhine-Main region.

Nuclear powers: suicide out of loyalty to the alliance?

NATO would then be faced with the question of whether to respond with a nuclear strike on Russian territory. In this case, however, the nuclear powers USA, France and the United Kingdom would have to reckon with the fact that they themselves would be the target of Russian nuclear weapons as a further counterattack. The question is whether Biden, Macron and Truss would launch their nuclear weapons at Russian targets, even though they would in turn be directing Putin's missiles at them. Then, at the latest, all decision-makers would reach the point where they would have to decide whether to commit suicide in solidarity with their NATO allies. This would be the last chance to stop the escalation and to settle the conflict, admittedly over a destroyed Central Europe, but at least without the downfall of mankind and of their own nation.

The very fact that it is not certain which of the two variants would occur makes the variants before it more likely. For both sides, the Western nuclear powers and Russia, a last lifeboat remains until the end. It is precisely this lifeboat that makes the scenario more likely. This is an old dilemma from the Cold War era. The interests of nuclear weapons states are different from those of countries that do not have nuclear weapons. NATO's deterrence is based on the promise that the nuclear powers are prepared to go down together with the non-nuclear-weapon states. If there are serious doubts about this solidarity to the death, i.e., Moscow considers it a "bluff," the nuclear umbrella for the non-nuclear states no longer works.


One might ask why it is worthwhile to even bother with such horror scenarios, which represent the unlikely worst-case scenario. Because these escalation scenarios make it understandable why actors currently behave the way they do. The worry that caused German chancellors from Konrad Adenauer to Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl to our present day sleepless nights was the gloomy vision that, in the event of conflict, Washington and Moscow would only be able to come to an agreement over the ruins of a destroyed Germany. Early enough not to destroy themselves and the whole world, but too late to prevent nuclear escalation on the European continent. This may explain why Scholz is not exactly overenthusiastic in his support for the Ukrainian offensive in the east.

https://www.achgut.com/artikel/wie_w...rieg_in_europa

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Thats why I think since long more European nations need nuclear weapons.

Yes. Including Germany. (And Japan, Australia and South Korea).