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Originally Posted by Bubblehead1980
So just how "rogue" was it of Kaleuns such as Otto Kretschmer who went inside, usually on surface at night, and attacked at what was basically point blank range, with just one torpedo in most cases? I imagine it stirred some of the more conservative command types...
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That practice was indeed certainly more of the exception than the rule. But Dönitz was a good enough leader to recognize and acknowledge effective tactics. The famous story with Kretschmer (and how he got his nickname Silent Otto), was his refusal to respond to status report requests. He had a pretty good idea that the British could triangulate them, so he refused. Got back to port, Dönitz said, “Kretschmer, since when do you not want to follow orders?” Kretschmer flat out told him, “sir, I feel like I am putting my boat at risk by radioing so much.” Dönitz accepted that.
Just to demonstrate how Dönitz allowed a certain amount of leeway to those commanders like Kretschmer who produced. Goes back to the old German “Stosstrupp” tradition of giving the “man on the ground” the power to take initiative and innovate.
Was somewhat different than the American doctrine, which prescribed by way of a chart a number of torpedoes that should be fired by type of target, merchants being something to the tune of three torpedoes. And that was considered gospel.