[Skybird]

International media report Finland will ask NATO on May 12th to join.


On a EU summit, especially Hungary and Germany block a decision to boycott Russian gas. On oil, Germany has moved and now demands an oil boycott, but as I believe not before the end of the year (or did I got this wrong?). Hungary wants not gasoil boycott either.


Neherlands, Italy are assumed to mull the sending of PZH-2000s. A few of them. Germany is reported to "check" whether it can afford to give away any. Only one third of the complete aresenal are operational, and Germany argued that it needs to keep these to fulfill its duties in active NATO roles.



Meanwhile, again, what some call the "inferno theory": FOCUS writes:


On May 9, a large military parade will be held in Moscow to commemorate the victory in the Great Patriotic War over Nazi Germany. This form of remembrance is part of Russia's collective identity and its military manifestation should help to reflect it again and again.

This year, at the same time, this day is associated with high expectations. President Putin will address the situation in the country and the progress of the "special military operation", i.e. the war of aggression on Ukraine. True, Foreign Minister Lavrov has decoupled the two events, saying May 9 has nothing to do with the progress of "events in Ukraine," but that they depend "on the need to minimize risks to civilians and Russian soldiers," as Russia's brutal ruthlessness is dressed up in diplomatic cynicism. But this will not dampen the different expectations for May 9.
Putin will have something to show on May 9 - the big question is: What exactly will that be?

After the revision of Russia's military approach, when troops were withdrawn around Kiev to reinforce the advance in eastern Ukraine, it was assumed this might also be related to President Putin announcing the "liberation" of the Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics on May 9 - as a badge of Russia's victory in the "special military operation." The capture of Mariupol and Kherson, as well as the establishment of new pseudo-states, would also be successes that could be celebrated as victories.

In the meantime, however, it is foreseeable that the Russian advance is progressing too slowly and is being repulsed too frequently to proclaim this as a certain fact. As a fake fact, it would succeed, but with some risks: What if alternative sources reveal different information? Or if the Russian front is later pushed back further and the territories cannot be held?

Political misrepresentations require a high degree of planning-safe expectation management. That an agreement will be signed in a week between Ukraine and Russia that establishes these breakaways is impossible. That Russia will not only be able to conquer the territories in a short period of time, but also to hold and govern them, is not very likely and would entail very high costs. These could be justified in Moscow, because it is a further step towards the complete unification of all "Russians" - by which at least Russia, Belarus and Ukraine are understood. But not until next week.
Rehearsal for Russia's Victory Day military parade.
Uncredited/AP/dpa A Russian tank artillery and military vehicles drive toward Red Square during a rehearsal for the Victory Day military parade.

Given the insufficient results of military action from the Russian point of view and the escalation of threatening gestures from the Russian leadership, another assumption gained some plausibility. It is that on May 9 the mobilization in the war will be announced, that is, not a victory, but the escalation of the special military operation to war. It says that the Russian military should push in this direction because more soldiers are urgently needed. The talk of "proxy war" with NATO was intended to get the Russian population in the mood for this expansion.

This assumption gained political weight because it is considered likely by the British Defense Minister Wallace. Russia's repeatedly renewed threats to use nuclear weapons also point in this direction of significantly escalating the military campaign. The obviously desolate state of the Russian armed forces can serve as a reason for escalation as well as its opposite. "A Russian army that prevails in a war of attrition by sheer firepower and mass would still be a far cry from the nimble, high-tech force that has been advertised over the past decade," judged the Economist.

Already in early April, the Tass news agency had reported that - unlike in previous years - no foreign state guests would be invited to this year's parade. This may be related to the vagaries of war or to the planning for that day. But the eyes of all governments will be on Moscow that day.

The federal government must prepare for all three contingencies:

First, that no more far-reaching decisions will be announced on May 9;
second, that the liberation of the existing and establishment of new "people's republics" will be announced as a result of the military operation;
third, that Russia escalates the war with mobilization.


In the first case, uncertainty about Russia's medium-term intentions would persist. In the second case, the question would arise as to whether this could be chosen by Ukraine as the starting point for a cease-fire or other agreement or - as has been increasingly formulated of late - an attempt would be made to push Russian forces back militarily from this area.

In the third case, fighting in Ukraine, while not immediate, would foreseeably increase significantly. Russia would have to deploy a large number of reservists who could compensate for the considerable losses of killed and wounded. The extent of their combat effectiveness and the repercussions this could have in Russian society would have to be observed.

To legitimize the escalation, it has been argued more frequently in recent weeks that Ukraine is backed by the U.S. and NATO, that Ukraine is not acting of its own volition at all, and that Russia is therefore in a conflict with NATO. This argument was strengthened by the reference to the "economic war" of the "unfriendly states". So much for Russian propaganda.

Whether this also corresponds to Russian assessments of the real war situation cannot be said with certainty. A war against NATO, which Russia would have to start because the NATO states will certainly not do so, would change the overall situation. It is doubtful whether this - even if one puts on the Russian glasses to assess the situation - can be seen as an advantage by the Russian leadership.

Only one argument could lend weight to this: NATO will not be as weak as it currently is in Europe for a long time. Whether it is weak enough in the eyes of Russian decision-makers to dare a military conflict seems very doubtful. However, the current war was launched under overly optimistic assumptions about the weakness of the enemy and its own strength.

For the NATO states, it follows that they must continuously - and in some places with the same pressure with which the geopolitical energy transition is being pushed through - build up their own strength. Russia's goodwill toward a peaceful solution is only recognizable to those who place their hopes above an analysis of the situation. This, however, is not a realistic approach.

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)


I see escalation as the most likely scenario.