[Skybird]

Russia - the "tenth of a state"


https://www.focus.de/politik/ausland..._69413755.html



All the assumptions that led Putin to launch the war of aggression were wrong. All the war aims that Russia's ruler set for himself are unattainable. While Putin commits one strategic mistake after another, for Russia an increasingly powerful adversary emerges in the east.

President Putin has proven to be a poor strategist. He has turned an overall favorable situation for Russia into a disaster for the country through war. Before the war, Russia sold large quantities of raw materials and used them to finance the state, military, and economy. Before the war, President Putin expanded Russia's influence in the Middle East and North Africa. Before the war, EU countries were at odds among themselves and with the United States.

Before the war, China also thought Russia had effective armed forces. Before the war, Russia had an influence on parts of the population in Ukraine. Already during the war, all this is over - and after the war, the consequences for Russia's state and society will be international isolation, internal repression, and a significant decline in economic output. President Putin has turned an overall advantageous situation into a comprehensive evil. Why?

Putin's favoritism: the messenger is beaten for the bad news

The decision to go to war is one that requires special attention and consideration, even for authoritarian rulers. This is because history knows of numerous wars that left the aggressor as the loser. The order to attack must therefore be well considered, checked for all counter-arguments and balanced against the imponderables of dynamic situation development. This is a particular challenge for authoritarian rulers because they are insulated from contradiction even more than other people in government offices. The longer they are in office, the more sustainable the illusion of control over the course of events becomes. This is because they are increasingly surrounded by yes-men who do not dare to deliver unpleasant news to the ruler.

For the bad news, the messenger is beaten. This is already the case in liberal institutions; how much more so in a repressive system that turns fear of change into fear of one another. The public stagings of Russia's National Security Council, in which President Putin made the top state security agencies appear like lackeys, captured this moment of the ruler's information isolation in a comically tragic way.

Russian illusions shatter in the face of reality

Then it happens, as Carl von Clausewitz described 200 years ago, that "one news supports the other, confirms it, enlarges it, paints the picture with ever new colors, until necessity has pushed away from us in flying haste the decision, which - soon is recognized as folly, just as all news is recognized as lies, exaggerations, errors."

In an echo chamber, which does not tolerate the contradiction, in which the synchronization of the judgments ("Yes, we should recognize the people's republics") is virtually demanded, the presumed certainties strengthen to the misjudgment. Then the circle of decision-makers still basks in the optimistic assumptions, while in truth they are already shattered by reality:

"The war will be short, well-founded and victorious."
"The citizens of Ukraine will greet us as liberators."
"The West, in its disunity, will not be able to quickly agree to sanctions."
"The Europeans prefer economic benefits to a clear stance after all."
"Germany's Putin savants will fix it."
"We will not be ostracized internationally because of the quick victory."
"After that, Washington and Beijing will also know the clout behind Russia's claim."

One assumption after another, which must have taken root in the Kremlin's leadership circle, turns out to be an illusion.

The pinnacle of these illusions is the overconfidence of the ruler, whose actions have no limits at home and who does not accept them internationally. This overconfidence suggests that he is in control of situations. Any time, any place. It tempts to action.

Putin will not achieve any of his war aims

We do not know publicly with whom the Russian president consulted before making the decision to go to war. We do not know publicly whether he actually carried out all of the optimistic assumptions listed above before the order to attack was given. Or only some of them. Given the situation that has now arisen, however, it is plausible to assume that he did. For if the Russian president had known that the situation that had now arisen was to be expected, he would have had difficulty in taking the decision to go to war in order to achieve the objectives he had claimed.

These goals were proclaimed by the Russian government:

Ukraine and Belarus were to be brought into a particularly close relationship with Russia.
A belt of buffer states was to be created between the Baltic States and Bulgaria, without foreign armed forces in these states.
The security of the European NATO states was to be decoupled from the U.S., and deterrence in Europe was to be reduced.

None of this is being achieved. Ukraine will not become a Russia-friendly neighboring state for a very, very long time. The states on NATO's eastern border will not renounce deterrence by foreign troops, but will strengthen it. The U.S. has once again become the firm leading power of NATO. Because instead of the optimistic assumptions, the situation is developing like this: The advance in the war remains at a standstill, concealed only by reckless bombing. Russian casualties are higher than expected. The sanctions are tangibly constricting Russia's state and economy after only a few days: the ruble in free fall; access to state assets restricted; the stock exchange closed; major companies facing insolvency. No other authoritative state supports Russia's actions. Nor does China, which is what President Putin may have hoped for.

Xi's China weighs ten times more heavily than Putin's Russia.

This is because Russia has acted in parallel against important strategic interests of China. China is interested in ensuring that the U.S. and Europe do not develop a common China policy, but that Beijing can exploit their respective special interests in terms of trade policy. The coordination of the U.S., European and Asian states in the sanctions policy against Russia have produced the opposite here: the unity of the West, strong as it has not been for a long time. At the same time, China is interested in economic recovery after the pandemic, which is now at risk. This is because high oil and gas prices in particular are hurting China, the largest importer. This has been caused by Putin's decision to go to war.

Russia's actions are aimed at stitching Europe together as a third world power alongside the U.S. and China, which requires Russian leadership. President Putin stated this goal as early as 2001 in his speech to the German Bundestag. This was overheard in the excitement about Russia's democratic perspective. Twenty years later, he still pursued this goal with the war of aggression on Ukraine. But he failed to achieve it.

In terms of international law, the war of aggression is a crime; in terms of Putin's own purposes, it is a mistake. After that, Russia's only option is to seek a new relationship with China as a tenth of a state with a huge land mass. One tenth of China's population, one tenth of China's economic power (with a declining tendency), that is Russia's weight, from which no relationship at eye level will grow. Only a democratic Russia will be able to take a different place in the international order in the foreseeable future.
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Prof. Dr. Thomas Jäger has held the Chair of International Politics and Foreign Policy at the University of Cologne since 1999. His research focuses on international relations as well as American and German foreign policy.


Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)