[Aktungbby]

I always find reading Doenitz's KTB interesting as there are some gems of information in there if you care to look for them.

The information is interesting but what strikes home is the consistent undertone of chaos and less than victory even in the daily reports. The Kreigsmarine is not winning at all; it is knee-jerk responding to the allied effort-particularly the air power- against which there is no solution.... In police work this is reactive not proactive. To win a global strategic war ya gotta be proactive and make the allies respond (knee-jerk) futilely to what you are doing to them. Minor tactical propaganda bright spots wll not carry the day. From may '43 of particular interest:

Originally Posted by May '43 ktb

The gaps caused by a rapid succession of convoy attacks in the North Atlantic during March had to be closed rapidly, as a large number of boats were needed to intercept the then widely scattered convoys. The IXc boats putting out in March and the steady stream of VIIc boats leaving port in April were able to make good this deficiency. b) Attacks on convoys during the past two months have definitely shown that Type IX boats are very vulnerable to bombing or depth charge attacks by reason of their more complicated structure. Comparative losses in the Atlantic give the following picture:

Losses:

Type IX Type VIIc March: 5 7 2 of these during attack on convoy 4 of these during attack on convoy - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - April: 7 and 1 boat that struck a mine 4 5 of these during attack on convoy 2 of these during attack on convoy - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - The ratio of Type IX to Type VIIc boats is 1 - 3. Hence the losses of Type IXc boats are much heavier, now that enemy defences in the North Atlantic have been strengthened, and operations are only justifiable if chances of success are proportionally increased. c) The expectation of better opportunities in the North Atlantic which led to the order for operations there being issued on 6.4 has not been borne out by the final information reports for March and April made by boats in the Cape Town, Natal - Freetown and Caribbean area. Attacks made on convoys by U 510, 169, 515 showed that great successes are possible because of favorable anti-submarine conditions (few naval escorts with convoys and they lack experience). Thus despite less shipping in these areas chances are actually no less than in the North Atlantic. It has therefore been decided: Type IXc boats leaving French ports are to be detailed to remote western or southern operational areas. Boats of the same type from home ports will still make their first operational trip in the North Atlantic.

In short: the bigger badder IX types (with 33% more torprdoes??!!) are removed from the principle zone of conflict- the mid Atlantic convoy routes....and as in the post above only carrying 66% of their intended torpedo loads any way. (15 0f 22) Or as I pointed out with Hardigan (post#8) and his 15 eels as the prima facia example: 8 ships will not be sunk and he was an exceptionally proactive ace kaleun. Von C's rule 2: "whenever possible increase firepower" is kaput by '43; no victory at sea is feasible.