[Sailor Steve]

Monday, January 5, 1920

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.


1. M Loucheur states that at the preceding meeting of the Council he had explained the state of the negotiations with the German Delegation concerning the tonnage claimed by the Allies. The German Delegation had sent a telegram to Berlin explaining that the 180,000 tons of docks which had keen over-estimated by the Allies would be deducted from the figure of 400,000 tons originally claimed. That telegram did not take into account the error on the other side committed by the Allies, who had not reckoned the 80,000 tons, whose existence had been revealed by the German inventory. The point of view adopted in that telegram could not evidently be accepted by the Allies. Had it been admitted the 400,000 tons claimed would have been reduced to only 220,000. M Dutasta and himself had explained to H von Lersner that they could not accept the point of view of the German Delegation. H von Lersner had then proposed as a compromise a draft which implied that the reduction agreed to by the Allies could not exceed 150,000 tons. The total amount to be surrendered by the Germans would thus have been 250,000 tons. They had then said to H von Lersner that that figure seemed to them too small for the Council to accept it. After a rather long discussion, Mr. von Lersner had proposed the following draft:

“From the 400,000 tons of floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredges claimed by the Allies, there will therefore be deducted such tonnage of floating docks as, after verification, shall be found to appear in the Interallied inventory by mistake—tonnage which therefore does not in reality exist. That reduction, however, will not exceed a total of 125,000 tons.”

They had reserved their reply; but upon thinking it over they proposed that the Council accept that text, which constitutes a very acceptable basis of compromise.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that if he understands aright that text will guarantee to the Allies a minimum of 275,000 tons with the possibility of obtaining more.

M Loucheur agreed that this is so in principle; but they should not conceal the fact that it is very unlikely that they will obtain a larger figure.

Sir Eyre Crowe inquires whether it is necessary to arrive at a definite decision on that very day, or whether he might consult his Government on the proposed figure.

M Clemenceau says that naturally if Sir Eyre Crowe expresses the desire to consult his Government, they could not take an immediate decision; the question, however, is urgent, and it is advisable to have it finally decided.

Sir Eyre Crowe asks whether the French Government accepts the text proposed by M Loucheur.

M Clemenceau replies that it does.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that in that case he also will accept it.

M Loucheur states that it would be wise to add in the last paragraph of the draft letter to the German Delegation, after the words “The 192,000 tons proposed by the German Government” - the following phrase: “And of which the list was submitted when the technical commissions discussed the subject”.

It is a pure question of form but that addition would be useful to obviate all chance of misunderstanding.

(It is decided to approve the draft letter to the Chairman of the German Delegation, with the following addition: “and of which the list was submitted when the technical commissions discussed the subject.” That sentence should be placed in the first sentence of the last paragraph of the draft letter, after the words: “The Allied and Associated Powers add that the 192,000 tons proposed by the German Government …”.)

Mr. Wallace would refer the present resolution to Washington for the instructions of his Government.


2. General Le Rond says that the Commission over which he presides has had two interviews with the German Delegates since the last meeting of the Council. Questions which it is absolutely important to solve before the coming into force of the Treaty are those concerning, on the one hand, the transmission of administrative powers, and on the other, economic affairs. On the first point agreement had practically been reached, but certain economic questions had been referred back to the Reparation Commission.

With regard to the situation of the plebiscite territories, their point of view has been given to the German Delegates in all its details four days before. The Germans had referred the question to Berlin. It was hoped that the reply of the German Government would arrive either on that or the following day.

Concerning the evacuation by German troops of the territories subject to plebiscite, the Germans have not been able to furnish any precise information. They had endeavored to draw the negotiations to Berlin, but on account of the Allies’ definite refusal they had declared that they would send for experts and the arrival of these was imminent. On questions which affected Poland, they had asked the advice of the Reparations Commission, and they hoped that the latter would communicate to them its opinion in as short a time as possible. As a matter of fact, it was only a question of finding out whether the Reparations Commission accepted the texts which they had proposed.

With regard to Memel and Danzig, the Supreme Council has decided at its last meeting that the Commission on Polish Affairs will be charged with preparing the draft agreement with the German Government concerning the transfer of sovereignty over those territories.

M Clemenceau says that it is important that the Commission on Polish Affairs submit to the Council a draft at its next meeting.

General Le Rond remarks that beside the questions which he had just enumerated there remains to be settled the one relating to transportation and that of the strength of the troops of occupation, which had been raised by a recent letter of H von Lersner

General Weygand says that there is no longer any difficulty on the question of transportation, properly speaking. H von Lersner’s letter, however, to which General Le Rond had just referred, might possibly reopen the whole question as it asked that the strength of the troops of occupation in the various plebiscite zones should be reduced.

M Loucheur says that he does not believe that H von Lersner’s letter really re-opened the whole negotiation. The Chairman of the German Delegation was merely calling the attention of the Conference to the considerable expenses involved in occupying the Plebiscite Areas by the numbers of forces proposed. For Danzig alone, the costs would amount to 80 million of gold marks, or nearly 800,000,000 of paper marks at the existing rate of exchange.

M Clemenceau states that this is certainly an important point, and suggests that it should be referred to a commission composed of the Chairmen of the Plebiscite Commissions.

Sir Eyre Crowe inquires whether M Clemenceau thinks that a commission of this kind could give the Council useful advice.

General Weygand replies that the question of the forces in the areas of occupation had already been examined by a mixed commission composed of diplomats and army members. Should they wish to proceed with a fresh inquiry into the question, it might be dealt with by the said commission, which has already been in operation, and consequently possesses the requisite working knowledge.

Mr Loucheur says that it is not to be wondered at that the Germans were a little taken aback by the amount of the sums demanded from them. Thus, for Danzig, whose budget was four millions of marks per year, the cost of occupation as estimated was to be 800 millions of marks.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that, with regard to Danzig, they had only decided on the organization of a base. The cost of maintenance of those troops could only be set against the Germans in the event of their having to be employed in the maintenance of order in the territory.

M Loucheur remarks that the Germans are depending upon a figure of 8,000 men to be sent to Danzig.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that they should take care not to reduce their forces too much. In Upper Silesia, for example, the Germans have massed considerable forces and difficulties might be expected. It would be unwise not to have sufficient Allied forces on the spot.

General Le Rond says that the question of Upper Silesia presented itself in a very special light. But there is no reason to prevent their maintaining the forces agreed upon for Upper Silesia, while they might make reductions in the quieter regions, such as those of Allenstein and Marienwerder.

M Loucheur says that it was evident that the Germans themselves understand the difficulties which might take place in Upper Silesia. And for that reason, they only ask in that province for a reduction of one-third on the estimated Allied forces.

S de Martino states that they have always been in favor of as great a reduction as possible of the Allied forces in the territories to be occupied. It is only because of the reiterated demands of the Allies that they have consented to sending the number of battalions which had been asked of them and which on account of their demobilization made it very difficult for them to furnish.

(It is decided that the Commission which had decided the strength of the troops of occupation to be sent to the plebiscite zones in Germany, as well as to Danzig and Memel, should be entrusted with the further inquiry into that question, as also the objections contained in H von Lersner’s letter dated January 2, 1920. This commission would be entitled to hear the Chairmen of the various Plebiscite Commissions.)


3. M Loucheur comments upon a note of the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission on that question, dated December 29, 1919.

He adds that beside its being purely a matter of form, he wishes very earnestly to draw the attention of the Council to the situation in Austria which remains extremely threatening. No serious steps have yet been taken to protect Austria from famine with the exception of the sending of the 20,000 tons of food-stuffs now at Trieste. The victualing of Austria is only assured until the end of January. The Czechoslovaks had stated that they are unable to furnish the coal they promised, as they lack the rolling stock necessary for its transport. The situation can only be alleviated by the granting of a loan to Austria at the earliest possible moment. In this respect, however, it is impossible for the Allies to take any action until America has declared her intentions.

Mr Wallace says that before taking any action the United States Government requires a decision of Congress, which has not yet been obtained.

Sir Eyre Crowe remarks that if nothing is done a famine will occur in Austria by the end of the present month. Could not Mr Wallace bring influence to bear on his Government, in order that the gravity of the situation in Austria might be emphasized to Congress, and that the latter be asked to reach a quick decision in the matter?

S de Martino inquired what time would be required for sending to Austria the actually indispensable foodstuffs, and would they arrive in time to save Austria from famine.

Mr Loucheur replies that as soon as they know exactly where they stand they could act rapidly. If need be, they will divert certain cargoes which would proceed to Trieste and the redistribution from there could be effected without much delay.

Sir Eyre Crowe asks how far they had got with the question of the creation of a commission for the temporary distribution of rolling stock between the various states resulting from the breaking-up of the ex-Austro-Hungarian Kingdom.

Mr Loucheur replies that the decisions of the Council on the subject are being dealt with.

With regard to the loan of 30,000,000 of florins which a Dutch group is to make to Austria, the terms put up to the Austrian Government seem very hard and there is the risk of a deadlock. The Austrian Minister of Finance is to arrive in Paris very shortly to discuss that question. In order to save time they intend to have him assisted by two members of the Reparations Commission. But in any case, this deal could not be concluded for a certain time and he wishes to clearly state that it seems impossible to him to stave off famine from Austria if the United States Government does not furnish a definite reply by the following week at the latest.

Mr Wallace says that he will submit to his Government the situation described by M Loucheur.

M Clemenceau inquires what the situation will be, should America’s reply be in the negative.

M Loucheur replies that nothing could then prevent starvation in Austria. Even if they decided to make the necessary financial sacrifices without America, their efforts will be unsuccessful, for the reason that it will be impossible for them to get dollars, which America alone had.


4. M Kammerer comments upon two notes of the French Delegation on the question, dated December 31, 1919, and January 6, 1920.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he thinks the question presents itself from a military standpoint. Before attending to Denikin’s demands they should decide whether the measures which he required of the Allies were not utterly useless. That was a question upon which their military experts should be called upon to give their opinion.

M Kammerer says that General Denikin is of the opinion that the Allies had three ways of helping him:

1) Bring pressure to bear upon Poland and Romania to force them to give adequate help to the Russian Army fighting against the Bolsheviks. That question is essentially one of a political nature.

2) Authorize the Bulgarians to send detachments to the assistance of Denikin’s forces. The question at issue is really whether appeal could be made to an enemy power with whom peace had not yet been ratified. It should be noted as a matter of fact, that the enrollment of Bulgarian troops in the Russian armies was expressly forbidden by Article 103 of the Treaty of Neuilly.

3) Lastly, any armament in Bulgaria in excess of that allowed for under the Peace Treaty might be sent to Denikin. That third question is of a military nature.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he believes that the military considerations should be the foundation of the decision to be taken, and that it is therefore necessary to consult their military experts. Why, for example, apply pressure on the Poles in order to ask them to help Denikin, if their assistance is not to change anything in the unfavorable situation in which that general found himself. He is personally inclined to think that Denikin’s troops will continue to retreat whether the Poles intervene or whether they remain at a standstill. In any event, they could not give a decision without knowing what their experts think.

S de Martino says that he believes with Sir Eyre Crowe that if their aid is not sufficient to remedy the unfavorable situation of Denikin’s army, it would hardly be worth while to force the Poles into an enterprise which would surely be useless and which involved certain dangers for Poland.

M Clemenceau states that it seems to him that the opinion of the Council is against any pressure being applied on the Poles to make them intervene in Denikin’s favor. This is also his feeling. As for using Bulgarian troops, he would be very much opposed to that course, for it would cause considerable difficulties in the Balkans.

Sir Eyre Crowe states that, with regard to the first question, he cannot express any opinion without referring to his Government. As for the use of Bulgarian troops, he is absolutely in accord with the President’s way of thinking.

M Kammerer says that it would, in principle, be quite desirable to send the surplus materiel to Denikin. The continued retreat of Denikin might, however, result in the loss of that materiel by allowing it to fall into the hands of the Bolsheviks. It would, therefore, be wise to send it only to places from which it could be rapidly evacuated, in case of need. This is a question for the military experts and for General Franchet d’Esperey, who is on the spot, to examine.

M Clemenceau agrees that they might refer the question either to Marshal Foch or directly to General Franchet d’Esperey.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that, as the situation in Southern Russia was changing from day to day, it would be wiser to leave the matter to the judgment of the Allied military representatives on the spot.

(It was decided to let General Franchet d’Esperey decide upon the wisdom of sending the Bulgarian war materiel in excess of the amount provided for in the Treaty of Neuilly to General Denikin’s troops, as well as on the means to be used for ensuring the forwarding, if need be, of that materiel.)

Mr Wallace will refer the present resolution to Washington for the instructions of his Government.


5. The Council has before it a note of the British Delegation on the question, dated January 4, 1920.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that as he had explained at the preceding meeting, the British Government deems it useless to send General Niessel to Reval in order to re-organize the Russian Army of the Northwest, which had been thrown back onto Estonian territory. Army He thinks that the best course to follow would be to allow the Estonian Government to take the measures it deemed necessary with regard to General Yudenitch’s troops. His Government, therefore proposed that the Estonian Government be informed that the Allied and Associated Governments had no further objection to its proceeding with the dissolution of the Russian Forces of the Northwest in accordance with its original plan.

M Berthelot said that the idea of sending General Niessel to Reval to re-organize Yudenitch’s army had been abandoned, and he agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe in thinking that General Niessel’s mission would be inopportune. He does not, however, think it possible to accept the British proposal, for the present situation was as follows: The Estonians had badly used and completely disorganized the Russian forces which had taken refuge on their territory. They had, on the other hand, signed an armistice with the Bolsheviks and seemed disposed to negotiate a definite treaty with them, which would be absolutely contrary to the Allies’ views. They had, furthermore, quarreled with the Letts on the subject of some contested territory, and are threatening military occupation. As a result we have no reason to be satisfied with the present attitude of the Estonians. The Allies had asked the Estonian Government to spare Yudenitch’s forces; the Estonians had not taken any account whatever of that admonition of the Allies. They might of course, leave the situation as it was, but it seemed to him that they would be going too far if they expressly withdrew the observations they had made. It would seem to encourage the Estonians at a time when we are not satisfied with their attitude. If the Estonians conclude peace with the Soviets it is to be feared that the whole cordon of Baltic States, perhaps even Poland, would soon follow their example, and that would constitute a very real danger.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he does not wish to hide the fact that serious arguments could be brought forth in favor of a policy of inaction. The situation did not, however, seem to him to be quite as just described by M Berthelot. They had asked the Estonians to suspend the disarmament of the Russian troops while waiting for a decision of the Council. They should therefore let them know what course the Council had decided to follow. He had accused the Estonians of having concluded an armistice with the Bolsheviks; they should, however, not forget that when the Estonians had asked them for assistance against the Soviets, they had refused to intervene. It might very well be that the Estonians had been so closely pursued by the Bolsheviks forces that no other course was open to them. It appeared that the maintenance of a Russian army under arms on Estonian territory was contrary to certain clauses of the armistice which had just been concluded and that measures were to be taken to effect the withdrawal of the Russian troops after disarmament.

M Kammerer says that from the latest news they had received from Estonia, the situation of Yudenitch’s forces appears to be desperate. They comprise approximately 15,000 sick men, and the 3 or 4 thousand remaining fit men do not offer any military value. It is rumored that these weak contingents will be transferred south, but that news has not been confirmed.

Mr Berthelot states that they have not merely requested the Estonians not to disarm Yudenitch’s army; they had also informed them that they were opposed to any armistice with the Bolsheviks. That armistice is all the more regrettable as the Estonians do not seem to have been forced in any way to conclude it.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that they did not know anything about that. A telegram received from Estonia and which seemed more recent than the information given by Mr. Kammerer, indicates that the withdrawal of the Russian troops is under way, under the conditions of the preliminary disarmament which is required by the armistice concluded between Estonia and the Soviets.

Mr Berthelot says that they are ignorant of the real situation. It therefore seems that the best course would be to close their eyes with regard to the present attitude of the Estonian Government and to leave, for the present, affairs in the status quo.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he agrees that no communication be made to the Estonian Government.

(It was decided that no representations should be made, for the time being, by the Allies to the Estonian Government on the subject of the relations of that Government with the Army of General Yudenitch.)