[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, November 4, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers.



1. Marshal Foch states that the President of the Armistice Commission has informed him that at a meeting at Treves of the Railways Commission the German delegates informed the Allied representatives that the German Government had decided to stop all passenger train service from the 5th to the 15th of November, both in the occupied and unoccupied parts of Germany. After the 15th of November passenger traffic would be restored but all express trains would be suppressed. He wishes to be authorized by the Council to reply that the suspension of railway service in the occupied territories could not be admitted and that if a reduction of railway service in these territories is consented to, it will only be on condition that rapid communication with the large centers of unoccupied Germany, with respect both to passenger traffic and postal service, should continue to exist.

(It is decided to approve the communication to be sent by Marshal Foch to the German Government notifying it that the Allied and Associated Powers cannot permit a substantial curtailment of service on railroads in the occupied territories.


2. The Council has before it a telegram from Sir George Clerk to the Supreme Council dated November 1st, 1919.

M Berthelot says that it is evident from reading Sir George Clerk’s telegram that everyone in Hungary desired the departure of the Romanian troops; they are an embarrassment both to the Friedrich Government and to the Allied Generals, whose authority is compromised by their presence. But, in spite of this fact, it remains necessary to have an Inter-Allied force on the spot. This seems to him all the more essential as he notes that the only Allied representative having a real influence in Hungary is Admiral Troubridge, and he supposes that this is because of the vessels under the Admiral’s command. So the Romanians should leave, but on the other hand, it is necessary to have an Inter-Allied force which will be more than a moral force. Sir George Clerk’s telegram also indicates that the Friedrich Government will retire as soon as the Romanian troops have left. Under these conditions it seems to him that the order of events should be as follows:

(1) Formation of an Inter-Allied force, if it is decided to form one;

(2) Departure of the Romanian troops, as soon as this Inter-Allied force can reach its destination;

(3) Withdrawal of the Friedrich cabinet; and,

(4) Formation of a Democratic government which will take charge of elections. Sir George Clerk, as a perfect gentleman, seems to feel confidence in Admiral Horthy, in whom he has found a pleasing personality. As far as he is concerned, it seems to him that the word of an Hungarian Admiral, however likeable he might be, and whose intentions moreover are known, is not sufficient.

S de Martino says that the Italian Delegation is of the opinion that the occupation of Hungary by an Inter-Allied force composed of Yugoslavs and Czechs will result in trouble; these troops, particularly the Yugoslav troops, have shown in the past that they are not averse to pillaging. Moreover, there exists a profound hatred between Hungarians and Serbs. The Italian Delegation therefore thinks that the troops which it is proposed to send to Hungary will only increase disorder. The Italian representative at Budapest has proposed an alternative plan of charging the Inter-Allied Military Mission with supervising the organization of the Hungarian army and of ensuring that it did not fall into the hands of the reactionaries. Such a mission for the Generals could be considered as falling within the terms of the Armistice and will not constitute an illegal interference in the Internal affairs of Hungary. In any case it will be well to know what kind of government it is desired to establish in Hungary. Sir George Clerk’s report seems to place confidence in Friedrich and Horthy, while, on the other hand, the French Delegation has characterized them as tools of Archduke Joseph; a definite policy should be adopted.

M Berthelot replies that if the Serbs and Czechs are to be commanded by Serb and Czech officers it will evidently be impossible to use them, but it is proposed to place these troops under Allied command. Moreover, whatever bitterness might exist in Hungary against the Serbs, he thinks that Hungarian public opinion is resigned to the loss of certain territories. In the next place, it seems scarcely possible that Admiral Horthy’s army can be controlled by a Commission which has no material force at its disposition: to follow any such line of action would be tantamount to insisting on a policy of impotence. Finally, as to the question of knowing what government should be supported, he thinks that there is no difference of opinion, and that S De Martino himself has no doubts concerning the true aims of Friedrich. This point of paramount importance remains: as long as the Romanians are there, the Hungarian Government has been able to do nothing. The day the Romanians left and nothing remained but the moral force of the Allied Generals, the country will be delivered over to reaction and monarchical restoration. It is vital to have a real force in Hungary; the question is to know what this force should be.

Mr Polk asks who will pay the Czechoslovak and Serbian troops placed under Allied Command. It was evident that it will not be their governments.

M Berthelot observes that the financial question will have to be examined but that it is less important than the question of principle which should be decided first.

M Pichon points out that it is necessary to know if it is agreed to organize an Inter-Allied force. For his part he thinks it indispensable. As long as Friedrich is there the establishment of a democratic form of government cannot be counted upon. Friedrich had proved that he was either unable or unwilling to establish one.

Mr Polk says that his difficulty is that the plan now proposed has not been suggested either by Sir George Clerk or by the Allied Generals; it is being discussed at long range. Moreover, he thinks that there will be difficulties in obtaining the necessary cooperation of the Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs; it will also be difficult to persuade the Romanians to withdraw completely, and the Council will find it hard to maintain control of the situation. Finally, he doubts if an Allied command will suffice to prevent the pillaging and disorders that S De Martino mentioned.

M Pichon says that evidently no decision can now be taken and that Sir George Clerk and the Allied Generals should be consulted.

M Berthelot observes that it will certainly be preferable to send Allied troops into Hungary, but that none are available. It is also clear that it will be difficult to eliminate the Romanians, and that if the three countries bordering on Hungary participate in that operation the difficulties will be less. On both sides there are adverse considerations between which a choice will have to be made.

S de Martino requests that his proposal be submitted also to Sir George Clerk. He is, moreover, greatly impressed by the fact that Sir George Clerk thinks that Horthy can be persuaded to keep his promises.

M Pichon thinks it is extraordinary that Admiral Horthy, who has raised an army with certain well known intentions, should suddenly renounce his designs.

S de Martino points out that Sir George Clerk has also indicated the possibility of trusting Friedrich and has spoken of private negotiations relative to the formation of a Ministry, whereas M Berthelot has said that the Council had already pronounced against Friedrich.

M Berthelot says that it should be recalled that after Sir George Clerk’s first trip, the Council had agreed that Friedrich must be eliminated. A draft to this effect has been prepared. In order not to seem to intervene in the internal affairs of Hungary this telegram has not been sent and it has been decided to entrust Sir George Clerk with a new mission, but Sir George Clerk’s instructions are contained in the draft telegram. This draft has been prepared by Sir George Clerk and himself. Sir George has pointed out to him that it would be best not to give Friedrich an order to withdraw and to only tell him that for the last time he was asked to form a democratic government - a thing which they judge it impossible for him to do. He recalls also that the Council has thought of publishing the telegram in order to strengthen the hands of the Hungarian Democratic elements. It is clear that if Friedrich had been able to form a democratic government he would long since have done so. Sir George Clerk, moreover, does not seem to have any doubt of his withdrawal. It seemed to him that the Friedrich Government, like any monarchical Government which attempts to establish itself in Hungary, should withdraw.

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he entirely agrees that Sir George Clerk should be consulted; he himself had suggested it at the preceding meeting of the Council. There is first of all a point which has to be clarified, namely: what is being asked of Hungary? It is to have a stable Government which will preside over the elections and with which Peace can be concluded. The occupation, which M Berthelot thinks will be a short one, is therefore bound up with the question of elections, and might well be prolonged. Furthermore, Sir George Clerk thinks that Friedrich will withdraw after the departure of the Romanians and he manifests a great deal of confidence in Admiral Horthy’s assurance that he will recognize a Government resulting from the elections. Sir George must have serious reasons for this opinion and he, himself, attaches great weight to it. Moreover, it is well known that the majority of the Hungarian population favor the establishment of a conservative form of Government; if the elections take place without mismanagement it is almost certain that the resulting Government will not be democratic. However, there exists no right to prevent the Hungarian people from forming a Government corresponding to its own tendencies, provided there is no question of restoring the Hapsburgs. He thinks indeed, that Admiral Horthy is counting on the elections to bring about in Hungary a Government satisfactory to himself and that doubtless explains his attitude and the assurance he had given to Sir George Clerk. Ought military intervention be resorted to, in order to prevent such elections? The whole question lay there. In the meantime, elections are impossible in Hungary until the Romanians have retired beyond the Theiss. The intervention of the Czechs and Serbs might likewise create difficulties. He doubts whether that intervention could be obtained since the Czechs are probably not inclined to favor the formation of a Government whose tendencies will cause them anxiety. Moreover, if the intervention of the Yugoslavs is requested they might ask to be guaranteed against an Italian attack; what would be done then? He thinks, for his part, that Sir George Clerk ought first of all to be asked if he thinks it expedient to form the Inter-Allied force which had been suggested. Why not be satisfied with the departure of Friedrich and the formation of another Government? That is what had been desired by the Council. There had been no thought of military occupation and no new fact had occurred to justify that occupation.

M Berthelot thinks that there is a new fact, namely; the organization of Horthy’s army. He is very nearly in agreement with the essential part of Sir Eyre Crowe’s statements. It is indeed probable that the elections will be favorable to politicians of the same shade of opinion as Friedrich, but the principle should be agreed to that the return of the Hapsburgs cannot be tolerated. It is impossible to intervene in opposition to the opinion of the country, nevertheless this opinion cannot be allowed to do what it pleases. Moreover, he does not think that the Czechs will create any difficulty over giving the assistance which would be asked of them, for Dr Benes has been the first to point out the danger. There is no doubt that the police of Friedrich and the army of Horthy will, at the time of the elections, act favorably to the reactionary elements.

Sir Eyre Crowe adds that Sir George Clerk should be asked if he is sure of the good faith of Friedrich and Horthy.

S de Martino says that Sir Eyre Crowe has alluded to a question which the Yugoslavs will doubtless raise if they are asked to send troops into Hungary. He cannot better reply than by reiterating the opposition of the Italian Delegation to the sending of Serbian troops into Hungary.

M Berthelot asks the reasons for this opposition?

S de Martino said the reasons are those that he has already pointed out; he is willing, however, for Sir George Clerk to be consulted on this point provided that his (S De Martino’s) suggestions are also submitted to him.

M Pichon points out that Sir George Clerk had made another recommendation, namely sending an Inter-Allied Mission to Transylvania. For his part he approves of this recommendation.

M Polk asks if the members of this proposed Mission could not be taken from the Allied officers at Budapest.

Sir Eyre Crowe recalls that Transylvania was to be given to Romania, and inquires whether such a Mission could be sent without previous negotiations with Romania.

Mr Polk suggests that Sir George Clerk be asked what part of Transylvania is referred to in his telegram.

M Pichon adds that he might also be asked to specify the accusations made against the Romanians.

M Berthelot reads a draft telegram which he has prepared in conformity with the views expressed in the course of the discussion.

Mr Polk asks if the sense of the Council is that the Romanians should eventually be represented in the Inter-Allied force?

Sir Eyre Crowe says that he, just as did the American Delegation, sees difficulties in such a course.

M Pichon says that he is not desirous to have the Romanians included in this force but he thinks that their exclusion will create additional difficulties.

Mr Polk remarks that he had only said that it seemed to him difficult for the Romanians to accept exclusion from the Inter-Allied force.

Sir Eyre Crowe calls attention to the fact that Sir George Clerk had asked if he was authorized to state that the Allies would recognize a Government, acceptable to him, which did not include Friedrich. A reply on this point should be sent to him.

Mr Polk says he takes it as understood that the telegram would be submitted to the Council before being dispatched.

(It was decided that at its next meeting the Council will examine a draft telegram to Sir George Clerk to be prepared by M Berthelot in conformity with the discussion of this question at the meeting of November 4th.)


3. The Council has before it a note from the French Delegation dated November 3, 1919.

General Le Rond said that there has already been preliminary conferences between the British and French delegates on the various Plebiscite Commissions. It will be very advisable for the Italian delegates to participate as soon as possible in these conferences. The Council should not forget that these Commissions are important bodies, that each country has to organize numerous personnel and that such organization will necessarily entail a long delay. In these preliminary conferences it will be necessary to agree on the personnel to be furnished by each Allied country and to prepare the negotiations with the Germans.

S de Martino thinks that November 7th is somewhat early. The 8th or 9th would be better.

General Le Rond observes that there is no obligation to commence negotiations with the Germans exactly on the 10th.

M Pichon wishes to draw the attention of the Italian Delegation to the question of the contingent to be supplied by Italy for the forces of occupation; the Council does not yet know if Italy has withdrawn her reservation.

General Cavallero says that the instructions he has just received authorizes him to withdraw that reservation. The Italian contingent will consist of five battalions and two batteries of Field Artillery, that is to say, three battalions and two batteries of Field Artillery will be sent to Upper Silesia, one battalion to Marienwerder and one to Teschen. He will come to an agreement with Marshal Foch’s Staff to have the strength of the three battalions destined for Upper Silesia sufficiently reinforced to equal approximately the five battalions demanded.

Marshal Foch says that this plan ought to be examined more closely but in principle it seems admissible.

M Pichon says that the Presidents of the Commissions should be named. The Council had decided on the 18th October that the Presidents should be elected by the Commissions themselves, but it later seemed preferable to have the Council appoint them directly. Ought it to wait until the Commissions had been formed?

General Le Rond thinks that it is important to make these appointments as soon as possible. Indeed the Presidency carries with it certain obligations; the nations furnishing the Presidents will also have to furnish a larger personnel. They, therefore, should be settled upon as soon as possible. If it is decided that the Presidency of each Commission should be given to the Nation to which has been entrusted the command of the troops in the same zone, he wishes to recall that at Allenstein the military command will be British, at Marienwerder Italian, in Upper Silesia French, and at Teschen American; but as for Teschen the American participation is awaiting the ratification of the Treaty by the Senate, and the question is all the more urgent inasmuch as only two months are left in which to hold the plebiscite.

M Pichon says that the Council feels that it is fitting that the military command in each territory to be occupied, and the Presidency of the plebiscite Commission in the same territory, should pertain to the same Nation.

Sir Eyre Crowe suggests that while waiting for America to assume the Presidency of the Teschen Commission it should be held by France, which already administers the neighboring territory of Upper Silesia.

Mr Polk agrees.

General Weygand says that a telegram has just been received from General Henrys containing information of the agreements concluded between the Germans and Poles with respect to regulating the taking over by Poland of territories to be immediately ceded to it by virtue of the Treaty of Peace. The application of these agreements, moreover, raise certain difficulties; for instance, it involves the passage over part of the territory of the free city of Danzig of German troops. Under these circumstances he thinks it important to notify the Poles to send representatives qualified to continue their negotiations with the Germans under the auspices of the Conference.

(This recommendation is approved.)

(It is decided:

(1) That the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers on Plebiscite or Administrative Commissions, to the extent of at least one Delegate from each Power on each Commission, should assemble at the Quai d’Orsay as soon as practicable - November 7th if possible;

(2) That the Polish Government should be invited to send to Paris representatives empowered to conduct with the German Government - under the auspices of the Conference - the negotiations rendered necessary by the cession to Poland of German territory, at the same time as the representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers discussed with the German Delegates questions raised by the putting into force of the Treaty of Peace.)

(It is further decided:

(1) That the Presidency of the Plebiscite Commissions should at Allenstein be held by the British Representative, at Marienwerder by the Italian, in Upper Silesia by the French, and at Teschen by the Americans; although provisionally it should be held at Teschen by the French Representative;

(2) That the question of the strength of the Italian troops of occupation should be settled by Marshal Foch and the Italian Military Representative.)


4. The Council has before it a note from the Belgian Delegation to the President of the Peace Conference dated October 25th, 1919.

Sir Eyre Crowe thinks that the question is decided by the former decisions of the Council. The best course would be to transmit this note to the Allied Naval Armistice Commission stating that the Council is of the opinion that the instructions previously given by it to this Commission involved the granting of the Belgian Delegation’s request.

(It is decided to transmit to the Allied Naval Armistice Commission the note from the Belgian Delegation relative to German vessels laden with wood destined for Belgium, and to inform that Commission that the Supreme Council is of the opinion that the instructions previously given by it involve the granting of the Belgian request.


5. General Weygand states that with respect to their railway system the Baltic Provinces are in a peculiar situation. During the war the Germans changed the tracks to normal gauge with the result that at present only German material and transformed Russian material could circulate on the Baltic system. It is evident that in order to assure the continuance of the economic life of the country part of the German material should be retained on the spot. Neither the Armistice nor the treaty accorded the right to demand this. He proposes that the German Government be informed that, by reason of Germany’s deliberate transformation of the railways of the Baltic Provinces, General Niessel should be empowered to determine the amount of German material to be retained in those territories.

(It is decided that the German Government should be informed by Marshal Foch that, in consequence of the transformation of the railways of the Baltic Provinces effected by the Germans during the war, General Niessel will be empowered to determine the amount of German rolling stock which should be left in those regions.)


6. The Council has before it the draft letter to the Chargé d’Affaires of the Dutch Government relative to the vessels sold by Germany during the war to Dutch Navigation Companies.

(It is decided to approve the text of the note to the Chargé d’Affaires of the Dutch Government relative to German ships sold during the war to Dutch Navigation Companies.)


7. The Council has before it a note from the Drafting Committee dated November 3rd, 1919.

Sir Eyre Crowe observes that the only thing to do is to approve the recommendations of the note. The Council at that moment agrees that the Secretary-General of the European Danube Commission, that is to say, Colonel Rey, should be Secretary-General of Conference provided for by Article 349 of the Treaty of Versailles. Representation of the European Danube Commission Conference Provided for by Article 349 of the Treaty of Versailles

(It is decided:

(1) To approve the recommendations of the note prepared by the Drafting Committee relative to representation of the European-Danube Commission in the Conference provided for by Article 349 of the Treaty of Versailles;

(2) That the Secretary-General of the European-Danube Commission should act as Secretary-General of the said Conference.)


8. M Fromageot says that the Drafting Committee wonders whether it would not be expedient to have Bulgaria sign a Protocol similar to those signed by the German and Austrian Delegations at Versailles and at St. Germain. It is difficult to take the Versailles Protocol as a guide for the Protocol in question. On the other hand, the St. Germain Protocol contains provisions which it would be advantageous to have Bulgaria sign.

For instance, it provides, in Section 1, that the list of persons to be handed over to the Allied and Associated Governments by Austria pursuant to Article 173, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, should be sent to the Austrian Government within a month of the coming into force of the Treaty.

A similar clause could be inserted in the Bulgarian Protocol. The provisions contained in Section 2 seem inapplicable to Bulgaria.

The same is not true of the provisions of Section 3; but as the Bulgarian Treaty, with respect to reparations, differs greatly from the Austrian Treaty, he thinks that the opinion of the Reparation Commission should be asked on that point.

Finally, Section 4 could be advantageously reproduced. Austria had also signed at St. Germain a declaration by which it undertook to communicate to the Allied and Associated Governments all the information at its disposal relative to vessels sunk or damaged by Austrian naval forces during the war. It might not be very beneficial to have Bulgaria sign a corresponding declaration, but at least it could not be prejudicial.

(It is decided:

(1) That the Drafting Committee should prepare, to be signed at the same time as the Bulgarian Treaty, a draft protocol similar to the protocol signed September 10, 1919, at Saint Germain, by the Austrian Delegation, subject to the decision of the Reparation Commission as to the expediency of repeating in the said protocol the provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of the protocol of Saint Germain;

(2) That the Drafting Committee should prepare, to be signed by the Bulgarian Delegation at the same time as the Treaty of Peace, a declaration similar to the one signed on September 10, 1919, by the Austrian Delegation.)


9. Mr Matsui states that he has been telegraphically informed that the Emperor of Japan, on October 30th, had ratified the Treaty of Versailles. Under the final clauses of the Treaty of Peace it becomes his duty to make a formal notification of this ratification. Should he do so at once or await the signature of the procès-verbal relative to the deposit of ratifications? It seems to him that he might await this latter date.

M Pichon says that the Conference will approve the procedure prescribed by the Drafting Committee.

M Fromageot says that that Committee has provided for this contingency in the draft procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications which had been approved by the Council. This draft had spoken of “deposit of ratifications or of notifications of ratifications.”

(The meeting then adjourns.)