[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, July 29, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers


1. M Berthelot referring to the decision taken on the previous day says that he understands the decision to refer to Austrian notes dispatched before the final Treaty had been handed to the Austrian Delegation. It would clearly be necessary to reply to any Austrian notes dispatched since then. He proposes, therefore, that the note regarding minorities be examined by the Committee on new States.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks the same principle might be adopted in dealing with the Austrian notes as had been adopted regarding the notes sent by the German Delegation. In the latter case there had been a Committee to survey the whole of the replies. He would, therefore, propose that M Dutasta be asked to arrange for a similar machinery in order that the whole of the replies be coordinated.

(These proposals are accepted.)

Note: The Resolution referred to is as follows:

(It is agreed that a Committee should be appointed for the purpose of editing the reply to the German Note. The Secretary-General is requested to arrange for this Committee to meet with the least possible delay, and to communicate to it the various portions of the reply as they were approved.)


2. M Pichon said that the Austrians had asked for an extension of one week beyond the period of 10 days allowed them to present their observations regarding the Treaty. They justify their request by reference to the change of Foreign Minister which had lately occurred. He thinks the demand could not be resisted, and asked his colleagues if they agreed with him.

(It is agreed that the period of ten days allowed to the Austrian Delegation to present observations on the Treaty handed to them should be extended by one week and that this should be communicated to them by the Secretariat-General.)


(M Loucheur, M Seydoux and Mr Waterlow enter the room.)

3. M Seydoux says that on the previous day the question of the resumption of the parcels post and of the money order service had been raised by the British Delegation. He had raised no comment on the resumption of the parcels post, but he had asked for time to consult the Ministry of Finance regarding the money order service. He had consulted the Ministry of Finance and found that the question had already been considered. On the 26th June the French Postal Service had been addressed by the Ministry of Finance which took the view that the instability of the mark made it undesirable to resume any money order intercourse with Germany. He found that the same opinion still prevailed. From this he concluded that the objection of the French Finance Ministry was a technical one and was not concerned with any political consideration. If the British Government therefore felt that there was no technical objection from the British point of view, there seemed no reason to object to the resumption of money order interchanges between Great Britain and Germany. The British Government, as far as France was concerned, was, he thought, free to act as it wished. The French Government, however, did not for the time propose to restore the money order service. Re-establishment of Postal Communications With Germany

M Pichon says that the only objection would be that the Allies would not be acting identically, but as the question was not a political one the matter was not of great importance.

(It is agreed that there is no objection to the resumption by Great Britain of parcels post and money order interchange with Germany in accordance with the proposal of the British Delegation.)

(It is further agreed that the proposals of the Special Committee as modified on the previous day should be accepted.


4. The Council has before it the proposal made by S Tittoni on the previous day.

Creation of Inter-Allied Organisation for the Distribution of Raw Material M Loucheur says that S Tittoni’s proposal really amounted to the perpetuation of the Supreme Economic Council. The very functions he wishes exercised were those hitherto exercised by the Council with the help of the Wheat Executive, the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council, and similar organisations. The problem before the Council is therefore merely restated in other terms. As the Council knew, the French and Italian Delegations favor the continuance of the Supreme Economic Council. Great Britain latterly had taken the same view. Only the American Delegation disagreed, and had wired to Washington for instructions. On the following Friday and Saturday there was to be a meeting of the Council in London. Everything depended on the instructions that might be received from the Governments. Without them the members could take no action.

Mr Balfour says that he has prepared a draft resolution to the following effect:

“That the problems arising out of the present difficulties of providing food, coal and raw materials to the Allied Powers be submitted to the Supreme Economic Council for examination and report.”

He has expressed his resolution in these terms in order not to bind the Supreme Economic Council in any way. S Tittoni’s proposal appeared to dictate the conclusion in some manner.

M Loucheur observes that neither resolution offered a solution of the question. All that could be done was to postpone it unless instructions were received for the Supreme Economic Council to continue its functions. In regard to the primary necessity of finding coal for Italy, he wishes to inform the Council that he had had a conversation with S Tittoni. There is information that between the dates of August 5th and September 5th, Germany would furnish one million three hundred and fifty thousand tons of coal. This coal was intended for French uses according to agreement. France, however, had agreed, in order to assist Italy, to despatch out of this one hundred and seventy-five [Page 372]thousand tons to the latter country. This would save the situation. In addition to this, in spite of considerable shortage in France, he had given an order for the despatch from the Saar Basin to Italy of one thousand two hundred tons daily. He hoped that Great Britain would also help to ease the situation and he expected to have a conversation with Sir Auckland Geddes at the end of the week.

(It is then resolved that the problems arising out of the present difficulties of providing food, coal and raw materials to the Allied Powers be submitted to the Supreme Economic Council for examination and report.)


(At this moment Mr Hudson, Mr J F Dulles, S Fiori, and Major Greig entered the room.)

5. M Loucheur says that on the previous day he had asked that the Expert Commission for the distribution of Rolling Stock in Europe should work in harmony with the Reparations Commission. This had apparently been interpreted by the Committee on Ports, Waterways and Railways, as meaning that the Expert Commission should work under the orders of the Reparations Commission. This was not what he meant to convey. It was clearly necessary that the work of the Expert Commission should be coordinated with that of the Reparations Commission. He therefore, proposes that the following Note, prepared by the British Delegation, be accepted:

“The Presidents of the Main Expert Commissions on the distribution of rolling-stock, will work in close touch with the Reparations Commission in order that the latter may take the necessary measures for effecting financial adjustments resulting (a) from the transfer or liquidation of the above rolling-stock, craft and installations and (b) from such other decisions within the competence of the above Expert Commissions as may affect the Reparations Commission. No final decision will be communicated to the States affected without the previous concurrence of the Reparations Commission.”

He would like to add that, should there be disagreement between the Expert Commission and the Reparations Commission, the disagreement should be referred to the coordinating Committee, the setting up of which had been agreed to on the previous day.

Mr Balfour says that two quite different considerations have to be reconciled. It is obvious that the rolling stock of Europe, as being a financial asset, should not escape the grasp of the Reparation Commission, but it is clearly important that for the economic reconstruction of Europe, so essential an instrument of reconstruction should be employed to the best purpose. Without this, work on Mines, Farms, Factories etc., would be wasted. From this point of view, there is no more important resource than rolling stock for the economic revival of Europe. This resource must be husbanded by the Experts. It is therefore necessary to reconcile these two important objects.

Mr Hudson says that the Commission of Experts which is to deal with the distribution of rolling stock is, according to the Treaty, entirely independent. It could not be subjected to the Reparations Commission. Should it be so subjected the Germans would have cause for complaint that the Treaty was not being observed. He quite agreed that it should work in harmony with the Reparations Commission, but if it were unable to take any decision without the concurrence of the Reparations Commission, the object for which it was created would be defeated. It is essential that it should be able to take independent decisions and have them executed speedily; should it have to wait for the previous sanction of the Reparations Commission it could not do its work.

M Loucheur says that the experts might be allowed to make provisional allotments of the railway stock, subject to sanction by the Reparations Commission. He disputes that the experts under the Treaty have any right to dispose finally of such material. The Reparations Commission, it had been stipulated, could intervene in all matters touching the disposal of material. He quite agreed that every day lost was a serious thing for the economic fate of Europe, but he could not admit that any of the material resources of the enemy countries could be disposed of irrespective of the Reparations Commission.

Mr Balfour said that he understands M Loucheur to agree to a temporary allotment of railway stock by the experts. They are bound, however, to inform the Reparations Commission of what they were doing. Their action would then be considered in its financial aspect, and the result of the action would be considered by the two Commissions together.

M Loucheur points out that according to the Treaty, only the Reparations Commission can receive material in discharge of the reparations debt. No transfer of material can, therefore, be made without the knowledge and concurrence of the Reparations Commission. He cannot therefore admit the complete independence of the experts.

Mr Hudson maintains that the experts should be entirely free to make a distribution of the railway stock according to the technical necessities of the case. It is the role of the Reparations Commission to consider the financial consequences of the action of the Experts.

M Loucheur quotes Articles 19 and 20 of Annex II of the Treaty. He points out that the Reparations Commission did not propose to make the allocation of the rolling stock, but should the experts make such an allocation that Germany was not able to restore her economic life in such a manner as to pay reparations at all, it was clear that the Reparations Commission had a right to intervene. In his view a mistake has been made in drawing up the Treaty, and the Experts should have been placed under the Reparations Commission. Without this there would inevitably be constant conflict of authority. However the Treaty had been signed and so he proposes that the experts should make a distribution, that they should inform the Reparations Commission, and that in case of disagreement the matter should be referred through the coordinating Committee to the Governments.

Mr White says that he sees no objection to this course.

Mr Dulles says that as the American representative on the Reparations Commission he sympathizes with M Loucheur. Should the Reparations Commission think it necessary to order a supply of coal from one country to another its intentions might be defeated, if the experts had allocated rolling stock in such a way that coal could not be moved.

Mr Hudson says that he thinks the subjection of the experts to the Reparations Commission a violation of the Treaty.

M Loucheur says that what he proposes is no violation of the Treaty, but a matter of internal arrangement among the Allies.

Mr Balfour says that the last sentence of the proposal under consideration seemed to imply that final decisions could be taken but not communicated to the Governments concerned. This appeared to be an absurd situation. He thinks that the experts can make provisional allocation, but that no communication of their allotment as final should be made till the Reparations Commission had sanctioned it.

Mr Hudson points out that the experts can only decide how the rolling stock should be distributed. They will be bound to utilize the Governments in order to have their plans carried out. For instance, should they decide that a proportion of German rolling stock was required in Denmark, they will be bound to inform the German and Danish Governments in order that they could execute the proposals. It is impossible to wait for the sanction of the Reparations Commission.

Mr Balfour says that a test question would be, should the Technical Committee desire to send 500 wagons to Czechoslovakia, are they entitled to do so without the consent of the Reparations Commission.

M Loucheur says that the answer in the case of experts would be yes, and in his own case it would be no. The experts, for instance, might lose sight of the necessity of transporting coal. If the Council of Five were in existence reference could be made to it, but, if it were not in existence, chaos would ensue. He thought it absurd that experts should act irrespective of orders. They should receive instructions from the Governments. The Clauses of the Treaty operated as against Germany, not as against the Allies among themselves. The various parts of the machinery employed for the execution of the Treaty must work together, otherwise there would be complete disorder. He therefore asked that definite instructions be given to the experts, so that they should not work independently of the Reparations Commission.

Mr Hudson says that M Loucheur had stated the issue very clearly. Poland, for instance, had been attributed certain territory which had been German. The accepted theory was that a certain amount of rolling stock went with this territory, in order to make its economic life possible. It might, in the opinion of the Reparations Commission, be necessary to allot Poland some rolling stock by way of payment in the Reparations account. Restitution is no business of the experts, but, after the Reparations Commission had done what it thought fit, it might appear to the experts that Poland required more rolling stock. The experts would then take a decision for the sole purpose of employing the rolling stock available to the best general advantage. According to M Loucheur, Reparations questions came in at this point. This, he submits, is widening the sphere of the Reparations Commission unduly. The Expert Committee, in his view, ought to be able to say that for technical reasons, rolling stock is required at such and such a place. M Loucheur’s view falsified the intentions of Article 371. Was this Article to be applied in its obvious interpretation, or was its application to be made subject to the political situation of Europe as a whole? For instance, is Poland to be deprived of necessary rolling stock because the Reparations Commission decided to pay Belgium in coal?

M Loucheur says that he thinks the clauses drawn up by the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways have entirely left financial considerations out of account. He does not say that the Expert Commission should not allocate rolling stock, but that this allocation should be provisional. The value of the rolling stock thus assigned, must be determined by the Reparations Commission. If, for instance, Poland can not pay for the rolling stock allotted her, was she to receive it for nothing? This would entirely stultify the work of the Reparations Commission. What he asked for was coordination. It was regrettable that better liaison had not been maintained by the various Commissions which had framed different portions of the Treaty. As the Treaty itself did not provide for coordination, arrangements must be made for co-ordination in its execution.

Mr Balfour said that he thinks perhaps the following proposal would reconcile the two points of view:

“The immediate distribution of rolling stock shall be made on the authority of the Expert Committee; but no such distribution shall be final until the financial aspects of the question have been considered and approved by the Committee of Reparation.”

(This proposal is accepted provisionally subject to further examination by the Experts present of the Reparations Commission and of the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways.)

Mr. Hudson asked that subject to this, the nomination of the experts should be made in accordance with proposal annexed.

(With the addition of a French member in the Principal Commission Para. 1(a), the proposals contained in the Report—Appendix “C”—are accepted.)

(M Loucheur, Mr Hudson, Mr Dulles and S Fiori withdraw.)


(At this point Mr Polk enters the room.)

(M Clementel, M Alphand, Mr Nogara and Mr Hutchinson enter the room.)

6. M Clementel said that the draft Clauses now before the Council has been unanimously agreed to. He explains the various clauses in which alterations had been made since the last edition. Some discussion arose concerning Article 29.

Mr White asks whether the Smaller Powers might not claim equal rights with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in respect to the “most favored nation” treatment.

M Clementel explained that this provision had been inserted at the request of the Japanese Delegates.

Mr Balfour asks why it is proposed to re-impose Consular Courts on Bulgaria.

M Clementel says that it was merely a case of re-stating preexisting rights.

Mr Balfour says that he had not been aware of any right of Consular jurisdiction in Bulgaria, but, in any case, he would have thought it more in keeping with the times to abolish or curtail such a right rather than to re-assert or extend it.

Mr White says that the United States did not wish to claim extra-territorial rights in Bulgaria.

M Pichon said that the French Government are negotiating just before the outbreak of war for the abolition of the capitulations in Bulgaria.

M Clementel points out that the formula employed is permissive. Special conventions might be entered into by each of the Allied and Associated Powers with Bulgaria. There was nothing to compel them to do so. The sentence regarding “most favored nation” treatment had been added at the request of Japan.

Mr Balfour observed that things are not left just as they had been before the war, as the United States and Japan were added to the list of Powers entitled to negotiate with Bulgaria regarding special rights which they had not possessed before the war.

M Pichon observes that they need not avail themselves of this right. France has rights which had not been put into practice. Just before the outbreak of the war, negotiations were going on for the abolition of those theoretical rights. The object of the Article was therefore quite a restricted one, namely, to enable France to resume these negotiations.

Mr Balfour remarks that it is odd that an Article with so restricted an object, contrives to add two Powers to the list.

Mr Matsui says that he understands that there is in practice no consular jurisdiction in Bulgaria. Japan, however, has been for a long time urging her right to exercise such jurisdiction in Turkey. Japan would therefore seem to be weakening her position unless this sentence were inserted in the Article. If none of the Powers chose to exercise their rights under the capitulations, Japan will do nothing; should the Powers wish to do so, Japan desires to be in the same position as the rest. Nothing very substantial is being asked for, and he thought that any exercise of the right was improbable. In view of the negotiations with Turkey, however, the Japanese Delegation had thought it desirable to have this sentence inserted.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks it is strange to insist in a Treaty on a right which no one wished to exercise, and which no one approved. With this comment, however, he would be content, and would not oppose the acceptance of the Article.

The Economic Clauses as drafted are then adopted for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria.

It is further decided to communicate these Clauses in the same manner as the other Clauses, through the President of the Committee, to the Smaller Powers concerned.


(M Clemenceau and M Tardieu enter the room.)

7. Mr Balfour reads the following telegram. He thinks this amounts to a refusal on the part of General Pilsudski to obey the orders of the Council.

(M Clementel, M Alphand and Mr Nogara withdrew.)

Telegram From Sir P. Wyndham, Warsaw to Mr Balfour.

July 25th, 1919.

“On July 24th I saw General Pilsudski as instructed by you in your telegram of July 23rd.

Upon my raising the question of the Polish troops being withdrawn to the line of demarcation General Pilsudski said that this was a responsibility which he would not take as the immediate result would be the outbreak of disturbances, possibly leading to regular warfare. He declared that he would resign Office and leave Poland for Lithuania if we insist on the Polish troops being withdrawn, and showed absolute determination on this point.

The internal situation is now so difficult that, as it seems to me, General Pilsudski would gladly avail himself of any opportunity to resign which might be afforded to him by foreign pressure in opposition to a cause which is popular in Poland. The political consequences will be serious if he carries out his threat.”

M Clemenceau observes that the telegram is dated July 25th and that the decision of the Council had been taken on the 26th.


Reply to Herr Von Bethmann-Hollweg

8. It is decided that no answer need be made to Herr Von Bethmann-Hollweg’s letter regarding his personal responsibility for the outbreak of war.


(At this point Mr Venizelos and the Members of the Commission on Greek Affairs, enter the Room.)

9. M Clemenceau, addressing Mr Venizelos says that of the Council thinks that he would probably have something to say regarding the frontiers of Bulgaria.

Mr Venizelos said that he would have something to say on the subject, but before dealing with that, he would like to give an explanation regarding the document produced by Mr White at a previous meeting. This document had been communicated to him by the Chairman and the Council would understand that he was considerably upset by it. It was implied that he had made use of a forged document to influence the Conference. He had never stated that the Mussulmans of Western Thrace desired to join Greece. Should they be given the choice, it was obvious that they would be inclined to choose the Allies of Turkey rather than the enemies of Turkey. What he had suggested was that Allied Officers should consult the Mohammedan Deputies without the knowledge either of Bulgaria or Turkey. He then reads a letter addressed to him by 8 Mussulman Deputies of Western Thrace. This petition he had sent to M Cambon, but he had never attempted to represent the Mussulmans of Thrace as desiring a union with Greece.

Mr Venizelos then reads a series of observations he had prepared on this subject. He adds that he had made complaint to the Government at Washington regarding the imputation made against him by the American Delegation.

Mr White said that the document had been communicated to Mr Venizelos confidentially. Mr Venizelos has therefore no right to make any communication to Washington on the subject.

Mr Venizelos said that the document had been communicated to him by the Chairman of the Council, and he thinks he had a right to defend himself vis-à-vis the American Government.

M Clemenceau says he thinks Mr Venizelos would have done better to reserve his justification for the Council.

Mr Venizelos says that he would withdraw his complaint at Washington.

M Venizelos said that in Thrace as claimed by him for Greece there are more than five times as many Greeks as Bulgarians. There are, in addition, a large number of Greeks in Constantinople and in the districts surrounding it. To these he makes no claim and he argues that this reinforces his claim to the other parts of Thrace. Against the ethnographical argument which entirely favors Greece an economic argument is alleged in favour of Bulgaria. He recognised that free access to the sea was one of the principles of the Conference. Whenever interests were opposed which could not be reconciled, it was necessary to decide which deserved the greater respect. The principle of nationality should take precedence over economic considerations. Bulgaria has excellent ports on the Black Sea. An outlet on the Aegean Sea is not a matter of primary necessity since the opening of the Straits would convert the Black Sea into an open sea. The inclusion of Greek populations in Greece was however a vital interest. Bulgaria could have commercial access to the Aegean either at Dédéagatch or, if this port were regarded unsuitable, at Cavalla. Similar rights might be guaranteed to Bulgaria as had been guaranteed to other land-locked states. Four states, each of them larger than Bulgaria, namely Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary and Poland had been left by the Conference without direct access to the sea. Why should a similar arrangement not be enough for Bulgaria? Poland had not been given Danzig, in order that the nationality of the intervening populations should be respected. It has been alleged that the arrangement he proposed served Bulgarian purposes well enough in peace, but would not suit them in war. He thinks this argument operates in his favour. There will be no chance for Bulgaria to establish a submarine base on the Aegean. Bulgaria was a continental power. Greece was very largely an island power. Should Bulgaria have complete control over a port in the Aegean, she could intercept the movements of Greek troops by means of submarines. He knew that strategic arguments were not in favour at the Conference but he only used this as a secondary argument and in reply to an objection. It is needless to attempt to satisfy Bulgaria. Nothing but Hegemony in the Balkans would satisfy her. She will undoubtedly attempt to upset the settlement made by the Conference. The only hope for peace in the Balkans was to set up her neighbors as ethnic units each individually too big to be attacked. It had also been said that the Greeks had left Western Thrace. This was true. They had been driven out by the Bulgarians and had for five years been refugees in Macedonia and Greece. Mr Venizelos then reads copious extracts from a work entitled “Rapports et Enquêtes de la Commission Interalliée sur les violations du droit des Gens commises en Macédoine orientale par les armées Bulgares”. He adds that the American Red Cross Society which has worked in Eastern Macedonia thoroughly corroborates the report of the Inter-Allied Commission. He argues that it is undesirable to entrust to the rule of a nation which could behave in the manner illustrated by these extracts, any foreign population whatsoever.

(Mr Venizelos then withdraws.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)