[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, July 26, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 10:30

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers


(At this point Marshal Foch, General Weygand, and the Military Representatives from Versailles enter the room.)

1. M Clemenceau states that, before passing to the subjects on the Agenda, he would ask Marshal Foch to explain the dispute that has now arisen between the Poles and the Lithuanians with regard to the line of demarcation that had been laid down by the Allied and Associated Powers.

Marshal Foch shows the demarcation line upon a map which he presents to the Council, and draws attention to the point at which the line in question has been violated. He points out that the question of the German evacuation of the territories under discussion was involved, and that, according to latest reports, General von der Goltz had begun a general withdrawal.

M Clemenceau states that, as certain aspects of the problem are new to the Council, he would propose that the question should be adjourned until the afternoon’s meeting, and that M Cambon should attend.

(It is therefore decided that the question should be re-discussed at the afternoon’s meeting and that M Cambon should be present.)


2. M Clemenceau reads two telegrams, dated July 7th and 24th respectively, relative to a rupture of communications through Warsaw between Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries, and asks Marshal Foch whether he is familiar with the details of this matter.

Marshal Foch replies that the question has not been brought to his attention.

(It is therefore decided to adjourn the discussion of this question until the afternoon’s meeting, at which time Marshal Foch would have investigated the matter.)


(At this point Mr Hoover and Mr Coolidge enter the room.)

3. Marshal Foch refers the Council to his military report of July 17th. He reminds them, however, that the political side of the question still asserts itself, and that this could not be dealt with by him.

M Clemenceau draws attention to the fact that the question of General Boehm’s action had now arisen.

Marshal Foch replies that General Boehm’s proposals are of a purely political nature, and that the military situation had altered to a certain extent by reason of the Hungarian attack upon the Romanian forces. These latter had been prepared, however, and were in a position to resist. The situation, therefore, was in the same posture as it had been when he reported on July 17th.

Mr Balfour asks whether Marshal Foch knows anything about General Boehm.

S Tittoni remarks that General Boehm is the Commander-in-Chief of the Hungarian Bolshevik forces.

Marshal Foch says that, according to his latest information, General Boehm had held a Lieutenant’s rank.

M Pichon remarks that he is actually the Hungarian Minister at Vienna.

Mr Balfour states that, while the problem is both military and political, one side of it is half way between the two. Boehm stated that he had sufficient influence with the Hungarian Armies to crush Bela Kun and set up a Constituent Assembly without the Allies being called upon to strike a blow. This presents the question partly political and partly military. He would therefore like to know whether, in Marshal Foch’s opinion, Boehm had the degree of military influence that he claims and what are the probabilities of his being successful.

Marshal Foch replies that he knows nothing about Boehm, nor of his military qualities. At the same time, the small countries surrounding Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Serbia and Romania, would not keep a passive attitude for very long in the face of Hungarian aggression and would shortly take an initiative of some kind, since it was obvious that they could not keep their armies mobilized indefinitely.

S Tittoni says he thinks that the information received from Hungary during the past month gives a tolerable picture of the state of affairs in that country. It is clear that Bela Kun represented no more than a minority and that he had raised against himself internal and external enemies. It is even stated that 80 per cent of the Bolshevik Armies in Hungary are hostile to him; if this were so, the offer of Boehm was only a manifestation of this discontent. Whatever was going to happen, it is evident that the Great Powers must lend some kind of assistance, either military or moral, since the reconstruction of Hungary from within was going to be a lengthy process. Two courses were now open. The first was to send out the Committee, as had been contemplated, and to support it with the promise of ultimate military force. The second course was to adopt immediately, and to put into effect, the military action proposed by Marshal Foch. All reports agree in thinking that Austria would soon be affected by Bolshevism.

M Pichon says that he agrees with S Tittoni, but thinks that the functions of the Committee must be kept distinct from the negotiations arising out of Boehm’s proposals.

S Tittoni remarks that, when the Committee has been decided upon, it has been agreed, at the same time, that it should not enter into relations with Bela Kun.

M Pichon states that the telegrams from the Allied Ministers prove that Boehm’s proposals were being taken seriously. It was therefore for consideration whether the Committee should not, after all, be authorized to deal with him.

S Tittoni states that, if Boehm is actually in a position to overthrow Bela Kun, it is none the less certain that he requires something from the Allied and Associated Governments. What is it, therefore, that he really wants?

M Clemenceau said that Boehm asks for nothing except moral support.

Mr White states that, by sending out the Committee, it might appear that the Allied and Associated Governments wished to enter into negotiations either with Boehm or with Bela Kun; it was not desirable to give this impression. Mr Hoover has a proposal to make which avoids this difficulty.

M Mantoux then reads aloud Mr Hoover’s proposal.

Mr Balfour then reads a draft proposal of his own, stating that it has the fault of coming to no definite conclusion.

M Clemenceau says that, as S Tittoni had observed, the Council is not entirely clear as to the requests and proposals which Boehm had made to the Allied and Associated Powers.

Mr Balfour remarks that both the military plans and the proposals of Boehm had as their object the expulsion of Bela Kun.

S Tittoni then says that the following distinct questions should be put to the Allied representatives at Vienna:

1) Is Boehm in good faith, or was he merely acting as an agent of Bela Kun?

2) Is Boehm able to carry out his promises, or does he want assistance?

3) What does he require?

Mr Hoover says he thinks Boehm had definitely asked that the blockade should be raised, foodstuffs sent into the country and navigation on the Danube reopened, if he, on his part, established himself as a temporary dictator.

Mr White confirms Mr Hoover’s point of view by reading a portion of the relative document.

M Pichon says that Boehm had made no demand, but had submitted proposals.

Mr White states that the Allied Representatives at Vienna evidently think that Boehm is to be taken seriously.

Mr Balfour summarizes S Tittoni’s questions, and states that he thinks they had been answered by the fact that our representatives at Vienna believed that Boehm was to be trusted, and was doing no more than asking for certain specific things.

S Tittoni says that he is not of the opinion that explicit answers had been given, and that more detailed replies should be obtained.

Mr Balfour then asks Mr Hoover if he is not justified in saying that the questions had really been answered.

Mr Hoover replies that, in his opinion, it is dangerous for the Allied and Associated Governments to open negotiations with secret agents. Would it not be possible to make a public declaration of policy and to allow Boehm to make his own deductions from it? Such a declaration might take the form of a statement to the effect that economic assistance would be given to a properly constituted government, and that such a statement would not bind the Conference to subsequent military action.

Mr Balfour points out that the fact that Bela Kun had not carried out the Armistice and had made war against our Allies stood out. He remarks that he would conclude his proposals by saying that, if any responsible government should be set up in Hungary, economic aid would be furnished it by the Allied and Associated Powers. He asks, however, whether the conclusion of the Council was that whether military action should be taken or the situation allowed to remain in its present state. He ask, in conclusion, how the declaration could be made public.

M Clemenceau replies that it could be published in the press.

Mr White read from a telegram to the effect that Colonel Cunninghame had, on that day, interviewed Boehm, who would be ready to act in a month’s time and undertook to overthrow Bela Kun in 48 hours, but that Boehm could not act until he knew whether the Allies would approve of his plans.

M Clemenceau remarks that the capture of Budapest seemed to be an easy matter, but that the questions which would follow it were most difficult. For instance, if the Romanians entered Budapest, a very strong feeling would be excited among the Hungarians. He then asks Marshal Foch for his opinion on the actual situation of the Hungarian Army.

Marshal Foch replied that Hungary has actually not disarmed. The Army is still in the field and it mattered little whether its leader was Bela Kun or Boehm. Even though a political formula were adopted, as the basis of subsequent action, any person who received support from the Allies might subsequently adopt a new attitude with every prospect of success.

M Clemenceau then asks how Hungary could be disarmed.

Marshal Foch replies that it could be done by laying down terms so severe that disarmament would be certain. The fact remains that, instead of the 6 divisions which had been allowed to the Hungarian Army, 12 are actually in the field.

Mr Balfour then asks whether Marshal Foch believes that an effective disarmament of the Hungarian Army could take place without an occupation of a portion of their territory.

Marshal Foch answers that an ultimatum, backed by military force, could effect what was desired. The threat to attack must remain. He has already stated that the Allied Armies acting in Hungary must be commanded by a single General, who would possibly be a foreigner. Could not the civil government be instituted in the same way by the assistance of a Czechoslovak or Romanian or other nominee? Some decision was none the less necessary.

Mr Balfour points out that there is no inconsistency between the points of view of Mr Hoover and Marshal Foch. In a public notification it could be stated why the Allies could not deal with Bela Kun, and what kind of person they would consent to deal with.

(It is therefore decided that Mr Balfour and Mr Hoover should confer in the preparation of a public notification to be sent to Hungary, and that it should be presented to the Council at the afternoon meeting.)

4) M Clemenceau asks Marshal Foch to explain his report to the Conference.

Marshal Foch then reads the conclusions of his report, in which he had stated that the total strength of the Army of Occupation should be 6,500 Officers, 151,000 men and 35,000 horses. He states that these figures had been reached in consultation with the Allied Military Representatives at Versailles. He had since received a letter from General Pershing in which the latter stated that the strength of the American Forces of Occupation would be approximately 6,800 men comprised of one regiment of infantry, one group of cavalry and certain auxiliary troops. He asked whether the proposals in his report were acceptable to the Council.

Mr Balfour then asks whether the proportion and numbers of troops to be supplied by each of the Allies in the Army of Occupation had been definitely fixed; because he himself was not aware of this having been done.

General Weygand states that the only question which had been discussed at Versailles was the total effective strength and not the proportion of the strength to be furnished by each Country.

General Thwaites remarks that the proportion to be furnished by Great Britain had not yet been considered by the War Office.

(After some discussion it is agreed that the proposals of Marshal Foch’s report on the subject of the total eventual effective strength of the Armies of Occupation upon the Rhine should be accepted. It is further decided that the question of the proportions in which this total strength was to be furnished by each of the Allies should not be discussed until the War Offices of the Countries concerned had been able to examine the question.)

5) Marshal Foch submits his reply to the question laid before him by the Council, with regard to the Allied Forces necessary in the plebiscite zone in Upper Silesia. In commenting upon his reply, he draws attention to the fact that the Division required must be an Allied Division, and that each Ally must furnish an equal quota. He further draws attention to the fact that there is a clause in the Peace Treaty providing for the armed Forces under consideration.

Mr Balfour says that the question of employing British troops was most difficult and that the War Cabinet must be consulted.

M Clemenceau remarks that the question had been decided by the Council of the Heads of Delegations in the sense that an Inter-Allied Division would be necessary. He reads the previous decision on the subject.

Mr Balfour asks whether it has been decided that the Armies of Occupation on the Rhine should supply the troops.

Marshal Foch said that such a decision had been arrived at but insisted that the force must be made up by equal numbers of Allied troops.

Mr White remarks that in his opinion the former resolution of the Council had been inconsistent in that it contemplated the use of the troops taken from the Army of Occupation alone, whereas the clause of the Treaty, referred to by Marshal Foch, states that troops of all the Allies should be used. Italy, one of the Allied Powers, has no troops in the Army of Occupation.

The question of the length of time during which the Army of Occupation of the plebiscite zone would be necessary, was then raised and it was stated that whilst it might be six to eight months, the longest period contemplated was eighteen months.

Mr White, further commenting upon the resolution of the Council, asks Marshal Foch whether the Division could be raised from the Armies of Occupation when they had been reduced to their ultimate strength of 150,000 men.

Marshal Foch says that the Division could be raised under those circumstances from the Army of Occupation, but that at the same time it was necessary to get it ready at once.

(Mr Balfour again draws attention to the fact that it is necessary for him to refer the matter to Sir Henry Wilson and after a short discussion it was agreed that the question should be adjourned until Mr Balfour should have consulted with the British War Office.)

6) Mr Balfour reads aloud a draft of the telegram that he had prepared for President Wilson.

(It is agreed that M Clemenceau should communicate the despatch to the President of the United States.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)