[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, July 5, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:00

Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Powers


1. (At M Clemenceau’s request, it is agreed that experts should not be present at the Meetings of the Council but should only enter the room if specifically requested to do so by the Chairman.)

(During the following discussion, Mr Herbert Hoover, Sir William Goode and S Luigi Crespi are invited to remain.)


2. M Clemenceau asks Mr Hoover to explain the economic position in Hungary.

Mr Hoover says that the problem is that of the economic rehabilitation of Central Europe. As matters stand there is no hope of removing and distributing the Hungarian harvest unless the Danube and the railways across Hungary are reopened for traffic. The question, therefore, is not merely an internal Hungarian question, it is one of external economic relations. The action of the Hungarians has tied up the Danube and with it a large proportion of the river craft used on it. Further, the withdrawal of the German Armies from South-Eastern Europe left behind it in Hungary a large quantity of rolling stock and river craft. In order to set the economic life of Central Europe going again, it was necessary to have control of these essential means of transport. The third aspect of the question is largely political. Bolshevik ideas are impregnating the working classes throughout the area. Unless some means can be devised of abating the infection, the economic regeneration of Central and South-Eastern Europe will be difficult. Bela Kun’s government is spending a great deal of money on sending Bolshevik missionaries to industrial centers outside Hungary. This reacts on production. Moreover, the military power of the Hungarian Government is growing. A kind of nationalist passion is thereby put at the service of the revolutionary theories advocated by the Government. It is not likely that Bela Kun will abstain from spreading his theories outside the borders of Hungary by the help of this military force. The next probable victim after Czechoslovakia is Austria. The social and political aspects of the question, Mr Hoover says, are not his province, but he would like to observe that Bela Kun’s party until the last three weeks has not represented methods of violence. Latterly, however, executions have increased, which indicates that opposition is growing in the country and that the methods of red terror are being resorted to. Previously, it might have been possible to treat the Hungarian revolutionary party with indulgence. Now that it is showing a tendency to overflow its frontiers, it must be considered as an economic danger to the rest of Europe.

M Clemenceau ask Mr Hoover what he thinks of the Szegidin group.

Mr Hoover replies that this group appears to him to be composed of extreme reactionaries without any notable intellectual capacity. For instance, their deliberations of late have been devoted to the question of the resumption of the right of dueling. He does not expect much help from that party. It appears, however, that discontent with the Bela Kun Government is growing among the working classes. Information from British sources has been received to the effect that the Trade Unions would gladly see the Government upset. Communism would not appear to have penetrated very deeply into the population and the Government is becoming, like that in Russia, a tyranny of a minority. Another difficulty applying to any solution that might be suggested is the obvious duplicity of Bela Kun. In support of this Mr Hoover quotes the following messages interchanged between Lenin and Bela Kun:

1) Message sent by Lenin from Moscow to Bela Kim at Budapest of 19th June, 1919, (includes following):

“It is necessary to make the fullest possible use of every opportunity to obtain a temporary armistice or peace, in order to give the people a breathing space. But do not trust the Entente Powers for a moment. They are deceiving you, and are only attempting to gain time in order to be able to crush you and us. Try and organize postal communications with us by aeroplane.”

2) Message sent on June 21st by Bela Kun (Budapest) to Lenin (Moscow) in reply to his telegram of June 19th:

“I thank you very much for your telegram in which you approve of my foreign policy. I am very proud of being one of your best pupils but I think in one point I am superior to you, namely, in the question of ‘mala fides.’ I think I know the Entente very well. I know that they will fight us to the end. In this war, only a state of armistice can occur but never peace. This is an out and out fight. Once more I thank you for your note.”

The authenticity of these messages is supported by the fact that they had been revealed first by British sources and subsequently intercepted by Austrian wireless. Of the various solutions proposed in the memorandum he had submitted, no doubt the military occupation of Budapest would be the best. He believes it would be welcomed by the population, but it is no doubt beset with difficulties. The alternatives to this policy are a more or less mitigated recognition of the Bela Kun Government. The plan he had suggested was that the various Inter-Allied Commissions working in the neighborhood should establish economic relations with the Hungarians. There need be no direct recognition by the Governments, but by this side entrance it might be possible to obtain the opening of the river and the setting in motion of the means of transport and thereby the distribution of necessary supplies. He admits that this might possibly strengthen Bela Kun’s Government, but, on the other hand, Bela Kun is supporting himself in favour with the working class on the back of the blockade. All the hardships of the situation are attributed to the Blockade. By removing it, the Powers would deprive him of this argument and he might find it more difficult to plead his case. Whether this would neutralize the advantage of semi-recognition, he does not know.

M Clemenceau asks what is being done to re-victual Hungary?

Mr Hoover replies that nothing at all is being done. At the time when Bela Kun came to power, the Economic Council was about to re-victual Budapest, as the situation there was thought urgent. The Communist Government, however, had, on coming into power, made a stringent search for all supplies and had, by careful re-distribution, managed to feed the population tolerably well. It appeared clear that they would reach the next harvest without starvation. Communism, therefore, had saved the Allied and Associated Powers considerable expenditure on food and supplies, as, since the establishment of the Communist Government nothing whatever had been sent to Hungary.

S Tittoni says that the question of Hungary is one of the most difficult the Conference has to deal with. The Bela Kun Government is a serious threat to the neighboring countries, including Italy. There have been two periods in this movement. In the first a peaceful revolution had been brought about. The effect of this stage had been the most dangerous. The Russian Revolution had been represented to the people of Europe as being accompanied by carnage and general destruction. The Hungarian revolution had been quiet. It was, therefore, more attractive and more dangerous. It appears to many in other countries that the sequestration of private fortunes for re-distribution and the re-allotment of house room were excellent measures which might be imitated to advantage in their own countries. The second period, however, appeared to reproduce the methods of the Russians. Not only were there executions but methodical and systematic massacres had been instituted. It is very necessary therefore, to suppress the volcano. The means of doing it, however, are not clear. He admits he has no suggestions to make. The blockade obviously is not a solution. If rigidly enforced, all non-Bolsheviks will starve and Bolsheviks would eat. If, on the other hand, food is imported into the country the Government will only grow stronger. He would welcome any feasible solution that might be proposed, but he has none to make himself. There is one point, however, to which he wishes to draw special attention, and that is the reported seizure of all securities in Budapest by the Bela Kun Government. Should these securities amounting to 6 milliards of francs be exported and sold abroad, it will be useless to demand reparation from Hungary. There will be nothing left to take possession of. He thinks it is imperative to put a stop to this.

Mr Balfour says that in his extremely lucid statement Mr Hoover had approached a question of which he recognizes the great complexity from the economic side alone. The economic problem is how to make transit by all means of communication through Hungary serve the purpose of equitable distribution of means of subsistence in South-Eastern Europe. This cannot be brought about unless the situation in Hungary is radically changed. Neither Mr Hoover nor S Tittoni offered any plan for a complete alteration of that situation. He believes, therefore, that the case must be approached from the military side. A short time ago the Council of Four had sent orders to the Hungarian, Czechoslovak and Romanian Governments with the object of promoting Peace among them. These orders had only been half carried out. Many things had happened since. Mr Bratiano, in a private conversation, had told him that the Romanians cannot and will not retire from the Theiss until the Hungarians had been disarmed. The Hungarians are withdrawing from Czechoslovakia and massing their troops in Hungary. Universal armament has been ordered. If the Romanians, therefore, retire from the Theiss, which they can defend, they do not know what lines they can hold, seeing their commitments on other frontiers. He thinks there is force in the argument put forward by Mr Bratiano. He has caused further inquiries to be made and had discovered that the Hungarians have not carried out their Armistice engagements. They have not reduced their troops to six divisions; in fact, they appeared to have doubled their forces.

He therefore suggests that the Military Authorities be requested, through their agents on the spot, to order the Hungarians to disarm in accordance with the stipulations of the armistice. This is not only the right of the Allied Powers but their duty. It should be made known in Hungary itself that until this has been done there can be no kind of negotiations with the Hungarian Government. Should it persist in breaking the terms of the armistice, military action should follow. We had some hope that the threat alone would overthrow Bela Kun’s Government. Should it not, the Powers are bound to do to Hungary what they would have done to Germany had she broken the armistice. To carry this out it will be necessary to organize the Romanian, Czechoslovak, Serbian and French troops at hand. When the Hungarians have been disarmed there will then be no excuse for the Romanians not to retire after this, when Hungary has been put into her right place, negotiations could be undertaken either with Bela Kun or his successors. By this means the evil of giving credit to Bela Kun, which Mr Hoover has shown is to be feared, will be avoided. At the present time Vienna is in danger and perhaps Romania. This could be stopped by prompt military action, which would be justified by Hungary’s flagrant breach of the armistice.

M Clemenceau says that he would like to state his opinion, though he fears it will not be a very clear one. He has agreed thus far with all the speakers. The situation reminds him of the La Fontaine fable in which a gathering of rats decided to hang a bell round a cat’s neck. All agreed this was desirable but no one knew how to do it. He thinks that the situation has been accurately described by Mr Hoover. He acquiesces in all S Tittoni had said, and he thinks Mr Balfour has said excellent things. But how were the Powers to do what he proposed? France is demobilizing and cannot stop the process. At the end of October there will be but three classes with the Colors; that is to say the Army will be on a peace footing. The French Chamber is resolutely opposed to intervention in Russia. He thinks the Chamber is right, seeing the results hitherto obtained; a milliard or so is being thrown away on the expedition in Siberia. This is an absurd expense and cannot continue. If Parliament, therefore, declines to fight Bolshevism in Russia, it will equally refuse to fight it in Hungary. Mr Balfour’s argument that the Hungarians had accepted the armistice and had then broken it and therefore deserved coercion is a strong one, if indeed they had accepted it. But what troops does Mr Balfour mean to use to coerce the Hungarians? He had mentioned Czechs, Romanians and French.

Mr Balfour adds and Serbs.

M Clemenceau says that they will require money. He for one cannot supply any. Moreover, Germany for the time being seems ready to fulfill her engagements and to behave well. Should the Germans, however, see the Entente thoroughly embarrassed in Hungary this attitude might change. The march on Budapest had been thought of before. In particular the Italians seem disposed to go there, and he heard that General Segro has gone to Rome to advocate the policy.

S Tittoni says that the Italian Parliament is of the same mind as the French.

M Clemenceau says that no strong economic argument can be brought to bear on the Hungarians. Whether the blockade is raised or not, little effect can be produced on internal policy. The population can hold out. He has some doubts about the capacity of the Czechs to fight the Hungarians. The Romanians might or might not be willing. At the present time they seem considerably dissatisfied with the Peace Conference. There are no British or American troops available. French and Italian troops therefore seem called upon to do the work. He must state clearly that for his part he cannot undertake it. He has consulted Marshal Foch and General Franchet d’Esperey, who had often wished to march on Budapest. He has asked for plans, and has been supplied with a plan more ambitious than that of Napoleon’s march on Moscow. French, British and Italian contingents are required. The fact is that both the peoples and the Parliaments of the Entente countries are anxious to settle the crisis more quickly than is really possible. After the vast upheaval of the war and the pulverization of military forces, and, on top of it, the universal inclination towards social revolution, it is hardly possible to produce order in a short time. The Conference had tried to establish justice in the world. This was not the first time that such an attempt had been made. All know what had resulted before. It is now clear to all who had taken part in the Conference how difficult it is to draw even frontiers equitably. His Italian colleague would doubtless agree with him. People like the Russians, who had been slaves under a terrible despotism, had thought that liberty could be exercised without self-control. They had betrayed their Allies and caused them immense losses. The evil had spread. Italy, though an old and wise community, had been shaken up. Great Britain and France had had their troubles. There had been disaffection in the French Navy and even in the Army. The world was sick of fighting. The Conference had therefore to deal with revolutions in military power, alterations of frontiers, and social revolutions inspired by no ideas. It had been thought that the Russian people would recover. That was a mistake; owing to the vastness of the Russian territory somehow the Russian people had survived its own disasters, but all intervention to assist them to establish a reasonable Government had been in vain. Now the evil has attacked Hungary, which had not been anticipated, as it was a country of peasants and relatively rich. The policy he had to offer was not one of which he was proud. It was simply this - to hold the issues and to wait. He says this after taking into consideration the feelings of the Entente Peoples, and of their Parliaments. All are in a hurry to cease fighting, and to resume normal life. They are probably wrong, but that feeling cannot be gainsaid. This is not a noble policy, and might be said to look like impotence. He will not deny it. But, after losing hundreds of thousands of lives and spending the national treasure, he thinks no other policy is possible. As to Hungary, he knows the country a little. Before the war the people had been the slaves of Germany, merely because they thought that Germany was the strongest power, but there was more common-sense there than in Russia. He had been struck in Mr Hoover’s statement by the fact that the trades unions were sick of the Communist Government. He would therefore follow Mr Balfour’s policy so far as to threaten Hungary with intervention should they not observe the armistice. Then he would consult the military experts. If military action has to be undertaken, all will have to help, and much money will have to be spent. In the meantime, however, he hopes that Providence might furnish some means of escape. It is not his nature to temporize, but in this case he will. Hungary could be surrounded by a “cordon sanitaire”; Communism would not last long in that country. If the Generals recommend a plan similar to that shown him some months ago by Marshal Foch he feels sure that no Government will undertake the task of coercing Hungary. It is not a showy policy that he recommends, but it was the best he can offer.

Mr Lansing observes that there is one question of urgent necessity, namely, that of making peace with Hungary. To do this it is necessary to have someone there to make peace with. Does the Council propose to make peace with Bela Kun? If not, with whom? If it cannot be made with Bela Kun, pressure must be brought to bear on him to go. The only means of doing this appear to be military means.

(At this point General Bliss, General Sackville-West, General Thwaites, General Belin and General Cavallero enter the room.)

M Clemenceau asks General Bliss to show what forces and what methods he thinks would be necessary to compel Bela Kun’s Government to respect the armistice if other means failed, and what hope of success he entertains.

General Bliss says that some six weeks ago, at the request of the Council of Four, the Military Representatives at Versailles had made a report on the means that might be taken to prevent a Hungarian attack on Czechoslovakia. The report had been to the effect that if military measures had to be resorted to, the troops used must be those on the spot, namely, Romanian, Serbian and French troops. It was then believed that the troops available locally would be sufficient. This was the opinion of the French General Staff. Since then, however, Bela Kun’s troops had increased from 150,000 to 220,000 armed men. The situation had also changed in other respects, and he is unable to say whether the troops then considered sufficient would be sufficient now. There had been an inconclusive discussion in the Council of Four on the report. Since that date he knows nothing of what had been decided. If the plan then recommended had been thought workable, it should have been submitted to General Franchet d’Esperey. This, as far as he knows, had not been done. Moreover, he cannot say whether the Romanians and Serbians would act. As far as he is concerned, he thinks the question requires study at Versailles, in order that he might exchange views with his colleagues on the new situation.

General Cavallero agrees with General Bliss that a new study of the subject is necessary. The action now required is not quite the same as that contemplated previously, and in the meantime the Hungarian army has increased.

General Belin said that all the Military Representatives had agreed that a demonstration of force would have been sufficient when they were previously consulted. He still believes that a demonstration by the forces locally available would be enough to overthrow the Bela Kun Government.

M Clemenceau says that he does not wish the Military Advisers to restrict their recommendations to the employment of forces at present on the spot. If more are required, he expects them to say so.

General Sackville-West says that he is in accord with his Military colleagues. He would like to re-consider the question.

M Clemenceau asks how soon a report can be obtained.

General Buss says that if all the information required were available, the report could be made within 48 hours.

Mr Balfour asks whether, in view of the flagrant breach of the armistice by Bela Kun’s Government, it would not be well to warn him at once that he must observe the armistice. He would be ready, however, if his colleagues preferred it, to wait 48 hours until the report of the Military Representatives had been received.

(It is agreed that the report be awaited.)

General Bliss points out that it will be necessary to consult the Commander-in-Chief on the spot.

M Clemenceau says that it will be sufficient to consult Marshal Foch, who has all the necessary information from General Franchet d’Esperey.

Mr Lansing asks that the Military Representatives add to their report a brief account of the armament at the disposal of the Hungarian Army, and of their means of replenishing this armament. In particular, he would like to know whether it was made within the country or imported from without.

(The following resolution is then adopted:

“It was decided that the Military Representatives at Versailles in consultation with Marshal Foch, should examine the military possibilities of enforcing on Hungary respect for the Armistice conditions accepted, and make a report to the Council in 48 hours. The Military Representatives were also asked to report on the means of munitionment at the disposal of the Hungarian Government.”)

(The Military Experts then withdraw.)

S Tittoni then suggests that the Allies take steps to forbid the exportation of all the securities seized by the Bela Kun Government, as the disposal of these securities abroad would render nugatory any claim for reparation on Hungary.

(The following resolution is then adopted:

“That the Financial Commission be asked to submit at a very early date to the Council, a proposal for preventing the sale abroad of securities seized by order of the Bela Kun Government in Hungary.”)


3. At Mr. Lansing’s proposal, the following resolution is adopted:

“Colonel W. N. Haskell, U. S. A., is appointed by this Council to act as High Commissioner in Armenia on behalf of the United States, British, French and Italian Governments, it being understood that Colonel Haskell will be coincidentally appointed to take full charge of all relief measures in Armenia by the various relief organisations operating there. All representatives of the United States, British, French, and Italian Governments in Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Constantinople are to be at once instructed to co-operate with and give support to Colonel Haskell.”

(The Meeting then adjourns.)