[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, June 25, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Five

(M Dutasta, Secretary-General of the Peace Conference, is introduced.)


1. M Dutasta said that he had seen von Haniel, who told him he had telegraphed twice to Berlin asking who the German representatives would be and when they were due to arrive, but had received no answer. Von Haniel had added that the German Government had moved from Weimar to Berlin and that their first Cabinet Council in Berlin was to be held this morning. On the conclusion of that, he expected an answer. M Dutasta had asked him to communicate again and he had promised to do so immediately. According to von Haniel, the German Government was encountering great difficulty in finding persons ready to sign the Treaty. He had made von Haniel understand that an answer was expected this evening, or tomorrow at the latest.

M Clemenceau instructs M Dutasta to proceed to Versailles tomorrow morning at 09:00 unless he has heard in the meanwhile from Colonel Henri.


2. M Mantoux says that M Tardieu is in attendance to obtain a decision of principle on a point connected with the desire of the French Government to be allowed to buy or to borrow United States ships for communication with the French Colonies, for which France has a great insufficiency of shipping.

M Clemenceau says the question should first be sent to experts.

(It is agreed, on President Wilson’s suggestion, that M Tardieu should arrange for a joint memorandum to be prepared by the experts of the Allied and Associated Powers.)


3. M Clemenceau, in reply to Mr Lloyd George, says it is his intention to hand the Treaty of Peace to Parliament as soon as possible after the signature. He will not make any explanatory speech and the next step will be for the examination of the Treaty by the Commissions of the Chamber and Senate. He does not expect to make his own statement until after the various Commissions have reported, perhaps not for three weeks.

President Wilson says that he, himself, will leave Paris immediately after the signature of the Treaty. As soon as he arrives in the United States, he will take the Treaty to Congress.

M Clemenceau thinks there are advantages in President Wilson making the first speech on the subject.

President Wilson says that, in his country, questions will then be asked as to why other Governments had done nothing.

Mr Lloyd George says that he could fit in his speech about the same time as President Wilson’s, although he is anxious to be away for the second and third weeks after his arrival in England.

Baron Sonnino says that the responsibility will be with the new Italian Government, but he thinks there is little doubt they will proceed as rapidly as possible. In view of the necessity of reports by Commissions, probably a fortnight or so will elapse before the Treaty can be ratified.


4. Mr Lloyd George brings forward a proposal he had received from Sir Ernest Pollock, the English Solicitor-General, suggesting that, in the light of the experience gained at Scapa Flow and the burning of French flags, steps should be taken to make the execution of Clauses 214 to 224 (Repatriation of Prisoners) and Clauses 227 to 230 (Penalties) interdependent.

(It is generally agreed that this suggestion is a useful one and should be taken note of, but that no immediate decision should be taken for its adoption.)


5. Mr Lloyd George suggests to his colleagues that the Trial of the Kaiser should take place in some Allied country removed from those where resentment at the Kaiser was naturally the most acute. He suggests that either Great Britain or the United States of America would be the most advantageous from this point of view.

President Wilson suggests that the Trial of the Kaiser should not take place in any great city.

M Clemenceau says he would like to consult his colleagues on the subject and would give a reply on the following day.


6. Mr Lloyd George reads a Note from Admiral Hope regarding the disposition of surrendered German and Austrian surface ships and submarines.

Sir Maurice Hankey points out that a report has already been furnished by the Allied Admirals in regard to submarines, Admiral De Bon having made a minority report.

(It is agreed that the Allied Admirals should be asked to prepare a report advising the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers as to what course they now recommended on all three heads.)


7. M Clemenceau adverts to the point he had raised at the morning meeting, namely, that France should be compensated for the loss she had incurred by the sinking of German ships at Scapa Flow, by being given some of the remaining German merchant ships and particularly oil tankers.

(It is agreed that a Commission, composed as follows:

Mr Baruch for the United States of America,
Mr Hipwood (or representative) for the British Empire,
M Monet (or representative) for France,
M Crespi (or representative) for Italy, and
A Japanese representative to be nominated by Baron Makino,

should meet to consider the possibility of exacting from Germany some reparation for the sinking of warships at Scapa Flow in the form of further merchant ships, special consideration being given to the case of oil tank vessels.)


8. President Wilson reads the following questions presented by the Superior Blockade Council:

1) Does the Supreme Council, in view of the authorization given by the Weimar Assembly to the German Delegates, desire that all restrictions upon trade with Germany shall be rescinded immediately upon the signatures of the Treaty of Peace by the German Delegation?

2) If not, upon what date shall these restrictions be rescinded?

3) When is the German Delegation expected to sign? If the Supreme Council desires that the blockade restrictions shall be raised upon the signature of the Treaty by the German Delegates and if the signature is likely to take place on Saturday, it is desirable that the Blockade Council should be so informed today. At least two days are required in which to terminate the present restrictions.

At M Clemenceau’s request the following note prepared by M Mantoux is read:

“Provision ought to be made for the eventuality of the German Government signing the Treaty of Peace, but delaying its ratification in the hope to embarrass the Allies and to take advantage of any incidents that might arise.

In 1871, it was stipulated by Article 3 of the Preliminaries of Peace that the German troops were to evacuate Paris and the forts on the left bank of the Seine immediately after the act of ratification. Much to the surprise of the Germans, the Preliminaries which had been signed on February 26th, 1871, were ratified by the Bordeaux Assembly as soon as March 1st, and the exchange of ratifications took place at Versailles the day after. Paris was evacuated at once, after less than two days of occupation, and the triumphal entry of Wilhelm I, which had been prepared for March 3rd, was cancelled.

It may be useful today to remind the Germans of the fact that the blockade shall cease at the same moment as the state of war, and that legally what brings the state of war to an end is the exchange of ratifications. But for the sake of humanity, the Allied and Associated Governments may concede that as soon as they have been officially notified the ratification of the treaty by the National Assembly of Germany the blockade shall be raised.

Such a declaration would encourage Germany to ratify the Treaty without delay, without fixing a narrow time limit to the debates in the representative Assemblies of the Allied and Associated countries.”

Mr Lloyd George said that this seems reasonable.

President Wilson reminds his colleagues of his reluctance to make women and children suffer for matters over which they exercised no influence. Nevertheless, the course proposed seemed the best in the circumstances.

M Clemenceau says that in the Rhine provinces there is little hardship.

President Wilson says that in the interior of Germany Mr Hoover reported great shortage.

(It is agreed that the Blockade should cease on the same date as the ratification of the Treaty of Peace, as provided for at the end of the Treaty.)


9. Mr Lloyd George suggests that a special Committee should be set up to consider the working out of the various measures for putting the Treaty of Peace with Germany into effect.

(The proposal is accepted in principle, and it is agreed that the members should be designated on the following day.)


10. The Council has before them a report by the Commission on Baltic affairs on the question submitted to it by the Council on the 23rd June, as to the effect which the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces by Germany would have on the food supplies in this region, in the event of the removal of the rolling stock by the Germans.

President Wilson, after reading the report aloud, suggests that the second proposal of the Commission should be adopted, but he considers that the first proposal to take advantage of Article 375 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany is not feasible. He suggests that Marshal Foch should be asked to take the necessary action through the Armistice Commission.

(It is agreed that a copy of the Memorandum by the Baltic Commission should be sent to Marshal Foch, who should be asked to demand from the Germans that when evacuating the Baltic provinces they should leave behind the German railway material now in these provinces as part of the railway material which Germany was bound to deliver to the Allies in accordance with the terms of Clause VII of the Armistice of November 11, 1918, and which has not yet been delivered. The railway material so left would legally be the property of the Allied and Associated Powers and not of the Baltic States.

It is further agreed that it is to the interest of the Allied Powers to secure the restoration as soon as possible in the Baltic provinces of the Russian gauge on the railways in view of the closer economic connections of these provinces with Russia than with Germany.)


11. The Council has before them a report from the Commission on Baltic Affairs, covering the recommendation made by the United States, British and French representatives at Libau.

President Wilson, after reading the Report and enclosure aloud, remarks that the program unhappily is not one that is practicable.

Mr Lloyd George comments on the fact that peoples fighting for their liberties want to have even their soldiers paid by the Allies.

President Wilson says that probably they have no resources for paying them themselves.

Mr Lloyd George reads a telegram from the British Commission at Helsingfors in regard to the complicated position that has arisen involving fighting between Estonians and Latvians.

(In the course of a short discussion it is pointed out:

1) That a military mission of the Allied & Associated Powers under General Gough, has already been sent to the Baltic Provinces.

2) That Marshal Foch has already ordered the Germans to evacuate the Baltic provinces under the terms of the Armistice of November 11, 1918.

3) That the Council has sanctioned supplies being given to the Baltic provinces, and that General Gough has been asked to advise as to what these supplies should consist of, as a preliminary to arrangements being made as to who is to give the supplies.

It is agreed that no further financial assistance to the Baltic provinces can be at present given.)


12. Following on the remarks he had made at the morning meeting, Mr Lloyd George proposes the text of a note to the German Delegation in regard to their intrigues on the Eastern frontier.

After the note has been read and a few suggestions made, it is approved and signed by M Clemenceau on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers in the attached form.

(It is agreed that the letter and the enclosure should be published.)


13. Mr Lloyd George says that the present military position in Russia is that Kolchak’s thrust, intended eventually to reach Moscow, had failed. The intention had been as a first step to unite at Kotlas with the forces based at Archangel. The Bolshevists there had driven Kolchak’s army back. Meanwhile, in the south Denikin had inflicted a severe defeat on Kolchak. The Don Cossacks had risen, and had taken 50,000 prisoners and 300 guns from the Bolshevists, and were now just outside Tsaritzen. Hence the latest information is that Kolchak is doing badly but that Denikin had routed his adversaries. Russia.


14. Mr Lloyd George says he has received a note from Mr Churchill submitting a proposal for cooperation of the Czechoslovak troops in Siberia with the right wing of Admiral Kolchak’s army, and requesting that the matter might be dealt with as one of extreme urgency.

(It is agreed that the question should be referred to the military representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, a Japanese and a Czechoslovak military representative being added for the purpose.)


15. M Clemenceau says that he has received a letter from the Chinese Delegation stating that they will sign the Treaty of Peace with Germany, with a reservation relating to Shantung. He replied that they must either sign the with the intention of abiding by it or not sign. They are just as much bound to honor their signature as the Germans were.

President Wilson says that Mr Lansing had spoken to him of this, and had said that any sovereign Power could make reservations in signing.

M Clemenceau reminds President Wilson that when the Romanian and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegations had spoken of signing with reservations, they had been asked to say what they intended by this. A Treaty which was signed with reservations was not a Treaty.

Mr Lloyd George points out that the Italians had said they made certain reservations, but they would sign the German Treaty without any reservation.

Baron Makino says that the Japanese Delegation had objected to many of the decisions of Commissions, but had bowed to the decision of the majority. The Treaty would have no effect if anyone could make reservations.

President Wilson suggests that someone should be asked to inquire from the Chinese Delegation what was reserved and what was intended by their reservation. If it is merely a protest, they are entitled to make this. He understands the Chinese Delegation are acting under specific instructions from their Government.

M Clemenceau instructs Captain Portier to ask M Pichon to see a representative of the Chinese Delegation and to inquire the subjects on which they were making reservations, and whether their reservation amounted to more than a protest.

(Captain Portier telephones this decision immediately to the Quai d’Orsay.)


16. Mr Lloyd George asks that the question of Turkey might be considered. President Wilson will shortly be leaving. It is unreasonable to maintain a state of war with Turkey for the next two months. Would it not be possible, he asks, to agree on some Peace Terms which would put Turkey out of her misery, outlining the frontiers of Turkey, but leaving the final dispositions of the territory that had not to remain Turkish until it was known whether the United States would accept a mandate.

President Wilson agrees that the final dispositions of Turkey ought not to be left for two months. His colleagues know his mind on the subject, and can discuss the future arrangements of Turkey. He suggests that the portions which Turkey is to lose might be cut off and the Treaty might provide that she should accept the dispositions of the Allied and Associated Powers in regard to them, just as had been done in the case of Austria.

M Clemenceau points out that this involves the question of Constantinople.

President Wilson says that the amputations will involve Mesopotamia, Syria and Armenia. The Allied troops will remain there to keep order until the final settlement between the Allied and Associated Powers.

Mr Lloyd George asks what will be done about Armenia. There are no Allied troops there. Turkey at present has some responsibility for the maintenance of order. If Armenia is cut off from Turkey, the Turkish troops will be withdrawn, and the Armenians will be left at the mercy of the Kurds. It will involve putting in some garrisons.

M Clemenceau asks what will be done about the Italians in Asia-Minor.

President Wilson says that this will not concern the Turks. He thinks some formula might be worked out.

Mr Lloyd George says that the district in question either belongs to the Turks or it does not. If it does, the Turk will say “What are the Italians doing here?”, and the Allies can only reply that the Italian occupation has been made without their knowledge or consent.

Baron Sonnino demurs to this statement.

President Wilson says that his proposal in regard to Turkey would be to cut off all that Turkey was to give up, and to oblige Turkey to accept any conditions with regard to oversight or direction which the Allied and Associated Governments might agree to. His present view is that a mandate over Turkey would be a mistake, but he thinks some Power ought to have a firm hand. Constantinople and the Straits should be left as a neutral strip for the present, and it is already in Allied occupation. He would make the Sultan and his Government move out of Constantinople and he would say what was ceded to the Allied and Associated Powers. He is only arguing now as to what could be legally settled as a basis for a Treaty, and he is not attempting to decide an ultimate settlement. He only proposes an arrangement similar to what is being made in the case of Austria.

Mr Lloyd George points out that this involves the question of whether the Turk is to go out of Constantinople.

President Wilson says that so far as his judgment is concerned, that is decided. He has studied the question of the Turks in Europe for a long time, and every year confirmed his opinion that they ought to be cleared out.


17. Mr Lloyd George says he has received a telegram from Feisal in regard to the United States Mission complaining of a breach of faith that the Commission is not an Allied Commission. Feisal had interpreted a telegram that General Allenby had sent him, as suggesting that Great Britain would take a mandate for Syria if no other Power would do so. At his request Mr Balfour had drafted a telegram to General Allenby stating in the most specific terms that in no circumstances would Great Britain take this mandate, and calling his attention to Mr Lloyd George’s statement on this subject made at an earlier Meeting in General Allenby’s presence.


18. President Wilson says that the hour is approaching when some demand will have to be made to Holland in regard to the surrender of the Kaiser. He is anxious that the demand should be made in such a form as would relieve Holland of any appearance of breach of hospitality.

Mr Lloyd George points out that a new principle is involved in this Treaty. A great crime had been perpetrated against the nations of the world. It had taken five years to bring this question to fruition, and the Allies cannot afford to allow Holland to stand in the way.

President Wilson agrees that Holland is morally obliged to surrender the Kaiser, but he wishes to make it as easy for her as possible.

M Clemenceau said he would be surprised if Holland objected.

(It is agreed that Mr Lansing, who had acted as Chairman on the Commission on Responsibilities, should be asked to draft for the consideration of the Council, a despatch to the Dutch Government. President Wilson undertakes to inform Mr. Lansing.)


19. The Council takes formal note of the Note prepared for them by the Drafting Committee.


20. The Council approves the Note to the Polish Government submitted by the Council of Foreign Ministers.

(The following Note is signed by the five Heads of Governments:

“June 25, 1919.

Polish Government, Warsaw.

With a view to protecting the persons and the property of the peaceful population of Eastern Galicia against the dangers to which they are exposed by the Bolshevist bands, the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers decided to authorize the forces of the Polish Republic to pursue their operations as far as the river Zbruck.

This authorization does not, in any way, affect the decisions to be taken later by the Supreme Council for the settlement of the political status of Galicia.”

The Note is signed by the representatives of the Five Powers, and is communicated by Captain Portier to a messenger who had brought it from the Council of Foreign Ministers.)


21. The Council agreed that the final text of the Note to the Turkish Government, together with the document read by the Turkish Delegation to the Council of Ten,6 should be published after it had been sent to the Turks.


22. The Council has before them the Note from the Turkish Delegation dated June 23rd, which is read aloud by President Wilson.

(It is generally agreed that the document was not a very serious one.)

Mr Lloyd George asks that before a reply is sent, a full discussion on the Turkish question should take place. It would be a great advantage if a short, sharp Peace with Turkey could be decided on while the Turkish Delegation are still in Paris.

M Clemenceau said he is not very hopeful of reaching a result.

(The proposal is agreed to.)


23. (It is agreed that, if possible, the questions of Reparation and Finance in the Austrian Treaty, which are at present the result of negotiation with the New States formerly forming part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, should be considered on the morrow.)


24. The Council has before them a draft letter to the German Delegation prepared by Mr Balfour and M Loucheur, with the assistance of M Fromageot and Mr Hurst, concerning the sinking of the German ships.

(The letter is approved with the substitution in the seventh paragraph of the word “justification” for the word “explanation”.

(It is agreed that the letter should be sent to the Germans immediately, and published in the newspapers on Thursday, June 26th.)


25. Mr Lloyd George insists on the importance of settling the form of the Mandates.

President Wilson agrees, but says he wishes to read the question up.