[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, June 25, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Five


(Captain Portier is present during this discussion.)

1. M Clemenceau reads the following letter from the German Delegation:The Rhine Convention

“Versailles, June 24th, 1919.

Mr President,

In accordance with instructions received from the Imperial Minister of Foreign Affairs, I have the honor to inquire from the Allied and Associated Governments when the negotiations can begin on the subject of an agreement relating to the occupied Rhenish territories.

Von Haniel.”

Sir Maurice Hankey, at M Clemenceau’s request, reads the pertinent article of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, namely, Article 432.

“All matters relating to the occupation and not provided for by the present Treaty shall be regulated by subsequent agreements which Germany hereby undertakes to observe.”

Mr Lloyd George says he will take no risks and will insist on the Germans signing without any discussion.

President Wilson and Baron Sonnino agree.

M Mantoux, at M Clemenceau’s request, then reads the following draft of a letter prepared by the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference:

“Monsieur le Président,

In acknowledging the receipt of your letter of June 24 with reference to the agreement as to the military occupation of the territories of the Rhine, I have the honor to remind you that under Article 432 of the conditions of peace, now accepted by the German Government, Germany is bound thereby to accept the terms of this agreement.

There is therefore no need to open negotiations on the subject and the instrument in question must be signed under the same conditions as the Treaty.”

M Clemenceau suggests that in the last line the words “under the same conditions” should be deleted, and there should be substituted the words “at the same time.”

(This is agreed to, and Captain Portier is asked to prepare a text for M Clemenceau’s signature.)

Captain Portier on his return states that M Fromageot does not like the use of the words “at the same time”. His objection is on the ground that Article 432 speaks of “subsequent agreements”, whereas if signed at the same time, it would be a “simultaneous agreement”.

(It is agreed to ignore this objection and M Clemenceau signs the letter, which is dispatched to the German Delegation.)


2. President Wilson reads the Report furnished by the Allied Admirals.

M Clemenceau says that for reasons he has already given, he cannot confine himself to a purely naval point of view. The action of the Germans in sinking their ships at Scapa Flow must be considered in connection with the information as to their intentions in Poland, which is confirmed from many quarters.

Mr Lloyd George comments on the fact that the information from Poland had been published in the newspapers without any explanation being asked for from the Germans.

M Clemenceau says it is useless to ask for explanations, as the Germans will only say that we had falsified the document. His view is that nothing should be done to delay the signature of Peace. All he will do today is write to the Germans on the questions of the sinking of the ships and the burning of the flags. The Polish affair will grow in a day or two, and give ample reasons for action.

Mr Lloyd George thinks it would be much better to take action to stop the development on the Polish front. The Germans now know that the Allies are aware that the movement there was not spontaneous, and could probably be stopped.

M Clemenceau agrees that it is worth trying.

President Wilson recalls that an alleged letter from Erzberger, which had been alluded to before at the Council, had turned out to be false. It had been traced to Polish sources. While he has the utmost confidence in Mr Paderewski (Mr Lloyd George says he also has this confidence), he suspects Polish sources of information. Consequently, he would like to have confirmation of the information as to German intentions on the Eastern front from other sources, before taking action.

M Clemenceau says that he is thinking of sending an officer today to Warsaw to photograph the intercepted document.

Mr Lloyd George points out that all that has been done up to the present was to publish it in the “Matin”. We ought to write to the Germans and say that this document had come into our hands, and to inform them that if the information should prove correct, the Germans would be held responsible.

Baron Sonnino agrees, provided that the signature of the Treaty of Peace was not retarded.

M Clemenceau says he has received a dispatch from Poland to the effect that the Polish Government are doing their best to prevent the peasants in Upper Silesia from being goaded into a rising against the Germans.

Mr Lloyd George says that riots must be expected though he does not anticipate serious fighting. The German Government ought to be told that they will be held responsible.

M Clemenceau offers to bring all the papers on the subject to the afternoon meeting.

President Wilson says that the sinking of the German ships at Scapa Flow has been a constant subject in his thoughts. The more he considers the matter, the more doubtful he feels. On the previous day he had met his four colleagues of the American Delegation, in order to learn their views. Mr Lansing, who is a very experienced international lawyer, said he seriously doubts whether the German Government could be held responsible for something that had happened outside their jurisdiction. If the ships had been sunk on the High Seas, or in a German Port, his doubts would be removed, but he very much doubts whether the German Government could be held responsible in International Law for what had happened in Scapa Flow. About the responsibility of the German Admiral, he has no doubt. The Allied and Associated Powers are now about to make Peace. They are dealing with a people of such a character that this new act makes no difference to our knowledge of it. Difficulties of this kind will often occur in connection with the carrying out of the Treaty. The Germans will be tricky and would perhaps often destroy things that they had undertaken to return, alleging that the destruction had been perpetrated by irresponsible persons over whom they had no control. Hence, it is necessary to face the issue as to whether if they did so, we are prepared to renew the war. All we can say at present is that the sinking of these ships is a violation of the Armistice. If we treat it as a violation of the Armistice, it will lead to an outbreak of war. He recalls that the Armistice continues in operation until the ratification of Peace by Germany and three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Until these ratifications are deposited, the Armistice will prevail. To take any military action is to abrogate the Armistice and to create a state of war while we are awaiting ratification. It would be a very serious step after we had signed the Treaty of Peace, thus to abrogate the Armistice and renew the war.

M Clemenceau suggests that it will not be the Allies who renew it.

President Wilson points out that if action is taken by the Allies, they will have to sweep the Armistice aside and there will be a state of war.

M Clemenceau does not agree in this. He points out that in the paper by the legal advisers, the action of the Germans gives the right to proceed to such further measures as the Allied and Associated Powers might deem appropriate.

Mr Lloyd George does not consider this would entitle them to occupy a city which was left to Germany under the terms of the Treaty of Peace, which had been signed.

Baron Sonnino says that if action is taken after signing, it will be taken in France as a great recoil and a surrender of victory, as well as an act of violation of the Armistice undertaken by the Allies.

M Clemenceau says that there are two questions; one of International Law, and one of policy. As regards the first, the Council had all agreed yesterday that the action of the Germans constituted a violation of the Armistice. His own opinion is unchanged. The Allies are free to take note of it, or to say nothing about it, or to say it was an excellent thing, but they cannot say it is not a violation of the Armistice. In his view, they are either forced to act, or otherwise to find some further means of protest. It is impossible for them to do otherwise. No Parliament in France will tolerate inaction. France alone has suffered from this action. Coming to the question of policy, President Wilson said he was not prepared to renew the war. The losses of the French had been greater than those of their Allies. In all quarters, demobilization was demanded. In the lobby, on the previous day, many Deputies had spoken to him of this. Consequently, he has no desire to reopen the war. But there is a great and supreme political interest at stake which prevails over these considerations. Germany has shown every possible proof of bad faith at every point. She has committed a number of violations of the Armistice. Germany is not now in a position to resist, but if the Allies were to wait each time and take no action, the day would come when Germany would violate the Treaty of Peace, when the Allies were no longer together and when the soldiers had all been demobilized. Hence, in his view, this was the psychological moment at which to say that we insisted on proper reparation. To take action now will have a very great influence on the future doings of Germany. If this opportunity is lost, he begs President Wilson to remember that the Treaty will be in great danger.

Mr Lloyd George says he is most reluctant to intervene in this discussion. Although the British Admiralty had made the strongest possible protest against interning instead of surrendering the German Fleet, nevertheless, the ships had been sunk in a British Port and under British care. This is the reason of his reluctance. He had consulted such of his colleagues as were in Paris, and they were quite clear as to their views. It is not a question as to whether to allow flagrant violation of the Armistice by Germany to pass without protest, or for not exacting punishment or compensation. That is not the point. The real point is that the form of compensation should have some relation to the offence. Hence, the question arises as to whether in compensation for the sinking of the ships, the Allies are entitled to seize a town after the signature of Peace. This offence had taken place last Saturday. The Treaty would be signed a week later. In the meanwhile, the Treaty contained a precise definition of the areas of occupation. In these circumstances, to occupy other territory would be a little bit tricky.

If Essen is to be occupied, the Allies ought to do so now. The only reason we did not do so was because we were afraid the Germans would not sign. This was admitted in these conversations, and this was the reason why it was proposed not to tell them. At the present time the whole feeling of the world is against Germany, and their action at Scapa Flow, and more especially in burning the French flags, had accentuated this feeling. The burning of the flags is felt to be a wanton insult. But to get the Germans to sign, knowing perfectly well that after their signature we did not intend to adhere to the letter of the Treaty, but proposed to advance further into Germany, would outrage the sense of decent people. The position of British public opinion is different from that of the French, and he does not want to have trouble with it. The Germans are old enemies of the French, and were the enemies of the British for the first time. Although British public opinion had been solid to march to Berlin if the Germans would not sign, nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that there is some feeling against the Treaty, including a considerable feeling among intellectuals. He instances Lord Robert Cecil and the two Archbishops. What he wants to avoid is causing a feeling that the Allies are not exacting justice, but were trampling on the fallen foe. Hence, he begged his colleagues not to advance into Germany after Peace has been signed.

M Clemenceau, interrupting, says that the French troops would never advance without the consent of their Allies.

Mr Lloyd George says that M Clemenceau asked what was to be done. Would we allow the incident to pass? Certainly not, but whatever is done must be announced before the signature of peace. He will take the risk of that. First he would punish those who were responsible, and this would apply not only to the German Admiral, who should be court-martialled, but to those persons who had destroyed the flags, who should be put in the same category as the other Germans to be tried.

Secondly, he thinks that the Allied and Associated Powers are entitled to relevant compensation. If some action of the same kind had taken place on land, no-one would ever dream of asking for compensation on the sea. The punishment must fit the crime, and consequently must be Naval. Two German ships of the first class had been saved, namely the battle-ship Baden and the battle-cruiser Hindenburg, which he supposes is better than any battle-cruiser the British Navy had. He would say at once that as those ships had been sunk in British ports, subject to the consent of his colleagues, France must have first claim to them. To show the importance of battle cruisers, he recalls that he had had a conversation during the war with Admiral Sims, who had pointed out that in 1921 the Germans would have had a superiority in battle-cruisers, a superiority which could have been countered only by obtaining battle-cruisers from Japan. If the Germans had a superiority of one battle-cruiser it would have been extremely difficult to bring their fleet to action. In addition to the Hindenburg and the Baden, some light cruisers had been beached at Scapa, and he would say at once that so far as the British Empire was concerned, he waives all claim to them and would allow France to have them, subject to the consent of his colleagues.

President Wilson interpolated that, for his part, he agrees.

Mr Lloyd George says that as regards the rest of the German fleet, the report of the Admirals showed that it was of two categories. The first category consisted of some very useful light cruisers. Great Britain does not require these, and if France wishes to have them, he will support her claim. As regards the second category, they are said not to be of much value, but he recalls that during the war old material had often proved to be useful. He does not know what more he can offer. In regard to the flags, it is more difficult to provide for compensation. He begs, however, that France would on no account act alone in occupying some city.

M Clemenceau said he would not do so without the agreement of the Allies.

Mr Lloyd George says that nothing could be more fatal. He does not anticipate real trouble with Germany for at least ten years.

M Clemenceau thinks he is wrong, and that trouble might come at once.

Mr Lloyd George says that even if it were in five years, it is just as important that the Allies should hold together.

He feels himself to be in the position of a supplicant, handicapped by what had happened in a British port, but nevertheless he hopes that France will not insist on any action being taken as an act of retaliation after the signature of peace.

(M Clemenceau withdraws at this point to speak to M Fromageot, and on his return,)

Mr Lloyd George says that the British Government will give up all claim to the German destroyers at Scapa Flow.

President Wilson says he will give expression to the fear that had been in his mind for many weeks. So far as he can recall, the Treaty of Peace only gives one method of securing compulsion on Germany for its execution, namely that the period of occupation can be extended by the Council of the League of Nations. He has asked himself, supposing Germany acts in bad faith and does not fulfill the Treaty what can we do? In his view, any exercise of force will be an act of war and the whole Treaty would be at an end. Everyone agrees that the action of the Germans at Scapa Flow was a breach of the Armistice. But if we are to retaliate the Armistice will be off, and the war would be on.

Mr Lloyd George says that the action taken by the Germans on Saturday had been an act of war.

President Wilson says he thinks the best plan is that proposed by Mr Lloyd George, namely, to write to the Germans and tell them that the act of the German Admiral was a breach of the Armistice, and that he will be tried. Also that the Allies feel it right to demand that the German Government should make restitution as far as possible. We cannot get more than Mr Lloyd George proposed, because the Germans have no more ships. He thinks, however, that we ought to avoid military action or anything that would give the impression that we are renewing the war.

M Clemenceau says he has tried his best to agree with his colleagues, and he hopes that they will try to do something to agree with him. He had asked M Fromageot whether the occupation of Essen would be a renewal of the war, and M Fromageot had replied that it looked very much like it. It would be an act of reprisal. He will, therefore, let this drop, though he still thinks that it is the best thing to do and that this fact will be especially decisive on the Polish question. There are three questions:

First, the juridical question as to whether the Germans had broken the Armistice, and the Council are all agreed on this.

Secondly, the question of punishment of the Admiral. They are agreed on this also.

The third is the question of reparation in kind and in amount. He will acknowledge that if adequate reparation can be made in kind, this will be the best solution, but it is not easy to arrange and he does not think it is possible. He asks himself, however, whether France cannot demand some of the mercantile marine left to Germany. M Bérenger had written him yesterday and said he ought to ask for some petroleum ships. He thinks something might be done in this direction. He considers Mr Lloyd George’s proposals as to warships satisfactory in proportion to their number. Perhaps some others can be salved. His idea today is to send the Germans a letter based on the text of the report from the Legal Advisers. He will accept this report subject to the few corrections as the basis of the letter to the Germans but will add a paragraph about the burning of the flags. He will add that the Allies would demand reparation as soon as the investigations they are making allows them to do so. Today he does not wish to go further than this. A remark of President Wilson’s had put into his mind the thought that it might be useful to add a warning that if the Germans continue in this war it will be necessary for the Allies to consider the prolongation of the military occupation. This will make them think a good deal, and will be a certain compensation for public opinion in France. In the meanwhile, the naval experts should be asked to give further information about oil vessels and the merchant fleet. Consequently, he thinks he is not so far from what President Wilson had proposed.

President Wilson then reads the report by the Legal Advisers.

(It is agreed to adopt this as the basis of a letter to the German Delegation, subject to the following modifications:

In the following sentence:—

“The destruction of these ships, instead of their preservation as has been provided, constituted at once a violation of the Armistice, the destruction of the pledge handed over, and an act of insubordination towards the Allied and Associated Powers,”

It was agreed to substitute the words “Gross breach of good faith, (felonie)” for “insubordination”.

In paragraph 3 it is agreed to insert the last sentence, beginning “As regards the question whether …” as an allusion to Article 31 of the Armistice Convention of November 11th, 1918, in some such terms as the following: - “According to the principles acknowledged in Article 31 of the Armistice of November 11, 1918.”

President Wilson says he will accept it provisionally, although he does not believe Article 31 is applicable.

Baron Sonnino points out that even if the Article is not directly applicable, the principle might be applicable.

At the end of the first sentence of Para. 4, M Clemenceau suggests to add, after the word “appropriate”, the following words: - ”as reparation for the loss caused.”

(This is agreed to.)

M Clemenceau suggests an addition at the end of the memorandum in some such terms as the following:

“The fact of sinking the German Fleet not only constitutes by itself a breach of the Armistice, but the burning of French flags in Berlin, taken in conjunction with it, constitutes a deliberate and systematic breach of the Articles of the Treaty of Peace. Consequently, the Allied and Associated Powers take official cognizance of these acts of breach of faith, and as soon as they have investigated all the circumstances of the act, they will demand the necessary reparation.”

President Wilson proposes that an English and French speaking person should be nominated by the Council to draft a letter to the Germans on the above basis. He proposes that the final sentence should be put in some such manner as the following:

“These articles are in effect a breach of the terms of the Treaty in anticipation, and inevitably create an impression that shakes the confidence of the Allied and Associated Powers in the good faith of the Germans, and makes it necessary to warn them of the consequences.”

M Clemenceau urges that the prolongation of the period of occupation should be specifically referred to.

President Wilson suggests some such phrase as the following:

“Makes it necessary to suggest the probable necessity of resorting to the means provided for in the Treaty of Peace.”

He thinks, however, it would be advisable to leave the matter to the Drafting Committee.

(It is agreed that Mr Balfour and M Loucheur should prepare a letter to the Germans, based on the above discussion.)

(M Loucheur, accompanied by Mr Hurst and M Fromageot, enters the room to receive instructions from M Clemenceau.)

Mr Lloyd George undertakes to communicate with Mr. Balfour.


3. M Clemenceau says that the Germans will arrive on Friday morning, but their credentials would first have to be checked.

Mr Lloyd George says that he has been informed that a telegram received on the previous day by the German Delegation had caused great hilarity. It was rumored that the Germans were sending some persons of minor importance to sign the treaty. He recalls that they had attempted the same thing in connection with the Armistice, and suggested that an immediate demand should be made to them to state who their delegates would be.

(M Clemenceau sends for M Dutasta and instructs him to make this demand immediately to the Germans.)


4. The following resolution is approved and initialed by the five Heads of Governments, and given to Captain Portier, who accompanied the Secretary-General:

“The Secretary-General of the Peace Conference is instructed to make the necessary arrangements for the signature of the Treaty with Poland not later than the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.”